Prima Secundae
66. Stoics vs. Peripatetics, Passions That Increase Moral Goodness, and the Order of the Passions (ST I-II Q.24 a.2 – Q.25 a.1)
Class of 2012-03-29
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/066-stoics-vs-peripatetics-passions-that-increase-moral-goodness/

[0:00] Okay, let's do another one here before we take our break, Okay. Whether every passion. I don't know. Is bad morally right now? Okay, this is because of the confusion in the Stoics right now. This question arises. To second one proceeds thus: It seems that all passions of the soul are bad morally. For Augustine says in the ninth book on the City of God that the passions of the soul, some call what sicknesses, right, and disturbances of the soul, right now.

[0:36] But every sickness or disturbance of the soul is something bad morally. Therefore, every passion of the soul is morally what bad. Shouldn't be disturbed. Yeah. Yeah.

[0:58] Moreover, Damascene says that an operation which is what, according to nature, is emotion, but a passion is something apart from nature, right now. But this, that what is aside from nature, apart from nature, in the motions of the soul, has the notion of a sin and of a moral evil, right now. Volsum true birth, stumbling on abuse.

[1:29] Whence he himself says elsewhere that the devil, the devil, was turned from that which is in accordance with nature to that which is what outside of nature, right. Therefore, these passions are bad morally speaking.

[1:52] Moreover, everything that leads us into sin has the notion of something bad. But passions of this sort lead us into sin. Whence Romans seven, they are called the what passions of sin. Therefore, it seems that they are bad, but morally right now.

[2:14] But against this is what Augustine says again in the fourteenth book on the City of God, that right love rectified love right has all these affections rectified.

[2:30] They fear to what sin. They desire to persevere. They are sad over their sins. They rejoice in what good works. Just because their love is rectified. huh

[2:46] Okay I'm not asking you kind of the background of where this difficulty arises? I answer: It should be said that about this question, other or diverse was the position of the Stoics and the Peripatetics. Now the Stoics are the Peripatetics are the followers of Aristotle, right now. For the Stoics said that all passions are what bad. Unlike the Buddhists. Yeah, yeah, the Stoics, huh? They have some character.

[3:22] Yeah. The Peripatetics said that moderated right passions right are what good right. Which difference, although it seems great secundum vocem right words right. Nevertheless secundum rem in the thing itself is either nothing or small right. If one considers the intentions of both right. For the Stoics did not discern between sense and what Understand. understanding. And consequently neither between the intellectual desiring power and the sense desiring power.

[4:11] Whence they did not discern the passions of the soul from the motions of the will, according as the passions of the soul are in the sense desiring power. Okay. But the simple motions of the will are in the understanding part. But every rational motion of the desiring power they called what will. And they called passion every motion proceeding outside the limits of reason right. And therefore fouling their what opinion or their position.

[4:51] Tullius that Cicero right in the third book of the Tusculan Questions right. Calls all passions what Sickness. so yeah. From which he argues that those which are what sick are not healthy. Yeah, and those which are not healthy are what foolish. Hence

[5:20] the foolish he calls what insane insane that's strong words right. But the Peripatetics huh. Call all motions of the sense power passions right. Whence they estimate that they are good, when they are moderated by reason right. Bad when they are outside the moderation of reason right.

[5:51] Whence it is clear that Tully that's Cicero, in the same book right. Inconvenienter right unsuitably. Disproves you might say or. Disproves right in the position of Peripatetics who approve of what the meanness of the passions right okay saying that everything bad even mediocre even a little bit right should be avoided right huh for just as a body even if it be a little bit sick it is not what healthy right huh but this

[6:38] medium of the sicknesses or passions of the soul is not healthy right huh but the passions are not said to be sicknesses or disturbances of the soul except when they lack the what moderation of reason right so it kind of results from the Stoics what not understanding the distinction between sense and understanding right and then between sense desire and rational desire right partly in the words but partly in their understanding those things once you can see what the way of speaking there and that the text that Augustine's referring to he's not saying that himself necessarily but quidam vocant some call

[7:32] not to the second about it being something outside of nature right huh that in every passion of the soul there is added something or diminished from the natural motion of the heart in so far as the heart more intensely or more remissly is moved right according to yeah what do you know about that stuff okay

[7:58] systolic and the diastolic yeah what do you know about that stuff okay systolic they give here as as contraction right and the other is dilating and according to this it has the notion of a passion

