Prima Secundae
70. Aquinas on Love (ST I-II q.26 a.4, q.27 aa.1-2): Love of Friendship vs. Love of Wanting, and the Good, Beauty and Knowledge as Causes of Love
Class of 2012-04-19
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/070-aquinas-on-love-st-i-ii-q-26-a-4-q-27-aa-1-2-love-of-friendship/

[0:00] So let's look at the fourth article now. Okay. Now, it's the third article in a way, although he's you know making a lot of distinctions there. You are touching upon the difference between the love that is an emotion, right, and the love that is an act of the will, right? Okay. It's hard for people to separate that, right?

[0:26] But now you get this other distinction of two kinds of love. To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems the love is unsuitably divided into the love of friendship and the love of concupiscence.

[0:42] Now, those are kind of the consecrated terms that came down even before Thomas, right? But you could call them the love of what wishing well, and the love of what wanting. Because concupiscence, I mean the wanting, right?

[1:03] For amor is a passion, as the philosopher says, but friendship is a what habit. But habit cannot be a part dividing what passion. So since love is a passion. You can't divide it through what the love of concupiscence and the love of friendship, because friendship is a habit, right? Okay. That's probably in in the naming thing there, right?

[1:40] Moreover, nothing is divided through that which is numbered with it. For man, for man is not numbered with animal, right? But concupiscence is numbered with love as a different passion from love.

[2:07] So therefore, love cannot be divided by what wanting. It's like saying you know one kind of love is wanting, this one is not love, right? Moreover, according to the philosopher in the,

[2:24] should be the, my book says it. Third ethics, but this is in the eighth book, right? Yeah. What do you have? You have a typo. Yeah. This is

[2:37] a. Threefold is friendship: the useful, the pleasant, and the honorable, right? The noble. But the useful and the delectable friendship have what concupiscence, right? I want sharing your money. I want you know to be pleased by you, you know. The pleasure of company.

[3:07] Saved saved the life of Leo Alvarez in Korea when his friends said to him, "They're getting him a transport truck." And they said, "Come over here and tell some of your stupid jokes." He said, "No, no, no, no. He's going to get this one." And they said, "Come on!" Well, he couldn't resist the crowd telling jokes, so he went and joined that truck. This truck in the mine killed everybody.

[3:25] So their love of humor is that their love their love of friendship comes out of their love for wanting his entertainment. But see how God works in condescension so many times. Okay, of course, useful and delightful friendship, but we're not friendship in the full sense, right?

[3:49] So you can see I can misunderstand these these this distinction, right? But against this, some are said to love those things to to love because they desire, right? Huh? Just as one is said to love what wine, wine, account of the sweetness that he desires in it, huh? Wine, I like dry wine more than the fancy. See, as it said in the second book of places, huh?

[4:20] But maybe it's more known to most people. Yeah, especially the ancients there, the Greeks, huh? Greek wine was quite a pleasant thing, you know.

[4:33] Samuel Johnson, Samuel Johnson, and Boswell sitting around drinking a couple bottles of port, you know. Warren says, "No, no, they got you know gout, so they take twenty two bottles, you know." That's only other quickly being wine. You know, took a fortified wine like, and I did a whole bottle of burglar table wine without any serious effects. But did a whole bottle of sherry or something like that, you know, it just is, you know, it's too much, you know.

[5:00] And port is a fortified wine too. But those things, sweet things, huh? But to wine and things of this sort, we do not have friendship, right?

[5:19] Therefore, other is a love of concupiscence, a love of wanting, and a love other is a love of friendship, right? Huh? Now, where does Thomas begin, huh? Well, he's going to quote the philosopher in the rhetoric, because in the rhetoric Aristotle takes up the emotions, right? Some of them in more detail, right? Because he's talking about how he's going to arouse these emotions or calm them down, right?

[5:47] In order to convict somebody or get him off or get him elected or defeated and so on. Yeah. Okay. So, answer. It should be said that, as the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, "to love is to will what? Good to someone." Okay. And you know, curious. You know, sometimes there's a distinction in the rhetoric that's very fundamental for practical philosophy or theology. And Aristotle even talks about law, you know, and the natural law, and so on.

