Prima Secundae
63. Summa I-II Q.22 a.3 and Q.23 a.1: Why Passion Belongs Chiefly to the Senses, and How Concupiscible and Irascible Emotions Differ (Eleven Emotions and Mozart's Keys)
Class of 2012-03-22
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/063-summa-i-ii-q-22-a-3-and-q-23-a-1-why-passion-belongs-chiefly/

[0:00] In the Name of the Father and of the Son, and of the, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, open the lights of our minds, Order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Amen. Help us to understand all that you've written. Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit.

[0:32] Amen. Amen. I did a Mass this morning? where Moses is standing up to God. there you know. You're living here. hold back that wrath. You know. Oh yeah. I think he actually has a passion of anger, right? Yeah. Yeah.

[0:52] Don't let the Egyptians say, you know, you let him out to the desert there just to get rid of him. Mm-hmm. Yeah. So guardian angels. There's a reason for them. But you get the impression, though, Moses really is somebody, you know, an intercessor like that for you. I mean, it's you know something, you know. Yeah. And Abraham too. Yeah. Yeah. Well, he appeals to Abraham, Isaac, and Israel.

[1:17] He says in the text today. Okay, I guess we're in the article three here in question twenty-two, right? To the third, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that passion is not more in the sense desiring power than in the understanding desiring power, right?

[1:41] For Dionysius says in the second chapter the divine names that Herotheus right is what taught from a certain divine what. Yeah. Not only learning, but also undergoing divine things. That's a beautiful text from Dionysius.

[2:03] But the passion of divine things, the undergoing divine things, cannot pertain to the sense desiring power, whose object is a sensible good. Therefore, passion is in the what intellectual appetite, desiring power, just as in the sense desiring power, right?

[2:28] Moreover, as an active thing is more potent, so the undergoing is stronger, right? But the object of the intellectual desiring power, which is universal good, is more what potent, active thing than the object of the sense desiring power, which is a particular good, huh? Therefore, the notion of passion undergoing is more found in the intellectual desiring power than in the sense desiring power.

[3:05] Moreover, joy and love are said to be said in what passions, right? But these are found in the intellectual desiring power, and not only the sense desiring power. Otherwise, it would not be attributed in Scripture to God and the angels. Therefore, passions are not more in the sense desiring power than in the understanding desiring power. This is forgetting the first meaning of passio, right, which involves the body.

[3:40] But against this is what Damascene says in the second book, describing the what animal passions, huh? That passio, passion undergoing, is a motion of the sensible desiring power, huh? On the imagination of the good or the bad. And another place, passion is the motion of the irrational soul through the suspicion of good or bad, right?

[4:18] Thomas answers simply that passion is properly found where there is a bodily what change, huh? Yeah, it's kind of some student there Wednesday night there asked me to add something on the you know text on my own and the words equivocal by reason, right? So I found one in my thing and brushed it up a bit and so on. But you know, I was thinking of how it's different, huh?

[4:51] The way you have a fundamental or first meaning, you know, in the different kinds. So I mean, if you have you know one where something is said equivocally by reason of its ratio to another thing, or by other ratios to the same thing, right? That to which you have a ratio is in the definition of the other, right? So Thomas's example is that of being said of substance and quantity.

[5:23] It's a quantity by reason of its ratio to substance. It's the measure or the size of substance, right? So substance is in its very definition. So substance is the first meaning there of what or fundamental meaning of of being, right? If you have things with other ratios to the same thing, like being is said of quantity and quality. One is the measure of substance. The other is the dispositional substance, right?

[5:51] Again, substance is first in definition, right? When you get to these most interesting names, where you have a likeness of what ratios, right? Um.

[6:07] Then the first one is the one that is most what sensible, right? Okay. So when you take, for example, the before, they're in the twelfth chapter, the categories, right? What's the first meaning of before?

[6:25] In time or in motion. Yeah, yeah. And as Shakespeare says, things in motion sooner catch the eye. What not stirs, right? So it's the very definition of time. so before and after there, right? So that's the first meaning, right? Or when Thomas orders the meanings of what being in, right? He starts with the one that Aristotle sees as being first. Also, we're in this room. Okay. There are teeth in my mouth, right?

