Prima Secundae
64. Summa I-II Q.23 a.1–3: Replies to the Objections, How Emotions Are Contrary, and Why Anger Has No Contrary
Class of 2012-03-22
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/064-summa-i-ii-q-23-a-1-3-replies-to-the-objections-how-emotions/

[0:00] Now let's go back to the where you placed objections, it's always interesting to see that. You had a quote from Aristotle, right? The passions are what joy, and sadness. To the first, therefore, it should be said that it has been said in the prima pars. For this, the irascible power was given to animals, right? That might be taken away the impediments, right? Huh? By which the concupiscible is prevented, right, from tending towards its what?

[0:42] Yeah. Either on account of the difficulty of obtaining the good, right, or on account of the difficulty of what? Overcoming. Yeah, yeah. What's the original story about sour grapes? We get the expression sour grapes. Aesop's story, yeah. The fox. The fox and the grapes. Yeah, but he wanted the grapes, right? Huh? And he hoped to get them by jumping up, right? He couldn't jump high. And every time he jumped, he fell short, right?

[1:12] Then finally, he what? He despaired. Yeah, yeah. That's kind of frustrating, right? And then try to the consolation is the way to pray, we're solving or something, wouldn't be any good, right? Okay. Because you tell students the story, you know, and say you want the girl, right? You try and so on, but you keep on failing and so on. Oh, I should be spoiled anyway. You know, just to be.

[1:35] People after you know she created she was like who wants her you know she created one of the plays there right and so on okay

[1:48] so the irascible is given to animals that the impediments might be taken away right by which the concupiscible is prevented in tend towards its object right either an account of difficulty obtain the good or account of difficulty of overcoming the what bad Bad, right

[2:11] and therefore the passions of the irascible all of them what terminate at the passions of the concupiscible right huh so they're what both the beginning and the what end right

[2:28] and according to this also the passions which are irascible are followed upon them joy and sadness which are in the what concupiscible right so original emotions are in the concupiscible and the final emotions in them right and the irascible come in between right you can

[2:58] see that in a sense the like likeness liking is before wanting and wanting you know gives rise to hope or despair it's either joy or sadness right you see that often in the music because the middle part is usually you know the minor or something there's some difference in it from the beginning to the end I mean not all music I suppose but at least it's my impression

[3:29] my Mozart's very perfect concerto like the twenty third piano concerto right it's in A major right but there seems to be an underlying sadness somewhere you know there's hints of it you know and when the famous writer on the concerto Mozart said it's like a spring day you know it seems uncertain there April day you know it's gonna maybe turn to rain or something like that you know and then in the second movement this you know minor movement all this sadness that's underlying comes out right but towards the end of the second movement it's kind of being resolved you know you see that Mozart hitting the key there of C a little bit you know at the end there you know and so and then

[4:13] the third movement begins with kind of rushed joyful melodies right that seems like almost escapism right and so he recalls a bit of the sadness there in the middle movement right but then he also starts sort of coming you know that this is not something he's not facing up to you know and and then when he brings the melodies back at the end he he plays them you know and and makes it seem absolutely inevitable you know he goes through them you know just just perfect you know because my brother Mark's favorite concerto it's I probably one Mozart concerto, my wife's favorite concerto.

[4:42] I pretty just about my favorite too, but it's one of the very best. Very subtle, which it does, you know. I mean, if you ever, you know, a concerto like that, it's got three movements. Why is it one piece of music and not three pieces of music, right? Because you have three movements, right? In a sense, to be one piece of music, it has to have a beginning, a middle, and end, right?

[5:10] You can kind of see that very perfectly in the twenty-third piano concerto. Now, Mozart's last concerto, the beautiful one, the twenty-seventh, right? And it was performed at the Gate of Heaven. That was the name of the tavern, you know. Played the piece. What is it called, The Gate of Heaven, right? But the first movement is absolutely beautiful, you know. But there's a kind of that world

[5:39] weariness, you know. Isn't? Towards the Mozart's life, but anyway. And then the second one comes out a very resigned thing, you know. And then the third movement is very childlike, you know. So it has a beginning, middle, and end too, you know. Just just absolutely beautiful, incredible, incredible. He does. A friend of mine, Leo Alvarez, said he gave me. He told me that I have to listen to that one.

