Prima Secundae
71. Aquinas on the Causes of Love: Likeness and the Other Passions (ST I-II q.27 a.3-4)
Class of 2012-04-26
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/071-aquinas-on-the-causes-of-love-likeness-and-the-other-passions/

[0:00] In the name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas, Deocratius God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray for us. Help us to understand all that you've written. In the name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, Amen.

[0:36] So now we get to the third article, right? The likeness is a cause of love. These four objections are really beautifully designed to help you understand this and not be led astray, like it could easily be done. To the third, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that likeness is not the cause of love, because the same is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the cause of hate, for it said in Proverbs thirteen that among the proud always there are fights.

[1:15] Fights. And the philosopher says in the eighth book of the Ethics that the the the what? Potters Yeah, potters You know, are rival, fighting with each other. Therefore, likeness is not the cause of what love. Carpenters. You know, one comes and he sees what the other guy did, you know, last year, and he complains about it. Never should do it that way. I ran a clergy about incense.

[1:56] I used to say to Warren Murray, you know, when my mother was a widow, right, and my and her sister was a widow, they're both widows, but they're both, you know, maintaining home by themselves, right? Why aren't they just, you know, moving together and have one house, right? And Warren said, you know, that woman can't do things the same way, you know, even sisters. Yeah. And kind of, you know, proportionate to me, he said, the two professors couldn't teach the.

[2:20] Yeah. Every once in a time, Warren and I we sat down and we said, you know, how we're going to teach, you know, philosophy and science, right? Now we're kind of scheduling. We'll go back to our respective places and to teach a course and did kind of different from what we.

[2:39] I don't think you two guys really teach the course the same way, right? And you know, they agree on things, they just don't do it the same way.

[2:52] Moreover Augustine says in the fourth book of the Confessions that someone loves another what he would not want to what be be. Just as man loves the what the actor, I guess, huh? Would not want to be the actor, huh?

[3:10] But this would not happen if likeness were the proper cause of love, for thus a man would love another what himself had or wished to have, right? Therefore, likeness is not the cause of love.

[3:26] These are well chosen these these objections. I think think about the objections is they kind of single out for special consideration just that aspect of the truth, right? And most people can't you know see the whole thing at once, so they have to see it bit by bit, and that's what it does, you know. It's very proportion to the student.

[3:54] The moderns never write this way, right? Moreover, each man loves that which he lacks, huh? Or what he needs, right? Even if he doesn't have that, right? Just as a sick man loves health, and the poor man loves wealth, right? But in so far as he needs and lacks these things, he has a unlikeness to them, huh? Therefore, not likeness, but also unlikeness is the cause of what love, huh?

[4:34] Moreover, the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric that we love those who are what? Beneficent. Yeah, Beneficial, in in money and in salvation, and likewise those who observe friendship, concerned, or those who have died, right, huh? Everybody likes that, huh? That thing.

[4:59] But all are not such, right? So you must be liking someone that's not like you, right? Therefore, similitude is not the cause of love, right? I might be a coward, but I kind of like the brave man, right? Why do I like him if I'm a coward, right? Or he's generous with his money, right? I'm a I'm a scrooge, so if I like this guy, he's generous with his money, right?

[5:29] If I'm a melancholic fellow, I like this guy. He's always joking, right? How can a melancholic man like the the jokester? Against this is what is said in the book of Ecclesiasticus, huh? That every animal loves what is like itself, right?

[5:48] Well, Thomas is going to have to see some distinctions. So Thomas answers that likeness, properly speaking, is the cause of what love. But it should be considered that a likeness between things can be of two kinds, right? In one way, from this, that both have the same thing in act, just as two having whiteness are said to be what similar or alike. In another way, from this, that one has in ability and in some inclination, that which the other has in what act, huh?

[6:35] Just as if we say that the heavy body existing outside its place has a likeness with the heavy body existing in its place, huh?

[6:51] Or also, according as ability has some likeness to the act itself, huh? For in the ability itself, in some way, is the act, huh?