[6:58] And you start with things that are more sensible, right? Okay. But then you get to these ones where it becomes equivocal by dropping out part of the meaning. And this is the example of passio, right? Now, but the first meaning of passio involves not that you're acting upon something, but that you're changing that thing, right? And that you're changing it for the worse, right? And then you drop off the idea of the worse, but keep the idea of changing, right?

[7:31] And finally, you stop that, and then you're just kind of receiving and being perfected, right? What you receive, right? You say, well, if you're dropping out some of the meanings to go on, why wouldn't that come first, right? Like when Thomas was explaining, when he said communius right? And then magis proprium It's like what is it the more general enter into the particular, right? See. Well, I think you might think that first, but

[7:59] maybe the more concrete one is what closer senses, right? So that I'm acting upon you when I stick my pin into you, or I stick my knife into you. It's more clear to you that I'm acting upon you. than when you see me, right?

[8:21] And and it's more sensible, right? It's more sensible to be hit with a to receive a pin or a knife than to receive the shape of me in your eye, right? So that's going to be like the first meaning, right? And you kind of carry it over, right? So the first meaning of passio involves this what bodily change, right?

[8:50] Which is found, he says, in the acts of the sense power, right? There's a bodily change, right? Okay. And not only a what spiritual change, right? As there is in the senses. Apprehending something, huh? But it's also a natural change, huh? But in the act of the intellectual desiring power, there is not required some what bodily change, right? Because this kind of desiring power is not the power of some organ, huh?

[9:28] Some bodily right. Hence, it is clear that the notion of passion is more properly found in the act of the sense power than the understanding desiring power. And then he follows the authority to Dionysian, right? As is clear through the definitions of Dionysian that are brought out in the Siddhanta there, huh? Okay.

[9:56] And so when you apply that first one of Dionysius, right, huh? I think there's a lot. To be understood, in Dionysius that doesn't go into here because it's not its purpose, right? He says that passio divinorum is said to be a what, an affection to divine things, right?

[10:18] And I suppose you are thinking more of the fact that that you are undergoing more with the with the desiring power than the knowing power, right? And so, if you have this wisdom that is tied up with with charity, right, like the Holy Spirit's gift of wisdom, right, then you are kind of having a what, a knowledge of God, right, because you are undergoing this love for God, right?

[10:44] So there is some things to be said about what he's saying there, right? But it's a what, affectio, he says, to divine things, right, and a union to it through what, love,

[11:01] which nevertheless comes about without a what, bodily change, right? So there is less the idea of passio, right? The original meaning, right? And then again, he says in regard to the second one that the magnitude of a passion not only depends upon the power of the agent, but also on the what, patient undergo, because those things which are very what, sensitive, you might say, right, suffer much or undergo much even from lightly active things.

[11:41] So although the object of the understanding desiring power is more active than the object of the sense power, right, which admits, nevertheless, the sense power is more what, passive, so it's following from the possibilitate patientis, right, that it's more affected, huh?

[12:05] Now, to the third, it should be said that love and joy and others of this sort, when they are attributed to God or the angels, or even to men according to the intellectual desiring power, signify a what, simple act of the will, with the likeness of an effect, right, without what, passion. Once Augustine says in the ninth book of the City of God that the holy angels, without anger punish, and without the what, compassion and misery, they come to our help, right?

[12:46] And nevertheless, right, the names of these passions, right, by the custom of human speech, right, also are what, usurped in them, right, on account of a certain likeness of the things done, right. But not on account of the infirmity of the affections, right? I was looking at that thing from the the committee on doctrine there, you know, for the American Catholic Bishops, right? Where they're examining that book by that theologian at Fordham.

[13:17] What's her name, Sister Mary? Sister Mary Anne Franks. Was it Elizabeth Johnson, something like that? But anyway, the first thing they criticize, of course, is that she's saying that everything said of God is really metaphor, right? She's denying that she's saying that, but that they give the attention to. Okay, that's just using a metaphor. I mean, she's saying the things said. We said literally, God, right? You know, and things of that sort.

[13:45] And so, all you can say is like, you know, God's angry or something like that, right? But you can't say something properly of God, huh?

