Prima Secundae
78. Concupiscence II: Natural and Acquired Desires, and Whether Desire Is Infinite (ST I-II q.30 a.2 replies, a.3–4)
Class of 2012-09-20
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/078-concupiscence-ii-natural-and-acquired-desires-and-whether/

[0:00] To the first, therefore, it should be said that the desirable—excuse me—the pleasant good, right, is not absolute, right, all by itself, the object of concupiscence, right, but under the notion of being absent, right. So it's the delightful good, in so far as it's absent, that causes what? Desire. Desire. Yeah. Wanting. Yeah. Makes sense, doesn't it? Okay.

[0:34] Just as the sensible—he gives a comparison now to the knowing powers—just as the sensible, under the notion of the what? Past. Past. Is an object of memory, right? It's always hard to translate ratione in that. It used to have Latin, right? So ratione, how do you translate that in English? Unless you say, you know, it's by reason of being past, right, that the sensible is an object of what, memory, right?

[1:05] Okay. So someone says the object of memory is the sensible. You say that's got some truth in it, but it's not precise enough, right? It's a sensible

[1:19] by reason of what, or under the reason of, yeah, yeah. Okay. These books that Aristotle has that follow upon the De Anima right? You have the De Sensu et Sensato as they say in Latin, The sense and sensible. Then you have the book on memory and what, recalling, reminiscence. Then you have the books on dreams, and so by the what senses, you know, the present, and by memory, the past, and then some people think in dreams they have some foretelling of the future, right?

[1:58] Aristotle is a very nuanced as to what he says about that, right? It's kind of interesting, how the present and the past and the what, future, yeah.

[2:10] And you meet people who say, you know, they've dreamt about somebody they don't know, and then next day they meet that person, you know, and things of that sort of thing.

[2:28] And these particular conditions, he says, diversify what the species of emotions or passions, right? Or even of what the different powers in the sensitive part, which respect particulars, right? Okay. So the distinction between the irascible power and the concupiscible power is not really found in the will, right? In the will, it's one power, but in the senses, it's something more particular.

[3:00] Now, what about Augustine now in the book on the Eighty-Three Questions? That cupidity is the love of passing things. huh? Cling not to perishable things, lest you perish with them. He's expressing himself so well, Augustine. Okay. Now, this is something that Thomas talks about in many places. That is a praedicatio per causam, right, and not per essentiam, right? When Aristotle says, you know, that sensing is an undergoing in the second book of the De Anima, right?

[3:44] Is that a predicatio per causam or a praedicatio per essentiam? Is sensing essentially an undergoing? Or is this a praedicatio per causam, and that the senses have to be acted upon by the object, right? But once they've been acted upon, then they can see or hear it. Maybe it's a praedicatio per what? Causum, yeah, yeah. So that's not just an ad hoc convention here that Thomas is doing to get Augustine out of a problem or himself out of a problem, right?

[4:30] And but you find this in Aristotle, and you find this in what? Daily life, right? That we sometimes use as predicatio per causam. So it's kind of a surprising thing when you first realize. Then you realize we are doing this thing.

[4:56] Or aliter dicendum. Another way you can get out of this problem, right, Augustine, is that Augustine takes cupidity in a what? Large sense, right? For any emotion of the appetite, which can be in regard to a what? Future good, right? Well, since you can love a future good as well as a present good, right? But he's using it in this context towards loving a future good, right?

[5:29] Then he comprehends under both love and hope. So notice Thomas's respect there for Augustine, right? You know, he realized that Augustine he's using words carefully, but we have to understand how he's using words, right?

[5:53] And that brings out an important thing about love, huh? So you know, when Saint Paul says that you know, if these three remain, faith, hope, and charity, right, but the greatest of these is charity, he speaks of charity as what? Remaining, right? Well, when you get in the next world, faith and hope will what? Disappear, right? But charity will be what? Remain, huh? And be maybe more perfect the charity in heaven than on earth here, but why is that?

[6:37] You see, well, it goes back to the nature of love. I can love what is what? The good that is present as well as the good that is what? Absent, yeah, yeah, yeah. So when you love God in this life, I is to some extent what? Absent, right?