[6:26] Something very explicit in the rhetoric, you know, beautiful quotes, you know. So Thomas is not ashamed to quote the rhetoric, which is a golden river of words, as as Cicero said. Now,

[6:44] the art of persuasion. Monsieur Diana said that persuasion is found first in music, and then secondly in what fiction, then third in what rhetoric. Right. I was looking a little thing at Coleridge. He's talking about Shakespeare, you know, and he's talking about the earlier works of Shakespeare, like Venus and Adonis and Rape of Lucrece, and so on, and what signs there are of him being the great poet he will be, you know, in his early works, huh?

[7:19] He's talking about how melodious the work is, right? And you know, where that man who hath no music in his soul, you know, so this can be said especially of the the poet, right? Huh? So something musical about these works of Shakespeare, you know, huh? Yeah. See that persuasion there. In Homer. Yeah. Of course, we still have all these words, you know. I mean, tragedy means a goat song, so on, and we use ode, you know, which you know is originally a musical term, right?

[7:52] Or a lyric, lyrical poetry, you know, and so on. It was actually sung a lot of it, and so on. Demodocus, you know, that's the dumbest thing. This was Father Owen Bennett used to say when

[8:08] oh no, he reminded me about Paul VI was referring to the difference between the preacher, who might say he uses rhetoric to persuade people, and the artist in various arts. He said the artist, especially in fiction, he says he has an advantage over the preacher because he can persuade people by identifying with the protagonist, whereas the the preacher is always kind of an antagonist, at least a priest who's preaching because he's going to preach against him and or whatever, and so he's always kind of antagonistic, appealing to the conscience, might say, but whereas somebody in a story can identify with the protagonist who is virtuous or Uncle Tom's Cabin, you know, is very persuasive, you know, to people against slavery, right, more so than speeches

[8:54] would do, you know. Persuasion means through the sweet, right? Mozart is even sweeter than Shakespeare, if not, huh? Incredible how Shakespeare says things so well, though. I always think of these things you know he says about somebody's death. You know, Horatio says, you know, now cracks a noble heart. Good night, sweet prince, and flights of angels sing thee to thy rest. How could you say that that better than that?

[9:33] It's a no way. Or when you know when the when Juliet is found apparently dead on her her wedding day, this happy day for her, and finding you know just started raving rambling, but then the father says, death lies on her like an untimely frost upon the sweetest flower of all the field. Who could say more beautiful than that? It's a no way. He's just the master there.

[9:56] You know, It's incredible the way he says those. things It's like Mozart. I didn't know where his melodies came from. They just came to. him. That's amazing. I mean, there's things like this, you know, come to you, you know, huh? But the end of his concert, he'd sit down and he played the piano and would just improvise, you know, they seem to enjoy it even more than the the thing, you know.

[10:26] When Beethoven heard Mozart's twenty fourth piano concerto, he turned to the other guy and says, "No, he says, we shall never recall that. Never recall that. What did Gieseking say when he got through recording the solo music for the piano of Mozart? There is only Mozart.

[10:48] You have a little treasure of these quotes. Oh yeah, oh yeah, oh yeah. Is Mozart in Columbia? Yeah. Contain Mozart. When Brahms talks about the magic figure, you know, I mean, he cannot believe every number is perfect. And there's it's never been done. You know, it's it's incredible. So you get different. You know, people are struck by this. That piece of Mozart, you know, how perfect it is.

[11:14] So he is the musician, right? Like antonomasia It's like Shakespeare's Federalist Papers, the poet. Long farewell to all my greatness. So going back to the body now, the article. I answer. It should be said that as the philosopher says in the second book of rhetoric, to love is to will or to wish good to someone, right? Thus, therefore, the motion of love tends towards two things, right?

[12:02] There's two objects in a way, there, right? To wit, towards the good that someone wills for someone, right? Either to himself or to another, right? And in that, to which he wishes what good, right? To that good, therefore, which someone wills to another, he has the love of what wanting, yeah. To that good, to that which he what the one to whom he wishes some good, he has the love of what friendship.

[12:38] So I call one sometimes the love of wanting, right? Because concubines is kind of word for wanting, and friendship. Say that it's the love of what wishing well, right? Okay. Just take that example in class. I used to go to the mixer, you guys. You see a good looking girl there, right? Huh? You know, am I wishing good to her? Or do you want it, right? You know, see, she's the good you want for yourself, right?

[13:08] Okay, you're not, you know, thinking the fact that I'm so good for her, you know, I might be bad for her. Say, but do you see very much what the kind of love is there, right?