[8:08] not however is it necessary that a passion always decline from the order of natural what reason right and then the answer to the third objection right that the passions of the soul in so far as they are outside the order of reason they incline to sin right but in so far as they are ordered by reason they pertain to what to virtue right huh

[8:40] it's interesting the tragedy as opposed to what have a catharsis of pity and fear right huh and pity seems to be what kind of a good emotion right okay much it would

[8:58] be a form of fiction that would induce envy make men envious if Karl Marx wrote some fiction he'd probably do that. Or if there is a for a fiction that made men melancholic, comedy kind of purges melancholy, right? And you get this—you read the great comic poets, right? That they're trying to purge melancholy, right? Drive it away.

[9:27] The comic is the example that one time I was reading. You know, I guess you read the moderns for a long. You know, get depressed. I remember.

[9:36] I remember my my teacher Caserta who was talking. I got a letter from the comic. He says he he feels like jumping off the bridge. He says he read the moderns. And so, but one thing you know, you know, a lot of the moderns think you know that the computer is the same thing as the human mind, right? And you know, really, really serious about that. I told you one time I saw on uh what was his name there on TV that. Interviews people.

[10:07] He was interviewing a big computer expert, or some story you know. and the guy was telling him how many years it would be before the computer, you know, went beyond our reason. And Charlie Charlie Rose, he interviews big people, right? You know, I mean, important people. you know, You know.

[10:24] Nodding like you know something. Like. He's taking this in, you know, huh? Yeah. So, so you know, he's a little depressed after all the kind of reading on this, gentlemen. And and then I guess he saw something in, in Punch, you know. where these two guys in the front of the computer, there's a printout. One guy's looking very positive, and he says, "What does it say? It says, 'I think, therefore I am.

[11:00] '" That was kind of a catharsis, you know. But they say that by catharsis, of, pity and fear, you know, that you have pity for the misfortune of another, right? Huh? But it doesn't get too sentimental because you have what fear that the same thing could happen to to you, right? Huh? You know, there's kind of a balance there, you know. So, Article three now. To the third one proceeds.

[11:37] Thus, it seems that a passion whatsoever always diminishes the goodness of a moral act. For everything that impedes the judgment of reason, upon which the goodness of a moral act depends, diminishes consequently the goodness of the moral act. But every passion impedes the judgment of reason. For as Sallust says in the Catilinario, is that the thing on Catiline I mean, all men who consult about doubtful things, right?

[12:23] They ought to be what empty, I guess, of hate, anger, friendship, mercy, right? Therefore, every passion diminishes the goodness of a what moral act, right? Aristotle says, if you allow the guy in the court to, you know, move the emotions of the jury, right? It's like warping the ruler before you measure.

[12:52] So if I'm angry, it seems worse what you've done, right? If I'm feeling pity for you, it doesn't seem so bad what you've done, right? You know, it seems bigger or smaller than they really are. Because passions, right?

[13:08] Moreover, the act of man, the more it is like God, the better it is, right? Whence the Apostle says in Ephesians chapter five, "Be imitators of God as what most dear sons, huh? " But God and the holy angels punish without anger, and they aid without the compassion of what misery, right? Emotion. As Augustine himself says in the ninth book on the City of God,

[13:46] therefore it is better to do what these good works, right, without the passion of the soul than with the passion, right? So he should give me a glass of water without any feeling sorry for my no pity my thirst, yeah. No mercy, just water.

[14:08] Moreover, just as the malum morale, the bad moral badness, is noted in order to reason, so also the good, right? But the moral badness is diminished through passion. For less does he sin who sins from passion. Than the one who sins from what industry, right? Therefore, a greater good, right? He does who does the good without passion, than he who does it what with passion.

[14:48] But against, this is what Augustine says in the ninth book on the City of God, that the passion of what pitying serves what reason when thus the what mercy

[15:06] yeah praebetur offered it's given to somebody yeah so that justice is conserved or when it is what whether it's given to someone in need, right, huh? Or when what one forgives, I guess yeah, When penitent. But nothing that serves reason diminishes the moral good, right? Therefore, the passion of soul does not diminish the good of moral.

[15:43] And I get those troublesome those Stoics, right, huh? Or Shakespeare, huh? It's kind of calls them a stock, you know. It kind of basically a Stoic and stock, you know. And you can beat the the the wooden thing there, and it just stays here and takes it, right? That's the way, you know. So if they take your wife and children and torturing them or something, you know, you can't do anything about it.