[7:00] We don't see him as he is, and so on, right? In the next life, he will be what more present, right? And the love will be what greater, then?

[7:16] It was interesting. I was reading Thomas this morning there, in the question twelve there, and he was saying one point there. Does everybody see God equally? And Thomas says no. And he said,

[7:36] "We all see the same thing, right? But one has more ability to see that thing, right? And they have more ability to see it because they partake more of the light of what glory, right? Huh? Well, why do some partake then of more of the light of glory than others? Well, because they love God more, right? Huh? And why does love do that, right? And Thomas says, "Well, love gives rise to desire, and desire in some way disposes you for the thing you desire.

[8:17] " Well, it could be in desire in the in the will, right? Okay. So the desire in the will disposes you to sense for that.

[8:29] Second student who really desires to know something, right? That kind of disposes him to to learn, right? So if you really love God a lot, then you desire God a lot, and you are therefore disposed to see God more, right? I

[8:54] used to sometimes, you know, you go back to the metaphorical sense there of the song, the song doesn't say, you know, would you want to unite yourself with somebody in marriage if you didn't think they loved you?

[9:07] I don't think so, right? So would God unite himself with somebody who didn't love him, right? See, but the more you you love somebody, the more you seem to be what worthy of being united with them, huh? So the more you love God, the more He will unite Himself with you, with your mind, and the more you will what see God, right? Huh? Okay. So get on my objection

[9:39] here. The passion which is directly opposed to concupiscence is innominata, unnamed, huh? Well, I had the same problem in English, right? Which adds itself thus to evil or to the bad, just as concupiscence to the what good, huh?

[10:06] And because there is what, and because it is of a absent good, yeah, bad, yeah. Just as what fear, sometimes in place of that is placed what fear.

[10:25] Just as sometimes cupidity in place of what? Hope. For what is a little what good or a little thing bad? Is this what we regard as nothing right? And therefore, for every motion of the desiring power to the good or towards the future evil, one lays down what hope and fear, which regard a difficult good, bad, good difficult to achieve or evil difficult to avoid.

[11:11] It's interesting, you know, in regard to election. You know, we have hope and fear. We'd probably say right rather than wanting and you know,

[11:22] hope and fear. We kind of alternate between these two, right? So we're going to take a little break here before we go on. To concupiscence here.

[11:36] Whether some concupiscences are natural and some not natural, right? To the third one goes forward. Thus, it seems that of concupiscences, some are what? Some are not natural and some non-natural.

[11:56] For concupiscence pertains to animal desire, right? But natural desire is divided against animal desire, or soulful desire, right? Therefore, no concupiscence is natural, right? Notice how many of these objections, you know, depend upon understanding the word, you know, and clearing up a misconception in the word, right?

[12:23] As Aristotle says in the book on Sophistical Refutations, that the most common mistake in thinking is from mixing up the senses of a word, huh? Therefore, no concupiscence is what natural, right?

[12:43] Moreover, a material diversity does not make a diversity in species, but only according to number, right? Like these two tables here, right? Two different species, but just differ in their matter, right? Because one's made out of this wood and the other's made out of that wood, right?

[13:10] Which diversity, according to number, does not fall under what art, huh? It's the difference between you and me. It doesn't fall under art, right?

[13:22] But if some concupiscences are natural and some not natural, they do not differ except according to diverse things that are what desired, right? Which makes a material difference, and according to number, what only, huh? Therefore, why not not to divide concupiscences through natural and non-natural, or by natural and non-natural. Moreover, reason is divided against what nature, huh? As is clear in the second book of the Physics, huh?

[14:03] Second book of Natural. If therefore in men there is some concupiscence that is not natural, is necessary that it be rational. But this cannot be, because since concupiscence is a certain passion, it pertains to the sense desiring power, not to the will, which is the desiring power of reason. Therefore, there are what, not some concupiscences that are unnatural, huh? Okay. But against this is what the philosopher, whoever he is, it's Aristotle, right?

