Prima Secundae
76. Per Se vs. Per Accidens; Hating the Truth, Hating in General (aa.5-6), and Why Hate Follows Love
Class of 2012-05-10
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/076-per-se-vs-per-accidens-hating-the-truth-hating-in-general/

[0:00] So, so in answer to the question whether a man can hate himself, is the answer he can hate himself per accidens, but not per se? Yeah, yeah. That's the answer. You see, I just picked it up. You know, not this exact question, but something similar. You know, Aristotle defines it as the good

[0:25] is what all want. That's the definition of the good, right? This is the very beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, right? The good is what all desire, what all want. And he gives a kind of little induction, right? And and he says, and then he he says, and they say, well, therefore, the good is what all want, right? Okay, and now somebody comes along and says, "Well, I know people want bad things.

[0:58] So how can you say the good is what all want, right? How do you defend it against that kind of objection, right? Or does this break down under the fact that there's, you know, there's something around, right?

[1:18] Well, he must think what he wants is good in some way. Yeah, yeah. So this is, in a sense, per se, right? To state that this would all want, right? The bad, as such, is not wanted, right? We say the bad as such is not wanted. Okay. But we have to admit. Something is a fact of experience that the bad is sometimes wanted, right? Especially for others.

[1:59] And sometimes even for ourselves, right? Okay. But it's not as such wanted, right? So that's the distinction, per se and per accidens Yeah, yeah, But now that distinction could come in there, right? too, you know, You know, because when you're when you're willing or wanting the bad, it might be because it appears good in some way to you, right? Even though simply it's bad, huh? So if you don't see the distinction here between per se and per accidens, you can sometimes speak of that perse as such, right?

[2:47] Speaking of it, then this whole thing will break break down, right? So you can't get anywhere in philosophy, you know, in the very beginning, people would be denying this, right?

[3:08] if they don't see that distinction. Same thing here, right? He's going to touch upon that in the next article, right? You know, we'll see this.

[3:28] But notice, as I say, Aristotle he talks about that distinction and that kind of mistake, right? He says to seize even the wise, right? I won't tell them it's really hard to see. Yeah, yeah But if you go down through the history, you know. You know, even Greek philosophy. See that people don't sometimes see that, right?

[3:53] I was giving the example there from Socrates today, right? But then the one from Heraclitus, you know the early Greeks. One opposite becomes the other, right?

[4:08] So you always ask the question: Does something want its own destruction? Well, the sick want it to be healthy. And then you want something to destroy yourself, right? You don't want to be sick, right? Well, that's per accidens, right? Huh? The sickness doesn't wish the health, but the body, right? Huh? So Aristotle distinguishes between the body and the sickness, huh? Because if health or to be healthy is something good, right?

[4:49] Huh? Then the body is in some way good too, because it's capable of being healthy, right? But sickness doesn't seem to be in any way good, right? Not in itself, nor is it capable of the good, right? But it's destroyed by it, right? That's a beautiful thing, there, in a way, where when you charge against Plato, right? And Plato, you see, kind of confuses the the what matter with non-being, right?

[5:18] So matter turns out to be a kind of what non-being, right? And again, the Platons, you know, they speak of accident as being non-being, but it's not nothing. Yeah, they're confused, right? But but there you can say that that accidents are not being simply, but in some way, right? So when I come, when when I was you know generated by my parents, I came to be, right?

[5:48] Duane Berquist came to be. But when I studied Euclid, I didn't come to be. I had to qualify, it. But somewhere I came to be, right? I came to be a geometer, right? When I walked into this room, I came to be in this room, right? When I leave this room, I will cease to be, not simply, I hope not, but in some way I will cease to be, right?

[6:12] I'll cease to be in this room, right? You expect it to be limited. until the fall, right? Until the fall, that's right. He leaves today, unless some unexpected surprise. Yeah. Yeah.

[6:39] So Plato's making the mistake of what, personipractinums, and identifies matter with non-being, right? You know, Aristotle or not Aristotle Thomas says, you know, Augustine, of course, didn't know Aristotle very much, right? He's kind of a Platonist, right? And he tries to follow the pattern as far as he can, the faith will allow, right? But sometimes he, you know, speaks a little bit like a Platonist, you know, where he speaks of the matter.

[7:04] If I could say it's a something that is a nothing, or a nothing that is something, that's what I would say, you know. But it's a little bit speaking almost like like you know Plato, right? Huh? But if you say, you know, he speaks that way of sin too, somehow. Yeah, but that's more reason to say sin is... Yeah, privation. But matter is not privation, right? And Aristotle argues, you see, that that if you know that matter desires form, right, because it's perfected by it, right.