[16:07] Well, you don't have any emotion because this is outside you. You know, this is inhuman, right? There is something of that in the Japanese, at least what I picked up from Brother Francis, who he said about the their attitude about like the disaster, the earthquake, and the nuclear, and so forth. And everybody's attitude is, well, it's something we can't, we can't do anything about. It's like they just go on as if it didn't happen.

[16:32] Yeah, as if it's meaningless. There is nothing to do about it. So that's kind of Stoic. Answer should be said that the Stoics, just as they laid down every passion of the soul to be bad, right, huh? So consequently, they lay down that every passion of the soul diminishes the goodness of the act.

[16:58] For every good from the mixture of something bad is either taken away entirely or at least it comes to be a lesser good, huh?

[17:10] And this, to be sure, is true if we call passions of the soul only, right? Those disordered motions of the sense-desiring power, in so far as they are disturbances, right, or sicknesses, right, huh?

[17:31] But if we name or call passions simply all motions of the sense-desiring power, thus it pertains to the perfection of human good that also those passions should be moderated by what reason, right?

[17:56] Because since the good of man consists in reason as in a root, huh? That's nicely said, huh? To that extent, a good is more perfect

[18:12] the more it what belongs to many things that belong to man, in so far it can be derived, right? Or extended to many things that belong to man.

[18:25] Whence no one doubts but that to the perfection of moral good it pertains that the acts of exterior members, the hands, I guess, and the feet, be directed by what the rule of reason, huh?

[18:41] Whence, since the sense-desiring power is able to obey reason, as has been said above, to the perfection of what the moral or human good it pertains that the emotions themselves be regulated by reason, right, huh? So I've got to continue listening to Mozart, right?

[19:04] So the sir used to ask me now, Do you find you can control your emotions now better? He was curious about. Thus, therefore, just as it is better that man what both will the good and that he acts by the exterior act, right? So also for the perfection of the moral good it pertains that man is moved to the good not only by the will but also according to the what Appetite.

[19:44] According as it is said, now it's very interesting quote in Psalm eighty-three, huh? Cor meum, my heart, and caro meum, my flesh, exult in the living what God. Where cor we take for the intellectual appetite, right? And flesh for the what?

[20:12] So if your core and your caro both exult in God, that's better than just your core alone, right? You know, it's the main thing, maybe, huh?

[20:29] Okay. Now, applying to the first objection, he brings in a distinction there. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the passions of the soul, emotions, in two ways can have themselves to the judgment of reason. In one way, antecedently, right, coming before,

[20:56] and thus, since they what cloud the judgment of reason, from which depends the goodness of moral act, they diminish the goodness of the act.

[21:12] For it is more praiseworthy that someone does a work of charity from the judgment of reason than if he does it from the what only the passion of what mercy, right? But another way it can have itself consequenter. Right huh Thomas must look before and after. That's all I can say. And this in two ways, right? In one way, by way of overflowing, redundancy, because when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to something, right, there follows a motion also in the what?

[21:57] Yeah. It follows its motion, the lower part also, right? And thus the passion existing consequently in the sense-desiring power is a sign of the intensity of the what will, and thus indicates a greater moral goodness, huh? In another way, by way of choice, huh?

[22:25] When a man from the judgment of reason chooses to be affected by some what passion, in order that he might more what promptly do, something. Yeah. the sense-desiring power cooperating, right now, and thus the passion of the soul adds to the goodness of the action, right

[22:52] He seems to be saying that all antecedent passions will obscure the judgment, though. So He says, to some extent, they cloud the judgment of reason, right now. So if all antecedent passions cloud the reason, then isn't it better to be... So you know the kid kicked the ball off, the porch there, whatever. Obviously, the anger is going to cloud his reason slightly. So it would be better him not to feel anger, and then out of reason, you know, punish him, and then anger would follow?

[23:28] It sounds kind of yeah, irrational. Not the way things work. Well, no, you lead somebody by their emotions, right? It's because they're not reasonable enough to be led by the reason, right? And so it's maybe better to to move them by their emotions if they can't be moved by their what reason. But I mean, the So if if all antecedent passions cloud the reason in some way, then is the more perfect man one who doesn't have antecedent passions?