[7:08] I was reading a little thing there by who was it? By Coleridge, no, but he was talking about in the early works of Shakespeare. Right? Can you see? You know, he's going to be really a great poet. And he's talking about the you know Venus and Adonis, those those early narrative poems. And he's talking about how how melodious the the rhyme is and the the meter and the poetry, you know.

[7:31] And he kind of quotes that phrase of Shakespeare, you know, "Beware the man that hath no music in his soul." This is especially a poet, right? A poet's got to be kind of you know have that musical melodious things, huh? And so you can see that he has something in what potency and inclination.

[7:53] And that's what you have when you have an older man say in some art or science, right? And he sees this younger man with some what some ability, yeah, some inclination these ways, right? The first time Heisenberg met Niels Bohr, Bohr was the greatest physicist in the world at that time, you know, Einstein. And Bohr was known as the man who you know understood the atom better than anybody else in the world, right?

[8:20] And he came to Germany, you know, giving a tour and lectures on the atom. And the they called the Bohr Festival, you know, the Germans. And well, Heisenberg was just kind of a young student then, you know, huh? But he attended one of Bohr's lectures, and he posed a question, right, huh? And Bohr gave him an answer, and we kind of looked at me, you know, like that, you know.

[8:41] And then after the session, he came over to Heisenberg and he said, "Let's go for a walk," he says. And he went for a long walk, you know, a couple hours like that. And Heisenberg said, "You know, influence all his future thinking about the atom, right? You know, but what did Bohr see in him? You know, some kind of a what ability there?" By the question he asked and some inclination towards these things, right?

[9:03] And he wanted to encourage him, right? Huh? See, our musician might see this in a young pianist, you know, right? A young violinist or something, you know. There's some ability there, right? They can, you know, just be encouraged, you know, huh? Because he's going to be, he's going to succeed me in some way, maybe a few years.

[9:28] Now he says the first way of likeness causes the love of friendship, right? Or you can call that, like I do sometimes, the love of wishing well, right? The love of benevolence. For from this that some two are like as having the same form, they are in some way one in that what form? Form. Just as two men. Are one in the species of humanity, and two things that are white in whiteness,

[10:09] and therefore the affections of one tends towards the other, just as as something one to himself. This another self, he's just like me, right? I like you because you're like me, and he wishes good to him just as he wishes good to himself. So this is the love of friendship, right? But the second way of likeness, that of ability, right, towards what act, right, causes the love of concupiscence, the love of what wanting, right, or the friendship of the useful, or the what delightful, right?

[10:51] Because the other person has an act, something that you are able to have that you have in ability or potency, and that ability or potency can be what actualized by contact with the one who has the thing in what act.

[11:09] For to each thing existing in ability, as such, there is a desire for its own what act, and in the achievement of that, it delights if it be sensing and knowing.

[11:30] Now it has been said above that in the love of concupiscence or the love of wanting as much as you see in English, the one loving properly loves himself, since he wishes that good for himself. You might say that he wants.

[11:47] Now more does one love himself than another, because he is one in substance with himself, right? While to another he is one in the likeness of some form, right? But it's not the same numerically only in God, only in God, right? Imagine the intensity there, because they have one nature in number, right? While you and I have one nature in species, huh? So,

[12:19] and therefore, if from this that he is like someone in the partaking of some form, he is impeded from the what the good that he loves. The other is made what odious to him, hateful, object of hate, but not in so far as he is like, not per se, right? But in so far as he is impeding his own what good,

[12:53] so you know, if you like this particular piece of music by Mozart, I'm going to start to like you, see. And you're liking that piece of music, by Mozart doesn't impede me from what Like you, right? Okay. But if you and I like the same girl,

[13:15] ah, so much so that I want to we both want to pursue her, right? Well, then we can get each other's way, right? Huh? Okay. But if there's a girl that we're not going to pursue, like some movie actress, and I really like that one, you know, and you do too, well, that's going to bring us together, right? Huh? Because you're enjoying her acting and so on, her on the screen in no way impedes my enjoying it, right?