[7:36] But the lack of form doesn't desire the form, but is going to be what if it desires its own destruction, right? Nothing wants what's bad for itself, right? Nothing, right. Okay, you take examples. You do the healthy one, sick one to be healthy, right? Well, the body wants to be healthy, but the sickness doesn't want health. That's because of them, right?

[8:02] So I mean, so you want to distinguish between what is desiring health as such, and what happens to what desires health as such, but is itself not as such desired, right? So I mean, that's all in the first book of natural hearing, the so-called physics, right? The series in the first book of the of the ethics, right? Huh? So this is the very beginning, and it's so fundamental these distinctions, right?

[8:32] Of the pair, you know. There's no book about them, but the the book of the, refutations, right? Kind of makes you concentrate on these kinds of distinctions because there's a very common and difficult to avoid kind of mistake that corresponds to each one of these what kinds of distinctions, right? Aristotle says the distinction from mixing up the senses of a word is the most common mistake being made, right?

[9:00] That's the thing he says about the first kind of mistake that he gives in words, right? And then the first one outside the first three predicables, there he says that even the wise are deceived, right? Which is a very strong way of saying it, right? But but all these ones are important and good to know, right?

[9:21] But this distinction is seen all the time when you're talking about the what, the the Trinity and so on, you know? Oh, that's a. I didn't see that, you know. But you start out thinking in simpler examples, right? Huh? When

[9:42] I try to explain Sartre's to us a little bit, I take the example of, of, you know, is it ignorance? And I can only teach the ignorant. I can't teach those who already know, right? Was our Lord say something like that, right? About it's come to cure not those who are healthy, you know, but those who are sick, you know. So I can only teach the ignorant, right?

[10:04] Nobody else can be taught. And therefore, you're you're you're able to learn because you're ignorant, right? Right. See, but really, ignorance is not what gives you the ability to learn. See. See? That's what Sartre's doing with the will, right? Huh? That the ability to choose. He says before you choose, if you really choose, right? Your will must be undetermined, right?

[10:38] So you know, if they give you a menu there, and the steak and something, salmon. Yeah. Yeah. If I really, you know, if if I can really choose which meal I want, right?

[10:54] Then before I choose, right, is my will determined to have steak or something? See. So it's like saying, just I can only, you can only teach the ignorant, right? Well, you can only choose if your will is what indeterminate. That indetermination is a kind of non-being, right? So it's this non-being in man. You know, Sartre's a great discovery. This non-being in man is what gives them free, makes them free, right?

[11:24] You know, being in nothingness. You know, the name of the book, right? And more for the latter. But he's making the mistake of what the per se and per accidens the same mistake that even Plato made with the matter there, right? You see, and so

[11:44] go down the history. You know, when you get to when You get to what's his name, Lord Bishop Berkeley, right? You know, and he's saying,

[11:58] "I can't know anything without it being what? Known by me, right? Can't sense anything without being sensed by me, right? But what is sensed by me, is in my sense. Therefore, all I know is what's in me, right? Makes sense, doesn't it?

[12:19] See, but same distinction, right? See, when I learn the theorem of Euclid, right, it's known by me, right. When you learn one, it's known by you, right. So what's known by me isn't known by you. What's known by you isn't known by me. So we're not knowing the same thing, right? But when I know the definition, let's say of square, I can't know the definition of square without being known by me, right.

[12:54] But is known by me by the definition of square, even when I know it, right? You know, I I kind of take a step beyond Aristotle. "

[13:16] And say, you know, that it seems to me that the fallacy of the accident, right, especially right, sees us when the accidental is always there, right, and it's necessarily there, right. You see.

[13:35] So you know, a square could be green, right? But squares are not always green, right? So no one would think that green is per se a square, right?

[13:49] But no one ever learns who is not ignorant. Ignorance is always there when you learn. You see. And there's always this what indetermination in the will before you choose, right?

[14:07] So you know Hegel comes along, you know, speaks of the tremendous power of the negative, right? You know. And well, the negative, you know, always comes before, right?

[14:22] What always comes before might seem to be what per se, right? And to give rise to what comes after, right? You know, there's always trouble in town after I arrive, right? You know,

[14:40] the way Sherlock Holmes, you know, has got to figure out that this is not just an ordinary crime. You know, there's a mastermind. This is this is the evil Professor Moriarty, right?