[14:48] In the third book of the Ethics, right? That's where he takes up the virtue of temperance. So, and the first book of the Rhetoric, huh? He lays down some desires to be natural and some not natural, right?

[15:07] I answer. It should be said, Thomas says as has been said, concupiscence is the what desire of a delightful good, pleasant good. But in two ways is something what delightful. He sees a distinction here. In one way, because it is suitable to the nature of the animal, as food and drink and other things of this sort, and the desire of these things is called natural. Yeah.

[15:44] Natural pleasure. What he's saying, and the desire of a pleasure of this sort is called natural, right? Okay. Because the desire is something that is suitable to the nature of the animal, so it's a natural desire, right? Eat food, let's say. In another way, something is delectable, pleasant, because it is suitable to the animal according to his what? His grasping, his knowing, right? Just as when someone grasps something as good and suitable, and consequently he delights in it.

[16:29] And such a desire, the delectable, is called not natural, and is more called in Latin, I guess, cupiditas. And this will be a minute for my dress because I have to move.

[16:49] Now, the first natural concupiscences, natural desires, are common both to men and to the other what animals, huh? Because to both is something suitable and pleasant according to nature, and in these also all men what come together. Whence the philosopher in the third book of the Ethics calls them common and what necessary? Necessary.

[17:20] But the second kind of desires are private to men, right? Of whom it is private to think out something as what good and suitable.

[17:35] In addition to that which nature what requires, whence in the first book of the Rhetorica, Aristotle calls the first concupiscence irrational in the sense of being without reason, right? But the second with what reason, huh?

[18:02] And because diverse people diversely reason, and therefore also what the theory of ethics proper and I suppose added, huh? Above the what natural, right? I always use expression English sometimes and acquired taste, yeah, yeah. As if you need some what work of reason there, right? To acquire a taste, right? Could you give some examples of what he means by these non-natural? Well, and I read Austri's essay.

[18:45] You read Austri's essay there towards an evaluation of music, right? Where he gave reasons for listening to the Baroque and Mozart rather than the Romantic composers. When I started out listening classical music, you know, it was Beethoven and Tchaikovsky and so on, right? Which are not too bad, but they're not as good as the Baroque, right? And the and the classical period Mozart, right? And so Austri says in the essay, you know, the one thing the Romantic guy won't admit is that emotion should be subordinate to reason.

[19:27] So you end up with what you know, but anyway, he's instructing me right now, so I'm acquiring now. So I start listening to Mozart and the Baroque and so on, right? And I remember the first time my brother Richard and my brother Marcus, when they brought home the magic flute of Mozart, right? Well, I was docile by nature, you know, and I listened tensely the whole thing.

[19:49] I didn't really hear anything, you know. But then all of a sudden you start to hear this stuff, you know, and then you realize how much is in there, right? And the more you hear it, the more you appreciate it, right? You need a little bit of work of reason there, right? See what Mozart's doing, and I suppose there's something comparable with Shakespeare, yeah, because it's difficult to read for us, yeah.

[20:15] But it's only after you think about it and learn about it that it becomes more desirable. Even Scripture, for that matter, yeah. And part of the you know the obscurity Shakespeare comes from the fact that words have somewhat changed their use and so on, and so that's not really Shakespeare's fault that we have that difficulty, right? This is what our friend Amy Tuck points out about the difference between the Bible and the Koran.

[20:38] Because so many Muslims they they praise the Koran because it's a great work of literature. Yeah, yeah. The Bible is not that good literature. And he says yes, but he said you have to read it spiritually, and then they'll appreciate more what's there. Yeah.

[20:55] As opposed to the which is nice sounding words of the Quran, but what's what it's saying is not that reasonable. Well didn't Augustine say? you know, you found the Bible unworthy to be compared with Cicero at first. You know, and Saint Jerome had the same sort of thing, and our Lord is supposed to have appeared to Saint Jerome and said, "You are Christian or a Ciceronian."

[21:18] Then later on, it become you know, you know, the rest of quidditas So you want to do rock rock anymore. Not Not much no So So, the desire for music would be a. I just it's kind of strange that you call it not. He didn't say I didn't say unmet.

