Prima Secundae
74. Love as the Cause of All Action, and the Start of Hate: Its Object and Its Cause in Love (ST I-II q.28 a.6; q.29 aa.1-2)
Class of 2012-05-03
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/074-love-as-the-cause-of-all-action-and-the-start-of-hate-its/

[0:00] Just another one here. Sure. This is quite a title here. Whether love is the cause of all things which the lover does, right? To the sixth one, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the one loving does not do all things from what love, huh?

[0:26] For love is a certain what passion, right? Emotion. But not all things that a man does does he do from passion, right? But some of them he does from choice, huh? Some things he does ignorance.

[0:45] Therefore, not everything that a man does does he do from what love, huh? Moreover, desire or the desiring power is a beginning, right? Of motion and action in all the animals, as is said in the third book about the soul.

[1:13] If, therefore, all things which someone does he does from love, then all the other passions of the desiring part would be what superfluous, right?

[1:29] Moreover, nothing is caused together from contrary causes, right? But some things come to be from hate. Therefore, not all things are from what love, huh?

[1:46] People do some awful things from hate, right? You know what did Stalin say? You know, to overcome your enemies, you have to really hate them. You know, no really. So, you know, and then of course the demons or heres are doing things because they hate us, right?

[2:10] But against all this is what Dionysius says, huh? In the fourth chapter of the Divine Names, that in account of love of the good, all do what whatever they do, right? You know what what what the Cajetan said there in the Summa. Here's the famous Leonine, you know, commentary. Thomas seems to have inherited the mind of all the Church Fathers because he so venerated them, right? So when you read Thomas, who are you reading?

[2:44] In the way you're reading Aristotle, and you're reading Dionysius, and you're reading Augustine, right? And you're reading Boethius, you know, reading all these people, huh? Reading one man, right? When you read a modern philosopher, that's who you're reading.

[3:02] It's kind of funny. I'm thinking about the way the modern philosophers, you know, they don't really learn from each other, but they're like, you know, two balls that strike each other and they go off in different directions. Okay, so it had some influence because, you know, Locke was reacting to Descartes, right? And Descartes said this, and off in this way, he was off in this way. But Aristotle was very clear about, you know, one should be thankful to his predecessors, right?

[3:30] Both those to whom one has gained some part of the truth, right? But also one should be thankful to those who were mistaken, right? Because in arguing against them, right, or checking what they said, we developed our mental powers, right? So indebted, you know, for them to their errors, right?

[3:50] You know, Newton, Kant, first lectured on the beginning of the first book of Natural, hearing, the physics, and you know, so clear the mistakes of what Descartes, right? But considering the mistakes of Descartes, there, you know, makes you understand in a sense much better the fact that the confused is more known and more certain than the what distinct, right? Because Descartes identifying certitude with what distinction, right?

[4:20] Well, if you give me a nice glass of red wine and don't let me see the bottle, and I say, "This is good," and you say, "What is that?"

[4:30] Well, the more precise I get, right, the less sure I'll be, right? I can probably tell you it's dry red wine. If you share that, right? But then as I get more particular, right, I'm not so so sure, right? Especially as you get older, your taste buds kind of wear out. I was teaching in California there in the '60s. There, I could tell the difference between Carbonnet Sauvignon North, and South of the Bay.

[4:57] You know, the media had different. You know, it's kind of tricky. You notice the difference, and I probably wouldn't notice them at all. You know, but but it's just in the less sure, right? Sometimes you turn the radio on and there's a

[5:19] piece of classical music on. So, who's that by? You know, it's funny. There's some pieces of Haydn and Beethoven that kind of resemble each other. You don't think of that. There's some certain pieces, right? And some pieces of Haydn that almost seem like Mozart, right? There are pieces of Johann Christian Bach, you know, been described as Mozart, there's something missing. But you know, sometimes you really seem like him, you know.

[5:51] So you try to be more precise and say who's this by, right? Then you're not so sure, right? But I know it's not the rock and roll band. Yeah.

[6:09] Well, Thomas says the answer. It should be said that every agent acts in account of some end. But the end is the good desired and loved by each one, right?

[6:26] Whence it is manifest that every agent, whatever he be, acts whatever action from some love. That's. For example. Yeah, the student I had, the student guy, was at the house there, you know, and Aristotle was saying in dialectic there you have two kinds of arguments: syllogism and induction, right? And Aristotle was saying the text there one should use the syllogism against dialecticus, right? The? Dialecticians, but with the whole hoi polloi, right?

[7:00] You use more what induction, right? Huh? And so I was talking about that, and he says that same thing earlier in the book, in the first book, he talks about syllogism and induction, right? So syllogism is more forceful, right? Huh? But the induction is more proportioned to us because it deals with the sensible, right? Huh? Now I was taking an example last night of the my one of my favorite theorems in Euclid, right, which is theorem five, book two, right?