[14:52] But again, it's because if this always happens, right? Because there's never really a you know masterpiece crime, you know, until Moriarty has arrived on the scene. You begin to think he's per se, right? But maybe you know what always comes before is not always what per se. There is such a cause, right?

[15:16] It's kind of marvelous, that these distinctions to see them. Take a little break now before we do. So the one cannot have and hate truth, right? For good and being and true are what convertible, right? You know what convertible means, huh? A and B are convertible if every A is B and every B is what A, right?

[15:46] But one cannot have and hate goodness, right? Therefore, neither truth, right, That would seem to follow. Moreover, all men naturally desire to know, as is said in the beginning of the metaphysics. But science is not accept the things that are true. Therefore, truth is naturally desired and loved, huh? But what is naturally in something always is in it, huh?

[16:18] No one, therefore, can have and hate truth, right? Moreover, the philosopher says in the second book of rhetoric that men love those who are not what. deceived, I guess. Yeah, they don't pretend to be other than they are, right? It's kind of a thing.

[16:41] But not except on account of what? Truth. Therefore, man naturally loves truth, right? So, kind of like some of the people don't try to be something they're not, right? So we want the true, the true man, right? With the true Mister. Sounds like Joe. Therefore, one cannot have and hate. But against this is what the apostle says, Epistle to Galatians, chapter four. I was made what? Enemy.

[17:14] Yes, saying the truth to you. Don't hear the truth. Hence, it should be said that good and true and being are the same secundum rem, right?

[17:31] No difference in the thing, but they differ in ratione, right? So you know Aristotle pointed out of course first, but he had that same distinction when you talk about the attributes of God, right? So they are what the same secundum rem, right? But they differ what In ratione in their definition, right?

[17:58] So that distinction was not invented by the theologians, right? But they saw that that distinction was necessary to see, right? Talking about God. But good has the what definition of desirable, right?

[18:22] But being and truth don't have that definition, right? Okay. Because the good is what all want. That's Aristotle says. That's the reference down there to the first book of the Ethics, right? And therefore, the good, under the definition of good, cannot be had in hate, right? Huh? Neither in the universal nor in the what particular particular, right? But now, being and true, in universal, in general, are not able to be had in hate, right?

[18:58] Because dissonance is the cause of what hate, and agreement the cause of love. But being and true are common to what to all things. But in particular, nothing prevents some being and some true to be had in hate, right? Insofar as it has the aspect of something contrary and repugnant to something, right?

[19:27] For contrariety and repugnance are not opposed to the notion of what being and true, as they are opposed to the notion of what good. It's kind of a subtle thing, right? Now he goes into some more in particular how this takes place. It happens that some particular truth, in three ways, can be repugnant to or contrary to the good that is what loved, Loved, huh? In one way, according as truth is as a cause and as the beginning, huh?

[20:08] Originally in things themselves. And thus, man sometimes hates some truth which he wishes not to be true that is true, right? Huh? Okay. So you have in Shakespeare, you know, where they're talking about your son has been killed. You know, and bringer of good, I mean, this message is not going to be delivered nicely, you know. So I don't hate to hear that my son has been killed, right?

[20:37] That's truth, right? It's a hateful truth. Another way, according as truth is in the knowledge of the man himself, huh? Which impedes him from the pursuit of the what loved. Just as if some wish not to know the truth of faith that they might freely sin. huh? How do I tell us with this going around. Yeah, yeah. From whose person is said, Job twenty one? We do not wish the knowledge of your ways.

[21:14] That's what Saint Augustine calls willful inadvertence. I don't want to look at that. Yeah. In a third way, one has what hate for the particular truth, as it were, something repugnant, insofar as it is in the mind of what another. When someone wishes to remain hidden in his sin, right? He hates

[21:43] that the truth about his sin be what Known, right? And according to this, Augustine says in the tenth book, of Confessions, that men love the truth that shines. I guess but they hate it when it corrects them, right?

[22:02] And to this is what clearly responds to the truth, right? Because it goes back to the fact that good and one and true, although they are convertible, they are not what same ratione in definition.

[22:19] To the second, it should be said: it is true that to know the truth as such is what loveable, and a kind of which Augustine says that they love it as what enlightening, right? But per accidens huh? Some of the same distinction. Per accidens, the knowledge of the truth can be what hateful, right? Not in so far as it is the truth, right? So that's why he says that, right?

[22:48] But in so far as it impedes one from something, what Desired. Desired, huh? Yeah, yeah. Can't marry my cousin, right? Too. Shouldn't they talk to the girl? But can't marry my cousin. To

[23:13] third, it should be said. From this proceeds that the fictitious people, right, are not loved. That man loves what? He loves to know the truth. As such, right? Yeah. Which men that what were not fictive manifest, right? Want to know the truth about these things, right? All these biographies being written about men, huh?