[21:45] But nonmet. Yeah, regarding so maybe getting the replied objections, we'll see some of the subtleties, right? In this, right? He says that same thing that is desired by a natural desire, right? Can be desired by a what? Soulful desire, right? When it is what? Apprehended, grasped. Yeah. And according to this, of food and what drink and things of this sort, which are desired naturally, right? Huh? There can be a what?

[22:33] A natural what? concupiscence. What is that going to be? Back to objection there, right? Objection is based upon what the natural appetite being divided against the animal, right? Huh? Problem about

[23:06] the the broccoli being a big feeder. That would be a natural desire, right? But not an animal desire, right? But in the animals, it can be what apprehended food, right?

[23:20] Now, to the second objection that this is only material difference, like two tables, there of the same kind. To the second, should be said that the diversity of natural desires from ones that are not natural is not material only, right? Huh? But also, in a certain way, formal, insofar as it proceeds from a diversity of the what? Active object, right?

[23:53] Remember how we're going back to the more general question about the desiring power. Thomas and Aristotle ask, "Is it a power which acts upon its object, or is it a power where the object acts upon it? " On the case of the power of digesting my food, eating my food, ah, my body is acting upon the food, right? My teeth are biting up the food, and there's.

[24:29] Juices in there that start to break the food down and so on, and more juices further down, I guess, and so on. And so the digestive power is a power that acts upon its object, right? Well, in the case of the senses,

[24:49] are you people acting upon the sounds I'm making, or is the sound I am acting upon tormenting your ears? The latter, right? Okay. If I yelled, are they acting more upon your ears, right? Okay. The same way, if you that painting over there, are my my eyes acting upon that painting, or is the painting acting upon my eyes?

[25:17] Well, the same with the emotions, right? Huh? The object of the emotion moves the emotion, right? So the guy with the gun moves me to fear, right? Huh? And the food, desire, and so on, right? Huh? So that's why he speaks of the objectivity, right? The active object, right? Huh? It's not an object that is undergoing, but that is acting upon us, right? And therefore, these emotions are called by Thomas passio, passiones.

[25:53] But the object of the appetitive power is the good, what? Apprehended. Whence to the diversity of the active object pertains what? Diversity of apprehension, of grasping. Yeah, the diversity of of the grasping pertains the diversity of the active power, right? Whence, in so far as something is apprehended as suitable by a what? Absolute apprehension, right? What does absolute mean there in that context? Absolute is usually in Thomas opposed to what?

[26:32] Relative, Relative, right? Huh? Okay. But he means that the desire arises without a comparison, right? Huh? Okay. From which are caused natural desires, which the philosopher in the rhetoric calls what? Irrational, huh? You have to be careful; about the word irrational and without reason, right? Huh? Okay.

[27:05] And in so far as something is grasped with deliberation, now that's an act of reason, huh? Okay. From which are caused desires that are not natural, which, on account of this in the rhetoric, are called and said to be with reason, right? Okay. So your love of Shakespeare is with reason. Yeah. Yeah.

[27:31] Some deliberation there, right? And we could say, though we love to hear your voice, yet well, we know that music hath far more pleasing. Quite a Shakespearean thing. With reason, with reason, my ear distinguishes.

[28:05] Okay, now what about the third objection here? Reason against, fight against nature, right now. How can emotion be rational, right? To third, it should be said, because in man not only is what

[28:31] universal reason, which pertains to the understanding part, but also what particular reason, which pertains to the sensitive part, as has been said in the first book. Well, that goes back to the treatise on the soul, right now. And according to this, also the concupiscence, which is with reason, is able to pertain to the sensitive appetite, right?

[29:05] And moreover, the sensitive appetite is able also to be moved by the universal reason, using the imagination as a middle term, right? Okay. So I often think, you know, people, you know, if they really heard Mozart, they would what? Yeah, yeah. And it takes a while, you know, to hear these things. I think before you start to really hear them, you know. That always makes me wonder about how often when he would say have a performance of his work or when he was alive or dead before recordings were available, would they just play it for a whole week or two weeks at a at a place, and then so people could hear it again and again?

