Prima Secundae
77. Concupiscence I: Is It Only in the Senses, and Is It Its Own Passion? (ST I-II q.30 a.1–2)
Class of 2012-09-20
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/077-concupiscence-i-is-it-only-in-the-senses-and-is-it-its-own/

[0:00] What Thomas is doing here, as you recall, if you remember way back in the spring, I guess it was, he's going through the what emotions, right, one by one, right? And this is emotion, one of the emotions in the what concupiscible appetite, right? Okay.

[0:23] So, and about these four things are asked: whether concupiscence is in the sense desiring power only, and secondly, whether concupiscence is a special what passion, a special emotion. Third, whether some concupiscences are natural and some not natural. I got some application today.

[1:01] And then fourth, whether concupiscence is infinite. Curious, ah, these these articles, ah, not the first two maybe so much, but the third and the fourth, I found should have some delightful surprises for the mind.

[1:22] To the first, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that concupiscence is not only in the sensitive desiring power, right? Appetitus in Latin of course can name what desire, but it can also name the desiring power. And so here, when they speak of the appetitus sensitivus, or this is a different case, it means the sense desiring power, right, the one that falls upon the senses. And then they speak of intellectual, rational desiring power.

[1:57] Okay, and this little bit of question about the word there, for there is a certain concupiscentia of wisdom, right? And he quotes wisdom properly, chapter six. The concupiscence, concupiscentia of wisdom, leads one to the perpetual kingdom, right? That's where my hope is. Okay. There's something to have the concupiscentia sapientiae, and I hope it's going to lead me to the perpetual kingdom, right? What Thomas calls the ordered society of those who seek God.

[2:40] But sense desire, the sense desiring power, cannot be born towards what wisdom, huh? Therefore, concupiscence is not only in the sense desiring power, right? I told you about the little exchange between me and and this professor there in college, you know. I was always trying to use the syllogism right. So one day in class, he turned to me and says, "Mr. Burquist, do you have an emotional attachment to the syllogism?"

[3:16] I said, "I might have an emotional attachment to some girl, but certainly not to the syllogism. It's hard to think you get emotional about.

[3:29] Your reason might like the certitude of the syllogism, the rigor of it, but yeah. So wisdom here, huh? Emotion don't go towards this sort of thing, huh?

[3:47] Moreover, the desire of the commands of God, right, is not in the sense desiring power. For nay, rather the, apostle, now that's what figure of speech there, right? The apostle with a capital A. That's what I want to see it? Yeah, yeah. For the common name is given to one in particular that stands out, right? So Aristotle calls Homer the poet.

[4:26] He quotes Romans chapter seven. Good does not dwell in me; that is in my what flesh, huh? But the desire of the commands of God comes on concupiscence, huh? According to that of Psalm one eighteen, huh? My soul desires concupiscence. huh Use that word. Wants to desire your what justifications, huh? Therefore, concupiscence is not only in the sense desiring power, right?

[5:09] Moreover, to each power there what is desirable concupiscibile, its own what good, huh? And therefore, concupiscence is in each power of the soul, and not only in the sense desiring. part of this is in the question of how particular that word signifies, right?

[5:36] But against this is what Damascene says, huh? Orthodox faith That the what Irrational part that obeys and is able to be persuaded by reason is divided into what concupiscence and thumos, right? Okay.

[5:58] In Greek, they say epithumia and thumas, right? So Plato and Aristotle talk about epithumia, which is kind of translated sometimes as concupiscentia in Latin, and they speak of that power as the what epithumia, or we in Latin speak of it as the concupiscible power, right? And then what Thumas, anger, right? huh? Okay.

[6:26] This is the what Irrational. part of the irrational part of the soul. Okay. It's rational only by what partaking, right? The part that what undergoes, huh? It's desiring. Therefore, concupiscence is in the sense-desiring power, right?

[6:57] So Thomas says, "I answer it should be said that as the philosopher, not another capital P there, right? I know I get some of these texts sometimes. I download texts of Thomas into my computer so I can carry it somewhere without carrying all my books. And if they don't have that P capitalized or even apostle that's capitalized, go in there and I change the capital A and the capital P, you know.

[7:25] It's not just any philosopher. It's not just any apostle, huh? I guess if you study the New Testament, you see that was it Peter and Paul are called what apostles, right? The others not really so much, huh? In in their letters and so on.