[13:39] In fact, you know, we can talk about it and enjoy it more, right? But if we're pursuing the same one, right? The same way if you and I are two what PhDs, but there's only one opening, or two doctors, and it's only one opening in the big, you know, important hospital, right? Then we can what? Yeah. Yeah. But that's not in so far as you are like me, right?

[14:04] Because you're getting in the way of what I want, right? And according to this he's quoting that thing from Aristotle the potters are this, and he's quoting that thing from Aristotle, the potters are rival and opposition to each other, right? Because they impede each other in their own gain or their own profit, right?

[14:25] And between those who are proud, there are always what struggles and so on, because they impede each other in their own excellence, which they what desire, right? So two men both want to be president of the United States or something, right?

[14:42] Okay. So again, there's the distinction between the what, per se, and the per accidens right? That first one is the way he doesn't even repeat the thing; he just explained the first objection there, right? Huh? Between pride, proud, there are struggles between the potters, right? Huh? Okay.

[15:11] Now, what about the second objection, though? A little different thing. The second should be said that in this also, that someone loves another, what he does not love, what himself. There is found a likeness in proportionality, right? And

[15:30] he's got to use that word because he's he's departed from the use of the word there in in Euclid, right? Huh? Euclid, two to three is a ratio. Three to four is a ratio. Four to six is a ratio. But you come back to the terms and you say, well, four is to six, yes, two is to three, and that's called a what proportion, right? But Thomas has already adopted the the more recent use of the word proportion to mean a ratio.

[16:00] So two to three is called a proportion rather than a ratio. Well, then when you say four is to six is two is to three, that likeness of proportions—what do you call it? Well, they got a clumsy way of using the word proportionality, right? Huh? Okay. Well, we'll we'll let Thomas take a pass on that, but but I think it would be better to to for in terms of language to follow.

[16:23] I have a master there in Euclid, right? In proportions, we see first in math, and they'd be much more clear. But what can you do with people, you know? Words become yeah, they're they're slaves to the custom. Yeah, it was funny because I was reading the Golden Chain there on Mark there, and they use the word perpetrate, right? Acting with huh? And and and we're talking about the word a little bit last night there.

[16:53] But in English, the word perpetrate got the idea of doing something bad, huh? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, it doesn't mean that at all. The commentary is just something. it doesn't mean that. Latin, the word, right? But for some reason, the word has has come to have that what? Negative connotation. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's like you know, it's correct. when you're translating, you know, Aristotle's definition of tragedy, you know, because it begins by saying it's an imitation of an action that is, you know, serious, complete, you know, some magnitude.

[17:21] Well, imitation means you know, kind of you know, a copy, you know, huh? Inferior. Yeah, and imitation in the commercial civilization we live in means a cheap like you know. Where Aristotle says the poet can represent men as they are, or as they should be, or as they are thought to be, right? I mean, you know, they get all these varieties, huh? So, um, doesn't mean inferior, right?

[17:50] So a lot of times, instead of saying an imitation, they say it's a likeness, right? But he doesn't have that thing, so words sometimes suffer. They decline, right? Or the other word, the word conspiracy, huh? Conspiracy, I think has a kind of a sinister connotation, right? And but it doesn't mean that. I mean, putting together, right? You know, closeness, you know. Conspiracy, you know, taking on a sense of a bad thing, you know.

[18:16] Assassinate somebody. Yeah. Perpetrate somebody. Yes, conspiracy. You're conspiring to perpetrate something. Yeah, yeah. Um. Just as one has himself to that in which he loves, right? So the other has himself in the appetitus, as if a good what, singer loves a Good writer. Writer. There's a what likeness of proportion there, according as each has what belongs to him according to his art, huh? I used to use the example there.

[18:57] I said a truly masculine man, right, wants a woman to be truly what? Feminine. Feminine, yeah, He doesn't want to be masculine. And she doesn't want him to be effeminate, right? You see. But obviously, what masculine and feminine are not the same, right? They're different. But for a man to be masculine is like for a woman to be what? Feminine. Yeah. So there's a likeness there of what?