[13:59] Thomas is a beautiful place there. Where, whereas I am reading one of the texts in the De Veritate, it was where he's talking about how

[14:13] there are some names whose like the word said good, the good, wise, and so on. These names are first placed upon something in creatures, right? But the thing meant by these words, right, is found more in God than in the creature, and is found first in God, right? So, here, Aristotle pursuing wisdom there in the in the fourteen books of wisdom, and he says wisdom is the most divine knowledge because it's the knowledge about God and the knowledge that God most of all has, right?

[14:52] Well, he placed wisdom first upon the human knowledge, right? The human knowledge is the first cause, but knowledge of the first cause is found most of all on God, and but first of all on God, right? Okay. When you say you know that the the Lord is my rock, well, then the the meaning of the word rock is not really found in God, and it means something in the material world, right?

[15:25] And t here is some likeness of God to a rock because of the solidity of the rock and its supporting things and so on, right? So metaphorically, rock is said of what God, yeah. Now, if you take if you take something like good or just, right, this is first placed upon something human, right? And but the so in the order of the imposition of the name, the placing the name upon it, it's placed upon something in the creatures, and then later on placed upon God, right?

[15:59] Well, what is signified by the word just, right? Or what is signified by the word knowing, or whatever it is, is actually found more in God than in the creature, and is found first in God, right? You know, but this is all gone with with the sister there from Fordham, right, You know. Didn't finish her philosophy.

[16:26] This is kind of the despair of the moderns. Don't have anything true to say, really, but anything, most of all. Yeah. Right. A couple years ago, yeah. Since just last year was in the news, she got all angry at the bishop for quashing the book because She misunderstood me. She said they should have dialogue. They didn't dialogue, and then they came back. Yes, you should. You should have initiated the dialogue by asking for an interpreter.

[16:52] And she didn't do that. That's her problem. Now we go to question what twenty-three. The difference of the passions to each other, right now. It's kind of amazing the way you see Thomas and these arguments. You know how often I'll take a quote from some great like Saint Jerome or Saint Augustine or Chrysostom or somebody else, right? And you can look upon these quotes as partly pertaining to dialectic, right?

[17:29] Because dialectic is reasoning from probable opinions, and Aristotle defines probable opinions as the opinions of all men, or of most men, or of the men who are learned in some art or science when speaking of the matters that are science, or most of them, think it, or the most famous illustrious, right? So you can say, hey, why is it? Why have all these wonderful quotes, you know?

[17:57] And you see, he says going back to you know Peter Lombard and before, right? You have all these wonderful quotes coming from Augustine, right, and others. Well, part of it is it makes sense from a dialectical point of view, right? You've got to be quoting these great people, right?

[18:16] You know, when I talk about opera, you know, I disagree with the great German composer, right? Wagner, you know, that the plot is the male element, you know, the dominant element, the music should be subordinate to the woman. No, no, no.

[18:42] But now Mozart, the man who we know wrote the greatest operas, right? In music, in opera, he says the words must be altogether the obedient servant of the music. See, so in Mozart opera, everything is turned into music, right? You know.

[19:01] Well, that's highly probable that the greatest of opera composers, right? Don Giovanni, for example, is the opera of operas, right? If he says this is the way it is, it's highly probable, right?

[19:20] Or Albert Einstein, right? You know, in 1905, he proposed what? Published three papers, all three of which were awarded the Nobel Prize. He actually got the Nobel Prize not for special theory of relativity because it's too hard to understand, but he got it for the photoelectric effect, right? And so, so here's a man who what? In one year, has three ideas awarded the Nobel Prize, most, but no doubt one such idea in a whole lifetime.

[19:50] So Einstein says a scientific theory is freely imagined. It's not reasonable. It's freely imagined. Well, Einstein says so. That's highly what? Probable, right? Okay.

[20:11] But then there's another aspect of it too, which is what we might call what belief, right? Human belief, at least, right? Okay. So before you really know these things, you tend to believe a mind that you think is what better than your own, right? And it's a mind that has reputation of Augustine or Thomas or something like that, right? So I mean, it appeals to you both from the point of view of what the necessity of human belief, right?

[20:44] I mean, even the greatest scientists kind of realize that, right? Everything I've read by by Heisenberg, and it always comes back to his first conversations with Bohr, right? Bohr, you know, was known at that time in when Heisenberg was just still a young student, right? Heisen Bohr was known as the man who understood the atom better than anybody in the world. And he came to Germany now and gave a series of lectures.