[7:31] And you've heard that one, right? No, I'm happy to demonstrate it there because I might lose it, you see. The theorem says if you cut a straight line into equal sections, right, and into unequal sections, right, the rectangle or square contained by the equal sections

[8:02] will be always greater, right, than the rectangle contained by the what unequal ones, right? Okay. But not only would always be greater, but you know by how much will be greater?

[8:24] By the square on this line between the points of section. Oh, how beautiful that is, right? Okay, beautiful. Okay. Now in developing that, I went forward and said, you know, it's possible then because of the difference in size, right? Here you have the same what perimeter.

[8:49] But not the same area. So it's possible, actually, because of that, you can make a rectangle with less perimeter but more area. But what's interesting here is that the square, which is the simplest of rectangles, right, contains the most area for the same perimeter, and sometimes even more area for less perimeter, right? Which is kind of anticipates what you find later on in what physical sciences, right, where the more universal a what theory is, the simpler it is, right?

[9:28] So the father of modern physics, Max Planck, right, so he discovered the the the what the name I forget that the Max Planck discovered quantum quantum yeah he believed then as he does now right that the more universal a theorem is the simpler it is right okay. And you have something like this, then you know that the most universal cause of all, God, is what? Yeah, yeah. Just kind of participate in this, right?

[10:09] The simplest contained area, right? Okay. And I used to, you know, make a nice analogy, right? And say that a man's words are to what he says as perimeter is to the area contained, right? And it's possible to say more with fewer words, yeah, if you're really wise, right? And so this is what Shakespeare does, you know. Aristotle does, Thomas does. They say a lot in few words, right?

[10:41] People can, you know, go on talking about love, you know, very little, you know. And so on. Anyway, if I wanted to be a rigorous here, I would give you a demonstration of this, right? I say, take an example. I say, well, let's say that the line is twelve, there, right? So if you divide into six, even it would be six by six. If you divide it in unequal, let's say, suppose you divide it in eight and four, right?

[11:14] Well, six times six is what? Thirty-six. And four times eight is what? Thirty-two. Yeah. And thirty-six and thirty-two differ by four. And six and eight differ by two, and two squared is what? Four, right? Now, if I'd done it even more and made three and nine, the area would be what? Twenty-seven. Twenty-seven, and now it'd differ from thirty-six by nine, and the difference between nine and six is three, and three squared is.

[11:51] Isn't that much more clear? You see? And easier to follow, but it's not as rigorous as if I gave the demonstration, right? It's sort of thing, right? My wife Rosie here has been giving talks in some of the Catholic high schools, you know, you know, about abortion and so on, right? And it's kind of interesting, you know. She uses examples, you know, and so on. And this is what sticks in the kids' minds, right?

[12:18] Because my I told her one thing that my sister-in-law told me at the end of one of these pro-life, you know, sessions. This young man was kind of lost in thought there, you know, and she got talking to him, right? And he'd always resented his mother, right, because she had, you know, given him up for adoption and that, you know, Who knows about it? Of course, in seeing, you know, this pro-life presentation, though, you're talking about women having abortions all the time, right?

[12:45] When I realized that his mother had, you know, despite whatever circumstances were, you know, she had had him, right? She had brought him into, she'd given him life, right? And it's changes, but this stuck in the kids' minds. These stories, you know, because it's so vivid, right? You know, rather the universal reason why it's important is wrong, you know. You know, they don't get that, you know.

[13:08] So here you see, Thomas says simplicity is a virtue, right? But it may be hard for somebody, to know you know, because it's not, it's a solecism right, huh? Every agent acts in account of some end. The end is the good desired and loved by each one, right? Therefore, every agent, whoever he be, acts whatever action he does from some what love, right? This goes back to what Aristotle pointed out that the good is primarily the end, right?

[13:45] What about the first objection, right? People don't always act from the passion of love, do they? He says that objection proceeds about the love, which is a passion and emotion existing in the sense desiring power, huh? But now we speak, and this is the more universal aspect. He's saying about love, communitatis, chapter taken in general, right? Insofar as it comprehends under itself the intellectual love, which the angels have, the rational love, right?

[14:21] The animal love, the emotion, and even the what natural love, right? For thus Dionysius speaks about love in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names. It's kind of beautiful, this? treatise you know for the passion of love. It's it's ending all the time more universal considerations of love.

[14:50] Now, what about the other passions being, you know, irrelevant now if if they're superfluous, right? The second should be said that from love, as has been said before, are caused, desire, and sadness and pleasure, right? So I love somebody, and they're absent, and I'm sad, right? So my sadness is caused by love, right? And consequently, all the what other passions. Whence every action that proceeds from any passion proceeds from some love, right?