[23:54] So now he's saying that man, homo amat se secundum se. That's per se, right? Huh? To know the truth, right? Huh? But in the second objection, there it said per accidens, huh? The cognitio veritatis potest esse odibilis, right? Huh? What does that mean? It means not as truth is it hateful, right? Huh? Because it means I can't do this, something like that, right?

[24:28] Okay, to the sixth one proceeds thus. It seems that hate cannot be a subject. Something in general, right? For hate is a passion of the sensitive, desiring power, which is moved from what A sensible grasping. But the sense cannot grasp the universal. Therefore, hate is not able to be a something in the universal.

[24:56] Moreover, hate is caused from some dissonance, which is repugnant to what commonness, huh? But community is of the notion of the universal, something common to many. Therefore, hate cannot be of something in general, universal. Moreover, the object of hate is the bad, but the bad is in things and not in the mind, as the philosopher says in the sixth book of wisdom, huh? The sixth book after the books of natural philosophy.

[25:33] Since, therefore, the universal is only in the mind, which separates universal from the particular, it seems that hate cannot be of something what universal.

[25:49] But against this is what the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, where he takes up the emotions and how you can arouse these emotions and help yourself in the courtroom or something, or calm these emotions that are.

[26:04] That anger is always among what singulars, huh? But hate is towards what general, right? For we hate the thief and each man who what slanderers, yeah, slanderers. We do all that, right? We hate these terrorists, right? In general, right? Hate.

[26:35] No, Thomas sees a distinction here. I answer: It should be said that one can speak of the universal in two ways, right? In one way, as it stands under the intention universality. In another way, about the nature to which such an intention is what attributed.

[26:59] For other is a consideration of man, the universal man, right? Like the species or genus, where it might be. Another of man, in so far as he is what man, right? If, therefore, the universal is taken in the first way, then no power of the sensitive part, neither the what grasping power nor the desiring power, can be what carried towards the universal. You know, it's singular, right?

[27:30] As the great poet says, the thing is singular when sensed. Universal one understood. So the man you see is individual man, right? Well, you understand what a man is. You got something universal, because the universal is through the abstraction from the individual what matter. So your flesh and bones are not in the definition of man, nor is mine. Otherwise, every man would be me. You might keep it general,

[28:04] and in the individual matter, every sense power is what rooted, right? So the matter which my eyes made is not the matter of which your eyes made, right?

[28:23] But some sense power, both the what grasping one and desiring one, can be what carried into something universally. Just as we say that the object of sight is color in general, it's called in genere, not because sight knows color, universal color, but because what the color that comes or is knowable by the sense does not belong to color in so far as it is what this color, but in so far as it's what color simply.

[29:06] Okay, I can see any color, right? Thus, therefore, the hate even of the what sense part can regard something what universally, because from the common nature of something, because from its common nature, something is adverse to an animal, and not only from this that is particular, as the fox, I guess, to the sheep. The wolf, right? A Wolf, yeah, okay, yeah, a wolf, yeah, you're right. as the wolf to the what sheep.

[29:45] Sheep. Whence you can say that the. sheep is a wolf Generally Generally, yeah. But anger is always caused from something particular, because from some act of the one injuring you, right? But acts are of what particulars. In an account of this, the philosopher says that anger, and I guess it's in the that anger is always towards something singular, right? But hate can be towards something in general, right?

[30:21] So I hate salmon in general. I'm not angry with men in general, right? This man. As if he come up, I'm listening to over something like like Timon of Athens there, and Shakespeare's great play there. You read *Tim of Athens*, and you go and read Socrates there, you know, and the *Phaedo* there, where he compares the hate of arguments to the misanthrope. Beautiful, Beautiful, Because you have this analogy there, that it's more known of course to us that the misanthrope has got something wrong with it, right?

[31:09] And the hate of arguments, but the the the man becomes a misanthrope because he doesn't distinguish between those men you can trust completely, who are very few, and those men you can trust, but up to a point, and those men you can't trust at all, right? And the same thing of arguments, he says there are a few arguments you can trust completely, and these were later on called by the father of logic demonstration, not the apodeixis, right?

[31:40] Most arguments are in the middle. There you can trust them up to a point. So a dialectical argument or a rhetorical argument, you can trust up to some extent, right? The dialectical argument more than the rhetorical one, right?