[19:23] Proportion, right? Yeah. You know, Washington Irving, you know, talks about how there's the this friendship between poets and painters and so on. Sometimes they're they seem to be very what?

[19:51] True friendships, right? Nothing false in them. And but again, because there's a likeness of what? Proportion. Yeah, a likeness, of ratios there. Like proportion Um and they don't come into conflict to see, you know. Why, why Dickens say and Thackeray, you know, were competing, you know, to write the best novel, right? And one write the novel, and everybody's talking about the other guy trying to, you know, write a better novel.

[20:17] And I guess they were in some kind of conflict almost all their life, and just towards the end of their life, there they passed each other on steps going somewhere, you know, and one of them turned around, extended his hand, you know, and just the other guy took his hand, you know, and you say, you know, this is because one is is competing the other, right? Huh?

[20:36] So between the poet and the painter, though, or something like that, right? Or even the painter, the musician, maybe, right? Huh? You know, he is to his art as I am to my art, right? So you respect him, right? Huh? And you respect the cook, right? Because he does what his his thing well, right? Huh?

[21:02] And yet they're they're close enough to to be have a likeness as the basis of friendship, but don't come to competition, right? The competition is what crotchety things, right?

[21:18] And that beautiful girl we both love, if she dies young, you know, we were both dropping tears over her grave. Maybe we wouldn't really be in competition anymore, right? We, you know, and and we could saw each other, right? And that's all that we go through in the monastery, and then at the end of the day, it's now happy days. Happily ever after. It was happily ever after.

[21:43] Yeah. There's only one left. There's only one left in the cemetery. Didn't say he initially, oh, I was in love with the beautiful woman, and then she died young, and then he saw her corrupting body, you know, and he realized how passing these things are, and so on, helped them with tears. And

[22:08] what about the third thing? You see, the one who loves what he lacks, right? Huh? Or needs rather, has a likeness to that which he loves, but the likeness that we spoke of, second kind of potency, to what act?

[22:26] So as to you know, talking there in the first book of the physics, there, right? Aristotle makes the point there. Does something come from its opposite as such?

[22:38] And does the sick man want to be healthy? Well, if the sick man becomes healthy. That will cease to be a sick man, right? So it will destroy him, right? Huh? So is it the sick man, insofar as he's sick, that wants to be healthy, or is it the body that he has that's capable of health, right? Who wants to be what? Yeah, because health is a what?

[23:04] Perfection of the body and the good of the body, but it's not a perfection of sickness. It's an elimination of sickness, right? So does the sick as such seek its own elimination? No, it's not the sick as such that wants to be healthy. I say, do the ignorant want to know? Say, not as ignorant. No, but the ability to know wants to know, right? And the ability to know has a certain affinity, although more distant, right, to knowing, right.

[23:38] So it's still likeness there being the cause of love, right? That second kind of likeness. So notice in the second and the third objection, you have two kinds of likeness, right? The second one it's a likeness in act, but it's proportional, right? And the third is the same thing, but it's likeness of ability to act.

[24:10] And the answer to that is the fourth objection. Why do we like the generous person, right? Why do you like the cheerful person if you're kind of a sap? See, according to the same likeness of ability to act, the one who is not liberal loves the one who is liberal or generous, right? In so far as he expects from him something that he wants, right? And the same reason, the one persevering in what friendship, friendship, to the one who what does not persevere, right?

[24:45] For to both there seems to be some what friendship on account of what usefulness. Then he gives another way of of solving this, right? Or it should be said that although all men, what do not all all men do not have these virtues according to a complete habit, right? Nevertheless, they have certain seed-like things of reason, by which the one who doesn't have virtue loves the one who is virtuous, as conformed to his natural reason, right?