[7:44] Okay. I answer it should be said that as the philosopher says in the first book of the rhetoric, concupiscence or epithumia, I suppose would be the Greek word, is a desire for the what pleasant, huh? There is, however, a twofold pleasure,

[8:06] as will be said below, one which is for in the understandable good, huh? Which is the good of reason, right? So wisdom is an understandable good, right? Virtue is an understandable good. Justice is an understandable good, right?

[8:29] The other pleasure is in the good according to the senses, as known by the senses. Now the first pleasure seems to be of the soul only,

[8:48] because when you study the De Anima there, right? The reason and the will are not in the body. Remember a guy talking about some neurologist, the way he was, some guy studying the brain, right? And he's kept on poking the brain and saying, "Oh, I taste steak or something," you know, or you know.

[9:10] But he couldn't find any place to poke the brain. Okay, so I just willed something. And so, like a spinal scientist, he concluded the will is not in the brain. Right. That's that's a good step forward, right? I heard something similar was a scientist was doing that for somebody else, stimulating his brain, and his arm went up. And the scientist said, "Do that again." And the man said, "I didn't do it.

[9:38] You did it." Yeah. He's got to say you you made me well that. Yeah, you did. it. I didn't do it. you did. it. Yeah, Yeah. So they're in the soul alone, right? huh Okay. The second, the one that is in the sense, is of the soul and the body what together,

[10:11] because the sense is a power in a bodily organ, whence the good according to sense is a good of the whole what combination you might say.

[10:29] Such a desire for pleasure seems to be meant by the word concupiscence, right, which pertains together to both the soul and the body, right, as the name concupiscence itself sounds in the Latin. To see that, right.

[10:51] Whence concupiscence, properly speaking, is in the sense desiring power, and those are of two kinds, right, and in the concupiscible power in particular, right, which is named from it. Okay. Let's go back to the reason why those are named that way, right? So in Plato

[11:37] and Aristotle, they use the term. In Latin, they speak of the what concupiscible and the what irascible. Now, our concupiscence and anger, the only emotion, only passion in that particular part.

[12:26] So why are these two powers named from one of the six emotions? Love, right? Concupiscence, pleasure or delight. Fear, right? And not fear, right? Hate,

[12:45] aversion, turning away from, huh? Aversion, and then sadness, right? Pain, and here we got five passions, right? Anger is one of them. We got hope and fear, right? Despair, right? Boldness, right? Okay, why are these two powers named from these two passions? Is any reason why they're named from those two?

[13:17] Because they're like the causes of the others, or the first among the others? No, love is more fundamental than you know. I want steak because I like steak, right? So my liking steak is more fundamental than my wanting

[13:35] steak. More visible. Yeah. I always go back to Shakespeare, right? And *Troilus and Cressida, and things in motion sooner catch the eye, than what not stirs, right? So if you want somebody's attention, you what? Wave. You know, you get off the airplane or something, or the train or something, and say you wave, right? Okay. If you don't want somebody to notice you because you owe them some money or something, right?

[14:03] Don't move around. Just just. You see, you see this in movies all the time now, where somebody's hiding in the room, right? And the police, whoever it is, about to leave, and then somebody to move something or you know a little bit, and then you back right in the end, tell them that. Okay. So things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs, right? That's a very important thing that Shakespeare says, huh?

[14:31] And Aristotle in the ninth book of *Wisdom*, right? He says that ability is known through act, right? So act is what is first knowable, and then he points out that the act that is first called an act is motion. So motion underlies everything, right? Now Thomas gives a good principle. He's explaining words equivocal by reason. We name things as we know them, right? So the order in naming follows the order in what knowing.

[15:10] You know that favorite question of mine: In what sense of before does one sense of before come before another sense of before? What's it before in our knowledge, right? In that sense of before, because we name things as we know them, right? So concupiscence is more like motion than, let's say, love, and therefore it's derived in pleasure. Because pleasure is kind of a resting, right? In the object of love, right, and you possess it, right?

[15:44] Like concupiscence, a wanting, desire, that sort of thing, is like a a seeking of which you don't what have, but that you like, right? Okay. My life can be with either one, having the object or not having it, right? So concupiscence is more like motion, and anger,

[16:07] you know, you know, and you're trying to explain what emotion is Mozart imitating, right? It's music, right? And sometimes it's hard to say exactly what it is, but when he imitates anger, it's very clear. And we have a letter, right, of Mozart to his father when he's writing the Abduction from the Seraglio, and he's explaining how he's imitating Osmin. He gets angry, right?