[15:27] Just as from a first cause, right now. So I do something to you out of my anger, right? That anger is not love, but it proceeds from some love, right? My excessive love of my own dignity or something, you know. Whence

[15:52] the other passions are not superfluous. Because they are the proximate causes, right? And to the third, it should be said that hate also is caused from love, right?

[16:16] So I hate rock and roll because I love the beautiful. Or I hate salmon because I love what tastes good. Yeah, something like that.

[16:35] That's what they somebody said. You know, they expect de gustibus non est disputandum. Somebody modified that for the case that you would use would be salmon. They used to say de gustibus non est disputandum. It's funny. We go to mass this morning. We go by a certain house that's got kind of an odd ink, you know. And and what would you call the color of pink, right?

[17:01] Well, I guess you know, wives or women or the authorities put the names for all these things here, and it's salmon. There you go. Now you know. And so that's what I thought too, you know. But I just, you know, my wife confirmed this. We call this house kind of an odd paint for a house, right? And but I'll say, you know, just seeing that house makes me sick to my stomach.

[17:26] Can you imagine living in a house Salmon painting? I'll even think of when you go into your house, every time you go into your house, salmon. Maybe somebody likes salmon. Yeah, I have a chance to ever meet them. I'll ask them. You people like salmon? See if they get the get the reference. I don't know why they give it that name. Maybe they're in salmon country or something.

[17:54] We take a little break here now, right? Instead of three, like he had on love, right? And let's look at the premium here, right? Then we're not to consider about hate, right? About this, he's only going to ask six things.

[18:17] Now, the first thing he asks seems reasonable place to begin, right? Whether the cause and object of hate is what? The bad, right? Well, that corresponds to the what? First article and the second question on love, right? Whether the good is the cause of what love, right? And they go together, cause and object, right? Because the object here is one that moves the power, right? So what is the object of of love?

[18:57] Is the cause of love? Is the object of hate? Is the cause of hate, right? So he says it utum causa et objectum right? That they go together, right? Okay. And just like the object of fear is what causes you to be afraid, you know, the guy comes in with a gunner, you know, a terrorist or whatever it is. Then he's going to arouse some fear in us, right?

[19:23] So the object of fear is the cause of my fear, right? What I fear is the cause of my fear, right? Okay. Arrest of some guys there for trying to blow up the A bridge there in Cleveland, I think it was. Really? Yeah. Yeah. Kind of a bunch of incompetents, I guess, I don't know whether they're guilty or not? Did they get a bunch of kids or something?

[19:47] Well, I know there's some kind of anarchist set in. Oh, really? In Cleveland, the whole place. Yeah, I believe. Have to tell. Sorry, Brian. So he doesn't have a whole question like he had about the nature of love, right? The kinds of love, right? Doesn't have a cutting on the nature of hate and the kinds of hate. Yeah. I mean, but you kind of know it from what's opposite, right?

[20:18] Then secondly, for there, hate is caused from what? Love. Of course, that's a little different, now, because love is the fundamental emotion, right? But love can be caused by another passion, but with another object, right? Now, but here, whether hate is caused from love. So both of those articles are about the cause, in a way, of hate, right?

[20:48] Okay. But then, rather than saying, you know, what is effective hate? It's a strange article. Whether hate is stronger than love, huh? Why should he he take that in, right?

[21:12] Comparison. Or you take, you know, the you expect the effects of love to be contrary to the effects of love, right? Huh? So maybe he he would admit that, but you take that as being what noble from what's gone before, right? So if love first of all unites us with the loved, right? Then hate, what? Yeah, that yes, he's invited to have an article on that, you know.

[21:43] But mutual and easier, right? Huh? What would be the opposite of that for hate? Mutual exclusivity, revulsion. Yeah, and then the third effect of love.

[22:04] Well not endroad No that's what he just said That was the second one. Ecstasy. Hatred must make you draw into yourself. or something. I don't know. I think so. Yeah, yeah.

[22:29] You hate people, don't go out to them except. Yeah. Introversion. Yes. Yeah, I've heard, I've heard that expression. Somebody hates somebody so much. If he was on the other side of the street, I wouldn't come across the street to spit on him. You know, if he was on fire, I wouldn't come across the street to spit on. But this guy's surprising. You wouldn't expect this third article to be what it is, all right?

[22:49] Whether hate is stronger than love, right? He has that. Now, whether someone can have and hate himself, right? I know how he answers that in another place. He talks about just like love, love as good as known. So maybe you could hate yourself without really knowing something. Then whether someone can have and hate the truth. Can you hate the truth? If you like being deceived, maybe. Was it pratchettian?