[21:09] What they called the Bohr Festival. They're so enthusiastic. But in one lectures that Heisenberg attended, Heisenberg posed a certain objection, right? And something Bohr was saying, and Bohr gave some kind of an answer. You know, he tended to give at those times. But he kept looking back over at Heisenberg, kind of. Who is it? Yeah, yeah. And so when he got to his lecture, he went to Heisenberg and he says, "Let's go for a walk."

[21:35] And they walked back and forth talking about atomic theory. You know, Heisenberg you know always refers to this conversation again and again. How much influenced him, right? And some people think you know Heisenberg was the greatest mind after Einstein, you know. And he was one of the greatest minds. But how much they you know learned from the what great man, you know, Wolfgang Pauli the same way you know almost you know Bohr is another father, you know, so much behind him.

[22:04] You see, and so these great minds are not what afraid to learn from another, right? Second-rate minds that try to be original, right? So you see something excellent here about these these quotes that they have. You know, was a demonstration in the previous one, and now you have the quotes here from. It makes you stop and think, right? If you don't necessarily entirely agree with it or the way it's said, maybe it makes you stop and think, right?

[22:35] So from a dialectical point of view, right? You want to proceed in something probable, right? You try to know these guys, right? Because most men don't have any opinion about these things, but those who you know are in these areas and are famous might have an opinion, and that's going to be probable because of their fame and respect people have for them, right?

[23:02] Also, for us, dummies. Thomas says, when you first learn, you see you receive what the teacher says as as his thoughts, not your thoughts, right? But then the more you think about it, the more you start to understand it, and then it kind of becomes what your thought, yeah, yeah. But secondarily, Aristotle says about food, right? You know, he says is food like the fed or unlike the fed?

[23:35] Because some of the Greeks before him said food is unlike the fed. That's why the the feeder changes it, right? Others say, well, how can you grow with something unlike yourself? Aristotle solves the problem by saying, well, in the beginning it's unlike you, but when you get through what digesting it, it's like you, right? So I eat carrots, you know, they're not like human flesh, but when I finally digested the carrots and so I'm broken them down and do some of them something resembling flesh, right, and not something resembling a carrot, right?

[24:13] That's the way learning is too, right? So when you first, it's not, it's like a a foreign thing, right? And like a carrot is foreign to human flesh in a sense, right? And and what even the great mind says, right? It's kind of foreign to your mind, but when you digest it, right? And I got to digest it. The master says, right? Then it becomes yours, right?

[24:37] You know, and you would hold this even if you what without the yeah yeah hold the Pythagorean theorem now because I think I assimilated Proposition forty seven there book one yeah yeah. Okay. Moreover, passions and acts differ in what species according to their objects, huh? But the passions, but there are the same objects of the passions of the irascible and concupiscent, to wit, the good and the bad.

[25:26] Therefore, there are the same passions for the irascible and the concupiscent, right? Huh? But again, says some, of diverse powers the acts are different in species, right? Just as to see and to hear, but the irascible and concupiscent are two powers dividing the sense what desiring power, as has been said in the first part. Therefore, since the passions are motions of the sense desiring power, the passions which are in the irascible are other than in species or kind from the passions which are in the what concupiscent, right?

[26:11] Well, let's see what Thomas says to say that it's immediate to this here now. Now going back to the pure powers, right? I answer. It should be said. Thomas says that the passions which are in the irascible and concupiscible differ in what species, right? He's giving the conclusion first, right? That's the kind of big print, black print, right? So I have to read the rest of it.

[26:44] Yes, for since diverse powers have diverse what objects, huh? This is the famous principle of Aristotle, right? Should we study the powers or their acts first, right?

[27:05] Yeah, should we study the acts? First, or their objects, right? Yeah, yeah. So the sense power is going to be known through the act of sensing, right? And sensing the sense of seeing, and sensing the sense of hearing is going to depend upon the difference between color and sound.

[27:28] Kind of shortening that whole thing there, but shows you the way that the human mind is what discursive, right? Reasons from the objects to the acts, and the acts to the powers, right? So he says, "since diverse powers have diverse objects, as has been said in the first part. " Is necessary that the passions of diverse powers refer to diverse what objects, right?

[28:04] Hence, much more do what passions of diverse powers differ in what species, huh? For a greater difference of objects is required for diversifying the what species of power than for diversifying the species of passions or acts that might belong to the same power, right?