[13:24] You know, remember when when the girls saying, you know, you know, later on, to me, you know, how she, you know, she affected upon, you know, the stable marriage of her mother and father, right? Now, and she thought it through the fact that they really wished well to each other, you know, and it's not the the love of wanting, yeah. When you go to the mixer, you see the nice-looking girl, you know, that's not the kind of love that makes it may be the start or something, but but it's not the you got to have this love of wishing well, right?

[13:55] Huh? And that's what you have to have in friendship there between Horatio and Hamlet and so on, right? The love of wishing well, right? Not that you're good for my bank account or something. Yeah, yeah.

[14:28] He says this division is secundum prius et posterius. it's not what univocal, right? Okay, just like the division of being into substance and accident is secundum prius et posterius, right? And the division of being into act and ability is secundum prius et posterius, right? Okay, for that which is loved by the love of friendship, simpliciter huh? And per se, Through itself, huh? Is loved, huh? Very often, simpliciter and per se go together, right?

[15:09] Huh? The simpliciter always has the sense of what's fully something, right? Huh? Okay. What is loved by the love of wanting is not simpliciter so negatively right, and it's not what secundum secundum quid, right? Huh? But it's loved for another, right? Just as being simply is what has being, and that's substance, right? Being secundum quid, what is in another, right? Okay.

[15:50] So did I come to be when I came to be in this room? When I when I dressed this morning that I come to be,

[16:04] I came to be clothed. Yeah, simpliciter in some way, right now. See, but when my parents generated me, God created my soul. Then I came to be simpliciter yeah Simpliciter. Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[16:20] Well, Shakespeare had that famous, you know, sonnet. You know, love is not love which alters when alteration finds, and so on. And we're kind of talking about you know love, simpliciter, right? You know, because things are obvious. The final couplet says, "If this be error and upon me proved, I never writ, nor no man ever loved. " Just marvelously, he's saying stuff, right? You can't see this, you know, here.

[16:47] You know, I never writ. No man ever loved. You know, He's talking about love, It's a leech there, right? Okay. So that's what this girl saw in her parents, right? That they had that kind of love. That's why they were solid, right?

[17:12] When kids first don't become friends, why do they become friends? Huh? We need somebody to play baseball with or football with, huh? So also in the case of the good, which is convertible with being, right? Huh? Simply is that which itself has goodness, right? But what is the good of another? Is good secundum quid, right? And consequently, the love by which is love something, um, yeah, is love simply the love by which is love something that might be the good of another is love secundum quid, right?

[18:02] Now this is is more a distinction, seems to me, of the of the love of the in the will, right? You have either one of these loves, right? Now, why, in the case of the emotions, do you really have the love of friendship, right?

[18:34] In a sense, the love that's strictly speaking an emotion is ordered to what's pleasing to the senses, right? Okay. So if I love something because it pleases me, what kind of love do I have for that which pleases me?

[18:56] Yeah, yeah. So what kind of love do I have for the music of Mozart? Yeah, That's the good I want for myself. The plays of Shakespeare right now.

[19:17] Incidentally, the word poet means what in Greek? Maker, yeah. But it seems like he's named by antonomasia huh I'm going to use it as an example in one of the dialogues, and he's working on this. As if it'd be no example, as if this is the most wonderful thing to make, right? What Homer made, huh? What does Democritus say? Homer made a world in verse, right?

[19:47] Quite a world, huh? Okay. Now, regard to the first objection, love is not divided through friendship and. concupiscence, but through the love of friendship and a concupiscence, right? That's just the way they're named, right? For he is properly said to be a friend to whom we what will wish some good, right? Huh? That we are said to want that we will for ourselves, right? Okay. Now, if the girls in my class got the thing, yeah, do you know?

[20:28] You know, when the guy approaches you, what kind of love do you have for me, though, wanting the love of friendship? That would probably science the guy for a while. Stumbling over. What kind of love? I don't want you. I just, I just, wish good to you. I wish you good, and are you good for me, though, saying because you want to bestow yourself upon me. It's just a fundamental distinction, right?

[20:59] But you know, I don't think you know that people hear that distinction explained very often, you know. But it's so fundamental to to marriage and friendship, right? And

[21:16] okay. And so is clearly applied to the what second one, right? Huh? And then, of course, in friendship, right? Huh? In the useful friendship and the pleasant friendship, huh? One wishes what some good to the friend, and to extent he does that, he what?