[23:32] She can hate truth. I don't know. Maybe. And six, whether something can be had, what, in hate, universally, right? Aristotle says, you know, we hate all these, But we don't anger every man, you know, because anger is kind of more particular cause, right? Okay.

[24:11] Well, anyway, before we get there, we'll look at the rest of the article here. However, whether the cause to the first one proceeds thus? It seems that the object and cause of hate is not the what bad, right? Huh?

[24:32] For everything that is, as such, is what good. Good, huh? So Augustine says, sin is nothing, right? To the man who sins, it becomes nothing. If therefore the object of hate is the bad, it would follow that no thing is had in hate, right? But only the defect of something, which is clearly false.

[25:03] Further, to hate the bad is praiseworthy, huh? Laudable. Whence, in the praise as some, it is said in the second book of Maccabees that they guarded optimae well, right? That's the laws, right? Huh? On account of the piety of Onias the priest, the pontiff, and what? They had hatred, so I guess they they had bad things and hate their souls, right? Had them. Was that the ablatio their odio?

[25:43] I think so. Yeah, because it's that their souls in hate had bad things, right? Yeah, had bad things in hate. If therefore nothing is hated except the bad, it would follow that every what hate is what praiseworthy, huh?

[26:04] I suppose it depends on what you hate, right? So is hate good or bad? Depends what you hate, right? Aristotle says in the *Premium to the to the De Anima* that all knowledge is what good as such, right? Not all love, and not all hate is bad, right?

[26:41] Don't they tell you should hate hate anybody or hate anything? Hate some things, anyway. Moreover, the same thing is not at the same time good and bad, right? But the same two diverse people, I guess, is what hateable and lovable, right now. You love salmon. I love salmon. You hate it. Sorry. Therefore, hate is not only of the good, but also of the bad, but also of the what?

[27:20] The good, huh? Perfectly good. But against this, hate is contrary to love. But the object of love is the good. Therefore, the object of hate is what?

[27:41] Hope and despair opposites, but. Yeah. Yeah. it's different kind of thing. Different kind of thing, yeah. Answer it should be said that since. love is not only of the good but also of the good. Since natural desire is derived from some grasping, right? Some knowledge, although not what.

[28:09] Joined, not joined with it. Joined with it. There seems the same what reason about the inclination of a natural desire and of a what? Animal. Yeah. Which follows a grasping that's joined to the animal, right? Isn't. Yeah. Well, when the tree wants sunshine, it doesn't know about sunshine, right?

[28:38] Someone else does know about. Now, in natural desire, this manifestly appears that just as each thing has a natural harmony with or aptitude to that which is suitable to it, right? Which is natural love, huh? So, to that which is repugnant to it and corruptive of it, it has a certain dissonance, right? Natural dissonance, dissonance, which is natural what? Hate.

[29:18] So the stone doesn't want to go up, right? Wants to go down. Thus, therefore, both in the animal desiring or in the understandable, understanding desirable power, love is a certain what? Harmony. Harmony, which the appetite.

[29:42] not the appetite for to that Which is apprehended as suitable to it, right? Huh? Hate is a dissonance, certain dissonance of the appetite to that which is apprehended as repugnant, right? Or harmful, right? Huh? That's definitely the way. it sounds huh. Now, just as everything suitable as such has a notion of the good, right? So everything that is what repugnant or harmful, as such, has a notion of the bad, and therefore, just as good is the object of love, so bad is the object of what?

[30:30] Hate. So he's arguing partly from hate being the contrary of love, that its object is what the bad, right? And partly from the likeness to what natural love and hate, right? Huh? Okay. Now

[30:54] you read about some of these vineyards, you know, and they seem to be, you know, what we would consider poor soil, you know, for farming, you know. But the a lot of these vines they like a kind of a rough soil and they don't like a rich you know tree on straw thing you know they hate that you know

[31:18] you see in the wine books you know Bacchus amat colles you know you know Bacchus, the god of wine loves hills right you know so on

[31:36] okay to the first therefore it should be said that being in so far as it is being right does not have the what ratio character repugnance but more being what suitable because all things come together in what being but being in so far as it is a what determined particular being has the notion of some repugnance to some what other determined being and according to this one being is hateable to another and is what bad for it although not in itself nevertheless in comparison to what another

[32:36] so I wouldn't want to be burnt at the stake huh? You wouldn't want to be burnt at the stake yeah would I want to be yeah no you're gonna do it

[32:50] but as far as something bad Something bad Yeah We actually used to cook our hot dogs over the fire right cook our hot dogs over the fire right Sure, yeah, or the marshmallows It's good for the hot dog to be in the fire It's good for the marshmallows, too. not good for me to be in the fire good it's good for the water to be heated up for tea yeah

[33:37] to the second should be said just as something is apprehended as good that is not what truly good right so something is grasped as bad that is not truly what bad once it happens sometimes that neither is what of the bad Nor love of the good to be good, To be good, right? Yeah. You can hate something that isn't bad, you love something that isn't good.