[6:07] And he said, "This was just a comment by my own." Yes. He said, "Oh, he said first time I heard that, he said brought tears to my eyes." And I said, "Why?

[6:22] How come? What's the matter with you?" Yeah, yeah. That middle, that middle, I like that very much. I guess they say very the sixteen that Mozart is very composer, but a little more detail. You know, I've seen his comments and the performance of the you know the greats doing there before, you know. But I'd see him play a little Mozart and have him talk a little more about it.

[6:50] Don't think I've had a chance to have that intimate conversation with him, you know. That's interesting, you know, to see that. A lot of talent.

[7:04] He and his brother is very, pretty much in the music. Okay. Now, to the second one, it should be said that the hatred of vices is attributed by Jerome to the irascible right, not by reason of the hate which properly belongs to the concupiscible right, but on account of the impugnation right, the fighting, right, which pertains to the what irascible, right.

[7:43] See the way he handles from there, right? That's good. Let's think about abortion this morning. You know, I was thinking, there's a real hatred of the human race, it seems to me, in abortion, right? Hatred of babies and women in particular, of the human race, you know. It makes me think it's kind of diabolic, you know, because who would he hate human race as much as a devil?

[8:11] What is what is Moloch and Baal? What do they have in common? Sacrifice the children. Yeah, yeah. Terrible. Now, third objection, right? That they have the same objects, the good and the bad, right?

[8:44] Well, he says the good, insofar as it is delectabile, right? Delightful, moves the concupiscible, right? Huh? But if the good has some difficulty to being obtained

[9:00] from this very fact, it has something that's repugnant to the what? Concubiscible, right? Huh? And therefore, is necessary to be some other power which would tend towards it, right? You can see something of reason there, right? Now, nor the physical. Yeah.

[9:19] And the same reason is about bad things, and this other power is the irascible. Whence ex consequente, huh? The passions of the concupiscible and irascible differ in species or what kind.

[9:39] Now we're not going to have two wills, right? One that has love in it, the other one that has hope in it, right? Huh? Things are more unified there. Little break here. To Article Two now.

[9:55] The second one proceeds thus: It seems that the contrariety of the passions, the irascible, is not according to the contrariety of good and what bad. For the passions of the irascible are ordered to the passions of the what concupiscible. But the passions of the concupiscible are not contrary except according to the contrariety of good and bad. Just as what love and hate, joy and what sadness. Therefore, what?

[10:35] There are no irascible passions. Neither the irascible passions either. Yeah. Neither the passions irascible contrary except by good and bad is what he's saying there, right? Okay. Because they arise from the ones of the irascible, right? So that's the cause, right? So. Explain them all. Yeah. You think? That's what the objection thinks anyway. Yeah. Moreover, passions differ according to their objects, just as motions by their what terms.

[11:23] But the contrariety is not in motions except according to the contrariety of the terms. It is clear in the fifth book of the physics. Aristotle distinguishes the kinds of motion, right? Therefore, neither in the passions is there contrariety except according to the contrariety of what objects, huh? But the object of desire is the good or the bad. Therefore, in no desiring power can there be contrariety of passions except according to the contrariety of good and what bad.

[11:59] Bad. Huh? Moreover, every passion of the soul is to be observed according to excess or recess, approach or what retire, as Aristotle says in the sixth book of Naturals. Naturals.

[12:20] But excess or approach is caused from the what ratio by reason of something good, right? But the recess or the withdrawal is from the reason of the bad, right? By reason of the bad. That's one way to get ratio in there by reason of the bad. Excess. Sorry. Because just as the good is what all what want. So the bads would all what flee? That's being said per se, right?

[12:57] Therefore, there can be no contrariety in the passions of the soul except according to the good and the bad, right? But against all this, son, fear and boldness are contrary, as is clear in the third book of the ethics. But fear and boldness do not differ according to good and bad, because both are with respect to some bad things, right? So if you think you can overcome them, you have audacia, boldness, and if you think you might not, then you have timor, right, son?

[13:41] Therefore, not every contrariety in the passions of the irascible is according to the contrariety of good and bad. Well, I answer, Thomas says, that passion is a certain what? Motion. As is said in the third book of the physics, Aristotle takes up what? Motions, right, and then acting upon, undergoing. Of course, our word emotion too fits into this, right? The possible set of emotions.