[21:44] Yeah, the ratio of friendship, huh? But because that good, he refers further to his own what pleasure or usefulness, right? Hence, it is that the useful friendship and the and the pleasant one, in so far as they are drawn to the love of what of wanting, falls short from the ratio of true what friendship, right? So when Cicero writes his book on friendship, he wants to call only the amicitia honesta, right?

[22:12] Friendship. I don't want to even use the word friendship for the other ones. Aristotle says, Well, you should use words like men in general use them, right? And because we do speak of these people as being friends, right? When it's based on usefulness or not, well, then we will, but we will distinguish, right? Huh? So he distinguishes you know them, right?

[22:37] And my father used to go to the ball games sometimes with the guy who sold the paint. So I imagine started out as a as a useful friendship, right? Because my father needed paint for the wagons and so on, other things that were painted in his company, right? They made, and the other guy, of course, I was going to need to sell paint to make a living.

[22:58] But then they got to like each other's company, right? And so they had to go to the ball game together. Not very often. Well, after a while, you know, so so I know they get to the highest kind of friendship or not. I never questioned my father about such intimate things.

[23:23] I mean, when our great friend Saint Bernard of Clairvaux distinguishes, you know, the love of God, right? He has these four stages, right? Well, the first kind of love you have of God maybe is what the love of wanting, yeah, yeah. You need him, right? You know, but then as you get to what like him, well, then maybe a little friendship, of pleasure. taste and see how sweet is the Lord, right?

[23:46] Huh? But you got to work up to it because the friendship of the love of charity is going to be a love of what? Yeah.

[23:59] Take a little break now. We're passing from the twenty-six to the twenty-seventh question, right? And from the twenty-seventh, we pass to the twenty-eighth. But no, twenty-six is about what the nature of love, you might say, right? Kinds of love and so on. And then the twenty-seventh is going to be looking before love, right? At the causes of love, because the causes before the effect. And then twenty-eight will be looking after, right?

[24:30] So he's obviously following Shakespeare there, right? And looking before and after, right? It's kind of beautiful the way this treatise is; these three questions, right? The nature of love, you're looking at love itself, and then you're looking before at the causes, and then after to effects. So this is the most well-ordered and complete fundamental consideration of love that I know of. Much more fundamental than the symposium or Plato.

[24:58] That's interesting things doing there, but no, it's much more. This is really. I don't know where you can go. You know, finding as fundamental as this. I like to use these three questions here in my course on love and friendship. And that reminds me. I just discovered, just for incidental reasons, I just discovered a work that was published. An early work of Jane Austen. That was a fictional work, I think, of letters.

[25:27] That she wrote as a very young girl. She wrote this, and the title is Love and Friendship. And I have a I haven't read it, but I just noticed it the other day.

[25:40] So now we're going to look before at the causes of love. Then we're not to consider about the cause of love. And about this, four things are asked. First, whether the good is the what. Soul cause. Cause of love, right?

[26:00] And secondly, whether knowledge is a cause of love, right? Now these two causes, the good and knowledge, will not be, you know, separate or really distinct, right? Because the good, as known, is a cause of love, right? So the good is the fundamental cause, but it's got to be known to be loved, huh? And so Thomas would say that knowledge is a cause of love to some extent, for the same reason that the good is, right?

[26:29] It's on the side of the object, right? Of love, right? But then you get the likeness. That's really something kind of fundamentally different from what the good, right? And I used to like to get the students going on this, you know, by saying, "Which is a stronger cause? Are you more attracted to someone who is good, or someone who's like you? " And you know, the great language that we think in the English language.

[27:00] If I say I like you because you're like me, right? Is that equivocal the two uses of words there, by chance, or is there a reason why? Because

[27:15] sometimes it seems that likeness is a stronger cause, right? Than what goodness, right? I don't know if that's the way it should be, but it still has a tremendous influence, right?

[27:34] And now fourth is really when you're talking about what some other passion, but that arises from another love that's more fundamental, right? If you're saying can love, you know, another love be a cause of this love, right? So it's my love of logic

[27:51] caused by my desire to be wise. My desire to be wise is because I I love wisdom, right? Warren and I used to Warren used to joke about what's it to you guys some crazy idea about how many years you have to spend studying logic so you can do philosophy? And people are completely losing their interest in wisdom. They haven't spent all these years on on logic, and it was like it's like Warren used to say, you know, when people learn languages, they used to in the old days, you'd spend you know a year or two doing scrammer, you know, and it drives you crazy, you know.