[31:58] And then the sophistical refutations about them, which you can't trust at all, right? And so Socrates is saying, you know, you've got to be naive if you think that you can trust every man, you know. And as they always say to the girls, you know, there are very few men you can trust completely. You can probably trust yourself completely with John Paul II, but most men you can't.

[32:24] Very, very few men you can trust yourself completely with. Most men you can trust up to a point, some men more, some men less. There are some men you can't trust at all. So if you should trust some man, you shouldn't trust at all, or you trust a man more than you should, right? Huh? Should you say, you know, that all men are, you know, bad and do with them, you know, like you know Dickens' character there in *Great Expectations*, um,

[32:58] or should you say, you know, that you should, you know, have a little smarts about men, right? Huh? You know. Then he says the same thing about the heat of arguments, right? Huh? He trusts an argument that shouldn't be trusted, or he trusts an argument more than he should, and then he says you can't trust any argument, you know. And he says, well, maybe you should say you don't, you don't, you should blame yourself for not knowing the difference between these three kinds of arguments, right?

[33:26] And that's when Socrates says we need a *technē*, *peri logous*, an art about arguments, right? And it's amazing that the so-called father of logic is. Aristotle, right, has those three. You know the way Thomas divides them, right? The prior and posterior analytics are which you can trust completely. physical reputation above them, which you can't trust at all, and then the the topics and the rhetoric there. You know about the arguments you can trust up to a point, further in one than the other, but not completely, right?

[33:59] You know, and so blame yourself, you know, for what? Not possessing the art about arguments, right? Understanding arguments. Don't blame it; say all arguments are worthless. It's kind of a beautiful comparison, right?

[34:19] We see Timon of Athens. I don't know if you know the play, but Timon of Athens, and he's extremely generous, right? He's always inviting people to dinner, you know, and he gives you a little gift when you come and all these things, and his own servants can see that these people are not really his. friends. Friends, right? And then when Timon falls into some financial straits, you know, because of his generosity, what's the problem with all his friends, you know?

[34:43] So he sends to you and sends to you, and you have some excuse, you know. Oh, I just if you'd come earlier, you know, that's an excuse. And then he, you know, he turns against all mankind and becomes the great misanthrope. Kind of strange play, you know. I don't know. Isn't too much of a stage, you know, thing, but but he's mentioned Timon of Athens, I guess, and in one of the Plutarch, you know, somewhere, you know, Shakespeare's marvelous thing.

[35:15] Yeah. Okay. But the hate which is in the understanding part, right? Since it falls upon the grasp, the universal grasp, of, the understanding can be in both ways. What universal hate, the intention itself. So if you know what a terrorist is, right? You can hate them all, right?

[35:48] Or an abortionist or something like that too. To the first, therefore, should be said that the sense does not grasp the universal, in so far as it is universal, right?

[36:05] But it does grasp something to which universality happens through what abstraction, right? To the second it should be said that that which is common to all things cannot be the reason for hate, right? But nevertheless, nothing prevents something from being common to many, which nevertheless is what in dissonance with others, and thus hateful to them, right?

[36:39] Um, have dissonance with salmon. Kind of funny. I was reading a review of a book there, National Review, right? You know, some guy who, at least he taught at Cal, but he now teaches in England. you know, There's been kind of a thing about novelists, you know, down to the centuries, right? But he's always telling some little anecdote about these people, right? And so it's kind of funny, you know.

[37:12] I guess it's amusing to read, but I don't know how good it is as you know literary criticism there is such a thing. But anyway, I'd probably say, you know, in purpose, he doesn't like salmon. They don't go down, you know. That'll be the footnote to my name.

[37:30] He hated salmon in general. Not just, not just. We'll get you a salmon-colored tombstone. Hated salmon. You know, it was that's the guy. You know, there's some guy in history. I forget what his name was, but you know, he attached a wine to someone in particular, and he left in his will, you know, to have a bottle just poured over his grave every anniversary of his burial.

[38:00] So my enemies, I guess, will dump salmon on my every anniversary of my my passing and burial. I'll have a cookout. We'll have salmon steak. Out

[38:16] of Berkeley. It's a little restaurant. We used to stop in on the way up to Quebec, you know, and it's a little kind of steak place and so on, but they had fish stuff there too. I think they they kept them in the same cooler or something, you know, the flavor had. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[38:35] Don't do that. It's like it's like the the Bordeaux cookies there. It's made by what do you call that particular place next to the cookies? But anyway, they put it in these these kinds of these you know gift boxes or boxes with the ones that have chocolate in them. I think, and it gets into the things. I like chocolate, but I don't like it in the in the other ones.