[14:23] Whence it is necessary to take the contrariety of passions according to the contrariety of motions or changes. But there is a twofold contrariety in changes or motions, as is said in the fifth book of the physics. One according to excess and recess. From the same. From the same term, right?

[14:50] Which contrariety is properly of what? Of changes as opposed to motion in the narrow sense. That is, generation, which is a change to being, and corruption, which is a change from being.

[15:08] Another, which is according to contrariety of terms, which properly is the contrariety of motions, as dealbatio, which is a motion. From white to. From black to what? White. Is opposed to darkening, blackening, which is a motion from white to what? Black. No, denigrate comes from that. Denigrate. Yeah. Denigrated me. Blackened by

[15:40] reputation. Yeah. Thus, therefore, in the passions of the soul, a twofold contrariety is found. One, according to the contrariety of objects, to wit, the good and the bad, right? But the other, according to the approach to and the withdrawal from the same what? Term. Yeah. Now, in the passions of the concussable, is found the first contrariety tantum, only, I guess that means, right? Which is according to what objects, right?

[16:30] But in the passions of the irascible, there is found what? Oh. The reason for this is that the object of the concussable, as has been said above, is the good or the bad, the sensible good or bad, absolutely.

[16:52] Now the good in quantum bonum, the good as good, right, cannot be a term from which, right, ut quo, but only as with ad quem to which, right.

[17:13] So the good is not that from which you go, but that to which you go. That's important to know that figure in your life. In general, yeah. Okay. Because nothing we we we rejects or flees, right? Refuses, you might say, the good in quantum bonum, right? The speaking per se, right?

[17:42] But omnia petunt ipsum, right? That's what we learned in the beginning of Nicomachean Ethics, right? The good is what all want. Likewise, nothing desires the bad in quantum malum, right? As such, right? But all what? Flee.

[18:05] I was thinking of the definition of the good. The good is what all want, but maybe the bad is what no one wants. Okay. But all flee. In account of this, the bad does not have the reason of a term to which, but only of a term from which. So the bad is that from which you move, not that to which you move. Got that? That's for distinction, huh?

[18:45] So we have these simple distinctions, right? You know, very convincing. It's beautiful the way he leads up, getting after subject here, but just beautiful the way he leads up. You know, to to the procession of the word from the Father, right? And he starts off by saying, you know, as you go from the but inanimate things, the only what act upon something outside of themselves, right? So fire generates fire in something else, and then you get to the plants where where you begin to have life.

[19:24] You have the seed coming from within, but as it matures, it falls off and goes its own way, right? And then you get to the senses, right? Well, then you know, I get an image of something, right? Color something, and goes into my memory, right? It stays with me, right? But you know, the memory is not the same thing exactly as a sense, right? So still a distinction there.

[19:48] If I get to the reason, when the reason has. this. thought that thought remains in the reason itself, right? Because it's building up, how it's more and more intrinsic, right? This going forward, right? Until you get to God, it's a beautiful way he leads up to it, you know. Very, very, very, very nice way he leads the mind there, you know, just to kind of. This was on the variable.

[20:13] No, well, this is no. This is in the the the first main chapter. Therein is it maybe about ten, you know, ten eleven there. In the fourth book of the Summa Contra Gentiles.

[20:36] Therefore, thus, therefore, every passion of concupiscible, with respect to the good, is as in it or towards it, right? As love, desire, or wanting, and joy, right? And every passion, with, respect to the bad, is as were from it, right? Huh? Fleeing it, as hate, flight, or abomination, and sadness, huh?

[21:07] Hence, in the passions of the concubiscible, there cannot be contrariety according to the approach and withdrawal from the same what object, right? Huh? If it's good, it's all. Yeah, if it's bad, it's all away from, right? Huh? But the object of the irascible is the sensible good or bad, not what absolute, right? But under or by reason of some difficulty, huh?

[21:46] Arduousness, right? This has been said above, huh? Now, a difficult good or a difficult good, right? Has the reason that one might what tend towards it in so far as it is what Good. good, which pertains to the passion of what hope, Hope, huh? But also that one might what recede from it in so far as it is what arduous or difficult, which pertains to the passion of what despair.