[28:30] Right, you have to kind of get people into reading the text right away. The beginning was the word, and the word, you know, that nice simple Greek and archaic. You know, I can kind of follow that.

[28:44] So, but it's a beautiful way. These are ordered, isn't it? Just, just amazing. What a man! What a mighty man! What a timeless. I mean, Aristotle knew about these things, but you know, but scattered around, and it's laid out even for numbskulls, you know, to get to know something about this.

[29:19] To the first, then one proceeds. Thus, it seems that not only is the good the cause of love, huh? For the good is not a cause of love except because it is what loved. But it happens also that the bad is loved, huh? According to that of Psalm 10, who loves iniquity Hates his own soul hates his own soul. Some people love iniquity. Otherwise, every love would be good.

[29:53] What's only every knowledge is good. Aristotle in the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, he he's going to talk about the desirability of this knowledge to the soul, right? And he says what? Although we hold that all knowledge is what good and desirable, right? Huh? Some knowledge is more desirable than other knowledge. And then he gives two criteria, right? Either because it's about a better thing, or because it's about it's more certain.

[30:22] But elsewhere he talks about the criterion in terms of what you know is more important in terms of certitude, right? It's better to know a little bit about God than to know I have five fingers, even though I'm more sure I got five fingers maybe than some of my knowledge of God, especially the Holy Spirit. Okay.

[30:45] Therefore, not only is the good the cause of love, but also the what? The bad. Moreover, the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric that we love those who say what bad things about themselves, right? Huh? Okay.

[31:08] Therefore, it seems that the bad is a cause of love, right? Okay. Someone tells me they're embarrassing moments in life. You know, we laugh. Have you enjoyed that? Right? You like someone who who tells about their faults, huh?

[31:29] You know, some woman asks, you know Johnson wrote the dictionary. You know, you may know, and but he has you know some mistakes in there, right? Huh? And so some woman asked him about this. You know why he said that? You know, do you expect him some run around? He says, "Sheer ignorance he says, "Madam." Sheer ignorance

[31:51] Which is not surprising you know you know think of how you thought this here. You know. Well, you like that, right? See, but is it good to be ignorant? No, see, but I want you to love Johnson because he, you know. or sorry, but, I made the same mistake myself, right? You know. Well, it's not good to make mistakes, but you love the guy for. Speaking of his own mistakes, right?

[32:34] Okay. Moreover, Dionysius says that not only the good, but also the beautiful, is loveable. For all, right? But against all this nonsense is what Augustine says in the eighth book about the Trinity. Certainly, nothing is loved except the good. Augustine is quite a is quite a mind guy. It's a busy guy, Augustine, you know. Didn't have you know the advantage of reading Aristotle much at all. Don't he mentions the categories he came into contact with?

[33:17] You know, tremendous mind, Augustine. I think Augustine and Thomas is the two greatest minds that we've had in the church. The good only therefore is the cause of love, right?

[33:49] Okay. I am sure it should be said that it has been said above. Love pertains to the desiring power, right? Which is a what power that. Undergoes, huh? That's true even of the will, right?

[34:10] Whence its object is compared to it as the cause of its motion, or the cause of its what, act, huh? When Aristotle distinguishes the powers of the soul, he distinguishes the powers of the soul by their acts, right? And the acts by their objects, right, huh? But you have this fundamental distinction between the powers that act upon their object, right? Like the digestive power which acts upon the food, right?

[34:44] And the sense power, for example, that is what acted upon. So, although grammatically I say I see or I hear the sound, right, huh? It's the sound that's active, and the ear that is passive, right? So that's kind of a fundamental distinction: does the object act upon the power, or does the power act upon the object? It seems that if neither was true, there'd be no reason for this to be called the object of the thing, right?

[35:17] Okay. So, is the desiring power like the the ear, the sense power, or is it like the digestive power, right, huh? The ear. Yeah. Acted upon, right? But it's the principle of acting, so then it goes out. Yeah, act has been acted upon. Yeah. But but but it's first you know something makes an impression upon it, and then there's motion towards that object, right, huh? That's the distinction I think Francis de Sales makes in terms of the love of complacency.

[35:55] That's how we're acted upon, and then the love of benevolence is going to go out. Whence its object is compared to it as the cause of its motion or its act, right? This is going to be therefore the most fundamental cause of love, huh? So it's necessary that that is properly the cause of love, that is the object of love, right?