[25:22] You know, not conformed to his present cowardice or whatever it might be, right? Yeah, like the sometimes the you see a real sense of kind of righteous indignation among prisoners when they see someone else treated unjustly. Men who have acted unjustly, been convicted of it, but they find out. Like I remember, Father Benedict Grosheau gave it on the tape when he was arrested for praying the rosary outside an abortion plan, And the prisoners were way incensed.

[25:50] They were really mad. Like, what does this country come to? It, they're really mad that he was arrested for praying the rosary outside an abortion plan, they were all curious, And they weren't very just men they were in prison. You know people talk sometimes about racism, you know, but certain what people don't like other people, you know, it's a class, right? Well, I suppose if likeness is a cause of love, then the cause of hatred is what?

[26:26] Unlike. Yeah, yeah. For some reason, those you know little things kind of stand out more than the essential things that we might be alike in, right?

[26:37] Chesterton has an essay on that where he says the how does he put it? He justifies. He says there's there's a good reason for things like ethnic jokes. He says they're perfectly justified. He says the same reason why we laugh when a man sits on his hat. Why do you laugh at a man who sits on his hat? I mean, it's a small, it's a ridiculous thing.

[26:59] But a man is so embarrassed by sitting on his own hat, and he says that's kind of the same thing with ethnic jokes—the shape of somebody's eyes, or color of his skin, or his hair, or his voice, or whatever it is, his size or shape. He says those are things that really make no difference in his value as a man, but they occupy so much of our attention.

[27:17] It's that disproportion between his real value, his real good, and these small things that occupy so much of our attention. So that's why racial jokes and ethnic jokes are all justified. He says as long as you don't mean to to say that someone's not equal to you or is not as good as you, if you're just trying to show off this disproportion between what occupies so much of our attention and his relative insignificance, he says that's that's the justification for those things.

[27:41] So he uses the example of a man sitting on his hat. Everybody laughs. Poor man has humiliated himself by sitting on his own hat. Have you known someone who uses garlic a lot? You know, the kind of smell they were found. There's the dags.

[28:02] Keeps the flies away. And the vampires, yeah, so I'm told. Now, which seems to be a stronger cause of love, the good or likeness? Because those are kind of the two fundamental causes of of love or liking, huh?

[28:36] Sometimes it does seem to be stronger, right? Huh? I guess it would be likeness. Maybe the likeness is the likeness of some good thing. I don't know. I remember Monsignor talking about you know a person being attached to the personality of the teacher, right? Huh? So you like him as a man, but maybe some other teacher.

[28:58] knows more, right? Huh? So the good that you—that is knowledge, right? This one man has more, right? But he's less like you, maybe. It might be in things outside of. Outside. So in terms of this, you know, the way you find these, you know, Shiites and Sunni fighting, but other races, the Kurds and the Turks and the Kurds and the other people there in Iraq and so on, you know, these people again today, and you know the things hit in the Balkans, you know, you know where you had these.

[29:34] So, in terms of, are you hating somebody because they're bad or because they're unlike you? I don't know Seems to be, you know, stronger because they're unlike you, right? And so that's more a cause of hate. than uh what's more, a cause of love, likeness, or or they could right? But they are kind of distinct causes in some way, right? Because God is very unlike us. Yeah, yeah.

[30:16] They're just what all men want. Yeah. I mean, notice when you talk about the love of God. In so far as I mean, one reason why you love God obviously is because He's good, right? He's goodness itself, right? But as you acquire, say, some grace or some some virtues and become a little way more like God, right? Then, because or even simply because you're made in the image of likeness of God, you realize it, right?

[30:44] Then that's a reason to love God, right? So there's kind of distinctness there, right? The goodness of God is a reason to love Him, and then because you are in some way like Him, more or less, right? Starting with the being made in His image, then you know going into the likeness you have through grace,

[31:08] virtues and so on, right? When Thomas is talking about the reasons for the the Summa Contra Gentiles right, or for this study, here And how wonderful it is, right? But one reason is to, you know, become like God, right? And theology and the kind just his way imitates God who knows all things by knowing Himself, right? So in theology we we consider God fundamentally and other things in so far as God is beginning of them or the end of them, right?