[39:03] So I never buy those ones. I got to get to buy the pure by itself, you know. So this thing had got the fishy smell, I think was getting a little bit into the steak or something. I don't know, kind of spoiling it.

[39:19] Okay, the third objection proceeds of the universal according as it stands under the intention of universality, and thus it does not fall under the under apprehension or the sense desire.

[39:35] It's kind of interesting this this collection of articles on hate, right? But why should hate be taken up after love? Thomas is just tired of all this talk about love. and went over to hate afterwards, or what was the reason to take up hate after love. It follows. It depends on it in

[40:01] some way. Yeah, but is there even another reason besides that, a more fundamental reason? There's, there's the same knowledge of? Yeah. So in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle takes up what virtue and what the vice or vices opposed to it, right? Because there's the same knowledge of what opposites, right? And in logic he takes up what you know. We talk about these things: where something follows necessarily, something doesn't follow, right?

[41:25] You know, and you have good and bad arguments, right? Same knowledge of what opposites. So love and hate, are what? Opposites. Yeah. this is a famous thing. It goes back to Aristotle and Plato too, I think. There's the same knowledge of what opposites, right? So one science about double, another science about half,

[42:02] or knowledge and what ignorance, right? Or knowledge and what error, right? Ignorance is opposed to knowledge as a lack of knowledge, right? And and error is more like the contrary, right? So it's the same knowledge of what opposites. Aristotle

[42:34] wrote a book on the poetic art, and what's it about? Tragedy and comedy? Yeah, Part of the comedy has been lost, but some of it, you know, obscurities. So

[42:53] you know what's the uh... In the politics there, right? Huh? What's the fifth book about? Well, it's about revolution, but also about conservation of government.

[43:19] And what These are opposites, I think, right? Okay. So if you know how to corrupt a government, how to overthrow it, right? You know how to what Preserve. preserve it, right? It makes some sense to have the same what. Book right, the fifth book of the writer of the Politics about these two because they are what opposites, right?

[43:51] Francis de Sales says too the treatise on the love of God he treats how love is generated, and grows, how it decays, and dies. Mhm Mhm Did Aristotle have a book there in Natural Philosophy: Generation, and Corruption.

[44:09] Makes some sense to have them together, right? So, inductively, you can see that there is the same knowledge of what opposites, right? And when I read these books, you know, I know black and white, I guess. You know, but you have to kind of know them together, right? So. like sweet and sour pork and so on. It is. It's interesting, you know, the same knowledge of opposites. So Thomas talks about hope.

[44:59] Is he going to talk about despair too? He talks about love, and then he talks about hate. So here's the connection that love is giving rise to all the emotions, right? But I mean,

[45:23] notice the next question thirty is what? And misery right, which we'll we'll be seeing in the fall, I guess, right? But notice that's very much an effect of love, isn't it, right?

[45:41] If I love steak, I want some steak, right? I love the girl, I want the girl. If I love the music of Mozart, I want the music of Mozart, right? But he puts hate before what? Desire. Before desire, even though some might say it wasn't desire, even closer in terms of cause and effect, right? But is is wanting the opposite of loving? Or Or liking, even uses a weaker word, right?

[46:19] I like wines, I want some wine, right? I like candy, I want some candy, right? Um, I like wisdom, I want some wisdom. You see, that seems, in some ways, in terms of cause and effect, to be closer, doesn't it, to love than hate, right? But yet he goes from love to hate, and then to what? Wanting, right? Was it because of the same knowledge of what opposites, right?

[47:00] What is what's the same is closer than what's near? Yeah. What was closer to knowing, learning, or ignorance? Well, learning is closer, right? Because you're ignorant, and then you start to learn, and you get a little knowledge. But in terms of being an opposite, right?

[47:27] Ignorance is more the opposite of knowledge, right? Learning is not really the opposite of knowing, right? So that's interesting. The order, right? You know, Thomas is. Is uh, I'm always struck by the order in the Summa there, you know, The, you know, you get the Secunda Secundae you're reading the Secunda Secundae there. But he takes up

[47:57] the theological virtues first, right? And then he takes up the cardinal virtues. But he takes up prudence first, right? Then justice, and then fortitude or courage, and then temperance, right? Now you compare him to his master Aristotle, right? Aristotle takes up courage and temperance first in Book Three of Nicomachean Ethics, right? And then he takes up justice in Book Five, and he takes up prudence in Book Six, right?