[34:11] Yeah. So what did the witches say in the beginning of Macbeth Fair is foul, and foul is fair. Hover through the fog and filthy air. So there's two areas there, right? Fair is foul, the good is bad, and foul is fair. Bad is good, right? And then two causes, huh? Fog that the mind is in, and then the filth of the appetite there, huh? That's a good example, you know.

[34:46] There's abortion thing, right? Abortion is good, right? Abstinence is bad. So, so, so the mind is in fog, right? Huh? Instead in filth, right? Going on in the world.

[35:10] That said, with that brevity of of wit, huh? Brevity of wisdom. I've been tempted if somebody's defending abortion. No, fair is foul, and foul is fair. Hover through the fog and filthy air. That that that should be the slogan of Planned Parenthood. Yeah, exactly what they do. Yeah. They market filth. Yeah. And then sell people abortion or something.

[35:54] To the third, it should be said that it happens the same to be lovable and hateable to diverse ones, according to what natural appetite, right? Huh? From this, that one and the same is suitable to one according to its nature, and repugnant to the other, right? Just as heat prolongs to fire is repugnant to what? Water. Water, right? Huh?

[36:23] And according to animal appetite, from this that one and the same thing is grasped by one under the ratio of something good, and by another under the ratio of something what? Bad. That's salmon between us. Yeah.

[36:45] That's probably the natural repugnant. We all have our natural enemies, right? That's what one of our teachers used to say about Brussels sprouts. They were intrinsically evil because God didn't intend to make them, or something like that. They're naturally defective.

[37:04] Okay, another time for another one here. Sure. Okay. Whether Hate is caused from love. the second one precedes thus, It seems that love is not the cause of hate. For those things which are divided as opposites, right, naturally are what together, as you said, in the predicaments. But love and hate, since they are contraries, are divided ex opposito right, as opposites. Therefore, naturally, they are what together. Yeah.

[37:42] Therefore, love is the cause of what hate. No. So I mean, you take a genus, right? What's the common definition there, kind of, of contraries, right? Well, they're species that are furthest apart of the same genus, right? Okay, so you divide, say, quality up, and you get habit, right? And you divide habit into good and bad habits, differentia virtue and vice, but they're what hama together, simul, right?

[38:14] Okay. So habit is before virtue, right? The genus is for the species, right? But the contrary opposites are what together, right? Okay. Virtue and vice, huh? So shouldn't you know love and hate be like virtue and vice, right? They should be hama But if if love is the cause of hate, that's the the so-called fifth sense there in the chapter in the categories, chapter twelve or chapter yeah, cause is before the effect, right?

[38:52] Okay. Chapter twelve is about before, right? Then chapter thirteen is about hama, right? Huh? Okay. And so I don't know. I don't know. Say.

[39:30] Moreover, one of two contraries is not the cause of the other, right? Wouldn't you say that the beautiful is the cause of the ugly, or the ugly makes something beautiful? But love and hate are contraries. Therefore, love is not the cause of hate. That's that's

[39:58] definitely well proven, statue. Moreover, the posterior, the afterward, is not the cause of the before, right? But hate is before what? Love, huh? As it seems, huh? For hate implies a what? Recess from evil. Love and excess to the good. Therefore, love is not the cause of hate, huh? So, in the act of contrition, there, right? Come on, man. They fear the what? Loss of heaven, pains of hell, yeah.

[40:42] But you see, you've got to kind of leave your sins, right, and then you kind of pursue the good, right? So you've left all things involved here. Yeah, yeah.

[40:53] So a person gets up one day and says, "I hate myself." You know, you know, maybe just doesn't think he's too fat or something. You know, and something he hates himself, right? His his his sins are where they are,

[41:21] right, huh? So he turns away from those vices and hate. Come before love, right? He turns towards the good, right, huh? Some way. So those are interesting arguments, right? Smart guy, that Thomas. I mean, damn smart, huh?

[41:49] But against this is what the great Augustine says in the fourteenth book in the City of God that all affections are caused from what? Love, huh? That's the word affection. It doesn't mean you know affection. You know, love. I mean, it's used for all the emotions here, right? Where you're affected. Okay. And therefore, also hate, since it's a certain affection of the soul, is caused from love.