[31:42] So in a sense we're imitating God's way of knowing in a very distant way, right? So we're becoming like Him, right? So, or if you have charity or you know the virtues, right? Or by becoming like God, huh?

[32:03] Well, God is very just, so He's very just, you know. That that's another reason to like Him, you know. Besides the fact that He's so good, right?

[32:20] If you love Him because He's good, He's probably more because is the likeness of act to act or ability to act. Yeah. So although He's given three causes of love, He could put the what knowledge, you know, kind of subordinate that, right? So it's the good as known, right? And like this is the cause of love, right? Now we come to the last article. Whether some other passions of the soul are cause of love, right?

[32:59] Analogously with this some other what act of the will, right, is the cause of what love, right? To the fourth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that some other passion can be the cause of love. If Thomas is going to take the other side, well, he's going to just admit the nut. In a way, this is possible. For the philosopher, it says in the eighth book of the Ethics that some are loved on account of what pleasure.

[33:36] But pleasure is a passion, right? A different passion than love. Therefore, some other passion is the cause of what of love, huh? Kind of funny. I'm re-reading the the Boswell's Life of Johnson, right? And Johnson and Boswell talks about, you know, spending, you know, an hour with Johnson. You know, his mind being infused with a greater mind. You know, so I'm so delighted with this. You know,

[34:12] so it's delighted gets in conversation with him is the cause of him loving the man, right? More desire is a certain passion, also, right? But we love some on account of desire, something that we expect from them, right? Just as appears in all friendship, which is an account of usefulness. Therefore, some other passion is the cause of love.

[34:48] I want some money. You have plenty of it. Can't do it. Like my my dad always used to say about the dog, said love means food. He's going to get food from you. He loves you very much.

[35:08] No permanent friends at all Only permanent interest. So, more Augustine says in the tenth book of the Trinity that of that thing to be obtained, the one does not what have hope, I guess. Yeah. Either he loves. Tepidly. Yeah, wickedly, yeah. Or altogether does not love, although he sees how what beautiful it is, huh? Therefore, hope is the cause of what love, huh?

[35:48] So he's got pleasure, desire, and now hope, right? But against all this, all the other affections of the soul are caused from love. So how can one of them be before love? As Augustine says in the fourteenth book of the City of God.

[36:09] Well, of course there can be what more than one good, right? Okay. I answer: It should be said that no other passion of the soul is there which does not presuppose some love, right? So behind any pleasure or desire you have, or any hope you have, is the love of some what good, right? And the reason for this is because every other passion of the soul either implies emotion towards something, like desire does, hope, or rests in something like joy or pleasure, right?

[36:51] But all motion towards something or rest in something goes forth from some connaturality, right? Or some what adaptation to it, right? And that pertains to the ratio of what love, huh? Whence it is impossible that some other passion of the soul be the cause universally of what of all love, right? Huh. But this is the distinction he wants. But it can happen that some other passion to be a cause of the love of something, just as one good is the cause of what another, right?

[37:35] Huh. So that's the example that he uses then to solve the first objection, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that when someone loves something on account of pleasure, right? Well, he's not denying that pleasure is not a cause of love there, right? But that love is what. That love is caused from pleasure, right? But that pleasure itself, again, is caused from some other. Yeah.

[38:07] For no one delights except in the thing that he loves in some way, right? Huh. That makes sense, huh? Okay. So in one sense he admits that some other passion can be a cause of love, but it's not the the love which it itself precedes, right? Okay.

[38:32] The second, similarly, can be said that the desire of something always presupposes the love of that thing. You never want something that you don't like. I never want salmon. I don't like Brussels sprouts. My wife went out to Boston yesterday to see some friends, and I said, "What did you eat? " Grace, it was sad. So, oh, I was in there. I said, "So, I think, I think when Warren comes down.

[39:04] we'll take Sam. I think we'll make some sound." So, well, I've got, I've got a big dollop. So, I'll have pizza delivered or something.