[48:32] So it's almost the reverse order, right? And you say, well, now are these two great minds in dissonance? Huh? Had they? Well, it's the way we know them, and I might say the way we experience what's more known to us. The others that we're learning.

[49:00] Wait just a minute now. Which is which? You say. Which one? You see, Thomas when he when he's saying, why does Aristotle consider the moral virtues before the virtues of reason, right? In the Nicomachean Ethics, right? And he says, well, he gives two reasons. One is that the moral virtues are more known to us than the virtues of reason, right? And the other reason, in kind of a practical reason, is that by the moral virtues we are disposed for the virtues of reason, right?

[49:34] Huh? Okay. But now, why does he take up courage and temperance before the moral virtue called justice, right? Huh? I suppose because the what virtues concerning the emotions are more known to us, right? They're closer to the senses and so on, right? And of course, courage is the virtue that seems to almost be moral virtues because because it comes from well, the Latin we can see more clearly, vir.

[50:09] You know, courage is the virtue of the man, right? The vir, right? So virtue, right? This is courage, right? And you know, the fact that we have a congressional or medal of honor for courage, right? I don't get a medal of honor for eating temperance if I do so, or even you know paying my my debts and so on. You know, they won't give me a Medal of Honor for those things, right?

[50:34] So this is more clearly you know virtue, right? So it's more known, right? And but now, why does Thomas, do them in the reverse order in the Summa, right? Theologiae, right? Or he takes up, why does he take up the angels, right, before the human soul in the Prima Pars, right? Well, obviously we know the soul before we know the immaterial substances, separate substances, as I call them, right?

[51:10] In philosophies, you study the soul in the natural philosophy, and it's not till wisdom that you study the The angels, right, The Long God, right? So why why is the order so different here? You say.

[51:28] Why is is is the order in theology the order from what is more known to us to what is less known to us? No, no, we're imitating God's way of knowing, which is by knowing Himself. He knows all other things, right? So the first thing we study, in a sense, in theology, is God Himself, right? And then the angels are more like God, right? Than we creatures, right?

[51:53] And now when you get to the virtues, right? Well, God has something like prudence, right? Divine providence, right? Okay, God has what justice, right? Um, but does God have have courage, strictly speaking, or temperance, right? Moderating eating and drinking.

[52:20] Um, ah, no, you see, so those are what less like God, right? Huh? You know, so you probably wouldn't say courage of God, except maybe metaphorically, right? But temperance wouldn't even be said metaphorically, right? Because you know, um, but justice is properly found in God, and and you know, so you can see that the order is theological, right? Is it? And that's why he takes up the theological virtues, whose object is God Himself, right?

[52:55] Before he takes up the virtues that are more human, shall we say, right? You know, less divine, right? So you can see a beautiful order that Thomas has, right? He's not going against Aristotle, because and and in the the second book of the of the Summa Contra Gentiles right, Thomas has got to talk about God in Himself, right, in the first book, and then the second book he's going to talk about God as the Creator and these things and so on.

[53:29] But then he points out how the order in theology here is just the reverse, right? Because in theology you begin with God and then go to the creatures, and in philosophy the order is just the reverse. You you know. So you have to appreciate that that marvelous order, right?

[53:52] And here you're closer to what we're doing. The reason we get in philosophy right Here the reason why hate comes right after love, it seems to me, is because it's the opposite of love, right? And

[54:08] same knowledge, opposites, right? Okay. And so, I guess even in theology, when you take up the virtues, there, right, in that different order, right? But you want to talk about the what the vice opposed to them, right? Same time. So. You talk about despair when you talk about what hope, right? And uh you talk About charity, you talk about envy, right? You know, when I was preparing the that course, there love and friendship assumption, you know, and

[54:46] I was trying to add a little bit to what you have in Aristotle and so on. But I was kind of influenced by, you know, the idea that charity is a kind of friendship, right? You know, I don't call you servants, but friends, right? And then the

[55:04] he takes up in that too is on charity, right? Envy, right? When things opposed to it, right? And so then I get talking even about human friendship, right? How envy is what opposed to friendship, right? So if I'm sad about your success or your, you know, your thing, that's really opposed to friendship, right? I should, you know, if I'm your friend, I should

[55:38] wish good to you, right? And so envy is really what opposed to friendship. And then I found these beautiful things in the English novelists, you know, where they talk about one. One of them says they say it's hard for a man to bear you know success well you know not get inflated you know so on but it's even harder for his friends to accept his good thing you know and so I suspect you know you know how prevalent envy is right huh you know so I say now you know you know I would take the example that they would know from they have roommates usually you know huh so two girls one of them is you know is being asked out by a real nice