[23:57] You see what I'm saying? Yeah. Is that possible for a man? Yeah, that's what I'm saying. It seems. In other words, would be more perfect if the man you know you watch the kid kick off. Well, I thought he was simply saying that the act of reason is going to be more perfect if it's not clouded by the emotion, right? He's not saying to what extent a man can have an act of reason that is in no way clouded by his emotions, right?

[24:20] Because they might come up, quickly, his emotions, right? Yeah, that's that's uh I know Francis de Sales talked about that because that's something that you see that in some of the most perfect saints they have what they call the motus primo primi. That was a grace that they could they had domination over even the first movements of their emotions but most of us never do even the saints we don't have that so that's at least it's great relief to read Francis says don't don't don't worry about it you can't control it it's not under our control but then once you recognize it then what do you do that's when you're in control but don't by the way but I've repeated many times many people don't

[25:00] be angry because you're angry don't don't have a crisis because you're in crisis we do often quote is Jefferson's advice there about you know if you're angry you know count to ten before you if you're very angry count to a hundred you know

[25:16] be better if it said if you're angry remember the passion yeah it says in Psalm six or something about they use it often these texts about angers because of anger my eye is obscure or something whatever Psalm

[25:48] six the second it should be said that in God and in the angels there is no sense desiring power right now nor also are there the bodily what members right now

[26:02] and therefore the good in them is not to be noted according to the ordering of passions or the ordering of bodily actions as in us

[26:15] so I'm put together from the body and the soul right I have to remember that don't forget now to the third it should be said that a passion tending to the bad preceding the judgment of reason diminishes the what sin

[26:42] but one following upon it in one of the what foresaid ways increases it right or signifies its increase right so it comes over because that's redundancy right the overflowing right but it out it if if it's a choice right

[27:19] I would enjoy giving you this glass of water I choose to enjoy it You know, is it Francis or somebody else? Somebody's quoting some saint there about this, you know, you have to

[27:42] choose to enjoy the what you think is the will of God, even though it's. Oh yeah, yeah. yeah And I think it's Francis de Sales talks about that too. Oh no, it's Father Hardin's book on prayer. He talks about that not only that we know what God wants, we have the strength to do it, but enjoy doing it. Wasn't the one? It wasn't the one nun there who was kind of disagreeable person.

[28:05] And and which one? I don't know which one it was, but but uh, Saint Teresa of Lisieux, you know, decided she's going to, you know, kind of show her kind of special Kind of. That was the one, yes. And the other nun, I think. She asked me, "Why are you so nice to me? " I think that was actually. I think it was Saint. Therese somehow got the impression that this nun didn't like her, and so she decided to go out of her way to give her a special smile.

[28:31] And that nun, when she died, that nun commented, "She must have really liked me because she always gave me a smile. " She didn't see through her.

[28:41] Didn't get the trick. Said something. Tricky bunch. Yeah, yeah. you got to watch them. I hope she didn't. Yeah, I always wondered if that nun ever ended up reading her. Really? Oh, that's what she was doing. I thought she did. I thought somewhere somebody Would have been mortified. Taught me that eventually I could break the news to her? Look, everybody's going to know this. Yeah, the whole world.

[29:15] The whole world's going to know this. I'm going to tell you. Sit down. Okay, so up to Article Four now. To the fourth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that no passion of the soul, according to its species, is good or bad morally, right?

[29:42] For good and bad moral, good or bad, is to be noted according to reason. But the passions are in the sense, desiring power, and thus that which is according to reason happens to them, right? But nothing that is per accidens pertains to the what species of the thing. Therefore, it seems that no passion, according to its own species, is good or what bad, huh?

[30:18] Moreover, acts and passions have their species from their object. If, therefore, some passion, according to its species, was good or bad, it would be necessary that passions whose object is a good would be good according to their species as love, desire, and joy. And passion whose object is bad would be bad according to its own species as hate, fear, and sadness. But this is clearly what false, huh?

[30:54] Therefore, some passion is not good or bad from its what species, huh? Moreover, no species of passion is there which is not found in the other animals. But the moral good is not found except in man. Therefore, no passion of the soul is good or bad from its what species. Those are good objections, huh? But against this is what Augustine says in the ninth book of the City of God that what pity, I guess you'd say, um, misericordia pertains to virtue, right?

[31:36] And Aristotle says in the second book of the Ethics that veracundia, shame, is a passio laudabilis. Wow, there you go. Okay. Christians have no sense of shame, right? No sense of shame here. That expression, right?