[16:33] And he says music must imitate his losing control of himself, but he says not in a way that is displeasing to the ear, or in other words, cease to be music.

[16:47] So these are both like emotions, right? And Shakespeare has a beautiful metaphor, right, and As You Like It, huh? Where Orlando and Rosalind and Celia, right? They fall in love very quickly, right? And the idea is to get them married off as quickly as possible, because you know. But the other characters, the brother says they are in the very wrath of love.

[17:16] Sticks are not, you know, clubs cannot separate them, right? But notice that metaphor, right? They're in the very wrath of love, right? You know, they're going at each other, you know, The way that people, you know. But there's a lot of emotion there, right, huh? But you're you're making a what metaphor here from these two species that have some similarity, right? It's kind of striking that Shakespeare could do that, right?

[17:39] Very wrath of love. So Thompson's up by saying, and the concupiscible power is denominated, named from, okay. But it includes those other emotions that we distinguished before.

[18:00] Now sometimes we take a word that's applied to something in the sensible world, right, and we carry it over, right. And to some extent, that's the solution to these first objections, right? Okay.

[18:17] To the first, therefore, it should be said that the desire for wisdom, or for other spiritual goods, right, which are not sensible goods, is sometimes named what concupiscence, right?

[18:35] Either on account of a certain what likeness, huh? Because both are kind of what desire, right? Kind of wanting, huh? That's very common, huh? Like we take the word see and we apply it, take it from the eye, right? And then Hamlet says, "I see. You can see my father now, looking around the post." And he says, "In my mind's eye, right, in the imagination." And then finally, be carried over to understanding, right?

[19:10] You see what I mean? So the word "see" is taken from the eye, and then applied to the act of imagination, and finally to the act of reason itself, right? Now something like that can take place with the word "love," right? And it could take place with the word "concupiscence But apparently the word "concupiscence in Latin is "tending more," stuck with the sensible one, right? But it could be carried over either on account of some likeness,

[19:41] or, and this is very interesting, what he says, on account of the intensity, right, of the what desire of the idea, from which there comes about a what redundancy in the lower what appetite, huh? Okay.

[20:04] That together also the lower appetite, meaning the sense, desiring power, in its own way tends towards the spiritual good, right? Fouling the what? The higher desire. Yeah. And also the body itself serves what? Spiritual things. Okay. There's kind of an overflow, you might say, right? Huh? Okay. And even the life of the mind, you know, when you're trying to understand something, you're having it difficult, and how come you see it?

[20:40] You know, there's kind of an overflow in the what emotions? You get kind of rocking up and down, you know. You know the famous example of the Greek who's supposed to have what? He's in the bathtub, right? Huh? And then he discovered a theorem, right? Eureka! He said, and he jumped out of the bathtub and ran down, putting his clothes on, you know. That's kind of the overflow, right?

[21:01] Huh? Sort of. In the life of Saint Teresa of Avila, there, right, she comes out of her what cell there, which she's been meditating or something, and all of a sudden she starts dancing, right? You know, and she's she's an overflow into the body of this, huh?

[21:19] And he quotes the Psalm eighty-three: "My heart and my flesh, right, exalt in the living what? God. " I was reading Thomas there in question twelve there of the Summa Prima Pars today. He's asking whether the the senses can see God, right? Of course, the senses can't see God as He is, but there's kind of a ambiguous passage there from Augustine, right, which Thomas has to explain, right?

[21:51] Huh? And Augustine's explaining that we see God with our senses in the way in which we see that our neighbor is alive. We don't really see with our eye his life as such, right? But we see him moving and talking or laughing, whatever it is, and then we what? Our reason, huh, perceives that he is what? Alive, yeah. And so when you see these things in the next world, right, illuminated by God and so on, oh yeah, God is there, yeah, all of these things in existence, right?

[22:24] Your mind right away will grasp that God is there, right? Huh? So it's like what they call the sensible praeter sensibile, right? It's grasped by some other power than senses, but when you sense, right?

[22:38] That's how I grasp that you're alive, right? By my reason, when I sense you, you know, acting like you're alive. Sometimes I know about the student, you know. He's passed away or something. Lower life form. Yeah. Now, in the reply to the second objection, he can get a little bit into the meaning of the word a bit, and at first part concupiscentia. To the second, it should be said

[23:40] that desire, I suppose, the word desire, right, is able more to pertain, properly speaking, not only to the what, lower appetite, but also to the superior, right? That the word is more able to be what extended, right, huh? Okay. For it does not imply some what consociation, some living together with, right? Which in desire, and that I suppose refers to what the body being involved, right? Not just the soul, right?