[28:35] Sometimes to students there, what is philosophy? Is thinking about things. So philosophy is. Yeah, that's kind of the beginning, right? Or is it thinking out things, right?

[28:57] Probably more of that You first think about motion and place and time, and then you what gradually think out what motion is, think out what time is, think out what place is, as Aristotle does, and last you have a thought out knowledge, right? Which I sometimes call reasoned out knowledge from the last kind of thinking out, right? So we think out definitions and divisions and distinctions, and then finally we think out what conclusions, right?

[29:33] Okay, so it's a thought out knowledge, so. But these are all in the same what order of beginning, middle, and what? End. Okay, but just as in natural things, huh? The diversity of genus follows a diversity in the what potency of the matter, right? Because the famous thing that Boethius says, or Porphyry says something, Aristotle says that the difference is taken from the form and the genus from the what matter, right?

[30:20] And the diversity of species follows the what diversity of form in the same what matter, right? So when Aristotle is distinguishing the imitative arts, he says they differ by what what they imitate and in what they imitate and how they imitate, right? But what is the first distinction among imitative arts by what they imitate or in what they imitate?

[30:58] Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, it's just like the matter, right? Okay. So if you take something like, say, sadness, right? One says you can imitate that in music with a sad melody, right? You can imitate that in what painting with a sad expression, right? You can imitate that in the words of the character in the play, right? Expressing his sadness, right? But those are quite different arts, right?

[31:32] But the one imitates in in what harmony and rhythm and so another imitates in words, another imitates in line and color, right? So the more fundamental distinction is by what and what they imitate, right? And maybe a carpenter might make this table and make this chair, right? But someone else in metal makes a metal chair and metal table, right? Would you distinguish the arts first by what they make a chair or a table?

[32:04] Is one art to make chairs, another art to make tables? Or is there one art in a sense for making things out of wood? Another art for making things out of plastic. Yeah. Another one for making it out of steel or metal or something, right? So

[32:33] then the diversity of species makes the distinction between sad music and joyful music, right? Or between tragedy and comedy, right? That's more a specific difference, right? Okay. So also in the acts of the what soul, right? The

[32:51] the acts pertaining to diverse powers are not only in what species but also in what genus, diversum. But the acts or passions respecting special diverse objects, comprehended under one common object of one power, right? Distinguish the species of that what genus, right?

[33:26] So he says. Therefore, this is all presuppose now, right? To knowing, therefore, which passions are irascible and which ones are concupiscible, is necessary to take up the object of what each power, right? Now it has been said in the first that the object of the concupiscible power is the good or bad, the sensible good or bad, simply what taken, right? That is either delectable, delightful, or dolorosum painful.

[34:03] Yeah. So the object of the what concupiscible appetite is what is simply pleasing or displeasing to the what senses, right? Okay. And so, if it's pleasing to the senses, you like it or love it, right? And it's displeasing to the senses, you what? Eat it. Eat it, huh? I dislike it. huh? Salmon.

[34:38] I'm down to that. That's it. my job. What the freaking salmon. I hope he hated sin more. You'll have to come up with a verse to put on your tombstone about salmon, something about salmon.

[35:03] But now, but because it is necessary, right? That at some time, right, the soul what? Suffer some difficulty or pugna some fight, huh? In obtaining, I guess, huh? Some good of this sort, right? That is to say, something that is pleasing to the senses, right? Okay. I told you about the. You heard about the the blackout there in Boston? There. There was a generator or something, you know, blew up or melted away.

[35:42] Yeah, yeah, and so in in one section of Boston, there was no no power, it's dark. Yeah, and so there's one restaurant didn't want to serve their meat, right? Even though they put in a refrigerator, so they gave it to the zoo. And so they picture the paper there, you know, that when the big cats are getting these, you know, steaks, yeah. You

[36:05] see, you know, you wouldn't try to take that piece of steak away from that cat, would you? Yeah. Yeah, pugna, right? Yeah. right. You'd be torn, right now. Okay.

[36:17] So if there's one bone and two dogs, or one piece of steak and two cats, or something, right? Right. Then there would be a fight because the difficulty they can't both have it, right? Okay. So Aristotle says the animals they fight over food and sex, right? Okay.