[36:22] But the proper object of love is what the good, because as has been said, love implies a certain what connaturality, huh? Or what complacency, complacency agreement of the lover to the loved, huh? But to each thing that is good, which is connatural to it, and what proportion to it? Whence it remains that the good is the proper what cause of love, huh?

[37:06] So you could say that love is a kind of what agreement of the desiring power with its object, right? What is agreeable to a thing is what fits it, right? What fits the thing is good for it, right? So therefore, the object of love has to be the what? What's good for the thing, right?

[37:37] So the plants that want a lot of water, it's good for them. You have a natural love of water, yeah. So we want a lot of sun, right?

[37:49] Some like shade. Yeah, I'm trying to grow some grass right now. Wait for it. How long does it take for grass seeds to come up? Ask me. I think it takes more than a week. Depends on how many birds eat them first. I can't make sure that you you know, you've got those cold nights to make it hard. Yeah. Yeah. We'll see what happens. And if those robins are out there, nothing, nothing's gonna survive.

[38:16] The one place I try to grow grass, you know, over the years, it doesn't seem to hold, you know. but the tree there has been weakened and it lost a lot there in that terrible snowstorm there, you know, early snowstorm. Part of it fell on top of the roof of the house. Yeah. It didn't really do damage as far as I know. Okay.

[38:38] Now, first, it should be said that the bad is never loved except under the what? Yeah. In so far as it is secundum quid bonum, right? And it's grasped as simply good. So I tell the students, you know, they're making this mistake of simply and secundum quid, right, all the time, right? Because they're doing something bad because it's good in some way, or they're not doing what is good because it's bad in some way.

[39:19] And thus, some love is bad in so far as it tends towards that which is not simply what true good. And in this way, man loves what iniquity. In so far as by iniquity he attains to some good, as for example pleasure, or money, or something of this sort,

[39:46] right? So the bad is per accidens, right? The object of love. Now, those who say bad things about themselves, right? Okay, are not loved. on account of those bad things, right? But account of. But account of which they say the bad things. For to say one's own what bad things has a notion of something good, insofar as it excludes fiction or simulation sort of sign of pride.

[40:31] you know humility right, That you admit your faults, right? Okay, so we love them for something good, right? huh? Like St. Augustine's confession. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So Aristotle has a virtue there, right, which is truthfulness, right? Okay. I never made any mistakes. He's got a deer into the person who says that. I don't make mistakes.

[41:06] That's my my friend who does woodworking. He said, "I don't know how to fix mistakes because I never make them." I don't know how to repair things.

[41:22] That was his first mistake. What's actually helpful about his instructions is he shows you how to make mistakes, and so he's able to correct you before you do it. He says, watch out for doing this because if I do this, then he shows you what happens. It's very helpful.

[41:45] Okay, so the first two objections were dealing with the bad seeming to be loved, right? So people choose what abortion because it's what. got its own way Yeah, yeah. They want to continue their career or something, right? Or it was an embarrassment, you know, for this and so on.

[42:20] The second objection there, right? Again, it's not really the bad itself that's being loved, right? I don't like you because you. I don't love you because you're a mistake, but because you admit your mistakes or something, right?

[42:40] Okay, the third objection was a different thing, right? Because the beautiful is not something bad, right? To the third, it should be said that the beautiful is the same as the good, differing only in its what definition. For since the good is what all what want. Of the notion of the good is that in it the appetite what comes to rest. But in the ratio of the beautiful, pertains that in the knowledge of it, in the aspect, the seeing of it, right?

[43:16] The appetite what rests, right? So when you see a beautiful, you know, if you got beautiful gardens, so on, you know, it's restful to just look at these beautiful gardens, right? Okay.

[43:34] I remember that was Larry Brown one time. He had a, he got a new sweater, and I liked the color. Yeah. And I said, Larry, I like your sweater. I like the color. He says, it's restful. It's restful. I said, yeah. that's a good description.

[43:53] Kasurik used to complain about you know, the romantic composers. you know, they they tear you out. he says, you know. By. Both sides, you know, it just uh you know makes you restful.

[44:13] Whence those senses, especially regard you beautiful, When those senses especially the godly beautiful that most of all make us know, to wit, sight and hearing, serving reason, right? Huh? For we speak of things that are visible, that are beautiful, and beautiful what sounds, huh? In the sensibles of the other senses, we do not use the name of beauty, for we do not say that what beautiful tastes.