[39:16] The even the smell of it, you know. Yeah. I went to a sports bar and had some buffalo wings. Yeah. You know, my wife likes, likes you know, fresh lobster right now. So, on the honeymoon we got up to Quebec and coming back to Maine, we got to stop and have some Maine lobster, right? Correct. And they're kind of expensive, maybe compared to what you pay maybe down here, maybe.

[39:44] And they're little, you know, very simple places, you know, huh? But you had to stop there to have a, have a thing. And the only besides lobster is potato chips to go there, you know. Like she's eating this lobster, you know. So he's jumping.

[40:00] Oh, it's not orange. That's a jumping. Once, while she gets a you know lobster, you know, and Chris, someday they're still alive, right? You know, and and sits on the counter. Almost like that thing is moving. We're

[40:21] probably. I'm from Minnesota, you know. In Minnesota, it's it's freshwater fish, right? Yeah. Walleye pike, huh? With the hominy slivers, that's that's really good, you know. And, I was in Fisherman's Wharf in San Francisco. I had to be new. Hey, here's some walleye pike. I don't know where they got it, but that's our order. Rather than, but you know, you don't have that seafood taste, you know, huh?

[40:41] You know, but if you grew up in Massachusetts, like my wife did, you know, then they, you're more exposed to the seafood, yeah. Yeah. I can eat shrimp, you know, that sort of stuff, but you know. I remember went down to a restaurant and and was it make you? And they got a shark, you know. They kind of got. They called a steak. My my son Marcus thought he was getting a steak.

[41:01] Shark. Yeah, yeah. What you do? He ordered the same. Swordfish steak. Yeah, swordfish is not too bad. Okay. But the desire of one thing can be the cause that another thing is what loved, right? Huh. Just as one who desires money loves the one in account of whom, right? I found this that he receives money from him, right?

[41:46] To the theory, it should be said that hope causes or increases love, right? Huh. Both by reason of the pleasure, because it causes pleasure, right? When you hope to get something, right? And also by reason of the desire, because hope fortifies the desire, right?

[42:13] Not that what we did not so intensely desire things, we did not hope to what? Yeah. So this is the story of the sour grapes, right? His desire for them was there, but when he lost hope in his desire, and that probably sour anyway, you know.

[42:35] But nevertheless, the hope itself is of some good, what? Love. So, no, no. This is kind of anticipating what you're going to say later on. Does hope come before love in the theological virtues? Well. you. got to be careful, honestly because you know, in the um Verbum Dei, right? You know, in the that magnificent proemium, right? At the end, it quotes Augustine, right? That by believing we might come to hope, and by hoping come to love, right?

[43:12] Well, there he's talking about the order of what generation, right? So, faith is generated first, and from that, in a way, generated hope, and then from hope is generated love, right? Say, well, how can hope be the source of what love, right? Well, there's going to be some kind of love there before, right? That is necessary for that hope, right?

[43:39] But once you you love God, then you have more hope in God, right? And Paul says, right, charity believes all hopes all, right? For the early generation, this could be, way, in which hope is before that love, right?

[44:00] And is it the love of of wanting that you have there? What is behind that hope, right? Because charity is is a love of friendship, right? This is the love of wishing well. So, you see, how this kind of prepares away, though, for kind of a discussion, at least, of of the order of of hope and love, right? Huh? Okay. So that's a beautiful text there, you know, that that proemium to the Verbum Dei, right?

[44:30] Okay, so we've considered love in itself and its kinds, right? What love is and its kinds, and then we looked before love at its causes, right? Now it remains to look after love at its what? Yeah. Very thorough guidance, Thomas, you know. Very, very, very well ordered, it seems to me, right? Huh?

[44:52] Notice how in the like when you apply it to the third objection, there you can see how the distinction even between what the love of wanting and the love of friendship, which came in the previous question, right, is presupposed, right, to understanding something about these causes, right? Huh? Okay.