[36:40] So because it's necessary sometimes that the soul undergoes some difficulty or fight in obtaining some good of this sort, right? Or in fleeing some bad of this sort, right?

[36:58] Insofar as this is to some extent elevated above the easy power of the animal, right To be sitting there with a bowl. of. candy next to you. No problem. That's what he said to you without even thinking, right? You know, there's no what, just kill this appetite right? You see, there's no difficulty in getting that, right? Okay.

[37:29] You see, sometimes you know this, even the professional athletes, right? They get into what, Fists cuts, you know? There's some difficulty in in winning. and the other team cheats. Yeah, yeah, And you sort of injure people, you know.

[37:49] They're trying to injure the, you know, quarterback. You realize how, how we do one is good quarterbacks. and he's knocked out of the game. That's the game, right? That's it. So, where he was knocked out for a whole year, right? Of course, it's an accident.

[38:08] Okay. But it's amazing, you know. I mean, if if one pitcher, you know, hits the guy, even if it's accidental, they'll get, you know, they'll be coming back. You know, it's kind of quid quid pro. quo, when it happens twice to the same guy, the dugout comes out and beats up the picture. That's what happens. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Because then you know he's aiming at. it. Therefore, the good or the bad, according as it has the what, ratio of something arduous or difficult, right?

[38:51] Is the object of the what, irascible, right? Okay. I notice the the theological virtue of hope is named by carrying over a name from what, the passion of hope, which is concerned with the what, the difficult, right? That's going to tell you something about hope, right? As even as a a virtue in the in the will, right?

[39:28] Whatever passions, therefore, whatever emotions, that's the word we use sometimes in English, right? Probably a better word than passion. because passion is new to particular, right? for excess, right, or something. We use the term emotions, right? Whatever passions then, or emotions, and emotions, taking the word from motion, right?

[39:54] In that sense, you wouldn't speak of an act of the will as an emotion. By motion, I mean if an emotion you've been moved. Very much that the word.

[40:09] Whatever passions, therefore, that regard absolute, he, says right, good or bad, pertain to the what? concupiscible, right? As joy and what sadness? Huh? Gaudium, joy regards the good, right? Tristitia, the bad, right? Amor, the good. Odium, hate, yeah, and the ones of this sort. There'll be two other ones: desire and aversion. If I want a better name, turning away from. But whatever passions regard the good or the bad, under the ratio of difficulty,

[41:02] insofar as something is what obtainable or able to be avoided with some difficulty, right? They pertain to the what irascible, as audacity or boldness, as we call it sometimes, huh? And timor, right? Okay. Now audacia and timor dealing with a fugibile cum aliqua difficultate, right? Huh? There's something bad that's difficult to avoid, right? And if you think you might not avoid it, then you have what fear, right?

[41:47] Huh? See, if you get up from your seat there in the bar and then it gets kind of a little pipsqueak, you know, you might have a little bit of what boldness, you know, about you know.

[42:03] Hey, liver lips. Wow. My my my wife's you know about you know ten years older than than her other sister and and brother was younger right, but her her brother's a big guy right, so I guess you know the sister was at some bar or what it was and and some guy was kind of bothering her you know, so he comes over you know and he says just two words beat it.

[42:27] The guy beat it. Look at ya, beat it, you know. That's gracious, a better part of valor to get the honor. That was that was a friend of ours who was in the Lebanese war, 70s, and they used to fight the war in the day and they'd be in the bars at night with the guys, some of the guys who were fighting, maybe. But anyway, they go down the bar.

[42:49] Of course, these guys are loaded with weapons. Yeah. When they go to the bar. Yeah. And so some guy was trying to impress a girl with his martial arts, and he's doing all this stuff, and these guys are just looking at him. He's from out of town. They didn't know who he was. They didn't like him. So. This guy, all they did, they just started laughing at him doing his martial arts, and they just opened their coats with all these weapons, and the guy goes, "Huh," and he ran,

[43:15] ran out the door. Again, him. I remember describing me in the bar with the guy who really worked out, really, really, really knew the verse, you know. And there were three Marines, I guess, you know, they got into altercation, you know, and it's going to happen. Three Marines lying on the floor. A tough guy, huh? Yeah. But you know, in the Bible there, right? Huh? Was it Goliath?