[29:52] Well, I noticed when they performed the first time, the the twenty second piano concerto of Mozart, right? And the audience demanded that the second movement be played again. Play it twice, right? They didn't have any records in those days. Yeah, because someone might hear a piece of Mozart once in his life. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's pretty amazing that they could distinguish it that well. We have to hear it again and again and again.

[30:21] Partly because we have the information so readily accessible, we don't have to develop the power of memory as much, maybe as they couldn't back then. But it's amazing how much they could discern. In one hearing or something. Mozart just sits down and improvise in the piano after the concert. You know, they seem to enjoy it even more. You know, you can see that kind of brilliancy, rising spontaneously from the man's.

[31:05] I noticed a lot of times. You know, if you go, if I go from reading this text or something like this to Mozart, you know, there's kind of a natural transition, right? You're still in the domain of reason somehow there, and why some more popular forms of music would be irritating, you know, or jarring, right? Is being unreasonable to say the least. I told you the story of Father Boulay there.

[31:36] You know, his restaurant, and they play up this crazy stuff, and so he sends up some money, you know, for them to stop. The request that they stop playing. The request they were sufficiently insulted that they didn't stop playing.

[31:52] He'll do a lot of things. Nerve to say. He was a friend of the symphony orchestra conductor there, you know, back there. So he could have sent him another bit of money to learn how to play the music.

[32:11] He insulted again. So when he would come back to the place. Well, now we have time here for the article four, and we have to. Yeah, take a chance and make sure we've got that. Okay.

[32:28] To the fourth one goes forward. Thus, it seems that concupiscence is not what infinite. For the object of concupiscence is the good, which has the notion of a what end. So Aristotle always points out the connection between the end and the good. The means is good, and maybe in a secondary sense, but primarily it's the end that is good. Well, finis and infinite, are. But the man who lays down the infinite excludes the end, right?

[33:05] If everything was desired for the sake of something else, right, then there'd be no end, really. Aristotle says. Therefore, concupiscence cannot be infinite. whereas, concupiscence is of a suitable or a fitting good, right? Since it proceeds from love, right, which is conformity of the heart with its object. But the infinite, since it is disproportion, cannot be what fitting. How could an infinite pair of pants fit me?

[33:42] An infinite pair of shoes, infinitely big or infinitely small, would not fit my foot, right? Therefore, concupiscence cannot be infinite. These are marvelous objections. He must have a lot of fun doing this. whereas, you can't go across the infinite, right? And thus, in them, it is not possible to arrive at the end, at the last. But to the one desiring, there comes about what pleasure to the fact that he attains the end.

[34:17] huh? Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite. It would follow that never would there be delight. Okay. So man is always trying to make more money, right? He's going to always be dissatisfied, right? Because there's always more money to be made. That's what Sam Walton said at the end of his life. Somebody interviewed him. You've made gazillions of dollars. What do you want now? I want to make more.

[34:47] Okay. But against this is what the philosopher says in the first book of the Politics, huh? That in infinitum, huh, concupiscence desiring, right, or existing, men desire what infinite things? Can you give an example of the man there?

[35:14] I answer. It should be said that it has been said twofold, right? Is concupiscence, right? One natural and the other what? Not natural. Non natural. Now the natural desire cannot be infinite in act, huh?

[35:37] For it is of that which nature what requires, huh? But nature always tends into something what finite and certain, right? Whence never does man desire infinite food or infinite drink?

[35:55] Even the kid doesn't want infinite candy, right now, to the point where he's had enough. Well, it depends on the kid. But just as in nature it happens that there is the infinite in potency rather than in act, right? Through succession, right? One day after another, right? One bottle after another, right?

[36:25] So desire of this sort can be infinite in what succession, right? Huh? As one having obtained food, right? Again, what? Another time. Another time? Desires food, right? Or whatever else that nature requires, right? Huh? Because these bodily things, good when they come, do not remain what forever, right? But they fail. Hence the Lord Himself said to the Samaritan woman, I guess, huh? Who drinks from this water?