[45:13] Because the different kind of likeness that is the cause of the two kinds of what love, huh? So what kind of a love did I have for De Koninck and Monsignor Dionne Hmm? Yeah. So it's a love of wanting, right? Huh? I wanted to know, right? And this man can but illuminate me, right? huh? I remember when Charles De Koninck used to come down sometimes on a kind of lecture tour, you know, and he would talk at some of the colleges and talk at the St.

[45:46] Paul's Seminary and so on, right? And and I could talk at the college and heard him talk at the seminary, and then we used to have kind of consortia of all the colleges, you know, where they would You know, study something, and he spoke of that too. You know, so remember this one friend of my my brother and his cousin. In fact, we just have him, you know, once a week or something.

[46:07] You know, huh? He gives enough to think about for the whole week. You know, a beautiful lecture. You know, huh? You know, my brother Mark talked about the first time he heard the guy. He was a ten man. Really explained things. You know, and really, this guy can learn from. You know, I told you when I I teach at Kasurik I went up to De Koninck and he'd heard about De Koninck you know, and he'd given up philosophy for a while because it was so poorly taught.

[46:30] And he went up there and he was older. And he said, "De Koninck he said, if you teach philosophy the way it was taught to me in the states, I'll get up and leave your class And De Koninck said, "Fine," you know. And then he gets so attached, you know, to De Koninck You know, you know, I mean, yeah. And so this man can learn from, right?

[46:48] Okay. So, but as I became wiser, maybe he could have chance for a little bit of love of wishing well, right? You know. Okay, but this young student, it's a love of wanting, right? But there's a likeness there too that he loves the same things as you. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But see, that's what I'm saying. The older man in the art, right? You know, when Mozart went to to London with his father, right?

[47:20] He's a little boy, you know. But you know, to hear him play, you know, this guy, I used to sit. You know, Johann that Sebastian Bach, but the youngest, you know, Bach there, right? The one who became a Catholic, right? He'd sit on his lap, you know, and play the piano together. You know, it was kind of like a father-son thing there, but he was encouraging Mozart, right?

[47:44] And some of the early pieces of Mozart, they're they're just um John Christian Bach, right? He's he's he's maybe turning a little a little uh Sonated by him into a little kind of concerto or something. You know, Mozart is, you know, there's you know officially 27 piano concertos on Mozart, right? But in Grillostone's book on Mozart, piano concertos is 23. Well, the first four are just kind of copies and imitations of Johann, you know, Christian Bach, you know.

[48:14] But it was most you know Einstein speaks of a pre-established harmony between Mozart and Johann Christian Bach, you know. Or Johann Christian Bach has been described, you know, as Mozart with something missing. But there's a sort of affinity, right? Huh? And I kind of enjoy that. I kind of enjoy Johann Christian Bach more than the great, you know, father Johann Sebastian Bach. You know, there's kind of affinity between him.

[48:46] Johann Christian Bach, you know, he went left Germany, went down to Italy and and taught there and played there and so on, married an Italian, I guess, became a Catholic, became a Catholic. And he went to London and so on, but there you see that affinity right between the, oh, it's in the greater manner. And they used to play the, you know, the quartets in the home there.

[49:11] Little Mozart wanted to play along with them, you know. And his father says, "Well, you know, you play along with so and so, you know." And facing the older man, just put down his father and both had to play. you know? Like he played always the piano, you know.

[49:25] I mean, the violin, without, you know, practice. So it's an incredible, incredible guy. The thing is that Mozart writes for every musical instrument, huh? I mean, there are oboe concertos and bassoon concertos, and you know, violin concertos and and piano concertos. But but he seems to and horn concertos, you know, but he seems to adapt himself to each instrument, you know. He doesn't feel for how an instrument, should be, he should you know write for it, huh?

[49:56] Probably writes for the human voice, you know. I always say, you know, no one realized how beautiful one's voice can be until Mozart wrote arias for it, you know. This is just so beautiful, you know. You don't realize how beautiful it could be the human voice.