[42:21] How do they translate that affection there? All emotions are caused by it. These were emotion, huh? Yeah. So I don't know how affection got to be.

[42:36] Love, right? It's a little like you know when you talk about luck, right? Is is good luck and is bad luck, right? But then for some reason, if you see somebody's lucky, it means good luck. Yeah, and you want to say the other guy's unlucky, right? I don't know why it is, you know. I guess something like that in other languages too, you know. Very interesting. You know, in Latin, if if you see somebody's fortunate, that means good fortune, right?

[43:05] Unfortunate, it's bad, huh? We do have an expression. in English we say somebody's down on his luck. Yeah. His luck hasn't been good. Yeah.

[43:21] Well, Thomas says, "Huh? " I answer, "Should be said that love consists in a certain what? Agreement, right? " Ah, of the lover to the loved, and hate consists in certain repugnance, huh, or dissonance, huh? But it's necessary in each thing, prius, right, to consider what fits to it, what is suitable to it, right? Then that which is what repugnant to it, huh?

[43:56] Because something is repugnant another because it is corruptive or it impedes that which is suitable to it, right? Whence it is necessary that love is before what hate,

[44:14] and that nothing is had in hate except through this that it is contrary to what to suitable that is loved, right? And according to this, all hate is caused from what love. Thomas is always looking before and after, isn't

[44:37] he? Hm. Was talking last time about these distinctions of four, right? huh? Well, in the twelfth chapter, the categories, you have the distinction of what the senses of before, right? And therefore the kinds of before the kinds of order, right? And then, and my friend there, you go Saint Victor, but Thomas says it in the day of the Commentary on the Ethics, right? He has a distinction of order in comparison to reason.

[45:13] So, if reason is defined by looking before and after, don't you want to know the senses of before and after, the kinds of order there are, the species of order, right? And then how order is compared to reason, right? Huh? Which gives rise to different kinds of knowledge that reason has, huh? Because an order he says that reason doesn't make, but only considers, and that order is considered in natural philosophy and later on in first philosophy.

[45:47] Then there's order which reason makes in its own acts, and that's considered in logic. Then the order which reason makes in the acts of the will, that's considered in ethics, and then the order which reason makes in exterior matter that belongs to the servile and mechanical arts, right? So you divide in the way. Human knowledge by the what order it considers right. You have to first see the distinction of order in comparison to reason.

[46:19] Now, okay. So you don't use the distinction of the kinds of order, you know, to distinguish the kinds of knowledge, but you need this other distinction, which is also the comparison of of order to reason, right?

[46:38] Try to get a philosopher in that. Right? What kind of a how you've been looking before and after without even considering these things? Huh? You better get into you better read Aristotle and Thomas, right?

[47:00] Otherwise, you'll be one of those modern philosophers ricocheting. They just yeah yeah yeah yeah. You you read what. Thomas says about the Latin Averroes right. They speak as if wisdom began with them. This is certainly not the way Thomas, you know, when he borrows from and learns from Aristotle and learns from Dionysius and learns from Augustine, right, and Poethius, right, And even Avicenna, right.

[47:32] You know, I I, I told you that I was looking at the article there, or this equality of the Father and the Son is that a real relation or relation of reason? Equality. Yeah. And in the Athanasian Creed, he says they're, you know, equal, you know, magnitude and power and so on.

[47:56] What Thomas says, it can't be a a real relation, right? You can't base on the fact that they have one nature, right? Because it's not a real relation of a thing to itself. So you see, Socrates is the same as Socrates, Socrates. That's not a real relation, right? And that's one kind of relation of reason Aristotle talks about, right? And then he says there can't be a relation of a relation, and that's Avicenna, one of the kinds he spoke of, right?

[48:26] So there he brings in, you know, Av Avicenna, who he's taken, you know, that and actually taken two kinds of relations of reason that Avicenna distinguished, and two that Aristotle did, and he puts the four together, right, you know. But he's using one of these, one of these, you know. He's not speaking as if wisdom began with him, right? He's taking this from his master Aristotle, and taking this even from Avicenna, you know, even though he disagrees with that of a son sometimes, right?

[48:58] That's where the modern philosophers are. They speak as if wisdom, you know, begin with them. That's really a good way of describing them. Now this is what I think. Yeah. That's what Ratzinger had meant to do in Rome

[49:23] some years ago. Some group of scholars for a certain publication celebrating some anniversary of their publication. Ratzinger was one of the founders of this thing, so they invited him to give a talk, and he kind of gave a kind of a what's the word? Cautionary exhortation to don't kind of get closed in on your own little world of discourse and your own ideas and just keep talking to yourselves.