[37:03] Comes to him. Yeah. Why is that? That's one of the most vivid scenes for Christ to know comes alive. You know, it just seems so. And the other one where he puts his name up in the tree there, you know, and he says, yeah, yeah, come down, but I need your help today, you know. He said, desires to see him, you know. But it seems to me it seems so real the scene, yeah.

[37:29] That's what maybe Elizabeth Taylor said that she had one husband; she desired another one. You know. But concupiscence that is not natural is what entirely infinite, huh? For it follows what reason, huh? But it what fits reason to proceed what infinitum, huh? Whence the one who desires wealth is able to desire them not to some certain term, right? But simpliciter to be rich quantum cumque potest much is able?

[38:23] Yeah, yeah. That's like can you recording, right? Same one. Same one. Yeah. Now there is another reason able to be assigned according to the philosopher in the first book of the Politics, huh? Wherefore some desire is finite and some what infinite. For always the desire of the end is what infinite, huh? In the sense that the end is what Desire for itself to itself, yeah. As health, right?

[38:59] Whence more health is more what desired, and thus an infinitum, right? Just as if white by itself what disperses, what is more white will more what disperse, right?

[39:18] So how much do I want to be pleased? No limit. How much I want to enjoy the music of Mozart. I want to enjoy it more and more. Plays of Shakespeare.

[39:36] But the desire of that which is for the end is not infinite, but according to that measure it is desired in which it is suitable to the what end, huh? Whence those who lay down their end to be in wealth—that that's their goal in life. See, they have the desire of wealth in infinitum.

[40:01] But those who desire wealth on account of the necessity of life desire wealth what limited. That's sufficient for the what Necessity of life, huh? There's a philosopher who says there, right? And the same is of the ratio of concupiscence of the other things, right? Is that kind of related to what he said about hatred before? That I don't just hate this thief; I hate all thieves. And that's just the opposite of wanting

[40:36] to desire. Yeah, I don't know if that's as much an end though with hatred. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I had to want to get rid of the Jews, I guess. Quite, quite a few of them, because he needed a limit to his iniquity.

[40:56] Now, the first objection there from the connection between the good and the end, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that everything that is desired is taken as something what limited, huh?

[41:12] Either because it is what limited or finite secundum rem, huh? Insofar as it is once what desired act, or because it is finite, according as it falls under what apprehension. It is not able to be apprehended under the what ratio of the infinite, because the infinite is that of whose quantity one takes there is always something outside of it to take, right?

[41:47] Can't drink the whole fountain. Can't drink the whole fountain? Yeah. Now, to the second, it should be said that reason is in some way of an infinite what power, in so far as it is able to consider something, ad infinitum, as appears in the addition of numbers and what lines. Remember the kids in the little. Can you count to a hundred, Daddy? I said, Yeah. Wow. Then after a while, you know, Daddy, can you count to a thousand?

[42:21] Yeah. Wow. You count to. Yeah. Once the infinite, in some way, taken is proportioned to what reason? For the universal, which reason apprehends, is in some way infinite, huh?

[42:45] So if I know what a number is, in some way, I know an infinity of things, right? And when I say, you know, no odd number is even, I'm talking about an infinity of things. Two infinities. Yeah, yeah. I'm pretty impressive that way, right? In so far as in potency, it contains an infinity of singulars, right? Instead of an infinity of things. That's why I was explaining Shakespeare's definition of reason, right?

[43:12] And one sense of large discourse is what a discourse about the large, right? And one sense of about the large is about the what universal. Well, if the universal, in some way, covers an infinity of things, that's really a large discourse you're making there. What do you do with the particular? A large discourse.

[43:38] To the third, it should be said, in order that someone be pleased, huh? It is not required that he what pursue all things which he desires, but in each thing desired that he follows, he takes what delight.

[43:57] He does get to each bonbon, each bottle, wherever it is, right? Huh? He enjoys it, right? Okay. So we have to have the pleasure of talking about pleasure next time, huh?

[44:14] Yeah, delight. Yeah, delight.