[24:26] But it implies simply the simple motion in the thing what desire. Okay. So they get a little bit of what Thomas meant in the body of the article when he said ipsum nomen concupiscentia sonata that there's a kind of a togetherness, right, of the soul with the body in emotion. It reminds me of Augustine there in the article on valuation of music, where he makes a good point that the pleasure of fiction, right, is not the highest pleasure, but it's the pleasure most proportioned to man because it involves the body and the soul, and therefore it can move us more forcefully.

[25:17] Huh? Seems to appeal to the whole man, huh? But the word desire is more neutral, you know. No, and going back to the first objection, I replied to the first objection. You know, is it simply because of its overflowing into the lower appetite that the word concupiscence is applied to the desire of reason or the rational part rather?

[26:00] I remember Dion talking one time. I remember Dion talking in class one time about the. The eros, right? The Greek word, which is very sensual, right? Eros, erotic. There was erotic love and so on. But sometimes it's applied to the what love of God, right? Okay. And because of the intensity of it, right? Okay. It's like in the Song of Songs, you know.

[26:28] Supposed to be the last book you read, huh? Because you've got to be confirmed in virtue, so misunderstanding the book, right? I can say all I can say about it is it's about marriage.

[26:43] You read the book too early. You're not a gray beard yet. You read St. Bernard's first sermon on it. It was in the same room, I think. Sometimes he was saying, you know, don't don't have the girls read this right away, you know. Read this later on when they know some things. I remember, like C. S. Lewis one time, you know, He's trying to describe the the love of the angels, right?

[27:22] Huh. And he's trying to give the idea that their love, in some ways, is more intense than our love, because our love is partly in the sense appetite, and partly in the intellectual appetite, partly in the will, partly that part is kind of divided, right? Huh. You know. And he compares it to what was it? The anger, I think it was, you know. Yeah, ferocious, he calls their love, you know.

[27:52] It's a way of trying to explain that it's got intensity, right? That our divided love doesn't have, right? I'm out now at the wedding. There, the I said I take a few plays of Shakespeare with me to read, right? I said, well, I certainly can't take any tragedies. It's not appropriate. You take tragedies? You're going to the wedding, right? So I picked up you know, volume as you like it, right?

[28:25] Huh. Volume Twelfth Night, huh? And one of them, Merchant of Venice, right? So you get little quotes, you know. And so when they describe Portia, you know, that in Belmont there is a lady richly left, huh? And she is fair, and fairer than that fair of wondrous virtue. So I was able to use it to apply it to the bride, you know. The last two parts, you know.

[28:53] I said, I said the groom. I said, you're a fortunate man, huh? For she is fair and fairer than that fair of wondrous virtue. Really, really, really, just the right lines.

[29:08] Okay, but there's two attractions there then, right? One is more in the sense appetite, right, and the other one more in the appetite of the reason, right? I was reading a little book there that my daughter had there, the Lucia there talking about the apparitions and so on. Very interesting things in there. You had a chance to read some of those. One thing too, you know, the angel that comes down, there's three visions of the angel before the Blessed Virgin.

[29:39] He says, "I'm the angel of Portugal." When Thomas explains the orders of the angels, the princes, right, archangels, angels where our archangels are, he's the last of the ones. The princes, he understands, as what heads of nations, right? And he gives the example from Scripture. You know, a couple of them are reading about their. nations So we should pray to that angel who's ever going the United States here for this election.

[30:08] Oh yeah. In Portugal, it's a national holiday, the feast of the angel, Guardian Angel of Portugal. June ninth, it's a federal holiday. Why do they pick that day? I don't know. It's amazing.

[30:27] Who cares when? Now to the third, huh? To each power of the soul, it belongs to desire its own what? Good, huh? By what is called natural desire, huh?

[30:48] You have that even in the plants, right? So I've heard, you know, the guy at the nursery, you know, say this likes a lot of water. It likes a lot of sun. Wants a lot of that, right? I like to broccoli. I like to plant broccoli, and says it's a big feeder, right? You've got to get another... Like to eat. Yeah.

[31:19] So to each power of the soul, it belongs to desire in this way, huh? Its own good by natural desire, right, huh? Which is not following some what, knowing some grasping. So use the word apprehension. Next use the word apprehend for what? Grasp. Grasping for knowing, right? Because in knowing, the thing known is in the what? Knower. So when I grasp something, you know, it's in my hand, right?