[22:22] Yeah. So when he despairs about getting the grapes, right? Likewise, the difficult evil has a reason to be avoided in so far as it's something what bad, and this pertains to the passion of what fear. Fear, huh? But it also has a reason that one might tend towards it, in so far as. What in something difficult to which one is evades being what subject to the evil right and thus there tends towards it what audacity or boldness

[23:10] there is found therefore in the passions of the irascible contrariety according to the contrariety of good and bad as between what hope and fear yeah Because hope is with respect to something good and fear with respect to something what bad but also in a second way according to what Approach and withdrawal. from the same term as between what boldness and fear. Boldness and what fear or hope and despair the same matter right okay that's nice

[23:53] it's a great subject of philosophy right contrariety right in wisdom it comes up mostly in the tenth book right I'm just thinking the object of hope and despair it's it's like a mixture of good and evil right yeah there's a good there but it's mixed with evil in the heart difficult but in the object of fear and daring you don't really have a mixture of good and evil like it's just evil but but now and with fear and daring it seems it's not like the object has a mixture of good and evil well no but he's saying that when I fear I tend to run away from it right and when I have audacity I go towards it right so but the but the object

[24:41] is evil in both ways yeah yeah yeah where you see it in the hope and despair it's a mixture of good and evil yeah fear and daring it's not a mixture of good and evil it's just evil in a sense yeah but in a sense this Thomas is going to come out later on and say that hope and fear are the chief emotions in the irascible, right and in a sense when I'm bold is because I have hope of what victory right so the good overcoming yeah yeah so in that sense yeah so just so the good of overcoming evil would be like the object of daring yeah yeah hope would kind of maybe give rise to the to the boldness there right now towards

[25:25] the victory yeah but nevertheless the boldness is with respect to something bad right now I can beat that guy right what really ends even in your own self discipline I remember because I encouraged somebody with this without understanding all this but I just somebody's trying to start it. Special adoration in their parish, and I just said, "Well, it's not just good," because she was saying a difficultness.

[25:54] I said, "Well, it's not just good; it's a difficult good. You got to work hard, you know, overcome basically yourselves, not only opposition in the parish, but yourselves to do it. Good way to do it. I mean, sometimes you start, you know, studying a video, some interest in it, and some reason you know, say, I don't ever understand that. Right, Mister? I teach an undergraduate there, you know, saying, I picked up a book, get gonna learn something, I let you know.

[26:20] Guys talking about a straight line that meets itself, you know. Well, I can't comprehend that. But I know people, you know, who pick up some author or some, you know, book because it's too. I suppose difficult, right? Now, so the despair of comprehending it or something, right? Or the effort is too much, right? So, so you can have, you know, the approach to something that's good and also what going away from it out of what despair, right?

[27:01] You know, um, Judas there, right? Despair that they seem to say, right? On himself, right? You know, and something good there that he was despairing at, right? That's why a very dangerous thing, despair. Yeah, terrible, dangerous thing. Right? It's almost it's kind of preoccupation with one's own badness that it can't be overcome or something like that. But that's why St. Gregory says marvelous thing about King David when he danced before the ark and humiliated himself before the whole population.

[27:44] And St. Gregory says because his wife, the daughter of Saul, despised him for that, she despised him for humiliating himself, and he said, "Oh, I'll lower myself even more." And he said, "St. Gregory says I admire David for conquering the Philistines, but even more for conquering himself."

[28:07] Yeah, well, she's she was difficult all the way. There was a great quote from Chrysostom in one of the articles on despair where he says that the problem, the real problem, is not sin but despair, in the sense that God can always forgive sin, but he can't. We can't do anything with despair. Yeah, like the real problem. That's what one of the Desert Fathers said about faith.

[28:35] You know, they, I forget Abba, which is one of the one of the ancient ones, and I think he was admired for his wisdom. So a bunch of monks came to test him and see how wise he really was, and they said, "Aren't you? I can't remember his name now, but aren't you so and so that you're the fornicator and the thief and the this and the that?"

[28:56] He says, "Yes, yes, yes, that's me, that's me." And they said, "Aren't you so and so, heretic?" He says, "I'm not a heretic." So they said, "Okay, so explain to us why do you accept all this but not that?" He says, "Well, accepting all these is good for humility because they might say if I haven't done them, I'm capable of them, and it's good for my soul to be humble and accept those things."

[29:15] He says, "But he says, but heresy separates me from God, and I don't want to be separated from God." So that and they all went away astounded at his wisdom. So I'm trying to turn this over. Well, what? I mean, don't those other separates from God? Well, their sins against charity, yeah. But you can still have faith without charity, so you can go back. But if you're sinning against faith, what do you got?