[31:57] Therefore, some passions are good or bad according to their own what species, huh? Well, Thomas says, huh? I answer it should be said that as has been said about acts, so it seems it should be said about passions. That the species of act or of passion can be considered in two ways. In one way, according as they are in the genus of what nature, and in this way, good or bad, moral good or bad, does not pertain to the species of the act or passion.

[32:42] In another way, according as they pertain to the genus of morals, as they partake of something of the voluntary and of the judgment of what reason, and in this way, good and bad that are moral, good or bad, can pertain to the species of the passion, according as is taken as the object of the passion, something which of itself is what suitable to reason or is dissonant from reason, right?

[33:14] In harmony or in clash with reason. Just as shame, verecundia, shame, which is the fear of the base or the ugly, and invidia, which is sadness about the good of another, right?

[33:38] For thus they pertain to the species of the exterior act, huh? I just happened to be reading a little bit in the biography of the Johnson, the Washington. You know how there was this kind of underlying what envy of him in his position there, right? This is kind of underlying factor. So, yeah. What did he say at the end of the over the death of Brutus? Right there, you know, all the others do what they did out of envy of great Caesar.

[34:11] You know, he didn't do it out of envy; that he did out of concern for the common good, feared that he was going to become tyrant or something. You know, the most demanded. To

[34:23] envy, huh? I forget. Years ago, some some book by some sociologist about envy and democratic times. Apparently, this is a this is a vice that democratic people are even more, you know. Capital. The capital of envy is Washington D. C. Isn't it? And at the same time, we said the thing about envy is only between equals. Well, I don't know. That's the principle. I mean, it's kind of a principle.

[34:42] Our bias appears. You know, people are so a pauper like a peasant doesn't envy the king. Here's an example because I think that's yeah. He wouldn't see the king's goodness. somehow reflecting his own Yeah, that's what I know. Probably maybe it's his commentary or the catena or something about when Christ was in the synagogue and they drove him out and wanted to throw him off the cliff, and he refers to Aristotle talking about this kind of envy or something.

[35:32] It arises from I am trying to think of how he puts it, but that they figure that he's no better than we are, so how can he do these things? He's like us, so they they can mistake their reason. They think he's their equal, so he has no right to tell us what to do or whatever. So that was kind of motivated, and that kind of their defective reason.

[35:55] It's like like you know a woman is more active maybe envy another woman than than be a man, yeah. And a man wants more to envy another man than envy a woman, right? A brother calls a woman, but it's not envy.

[36:21] Oh yeah, that was Father. It was Father John Moore. He was here, and he said he was he had been a diocesan priest. That's why he'd sit at all kinds of councils and committees. And then my nickname for her, Sister Mary Anthrax, was there and talking about justice and rights and all this stuff. And and he's and he's just she's you know she's going on and on like she always does about this because she's one of these feminists.

[36:47] And so finally he just chimed in at the end of her rant about something, and he said, "Sister, I know just how you feel. I always wanted to be a nun. "

[37:03] So he mocked her envy. So the first objection, it should be said that that ratio proceeds about passions, according as they pertain to the species of nature, right now, as the sense desire is considered in itself. But according as the sense desiring power obeys reason, already good and bad, per accidens, but per se, but what per se, right? In particular, per se. The

[37:46] second should be said that passions which tend towards something good, if it be a true good, are good, right? And similarly, those that recede from a true what bad, a converso, those passions which are by what.

[38:07] From good and to excess to the bad are what bad. What's this vice there? There, it kind of didn't translate good, you know. One of the, it's capital sin, so to speak. But they they took it as laziness, right? But that was not really what what it was exactly. Acedia was the Latin word, right? But this meant kind of the sadness that you want to exert yourself to get up and go to church or go to the sacraments or to pray or something like that, right?

[38:43] Or do some spiritual reading, you know. The body is is what by its passions, right? Finding this, yeah, yeah, yeah. That was you know classified as like you know you know capital sin, right? This is a very serious thing, right?

[39:11] Yeah, I guess a lot of people think laziness is just. I don't want to grow more grass. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Laziness. Maybe maybe this is not a good word to use the name. I don't know, but Yeah but there you seem to have a passion that was. Harmful, you know? Somebody's calmly pointed out that you could still be very active while Workaholic, workaholism is kind of, can be a symptom of Yeah.