[31:51] So when the mind grasps something, it's contained in the hand, in the mind. By love is what? More in the thing loved. So the thing love is in the thing loved, but the thing known is in the knower. Just just to reverse, huh? So I could use that word apprehension, huh? When I was first studying out in philosophy, they always called the first act of reason simple apprehension.

[32:26] But the English word would be grasping, right? Simple grasping. Grasp what a square is. Grasp what a circle is. And then you can grasp that a square is not a circle. You've got to grasp what a square is first, and what a circle is.

[32:45] Quadrilateral. You can grasp that a square is a quadrilateral. But to desire good by a what? Animal desire. But animal goes back to the word anima, right? Soul, right? Now, okay. Which follows some what grasping, right? Pertains only to the desiring what power, right? So he's distinguishing between natural desire, right, which is found even without knowledge, and the one naturally desiring something, right? From this desire that follows upon some kind of grasping, so the sense desiring power and intellectual desiring power are named that way because they follow upon some knowing, either by the senses or by the

[33:40] intellect. Okay. But to desire something under the notion of a good that is pleasant, according to the senses, which is property, in strict sense, concupiscere pertains to the concupiscible what power. Okay.

[34:10] So, any question about that first article? A lot to do with understanding the words here, right? More than that, what the words signify. Now, to the second one goes forward. Thus, it seems that concupiscence is not a special what passion

[34:44] of the what concupiscible power, right? Thomas will call the emotions what passio, right we speak even English. We speak of the speaker as moving the audience, right? Or the actor is moving the audience, right? And being moved is a passio and undergoing,

[35:16] but we name it for motion, emotion, right? They're connected, right? Passio and emotion, but see, the ancients to say, you know, how sometimes a word is better in one language, another language, right? But apart from that, sometimes there's something in one word in one language that the synonym for that in another language doesn't have, or vice versa. Well, I was reading Twelfth Night, of course Shakespeare has the same pun that he has in the Two Gentlemen of Verona, where they pun upon the word understand.

[35:57] And I don't know how funny it is, but it certainly concentrates your mind upon the fact that the word understand comes from what stand under it. So the guy will say, you know, I don't understand you. What do you mean by by by? Cain understands me understands me, you know. And then they think about like this, and but there's a word in Latin that corresponds to understanding

[36:25] etymologically. Substance, Substance, yeah. Now, substance in Latin, following what it has in Greek, substance can mean what what a thing is, the substance of a thing, what it is, or can mean the individual substance underlying things, right? So you could say, what does the understanding understand? Well, what something is, and it corresponds to substance in one of its meanings in Latin. Or the senses know only what we call accidents, right?

[36:58] And the reason understands what stands under that, right? That's a special application to the to Eucharist now, because the senses don't understand what's there, what stands under the accidents, right? But they sense the accidents, right?

[37:26] What does it mean to understand an effect? We speak of the underlying cause sometimes, right? So to understand an effect means to know what its cause, right? And of course, in English, the word for cause is ground, which stands under things, right? So Shakespeare often uses the word ground, right? But you still see it in legal terms, grounds for divorce, right? Cause for divorce.

[37:57] What does it mean to understand a word? One Latin Thomas always speaks of the impositio, the placing upon of a word, right? We say in English, put a label on something, right? As if the meaning or the thing that the word signifies is under the what? Yeah. So to understand a word is to know what stands under it. To understand a word equivocal by reason is to know not only the meanings that stand under it, but to know also their order, right?

[38:40] Like the four meanings of before, right? Or the eight meanings of in, which Thomas orders there in the fourth book of Natural Hearing. It's a beautiful word, understand, right?

[38:58] But apprehension is no better than grasp, right? So should we use the word grasp in English. But passion and emotion are connected, right? So the first objection: passions are distinguished according to their objects. But the object of the concupiscible is something what? Pleasant. Pleasant, according to the senses, which is also the what? Object of concupiscence, according to the philosopher in the first book of rhetoric. Therefore, concupiscence is not a special passion in the concupiscible.

[39:50] What seems to be saying here that, in the sense appetite, what does good and bad mean? Agreeable to the senses, disagreeable to senses. Salmon is bad, obviously.

[40:05] There's this one feast in the local church that we go to, you know, on the weekdays, Sunday too. But he's from Wisconsin, right? So he's an old what? Farmer hand there. He well no he's he's a uh um the Cheese man, what do you call him? Dairy farmer. Yeah, but being the.