[43:44] Was it? Yeah, and he was he was approaching David. Was it with audacia, right? Huh? I don't know. I assume David had a little bit of Timor, you know. But no, that's something what

[44:06] to be avoided, but it's difficult to avoid it, right? Okay. But then, spares with regard to a what? Good, right? Huh? So if the good is difficult to obtain, but you think you can obtain it, right? Then you have hope, right? Huh. But if not, then you have what Despair, right?

[44:36] So that's the difference then between those two, right? Huh. Okay. Now in Mozart's music, right? Huh. One of the big differences that came in is the major key and the what? Minor key, right? Huh. Now other things equal, because rhythm and things can affect these things, right? Huh. But is the major key and the minor key equally suitable for emotions? So if you want to represent sadness, what key do you use?

[45:20] Minor. Yeah. And when Mozart is going from hope to despair, the singers have the same melody and turn it into the minor key, because despair is going to be represented by the minor key, but hope by the what? Major key, right? Huh. Joy is going to be by the what? Major key, right? And love, right? Huh. But hate or sadness, right?

[45:49] Um. So anger and despair, right? And fear would be represented by minor key. In hope, in what boldness by what yeah. Now there are much more you know subtle differences right in the keys right. So if Mozart wants to represent, let's say hope or boldness right, he's going to probably use C major or what D major right. C major a little bit more for hope, D major a little more for for courage or for boldness right.

[46:36] Okay, so D major is the key of the march right. You know, and then E flat is a little more in between you know. But if he's going to represent, say, concubiscible joy, it might be in G major or B flat right. So it tends to use keys in a very very

[46:56] determined way by Mozart right. When they compare Mozart with his great contemporary, there Haydn right, Haydn will modulate from one key to another you know, kind of you know variety is the spice of life you know that sort of stuff you know. But Mozart when he changed the key, there's a reason why he's doing it, right? He wants to represent something, right? So we had the aria there and the Mozart writing a letter to his father about representation of anger there, right?

[47:22] The husband there and the abduction for the surrounding, of it, right? When they get the girls out of it. But I mean, he's very much aware of what he's doing, right? Okay.

[47:37] So which is closer to reason, the concupiscible or the irascible emotions? Yeah, yeah. And I'll help you to understand Mozart's five last symphonies, right?

[48:03] Where the C major symphonies, the 36 and the 41, the Jupiter and the Linz symphony, there in C major represent what magnanimity, right? Magnanimity is the virtue that does what's great and all the virtues, right? So it's the hope, right? Okay. But then the the

[48:27] so it's kind of representation of magnanimity, that virtue. But then the 38 and the 40 represents what more courage, right? Okay. And of course, there's two acts of courage. One is to what approach the dangers, right? The other is to put up with it when it's forced on you, right? The 40th is more of that symphony, the 38 is more, you know, approaching the thing, right? So and see Mozart, huh?

[49:02] How he's I remember first saying to the historic, you know, I've seen Mozart's concertos where he had this kind of irascible there, you know, confidence of song, you know, showing the great Dieter Hopkins on the piano concerto by Mozart, right? That's one of the greatest accomplishments of Mozart, and that's dominance of reason there in Mozart.

[49:26] I was listening to one of the early operas of Mozart yesterday, you know, and I said, "It's not very good." I said, "That's you know, I got to say things about. Well, if I really hear them, I said some real nice things in those early works, you know. I know Warren Murray was down one time and I had got it, and Zaid, most of you have not even heard Zaid, right?

[49:47] I said, gorgeous aren't you? Warren almost falls in his chair as he says, "You know, this looks so beautiful by Mozart. He'd never heard, you know. I mean, you know, so you wonder what you know. There are some things hidden in these earlier works, you know. They're really beautiful, Magnificent. So anyway."

[50:10] So you see the difference now between the irascible, right? So you got to learn that there's going to be six emotions in the concupiscible, three with respect to the good, absolutely, and three with respect to the what, the bad, right? Huh? In regard to the good, there's like or loving, right? And then when you don't have the good, there's desire or wanting, right? And that's the beautiful English word want, right?

[50:43] Which means both lacking and desiring, right? Huh? So it's a beautiful one, right? So wanting arises from love or liking when you don't have what you like or love, right? Huh? So I like wine, don't have any, now I want some wine, right? Or I like steak, don't have any steak, give it all to the, to the picnic. Yeah. So I want some steaks, okay? But then if you get what you like or love, you get the steak or you get the wine, then there's joy, right?