[29:37] Nothing. Nothing. That's it. It's gone. So that's why the environment. He knew the order. Knew the before and after. Well, that's because when when uh an argument. Is that is the opposite of the best the worst?

[29:59] Yeah, for the most part it is, right? But if the lesser right involves the loss of the greater, right? You know. Okay. So I say to the students, I say, which is better to breathe or to philosophize? And my students say, well, it's better to breathe, right? And they, I say, why? Well, if you're not breathing, you'd be dead, right? Okay. So,

[30:40] see now, is that a good argument, right, for saying that breathing is better than philosophizing? For saying the opposite of breathing is worse than the opposite of philosophizing, which is not philosophizing, that's right. Well, see, for the most part, that's true that the opposite of the better is worse, and the opposite of the worse is the better, right? But if there's a before and after there, right, in the sense of being, right?

[31:12] If I can breathe without philosophizing, but I can't philosophize without breathing, then the loss of breathing is going to be worse than the loss of what philosophy, because I lose everything with that, right? Okay. But that's because it's breathing is before philosophizing in the sense of what of being, right? That's why I catch up. I tell them in the early days when I explain the senses and the categories of before and after, and I say now later on in the course you're going to mix these up, right?

[31:47] So they're really arguing that what breathing is better than philosophizing because it's before in the second sense of before. I'm not arguing it's before the second sense, the fourth sense, right? Just like Saint Paul there, you know, the greatest of these, right? But you're kind of saying it now with faith, though, right? See, so if you lose hope, you're going to lose charity too, right? So in a way, it's worse to lose charity than if you're saying, and if what's your to lose faith, right?

[32:16] Huh? If you lose faith, then you lose hope and charity, right? So it might be that the loss of faith is worse than the loss of charity, but that doesn't mean that faith is greater than charity. Saint Paul sees that, right? It's a very subtle thing, though, right? Huh? But it shows the you know the fundamental character of that text in the chapter 12 of the categories, right?

[32:40] As I explained last time, with with that text of Saint Paul, it's magnificent, you know, in terms of the chapter 12, right? Mr. Tillia, there, this Saint Paul, right? The chapter, you have to admire this, you know. Well, we were saying last time something about some saint there who was talking about mercy of the God to people like Aristotel, or what? Yeah, I still haven't figured out who that was.

[33:04] I keep thinking it's some medieval mystic. I think one of the women mystics. It's. I thought it was Gertrude, but I don't. I don't think it was. That's interesting. Unless it's in, if it's in that, you have given us. I don't think I would remember if it'd been there because I've been to that file before. I'm really reading everything up. It's not in that one. It's in that, you had given us a biography of Gertrude.

[33:26] Was it that one? I think it may have been in that. I have to go look at it because I can't. Because I can't remember anybody else I read who was like had anything like that in it. But but I was she was asking whoever this mystic was, this saint, asking Christ, "What about Aristotle? What about?" And she asked some others, and and he says, "What are you?

[33:46] Don't it's not your business to worry about my mercy towards him." Just left it, but he spoke of it in terms of mercy. That's interesting. Now, whether some passion in the soul is not. Having a contrary, right?

[34:10] To the third, one proceeds thus: It seems that every passion of the soul, every emotion, has some what contrary, right? For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or in the concupiscible.

[34:30] But both passions have contrariety in their own what way, right? Therefore, every passion of the soul has a contrary. Moreover, every passion of the soul has either good or bad for an object, which are objects universally of the desiring part. But to a passion whose object is a good is opposed a passion whose object is what bad. Therefore, every passion has a what contrary.

[35:10] Moreover, every passion of the soul is by acceding to or retreating from or retreating from, as has been said. But to any what approach is contrary recess and the reverse. Therefore, every passion of the soul has some what contrary.

[35:37] Those are pretty convincing arguments, aren't they? Yeah, seems like a pretty clear either or. Yeah. But against this, anger is a certain passion of the soul, right? But no passion is laid down as contrary to anger, as is clear in the fourth book of the what ethics, huh? See where Thomas is doing all this stuff.