[39:36] Actually, you're trying to distract yourself from Spiritual. the spiritual things until you throw yourself into work. Mhm. That can be a symptom. Or travel, or entertainment, or, or Anything to escape Yeah. the demand of the spiritual. Yeah. To third, it should be said that in brute animals, the sensing, uh, sense, desiring power does not obey reason, right? And nevertheless, insofar as they are led by a certain what,

[40:07] natural estimative power, right? Which is subject to a superior reason, to wit, the divine, right? There is in them a certain likeness of what moral good, right? As regards the passions of the soul, right?

[40:24] So a dog will maybe protect you from the the bad man or the even the bad animal, right? Yeah, my my my mom had that experience once. Charlie Brown. Charlie Brown. The dog is entertaining there. It was it was awful experience for her. It was early early morning. It was so dark. It was in the winter time. She was able to walk the dog in the early morning.

[40:44] And she'd leave the house, the neighborhood's all dark, and she's got the dog on this huge long leash, way way in the bushes. And some guy comes just cruising up the street, really slow. And she just she sensed fear right away. And she she said, I was just terrified. If he had just taken me by the hand, led me away, I couldn't stop. She was that scared.

[41:04] She knew something was really wicked. And the guy opens the door of his car on the passenger side, and he looks out and he sees her, and he looks at the dog, and he says, "Oh, he's a bloodhound." He says, "They're real quiet, aren't they?" That's what he said. And then and Charlie never raised an eyebrow at anybody. And when he said that, Charlie did one leap.

[41:26] And the guy slammed the door. Charlie hit the car, and he took off. So Charlie sensed the fear too and protected me. Yeah, yeah, that's interesting. But she said

[41:35] he just took one flying leap, and he never he never raised an eyebrow anyway. The cats have waked up there. Owners, two in the house is on fire. There's a fire in the house. Yeah, kind of unusual things. Oh, so that's I didn't even smoke for that long. Exactly. And you're going to say, "Oh, quiet, quiet. Go to bed. " I'm not going to let you in.

[42:06] You're too fat already. Did you read the story of George Washington when he had to get the troops because they're just they're just getting really frustrated with everything because Congress was never giving them any. Yeah. And so there's almost a risk of rebellion or whatever. And so anyway, he's trying to he's trying to pep them up, and he pulls out this thing, he's trying to read this thing.

[42:36] It was Congress again, trying to promise him something. He's wearing the glasses, yeah. Yeah. And he he uh and it was like everything. It was just terrible situation. They're just sitting there like you're not even talk to us. And anyway, he he says, oh, you'll have to excuse me. He pulls out his glasses. He says, um, I said, can you keep down the stairs? I can't get get separated.

[42:58] You know, his eyesight had gone in service of his country. Yeah, that's he says. Acted on to read. Oh, so you have to pardon me. Not only have I spent all the yeah, like I spent all my years in service of my country, but even then, lost my eyesight in service of my country. And anyway, it just broke the movie. Just he just got their sympathy for the whole.

[43:20] It was just really beautiful. They showed it from that time. Well, nowadays, of course, the soldier don't have to worry about what Congress has to say about anything. Did you say the president says go shoot him? He they go shoot him. What's the name of the author of the biography? Ron Chernow. Chernow. Chernow. I think it's C H E R N O W something like that. Oh, Chernow.

[43:42] Yeah, Chernow. He's written a biography of Morgan, I guess, and a biography of Alexander Hamilton. And he's working on one. I guess he's working on one on Ulysses Grant. Oh. So it should be interesting. But he fought for that nomination for money. You wouldn't know that. No, I read the same book. It's kind of yeah. It's kind of Morgan first, so he's very much in the monetary thing, and then Hamilton is so that way too, you know.

[44:15] But has other interests in Washington. So. Okay. I remember Ted Tabitha there with our cat when had the kittens there. Of course, Maria's watching there. You know, tears running down her face and watching. Having to give birth to these kittens, you know. But anyway, when the kittens are old enough to drink milk out of a bowl rather than from their mother, you wouldn't give you know six or seven bowls.

[44:44] You'd get one big bowl, right? You put it down, and they all the little kittens are over, and they stand, you know, and things like that. And Tabitha would stand back like that, like that. And and it was after the last cat, the last kitten, rather, left the the thing, then Tabitha over and tries to milk herself. Oh. She stayed back like that. I really respected her, you know.