[44:41] tastes or odors, right? Huh? Okay. So you see, the steak is beautiful. Sometimes. I see even with wine. I see, you know, you know, you know, that the color of the wine, you might that's the eye, right? It's a beautiful color, right? Or I drink my tea in a clear one now, because it's beautiful, you know, the color of the tea, you know, and but we don't say the taste is beautiful.

[45:11] Taste beautiful? Nobody says that, right? Tastes good, you know, good taste. Um, we do not speak of beautiful savors and odors and so on. And thus it is clear that the beautiful adds above the good, right? Huh? A certain order to a what knowing power, right? Huh? Thus, that the good is that which simply pleases the appetite, right? That is beautiful. The apprehension of which pleases, right?

[45:49] Huh? It's more particular, right? Now, that did not go into it now, but you know, there's a question sometimes asked, you know, is the beautiful more the object of of love or the object of what knowledge? Huh? Okay.

[46:15] You know the famous poet there Spenser, huh? Before Shakespeare, you know, you've seen his poems there to earthly beauty and earthly love, and then followed by the poems to heavenly beauty and heavenly love, right? Huh? So we we tend to what

[46:37] connect beauty with love, right? In those things, right? And in this marvelous English language, right, lovely is kind of a synonym for what beautiful, right? So lovely is taken from the word what love, right? So in that way, it seems that the beautiful is more the object of what love than of what. Knowledge,

[47:08] and I'm not sure though that that's true. There are texts, you know, where the beautiful seems to be tied up with, but knowledge, huh?

[47:26] That's a good, interesting thing to discuss, you know. Do you love God because He's beautiful, or you want to see Him because He's beautiful?

[47:59] I told you I had a very beautiful painting on my wall. Do you want to love it or want to see it? See it, see there. Yeah.

[48:13] But the beautiful, as a sort of perfection, is the object of what of knowing, right? That's one of the definitions of love. The beautiful is what pleases when seen. Yeah, yeah. As reference, the appetite there to see, please, but you know, the seeing there. And I have one of Heisenberg's essays there, you know, the importance of the beautiful there for the discovery of theories, right? And if you get to know these guys, the men who made great discoveries, they're very much tied up with the beauty of the thing, right?

[48:54] Why didn't accept somebody's theory? What's ugly, you know? Yeah, these two, Tom says, are beautiful. I think, you know, huh? Do we have time for another. We've got to stop here.

[49:31] Maybe we should stop here. We've got to stop here. We've got to stop here. We've got to stop here. We've got to stop here. We've got to stop here. We've got to stop here. We've got to stop here. What? Yeah, I think we can manage that one. Okay. Okay. It seems that knowledge is not a cause of love, huh? Because something is what sought, right? This happens from what love, right?

[49:51] But some things are sought which are not known, as sciences, right? For in them it's the same thing to have them as to know them, as Augustine says, right?

[50:04] And if they are known, they are had, and are not sought. Therefore, knowledge is not a cause of what love. Moreover, it seems to be the same reason that something unknown is loved, and that something is loved more than it is what known. But some things are loved more than they are known, as God, who in this life can be loved to Himself, but not known to Himself.

[50:42] Therefore, knowledge is not a what cause of love. So if something can be loved more than it is known. then how can knowledge be the cause of love, right? It seemed that they would be what proportional, right? But then it doesn't. So

[51:07] the theologian might not love God as much as the charwoman, as they say. Okay. Moreover, if knowledge were the cause of love, there could not be found love where there is no knowledge. But in all things there is found love, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names. But there's not found knowledge in all things, right? Therefore, knowledge is not a cause of love.

[51:47] Against all this nonsense is what Augustine proves in the tenth book of the Trinity, that no one is able to love something what unknown. Okay.

[52:03] So can you love wine if you don't taste it? Can you love liquor if you don't taste it? I think I think a river floats in on say, saw a saying last night. They said, "If ever there's a marriage made in heaven, right, it's out of fruit beer and vanilla ice cream."

[52:32] You've got the fendi or something like that. My wife make it a nice, you know, Sunday outfit. I get a root beer float. He would probably have it. Very similar drink. He probably have it. He likes, yeah. I don't know. I don't know if he likes a root beer float, but he likes to have ice cream in the soda. Whenever there's a galleta, he always get it.

[52:52] I noticed it. Soda pop in the thing. Okay. Now I answer. Thomas says that has has been said. The good is the cause of love in the way in which the object, right, is cause of love.