[36:03] He plagiarizes. Yeah. Well, he's not. We should give him credit. Therefore, not every passion has a what contrary, huh? And Thomas says, "I answer: It should be said that it is singular in the passion of anger, right? That it is not able to have a what contrary. Neither contrary in the sense of excess nor Two or or recess of the from the same thing, I guess, right?

[36:33] Nor according to contrariety of good and bad, right? So this is why you have this odd number, this odd number of passions, right? You said there was six in the concupiscible and five in the irascible, right? Well, contraries come in what twos. So why don't you have if everything would be what have a contrary? You'd have a even number, it seems, right? Well, which would be very appropriate.

[37:01] Yeah, yeah, yeah. But instead, you have what eleven, right? It's interesting how when they give the apostles they kind of put them in couples, right? You know, you know. And pairs of brothers. Peter and Andrew, James and John, you know, Philip and Bartholomew, Thomas and Matthew, and then the James of Thais, right? And and Thaddeus, Thaddeus the one name again, and then poor guy got stuck with Judas.

[37:32] Assassination. Yeah, you got to get sorry. Because you end up with with eleven good guys and one bad guy, so you got eleven now, so you got a problem here. No, it's twelve good guys and one bad guy. Christ is the one. That's why thirteen is a bad number. It's Christ and my Christ with the apostles, but one of them was Judas. That's why thirteen. That's one of the sources of thirteen being a bad number.

[37:55] Well, I said it was thirteen. It is, but but that was after. In these physical refutations, you have thirteen kinds of mistakes, right? Was that right? Yeah.

[38:07] So that's why that's why I didn't begin. Okay. So it's singular in the passion of anger that is not able to have a contrary, neither in the sense of what approach or we withdraw from the same thing, right? Nor according to what the contrariety of good and bad, for anger is caused from a difficult evil already what laying upon oneself, right? Already present now. To whose presence is necessary, right?

[38:47] That either the what appetite succumbs, right? And thus it does not go out of the terms of what sadness, which is a passion irascible, or it has emotion to what

[39:06] invading or attacking the evil that is harming, right? Which pertains to what anger, huh? But emotion to what flight? Yeah, is not able to have right, because the bad is laid down as present or what Pass. Pass. And thus, to the motion of anger is not contrary any passion according to the contrariety of excess and what withdrawal. Yeah. Nor also according to the contrariety of good and bad, because to the bad now lying upon you, right, is opposed the good already achieved, which cannot have the notion of the arduous, the difficult, right.

[40:03] Nor after the attaining of the good does remain any other motion except the resting of the appetite in the good what obtained, which pertains to joy, which is a passion of the what concupiscible. Whence the motion of anger cannot have some motion contrary of the soul, right? Some motion of the soul is contrary, but only there is opposed to it the what?

[40:42] It's a seizing from motion, right? As the philosopher says in his rhetoric, right? I know St. Thomas, you know, he'll quote here sometimes his rhetoric, right? He's talking when he's passionate, also. You see now where he's stealing from, right?

[41:03] As the philosopher says in rhetoric, that metessere, right? Yeah. Opponent to that which is to be angry, right? Which is not the contrary opposite, but the negative or lack, right? Okay. So what do you say? Calm down.

[41:37] I guess when Rosalind's brother got get angry, you know, just on the floor, you know, put somebody's sprinkle some water on him. Probably holy water. Big break,

[41:56] yeah. That's interesting, though, right? This is why we have eleven, right? We have an odd number, huh? We're an odd bunch. This kind of runs to Greek philosophy, though, you know, that things are based on contraries, right? Aristotle, in the twelfth book of Wisdom, tries to, you know, reject the idea that this is the whole story because the first cause has no contrary. But you know, for the Manichaeans there was what two, and you had two contraries, right?

[42:31] So the universe is apparently odd rather than even, huh? It's even till you get to that the last one, and then that's it. See, do you prefer odd numbers to even numbers?

[42:58] Seven is an odd number. Yes, seven sacraments, seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, the Trinity, Five books of Moses. When they say you know, you know the Trinity by natural reason. Of course, they quote Aristotle there in the book on the universe. You know, three is a number used in praising God, and so Aristotle must have known. You know, Thomas said, no, no, no.

[43:29] But he says you know, attributed you know, considered perfection number three, right? And type of beginning, middle, and end. You know, so the idea of using something perfect, you know, to

[43:43] to do that. We have to stop now, right? Okay.