[40:28] What's name of the football team out there? Packers. Cheese. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And so the other day he was giving a sermon or kind of a talk, and he said, "What's the most important thing in confession, right? What's somebody said, 'Big sorry for your sins, ' right? Yeah, he says no. He says if you voted, if you if you wanted the the Rams or something to win, you know, rather than the Packers, yeah, and and you haven't, you know, repented, you know, then, you don't get the resolution.

[41:00] He's always doing some little thing in there about that thing, and it's kind of a standard joke, you know. But he gets enough mileage on it. That's kind of funny, you know. That's that's because he's from Wisconsin. Yeah, I know. I I like it myself, you know. Some of those things we're doing it, you know. But I don't know how many references he makes. to that you know But he works it in some way or other, you know.

[41:23] So that's penitence, right? Still want the the other team was to win. You won't be forgiven. But anyway, here in that first objection, I think Aristotle is thinking about good and bad. Refers to what? What to the senses? They don't know good in general. They don't know good as what all desire, you know, but they know the good as what is agreeable to the senses.

[42:03] And remember one time my little son there, he's little, a little bit more, but um, they kind of figuring out, you know, oh, this is a good meal, this is a good dinner, if they like it, it's agreeable to their senses, you know. But if you serve me sandwich, this is awful dinner.

[42:26] I find it disagreeable to my senses. Warren Murray likes salmon, you know. So I don't know. I'm the lonely club. Yeah. More of Augustine says in the book of the eighty three questions

[42:54] that cupidity is a love of passing things, right? Cupiditas. It's a love of transient things, and thus is not distinguished from love. But all passions that are special, are particular passions, are distinguished from each other, right? Therefore, concupiscence is not a special passion in the concupiscible, right? Augustine is always getting us in trouble, right? These Thomas has to draw him back, you know. So,

[43:40] um, moreover, to any what passion of concupiscible is opposed another passion, special passion in concupiscible, as has been said before, right? So, to love is opposed hate, right? To pleasure is opposed pain, okay? Or to joy is opposed sadness, right?

[44:08] But to concupiscence, there is not opposed some special passion in concupiscible, and we have a little problem there, like in English, right? What's the name for that passion that's opposed to incubusance if there is? But we, you know something kind of in our version. That doesn't quite take get the get the sense of. it

[44:35] For Damascene says that the what? Oh, expected or awaited good. Yeah, constitutes concupiscence So concupiscence is for a good you don't what have right? Yeah. But when it's present, you have joy, laetitia Don't you give a woman sometimes in laetitia Similarly the evil that you're expecting, fear. But the present of the evil is what sadness, right? From which it seems that sadness is opposed to what joy, and what fear is opposed to.

[45:22] I mean, to concupiscence, right? But fear is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible. Therefore, concupiscence is not a special passion in the concupiscible, right? But maybe, maybe Denison had some of the same trouble that we have, naming the thing, right? Aristotle's in the Ethics there, and he's giving the names of the virtues and the vices, huh? And he says it comes to sense pleasure, right?

[45:56] There's a name for the vices that go to excess, right? The man who pursues the pleasure of drink too much, you know, a drunkard or something, right? Or the man who pursues the pleasure of eating too much—we got a name for him, a glutton, right? But a man who doesn't pursue the pleasures of the senses enough—we don't seem to have any name for him, right? And that's Aristotle says because it's so rare.

[46:19] that a man takes no delight in these things, or less than he should. So we don't run into. We don't have a name for it, right? So sometimes things don't have a name, and we have to invent a name, right? Mm-hmm. Dr. Bruce. I don't understand why he's saying. uh so is fear counter to concupiscence. I wouldn't have thought fear is was counter to concupiscence. I would have thought the theory of concupiscence is a movement to pleasure, a movement to pleasure.

[46:57] Why is fear? It seems the opposite. Would not be fear contrary to that? Would be something else. Well, of course, he's quoting the text from Damascene, right? Isn't it? Yeah. Yeah. And so. Damascene got that. Yeah, but then then he's going to explain why Damascene said that maybe, right? Okay. Okay.

[47:24] I'm afraid that uh the wine will run out. You know. You know the wedding, of the feast, of Cana there, right? Fear that the wine is going to run out, opening wine for all these guests. Yeah, but you're going to see about the aftertaste. Just make sure the glasses are there for everything. Might be some context you might have the fear there, right?