[49:49] It will be more. He was an open, and one of the stuffed shirts that was there raised his hand and said, "Who are you talking about?" And Ratzinger just bowed his head. I guess chiefly myself. What a jerk! That guy was. What a deal was. He spoke as if wisdom started with him.

[50:16] Now, what about this first objection, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that in those things which are divided ex opposito, right?

[50:30] Some are found which are naturally what simul, right? Together, both secundum rem, right, and secundum rationem, right. Just as two species of animal, like dog and cat, right, dog before cat or cat before dog,

[50:56] or two species of what color, green and red. Now, some are what together according to reason, but one is what before the other and is cause, as is clear in the species of what Numbers. numbers, figures, and what motions. So, like like locomotion is a cause of the other kinds of motion, right? Okay, alteration is a cause of what growth, right? supposition, right? Okay, one can be without two, but not vice versa.

[51:43] Two can be without three, but in figures, a triangle joins into the square, right? To all those those parallelograms, right? So, and that's what he's saying there. They are simul secundum rationem, but one is really before the other, right, and its cause.

[52:25] So, when reason says number, let's say two and three, right, is two more number than three? No. But secundum rem, two is what three? Yeah, yeah. And that's when Aristotle gives the second sense of before there, right? His example is one is before what two. Thomas is cribbing it, right?

[52:58] Okay, but I don't remember Aristotle making this distinction. that. This explicit one he does, you know. Um. Some are not what, simul or together. Neither secundum rem nor secundum rationem, as substance and what, accident.

[53:27] For substance, secundum rem, realiter, right? is the cause of accident, right? And being, secundum rationem, right, is attributed to substance before accident, right? Because it's not attributed to accident, except in so far as it's in what. So, and if you didn't know the categories, how would you understand this text, right?

[54:13] Now, love and hate naturally are what. Together. Secundum rationum. Mm-hmm. But not really. So no, so it's dividing emotions, right? They say. you divide emotions into love and hate. Other emotions too, but you know. So, emotion is set of love. That's one emotion. It's another emotion. So they're kind of equal, aren't they? Right. They're they're together, right? Okay. But yet, love is what. A cause of of hate, right?

[54:54] Like he explained in the body article, right? So, secundum rem, love is before hate. But is emotion set of love before hate? In some ways, I'm seeing one of the daily articles here that hate is more what sensible

[55:18] than love, right? Okay. Yeah, visceral. Yeah. Now, one day, when I divide Shakespeare's plays into four kinds, right? Huh. But the you have one in though you have what tragedy and comedy, right? And the plays in between, you know, during the Renaissance, they were trying to understand not so Shakespeare's plays, but plays that don't seem to be their tragedy or comedy, right, but something in between. And so they coined a word that was tragicomedy, Tragedy, you know, for one of their names, right?

[56:00] Huh. Okay. Historically, the the word what romance, right? But there's there's the medieval romance and there's a Greek romance. And so there's two middle kinds in Shakespeare. One this goes back to Greek romance, right? And the other goes back to the what, the medieval romance, right? Okay. Now the new editions coming out of Shakespeare, you know, they don't follow the original division of the plays, right? Which was into tragedies and comedies and history, right?

[56:32] I mean, they may keep the histories in there and tragedies and comedies, but then they take the last plays of Shakespeare, the last four, and call them what romances, right? But then the Greek romances, right? Then the other one could be called romances too, you know, but different sense of romance, huh? But in some sense, those ones in between are tragic comedies, you know. They're called dark comedy sometimes, you know, but but it it seems to be like what a mixture of tragedy and comedy in a way, right?

[57:02] Huh? And therefore to be what in a sense posterior to tragedy and comedy, right? When you divide it into its species, you make them kind of what, ex aequo, right now, you know, this kind of play. This species, this species, right? So it'd be ama secundum what, rationum, right?

[57:25] What play would be before secundum rationum, right? Not secundum rem unless you're a Platonist and think that there are forms, right? There are taking you know, things, right?

[57:50] Okay. So love and hate are simul secundum rationem, but not secundum what, rem, right? Okay. Now, if you know the fifth book of of natural philosophy, right? You know, I mean of the

[58:13] natural hearing, you know, the fifth book of the physics. That's where Aristotle divides what motion into its what, species, right? Okay. Now, probably you knew in in high school, you know, if not in college, um, kind of the popular division was into physics, chemistry, and what, biology, or, of the natural sciences, right? Well, that division goes back to Aristotle. Okay. But it goes back originally to the fact that he distinguished locomotion, change of quality or alteration, right, and then change of quantity and some growth, right?

[58:55] Huh. So the oldest part of physics was about change of place, right? And then chemistry was about change of quality, right? And then biology about change of what, growth things and growth and other changes that develop on life, right? So that that became traditional, right? Huh? Coming down from Aristotle, but when it became customary, they didn't understand the basis for the division, right? Which is the distinction of three kinds of change or motion, right?