[44:48] Her paternal instinct, I guess. So he had to go over there and get the one that had had her fill of milk, you know, and then into Norman had some milk herself. That's what he struck me. That was that was a lovely. Yeah.

[45:24] What was he always talking about? You know, my tabby, they're going there and taking her soft paw and rubbing around the cheek, you know. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That kind of touched her, you know. Well, sometimes I've seen that with dogs and with cats. Cats more than dogs. If they're very, very content. Now, our two cats don't do this because why? Because they're females, maybe I don't know.

[45:46] But I remember Andy used to once in a while. He's just sitting in your lap, and you put your hand out, or something. He'll put his paw on your hand. Yeah, yeah, like that, like that. Yeah, he's content, and he just wants you to know. Hey,

[46:01] let me tell you something, son. This is going to hurt me more than hurt you. There's a similitude of moralis boni, Right now, you know, like with horses, you know, since horses, you know, were kind of brave in battle, right now, other horses, you know, with panic or something.

[46:24] Do you have time to do one more article or not? Yes. So up to question twenty-five now, the order of passion. Passions to each other, right?

[46:34] Then we're not to consider about the order of the passions to each other, right? And about this thing, four things are asked. First, about the order of the passions of the irascible to the passions of the concupiscible, right? So are they before or after or both?

[46:58] Then about the order of the passions of the concupiscible to each other, and then about the order of the passions of the irascible to each other, and then about the four chief passions.

[47:16] That fourth one was important for my attempt to define comedy, right? Because I started off with the idea that comedy was the contrary of what tragedy, right? So if tragedy moved us to pity and what fear, right? Then comedy should move us to the opposites of pity and fear, some kind of what joy as opposed to the sadness of pity, and then what boldness or audacity, the opposite of fear, right?

[47:50] Well, then when I read this, right, I said, well, maybe these being the two principal forms of fiction, tragedy and comedy, right? Maybe they're concerned with the what chief or principal passions, right? And of course those are sadness and fear and joy and hope. So maybe it's more hope comedy than what boldness, right? And I was reading, you know, mainly from the English comic muse, you know, getting support for this, but I looked at a book by the comedies of Terence, right?

[48:35] And the guy was saying, you know, kind of, you know, paraphrasing Saint Paul, you know, faith, hope, and charity. The greatest of these is charity, right? But in comedy, the greatest of these is hope, you know. And there's obviously no theological, you know, comedy, but I mean, it struck me, right? He's a guy who, you know, was kind of a scholar, you know, and translated the Terence and studied his comedies and so on.

[49:01] And it seemed to be, you know, hope, you know. So you get all kinds of witnesses like this, right? That hope is the one. But I was led to it by this discussion of principal passions, right? You know,

[49:17] yeah. I mean, we do you know joke sometimes and we're bold or something like that, you know, like you know, David there with the little slingshot and making fun of you know, but but hope is more the effective comedy, huh? Hope and and mercy, kind of joy.

[49:41] Okay, the first one ought to be sed contra. It seems that the passions of the irascible are prior, before. the concupiscible passions, right? Strange to think that right think that, right? Yeah. For the order of passions is according to the order of the objects. But the object irascible is the arduous good, right? Which seems to be supreme among other goods, huh?

[50:12] Therefore, the passions of the irascible seem to come before the passions of the concupiscible. Well, that's a good attempt. Moreover, the mover is before the moved. I'll agree to that. But the irascible is compared to the concupiscible as the mover to the moved. For to this is given to animals. The irascible. Yeah. That they might take away the impediments by which the concupiscible is prevented from enjoying its what object.

[50:51] But the removens prohibens huh? Has the notion of a mover as is said in the eighth book of the physics. That's one of the accidental causes, right? So when, pressed the pillars out and the roof fell in there, that was removens prohibens, right? Yeah. Special kind of accidental cause. Yeah. Yeah.

[51:19] Moreover, joy and sadness are passions of the concupiscible. But joy and sadness follow upon passions of the irascible. For the philosopher says in the fourth book of the ethics that punishment, huh, quiets the impetus of what anger. Didn't look Didn't look good, to Hirsch. Though, right now. Yeah. Didn't quiet the impetus. Maybe we're

[51:51] making what pleasure or pleasure in place of sadness, right? Okay. Therefore, the passions of the concupiscible are after the passions of the irascible, right? Well, maybe they're both before and after, but we'll see what he says.