[47:53] Warren Murray tells me he belonged to some gourmet society, you know, right? So he decided to go to the annual gourmet dinner, right? Huh? We sat down next to a you know stranger there, you know, the stranger was talking about the difficulty they had finding this in from this, this delicacy in from that place, you know, and they almost didn't get it, you know, and so and he was so agitated you know by the whole thing.

[48:13] Warren quit the society. He's excited because you're afraid of things, you know, showing much went unarrived from the from the end of the world. Yeah. So there was a fear there, right? Huh? Most desire.

[48:36] But against all this is that concupiscence is caused by love, right? Huh? So it's not the same thing as love, right? So I want steak because I like steak, right? I want wine because I like wine, right? Like being a weaker word for love, right? Okay. And it tends towards what Delight, right? So you bring me the bottle, bring me the steak. Ah, now I like. Now I have pleasure, right?

[49:07] You see. So isn't concupiscence then different from its what cause, which is love or liking, and what it tends towards, you know, to the enjoyment of that, right? So isn't it distinct from them? And thus is distinguished from the other passions of the concupiscible as being a special what passion. Well, Thomas is going to reply. Answer: It should be said that as has been said before, the pleasant good, right?

[49:44] What is pleasant? That is to say, according to the sense, right? Is in general, right, communitatively, commonly the object of the concubusble, right? Whence, according to its differences, the diverse passions of the concupiscible are distinguished. I notice that's a difference between the concupiscible appetite and the irascible appetite, right? Because the incubable appetite is concerned with what is simply pleasing or displeasing to the senses, huh? While the irascible is kind of the what the fighter, right?

[50:26] Huh? The defender of what you like, right? And so when you go to a fight, it's not because it's pleasant, right? But because you're angry, you know, or because you're bold or something, right? Huh? Okay.

[50:41] Or you run away because you're afraid, right? Not because it's enjoyable to run away, exactly. So he says, in general, the object of the concubusable is what is pleasing to the senses. Hence, according to its differences, the diverse passions of the concupiscible are distinguished. Now he says the diversity of the object can be noted either by the nature of the object itself, or by the diversity in the what?

[51:17] The power of acting. Power of acting. Now he says the diversity of the active object, which is according to the nature of the thing, makes a material difference of the passions.

[51:32] But a diversity which is according to the active power makes a formal difference of the passions, by which the passions differ in what species in particular.

[51:46] Now he says there is another reason of a motive power of the end itself, the good, according as it is really what present, and according as it is what absent, right? So absences make the heart grow fonder, right?

[52:08] There's a little thing to confirm this, right? For according as it is present, it makes the thing to rest in what itself, right? So notice how we describe something beautiful, a beautiful painting or a beautiful what music of Mozart, we say it's what very restful, right? Or beautiful scenery, right? Huh? You know, so how restful, you know? You know, I was driving through the mountains there, you know, Pennsylvania, so on, and so on, even New York there, New York City, but they're announcing, you know, they've just been voted the dirtiest city in the country, New York City.

[52:49] But I mean, there are some beautiful places up in the Hudson there, you know. That's where you know, coming on Hudson there, and the Hudson Highlands there, and so on, West Point is, you know. You see Dickens notes, you know, in America, you know, describes how beautiful West Point is, right? Call this because the million dollar view there, you know, huh? When when they give you a little tour, you know, the million dollar view, beautiful, you know.

[53:20] I remember a friend there was, you know, one of the views in the river and so on, and he had a piano there. He's a piano player, you know. He says. It's really like the

[53:31] finest place to be playing the piano. It's just beautiful. See, but no, we call those things very restful, though, right? It's very restful, right? You can see, kind of, you know, just having a house there, something like that, and seeing those beautiful mountains and so on, you know, green, lush green.

[53:51] So, according as it is present, it makes one to rest in itself. So pleasure is kind of like resting and anything beautiful. But according as it is absent, it causes one to what? Move towards it. Did you have to move towards it, right? So we said before that wanting, right, arises in the absence of what you like, right? So it's like emotion, That's why it's more known to us, huh?

[54:24] So you're more aware of the fact that. You're hungry, than that you're enjoying something. You're contented, as they say. Stay at the Comfort Inn. You know. Stay one at the Comfort Inn,

[54:50] the other stayed at the place, but the Comfort Inn has got the you know Wall Street Journal there, you know, for you. The other one just got the USA Today, you know, lousy publication. So, and the breakfast is much better at the Comfort Inn, you know, nice. Yeah, it's a real good one at the Comfort Inn, you know, but the other one it's

[55:16] cheap. Yeah. But am I aware? Am I as aware that I was comfortable at the Comfort Inn as that I was? Looking for something to eat. in the other place Looking for something to eat. I'm hungry.