[51:22] You know? And you have the same thing exactly like that in the bad, right? You have dislike or hate, right? And that can be in the presence or the absence of the thing, right? Okay. So I hate or dislike salmon, okay? So I try to avoid it if I can, right? But if I'm invited to your house for dinner and you're serving the salmon, now I'm, sad, I'm, trying to show my sadness.

[51:55] Why are you so depressed? Okay. You see, you see, you see how the six are, right? Huh? Okay. Um. Uh. So Mozart represents all those, right? Okay. But then in the irascible, there's going to be what, five emotions, huh? And when two of them arise from desire, right? When you desire a good, uh, but it's difficult to obtain that good, right?

[52:39] Then there arises either hope of overcoming the difficulties or despair of overcoming the what, difficulties, right? Huh? And if you hope, you probably what persist, right? Huh? But when you start to lose hope and despair of winning the girl or getting the position you want or whatever it is, then you have despair and you kind of what, give give up, right? Huh? Okay.

[53:13] But now, when you're trying to avoid something bad, right? You just shut the door and that's it. But if it's something difficult to avoid, right? Then if you think you might not be able to avoid it, you start to feel fear, right? It's kind of above your powers. If you think you can overcome it, you only need a certain boldness that can take care of this, right?

[53:40] Okay. Young men are bold, right? But don't realize. Yeah. Okay. But you see, there's a there's a one more emotion in the irascible, which is anger, right? Okay. Well, how does that arise from? Right. That tends to arise when something bad has been what, kind of forced upon you, right? So if you step on my foot and cause me some pain, and I say to you, "You're on my foot," you know, and you say, "So what?"

[54:20] Well, now there's a little difficulty in avoiding this pain, right? And what emotion tends to arise? Anger, right? Now, and they'll help me to get you off my foot, right? Um.

[54:37] But if I'm getting, if I'm enjoying what I like, right, then there's no difficulty there, enjoying what you like, right, and having what you like, right. So nothing arises from that, from joy in the what, concupiscible, right? Now, as far as the irascible is concerned, but sometimes from sadness there arises this anger, right? When you, you know, thinking get rid of this. So we have altogether eleven emotions, right?

[55:09] Six in the concupiscible and five in the what, irascible, right? Interesting number, eleven, right? Huh? It's a symbol of what? Transgressing the decalogue, right? It's a symbol of what? Sin, right? You know? I mentioned how that's the other day, when Peter says, you know, how many times I forgive my, you know, how many times? And and seven times and Christ says, I guess seventy times seventy, but are seven times seventy or something like that.

[55:48] But I guess Augustine gets a text that it means 77, right? So he's got to explain the number seventy-seven. Well, it's seven times eleven, right? Well, eleven is is about transgressing the decalogue, right? That's that's and seven is the number of days in the week, meaning that in all time, throughout all time, you should be forgiving the.

[56:13] Yeah, so, but the other place where that comes up, to eleven is the symbol of that, right? I was actually joking when I was in high school there. Me and my buddies had a table eleven there in the show. So, and then each day I realized that 11 is a symbol of integration of the decalogue. What's interesting. is there are 11 emotions, right? huh? And there can be you know particular differences that there can be what sadness about different things, right?

[56:51] So envy is sadness over the what good fortune of another, right? Huh? Pity is sadness over the misfortune of another, right? Okay. So there are what particular differences, but those are more individual differences, right? Thomas talks about them sometimes, huh? So someone said it's not a genus then Well, I don't know if he, I don't know if Thomas calls them species, but there certainly are something like that, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[57:30] You have to talk about it. You talk about tragedy. Tragedy moves us to pity and fear, right? Pity is like a kind of what sadness, right? But sadness over the misfortune of another, right? When a man seems to suffer more than he deserves, right? It doesn't deserve at all.

[57:51] King Lear, even Aristotle, you know, so. It's interesting the word, you know, pity has been carried over to God, right? I mean, kyrie eleison right? The eleison is the same way you have in Aristotle, right? For pity, right It doesn't name any emotion, of course, in God, but it's in similarity, right? God's will to relieve our misery, right? It's called mercy.