[59:27] And so they just started getting things like atomic physics, right? Which really is not getting the change of place, right? When they, you know, they discovered atomic physics, it wasn't that, right? And so when you when you when you come to Heisenberg, right, he's dividing the physical sciences, right? Huh? He puts atomic physics with what chemistry, right? That's kind of complementary, right? See, so if you put atomic physics with mechanics, chemistry over here, you know, that's because you're not, you know, that's kind of the accidents of the way things developed, you know, huh?

[1:00:07] And but it's not understanding the original reason for the basis for the distinction of the three, right? Okay. So if you're dividing a genus into species, secundum rationem, the genus is before the species, but the species are what together, right? Okay. But nevertheless, Aristotle will say that what if you want to what alter things, you want to melt the wax, let's say, you kind of bring the the wax to the fire, the fire to the wax, right?

[1:00:37] It's going to be a change of place, right? So there can be a change of place, but there can be a change of place without a change of quality, but there can't be a change of quality without a change of what place, right? When the sun comes up, you know, it forms earth, right? Okay. But there can't be growth without a change of quality because you have to what change the food into something that can be assimilated to you, right?

[1:01:04] So that was an example he gave was in the text here, one of the ones there where he says some things are simul secundum rationem, right? But one is really before another in a cause, as is clear in the species of numbers, figures, and what motions, right? When Aristotle was dividing motion into three kinds, it's kind of what simul, right? Those three kinds, right? Secundum rationem, right?

[1:01:39] Okay. That's when we speak in the categories, right? When you when you divide, right? So it's like when you when you divide let's say rectilinear plane figure, right, into triangle and quadrilateral and pentagon and hexagon, right? Huh? They're being divided what secundum rationem into what things that are simul, right? Okay. So triangle and quadrilateral will be divided against each other, right? Okay. I get maybe one is what before the other, right?

[1:02:19] Because triangle is simpler and and in every rect every other rectilinear figure is composed potentially, right, explicitly of triangles, right? It's the theorem theorem, right, that the diagonal of the of the what parallelogram divides into two equal triangles, right? Hey, you're such a guy, this this Thomas, you know? Okay. Thomas is looking before and after secundum what rationem and secundum what. Well,

[1:03:14] I'm just getting into it. He's just getting into it. Which is which is before secundum rationum, the wisdom of Aristotle, the wisdom of God.

[1:03:30] Yeah. The wisdom of God. No, we know the wisdom of Aristotle before the wisdom of God. We do, yeah. Yeah, yeah. But secundum rem, the wisdom of God is before, right? Okay. Okay. But you know when they talk about you know

[1:03:54] is the word wise carried over from human wisdom to God? You know, there's some changes obviously. You know, it is, yeah, yeah. But secundum rem, right? The wisdom of God is the original wisdom, and our wisdom in some ways is, but an effect of that, and you know, like this and so on, huh? You know. I was reading some subties on the Trinity there in the in the sentences.

[1:04:31] You know, they say these things are so subtle. You come away realizing you don't really understand the Trinity. You know that what must be to to see God, right? And actually, oh, that's the way. That's the Trinity. Yeah. Under illusions, all of you. Now,

[1:05:06] what about one contrary is not the cause of the other, right? Well, love and hate are contraries when they are taken about the what same thing, same, huh? But when they are about contraries, they are not contraries, but they are following upon each other, right? What does he mean by that, right? Well, to love salmon and to hate salmon are what? Contraries are about the same thing, right?

[1:05:36] Huh? But to love beauty and to hate what ugliness, right? The contrary. See, or to love virtue and to hate vice, are they contrary. No, And in a sense, my hatred of vice, he says, presupposes my love of what virtue, right? I wouldn't hate vice if I didn't love what virtue. I wouldn't hate the ugly if I didn't love the beautiful.

[1:06:12] So they're not contrary, but simul vicem consequentur For is of the same rationis, right? That something is loved, and that its contrary is hated, right? The one loves virtue and hates vice, right? That one loves the truth and hates what falsehood, right?

[1:06:41] And thus, the love of one thing is the cause that its contrary is hated, right? That's a beautiful distinction, right? It's not hard to see when you stop and think about it, right?

[1:06:56] Now he says, in execution and carrying out, first is to recede from one what term, then to exceed to the other term, right? But in intention, it's the reverse, because on account of this, one recedes from one term, one might accede to the other, right? Now the motion of the desiring power more pertains to intention than to the carrying out of something, right? And therefore, love is what, yeah, is before hate, since both is a motion imperative.

[1:07:37] Good prayer. I stop now.