[55:39] Huh. Whence the desirable, right? Huh. According to sense, in so far as it what this is very interesting what he says here. In so far as it adapts the desire right to itself,

[56:01] the pleasant, in other words, conforms the what desiring power to itself. You could almost say that's what love is. It's the conformity of the heart with its object. It's the agreement of the heart with its what object. Yeah. Okay.

[56:23] So he says adaptata makes act towards right too, and conforms. It causes what love. Isn't that so? Huh. You know, he said that fits me. Huh. So, you like it, huh?

[56:50] That's conformity, right? That's that's love, right? So, in so far as the what we love is absent, it attracts one to itself, right? And therefore, it causes concupiscence, right? In so far as it's present, it rests in it. It causes, therefore, what pleasure, right? Thus, pleasure is a passion differing in species both from love and from what. Yeah. So love is more what the conforming, conformity of the heart to its object, right?

[57:35] The agreement of the heart with its object, right? Now once you have that conformity to the object, that agreement with the object, then if you don't have it, you seek it by concupiscence, right? But if you get it, then you settle down, right? Okay. You know, when I was growing up, you know, they always talk about the boy gets lost from his parents, whatever is New York City, right?

[58:02] And so the police pick the kid up there and they're looking for the parents, right? But before they find the parents, they've got a restless kid, right? So the standard thing was to buy him an ice cream cone. And then the kid settles down, right? You know. And I mentioned we were driving across country, you know, when the kids were very little, and we know that they get restless, you know, in the car, right?

[58:27] So what I did was make three little bags with some candy in each one of them, and put them in a bigger bag, you know, put in even a bigger bag, and then, you know, we can't stand anymore. I say, you know, pull one out, you know, and give each of them a little bag, and they share them, you know, and they talk and very pleasant, you know, and then go on for another hour or two, and then I'll say, yeah, daddy, yeah, daddy has to get what he's out.

[58:54] You know, we have a big bag, you know. I was very clever of me to do it, you know. But it shows you. It shows this is practical knowledge, though. Those were your love bombs. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Launch them back in the bag. Just to quiet them down, right?

[59:15] Yeah. But he says to what? Desire this delightful thing or that one makes what? Concupiscence is diverse in what number, right? So the what desire for steak and the desire for wine differ because steak and wine are not the same thing, even though they complement each other. Okay.

[59:49] So that's a subdistinction, right? But I can I can like wine, I can desire wine, I can enjoy wine, right? I can like steak, I can desire steak, I can enjoy steak, right? Huh? Okay.

[1:00:12] I know when I was I was working on the definition of comedy there and so on, and then you had to enter into these particular kinds of what sadness, right? We're talking about tragedy and comedy, and so pity is what. One kind of sadness, right? And envy is another kind of sadness, right? And pity is sort of a good kind of sadness. Envy is a bad kind, right?

[1:00:44] But how do they differ, right? By the object of the sadness, right? So envy is sadness over the good fortune of another, right? Why pity is sadness over the misfortune of another, right?

[1:01:03] See? But what's loneliness, huh? What's sadness over the absence of a what friend? Now, what's melancholy? What sadness over one's miserable condition or the miserable condition of the world? Which one is apart?

[1:01:28] Obama's been elected. Very melancholy, you know. Yeah. It might make us angry instead of sad. Makes you nervous, anyway. So all these different kinds of sadness, right? Huh? Okay. And you have these different kinds of what concupiscence, right? Huh?

[1:02:06] Now it's kind of important for moral morals and so on. Aristotle teaches in the eighth book of the Politics. He's saying there are certain kinds of music children should listen to, and others not. And you know, Augustine points out the music of the Baroque, right, and the music of Mozart and Haydn and so on represents the emotions in a state in conformity with what reason, right? So if one gets to like the music of the Baroque or of Mozart, one's emotions are moved in sympathy with it, right?

[1:02:44] And that's something of a disposition, right? At least a remote disposition for moral what virtue, right? It's not sufficient, maybe, to listen to Mozart now, but it did the Baroque, then. Yeah. Oh, yeah. Yeah. I wish he. could give us a concert sometime. He's out of practice now. He's got so much. What other things to do? I mean, he could accident the piano. I don't know.

[1:03:17] But I think Mozart's one of his favorites huh? So that's good. Good. Okay.