[56:22] guy who's going places you know and so on you know but she's a little bit of envy towards this you know you know see but isn't that isn't that that's really a movement opposed to what friendship right and you have to kind of suppress that if you find that you know see or if you two guys you know are roommates and one of you got a nice girlfriend or or or one of you has got a nice job lined up for him and he gets out of college and all they say that one out of two guys gets a job or something you know and I can't find a job or you know and you've got you know the the law you know whatever whatever

[56:59] it is and and so you feel a little bit of envy and somebody else has success and that same things but so knowing what friendship is makes you recognize what envy is and seeing the opposition of envy to friendship kind of you know to the extent that there's envy in friendship that's a defect of friendship right and contrary to the very nature of friendship huh.

[57:36] That's why I admire those great poets there, you know Homer and Shakespeare, right? Huh? Because they represent, you know, the the Shakespeare has a sonnet there, you know, he's singing about his friend, you know, succeeding, you know, and so on. How he rejoices in it, right? But he but he makes comparison. He has a decrepit father, you know, rejoices to see his son, you know, his son, you know, succeeding on the athletic field or what is, you know.

[58:02] And I said, and and Homer, right? You see, when the great Achilles has lost his best friend Patroclus, there, right? And he mourns Patroclus like a father mourns a loss his only son. see? But some man you might be very close to, like Achilles is very close to Patroclus, right? That compares it to a father, you know, has lost his only son, right? Well, in my experience, you know, bad as we human beings are, right?

[58:29] Huh? I've never really seen a a father be envious of his son's success, right? Or if his son is more successful, you know, than he was as a father, right? Huh? They rejoice in that, right? Huh? You know, so these two great greatest poets here, Homer and Shakespeare, right? They they see the love of the father for his son as containing something in the perfection of friendship, which requires, in a negative sense, to say it, that be without envy, right?

[59:04] There should be no envy between friends, right? Huh? And therefore, it should be like the friendship of the father and the son, right? Huh? But it's because the father naturally sees the son as a continuation of himself, another self, right? And that's what a friend is, another self, right? So it's beautiful the way these things work out, right? But I've been thinking about it because I was reading, you know, among other things, I wasn't at least in my course in the treatise on friendship.

[59:35] but. I suddenly would stick in an article whether charity is friendship at the end of the course, you know, because it's beautiful if you if you read Aristotle, the objection, you know, based upon, you know, you're supposed to love your enemies, right? Well, you know, friendship requires mutual love, right? And then Thomas, you know, you know makes a beautiful distinction that you if you love somebody, you love their children and those related to them, right?

[1:00:03] And so your primary object is your friend. His children are kind of a secondary object, right? And beautiful distinctions, right? So it's not really contrary to the idea that friendship requires what mutual love, right? So often you'd be a friend of your enemy, you know, but that's a secondary object, right? So it's beautiful things, but just seeing, you know, that he treated envy there with charity, right?

[1:00:27] Huh? I don't know if if you know and you've heard people talk about charity never bringing envy, right? But But one opposite illuminates the other, right? Aristotle says, "When opposites stand alongside each other, are more clear, right?"

[1:00:43] You see, the opposite alongside each other, they stand out, right? Stay going. Or fade out too much. So when you come back, we'll come back in the fall. We'll start with concupiscence right?

[1:01:03] We'll desire to come back to it. Yeah, you desire to know. Yeah, yeah. But notice how he goes on from concupiscence to delectatione. He doesn't take the version up, does he? It's the opposite. Yeah. There's a lot of things here.

[1:01:26] A lot of things. But now, right after the new son friendship, I mean, on pleasure, he takes up dolor, pain and sadness, right? So that that's right. What causes that? He never does treat the version.

[1:01:50] Yeah. So he must be. He must of be understanding when he takes the concubiscence, right? I knew he wouldn't feel less of this. Right. Marvelous, these guys.

[1:02:09] I told you about that famous dinner we had, in, honor of Charles de Koninck and Jacques de Molion. Did you say that? Or Jacques de Molion, They, they were, you know, honoring him and praising him and so on. So then de Molion and de Coninck they get say a few words, you know, just past all this praise, you know, and de Molion thanked them, you know, and so on.

[1:02:28] But he said, "You should have been praising me. You should have been praising Thomas, right? He's he's the master. I'm not the master." And then de Coninck just turns it up. He says, "Well, you should have been praising Aristotle, because that was Thomas's master." So poking fun at each other and so on. But