[52:10] But against this, the passions of the concupiscible regard the good absolutely. The passions of the irascible regard the good, what qualified or contracted, or particular, the arduous, right? Since therefore the good simply is before the good contracted, it seems that the passions of the concupiscible are before the passions of the irascible.

[52:38] I answer. It should be said that the passions of the concupiscible are to more things, right, than the passions of the what irascible. For in the passions of the concupiscible is found something pertaining to motion, to wit, what desire, and something pertaining to rest, to wit, joy and what sadness.

[53:08] But in the passions of the irascible, there is not found anything pertaining to what rest, but only pertaining to motion. It's interesting observation by Thomas. The reason for this is because in that which is now at rest, right, it does not have the notion of something difficult, arduous, which is the object of irascible. At least it would be the good thing at rest, right?

[53:42] Now, rest, since it is the end of motion, is before in being intended, right? But after in being carried out. If therefore we compare the

[54:00] passions of the irascible to the passions of the concupiscible, which signify rest in the good, manifestly the passions of the irascible precede in order of execution passions of this sort of the concupiscible, just as hope precedes what joy,

[54:22] whence it also what causes it, according to that of the Apostle Spe gaudentes, right? Though maybe Saint Paul is talking here about the spes that is an act of the will, not right. But

[54:37] the passion of concupiscible, implying rest in the bad, to wit, sadness, right, is a middle between two passions of the what irascible. For it follows what fear, right? For when there occurs something bad that is feared, it causes what sadness. But it goes before the motion of what anger, right? Because from the preceding sadness, someone is rises up in revenge, right, in ultionem, and this pertains to the motion of what anger.

[55:24] And because to what payback is it? Like, like evil, I guess. Yeah. Is apprehended as good. When the iratus has what achieved this, he rejoices, right? And thus it is manifest that every passion of the irascible ends in a passion of the what concupiscible pertaining to rest, to wit, either joy or what sadness.

[56:04] But if one compares the passions of the irascible to the passions of the concupiscible that imply motion, thus manifestly the passions of the concupiscible are what prior, in that the passions of the irascible add something over the passions of the concupiscible, just as the object of the irascible adds something over The object of the concupiscible, namely, something arduous or difficult in getting the good or avoiding the bad, right?

[56:40] For hope adds above desire a certain conatum, a certain attempt, right, and a certain elevation of the soul, right, to what achieving a difficult good, right?

[56:58] And likewise, fear adds over what flight or abomination, away from a certain depression of the soul on account of the difficulty of avoiding the what the bad, right? Thus, therefore, the passions of the irascible are a middle between the passions of the concupiscible, which imply motion towards the good or towards the bad, right, away from the bad, and among the passions of the concupiscible, which imply rest in the good or in the bad.

[57:34] And thus it is clear that the passions of the irascible have a beginning from the passions of the concupiscible, and that they end up in the passions. So Thomas seems to be saying they're both before and after, right? He looks before and after this guy Thomas.

[57:56] He uses his reason, in other words. Now he says that first argument, huh? That the irascible is dealing with something supreme among good things, right? That first argument proceeds as if the object, as if the notion of the object of the concupiscible was something opposed to the arduous, right? As is of the ratio of the object of the irascible that would be difficult. But because the object concupiscible is the good absolutely, it is naturally before the object irascible as the common is before the what private particular.

[58:41] Now what about this? movens prohibens. Well, that's not a movens per se, but a movens per accidens, huh? But now we are speaking of the order of the passions per se,

[58:58] and moreover, the irascible removes the what private rest from the concupiscible's object. Whence from this it does not follow except that the passions of the irascible precede the passions of the concupiscible pertaining to rest, right?

[59:19] You'd say if you didn't want something good, right, you wouldn't make the effort when you realize the difficult good, right? Okay. So I want to be elected, you know, and popular guy, you know, vote for me. And I get out there, and realize it's a little difficult. Yeah, well, I got to have hope of getting elected, right? I got to make the effort now, you know, and run around to caucuses and so on.

[59:46] And that arises because I want him to be elected in the first place, right? It just happens to be difficult in the way of my getting elected.

[1:00:00] You can see these guys need the. Get angry too sometimes, right? And have fear of losing elections. True. Okay. The third argument is answered by seeing what way the before and after, right? Okay, so we can bring this session to a halt now. Next.