[53:16] But the good is not an object of the desiring power, except in so far as it is what grasped, and therefore love requires some grasping of the good that is loved. And on account of this, the philosopher says in the ninth book of the ethics that bodily vision is the beginning of what? Yeah. It's very clear that Romeo and Juliet, right?

[53:46] And similarly, the contemplation of spiritual beauty, right, or goodness, is the beginning of spiritual what? Love. Thus, therefore, knowledge is a cause of love, for the same reason by which the good is right. It's on the side of the object that he's saying, right? Okay. As opposed to this likeness,

[54:13] which is cannot be loved unless it is what known. So this, in a sense, is a continuation of the previous article. It's the good as known that is what the object of love, right?

[54:29] So the first, therefore, should be said that the one who seeks knowledge is not entirely what ignorant of it, right? But according to something, he foreknows it, either in general or in some effect of it, right? Or through this that he hears it, what praised, as Augustine says in the tenth book of the Trinity. Thus, he's able to what? In this way, to know it is not to have it, but to know it perfectly is to have it, right?

[55:04] Okay. So if I learn that medicine is the art to cure the body of disease, oh, I like to have some of that, right? Okay. Or logical help me to avoid mistakes. Oh, okay, I like to have that knowledge. Something desirable. Yeah.

[55:23] Now the second one is a beautiful thing here for the for understanding the spiritual life, huh? To the second, should be said that something is required for the perfection of knowledge that is not required for the perfection of what? Love. For knowledge pertains to reason, to whom it belongs to distinguish, right? We said the distinction is what? Before seeing the before and after, right? So if reason looks before and after, it must seek distinction, right?

[55:58] So it belongs to reason to distinguish among those things which are what? Joined secundum rem, right? And to put together in some way those things which are diverse by comparing one to the other, right? And therefore, for the perfection of knowledge, it is required that man knows step by step whatever is in the thing, right? Just as the parts and the virtues and the properties. But love is in the desiring power, which regards the thing as it is in itself.

[56:30] Whence, for the perfection of love, it suffices that the thing be grasped in itself, that the thing, in so far as in itself is is grasped, is loved, huh? And in count of this, therefore it happens that something is more loved than is known, because it can be perfectly loved even if it is not perfectly known. So not to take something apart to love it. So you could like the salad dressing without what?

[57:03] Distinguishing the ingredients, right? Okay. In a lot of wines, they made you know different grapes, right? Sometimes they tell you the percentage of this, the percentage of that, you know. But you can enjoy the wine without, but without distinguishing that the grapes is made from, right? But you don't, you know it fully then, right? Not a lot.

[57:26] Karl Warren says to me, "You know, raving about the Jupiter Symphony. What's it does at the end?" I said, "Well, kind of." Well, he combines five melodies together. I said, "He does."

[57:39] But Heisenberg talks about that because Heisenberg was a great musician, right? Very great pianist and so on. And yeah, you're right about Heisenberg there. Playing Mozart sonatas, so good to play. His stock just went up. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. We talked about you know the difference between enjoying music and analyzing it. You know, the physicist he made it analyzes the music sometimes, but that's really enjoying the music, right?

[58:08] So you kind of love the the whole thing, but you got to take it apart to really know it. It is there's I don't know where Warren gets it somewhere in the computer or somewhere, but you know, do we take apart a Mozart piece for you? Wow. Wow, the subtlety, all the doing, you know, I didn't know, all that sort of stuff, you know. Yeah, yeah. But Mozart said, you know, some of his music could only be fully appreciated by a connoisseur, but it's written in such a way that everybody will like it.

[58:35] But second, you mean some of the inversion? You know, maybe know what the actual verse, what the meter is. But just as most of all, clears the sciences, which some love on account of a very summary knowledge which they have of it, right? That they know rhetoric to be the science which man is able to persuade, and this they love in rhetoric, right? So Augustine was persuaded.

[59:03] teacher rhetoric, wasn't he? And similar it ought to be said about the love of God. So you can love somebody more than you know them, right? This is too even about God, then, right?

[59:23] Now this love that's in all things, this natural love, is caused by some knowledge, but not the knowledge of the natural things themselves existing in them, but in the one who what? Establishes nature. Yeah.

[59:43] So God knows that the plant needs a lot of water. Knows that broccoli is a big feeder, right? Made it that way. Made it that way. Yeah. Okay. Let me

[1:00:01] we should stop here right now.