Prima Secundae
80. Aquinas on Pleasure, Part 2: Is Pleasure in Time, How Joy Differs from Pleasure, and Pleasure in the Intellect (q.31 a.2–4)
Class of 2012-09-27
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/080-aquinas-on-pleasure-part-2-is-pleasure-in-time-how-joy-differs/

[0:00] But if pleasure is really more a kind of a rest than a motion, it's going to be in time, right? That's the question. To the second, then one proceeds thus: it seems that pleasure is in time, for pleasure is a certain motion, as is said in the first book of the what rhetoric, huh?

[0:22] The philosopher says that, right? But all motion is in time; therefore, pleasure is in time, right? Huh? Now, sometimes the word motion, is, even carried over to understanding, right? And you know, when Plato says that God moves Himself, right? Thomas says he doesn't really mean motion in the original sense, right? But he means God understands Himself and loves Himself, right? Okay. And of course grammatically, of course, the verb always signifies with time, right?

[1:05] And therefore, it looks back to the original meaning, right? But it's maybe something now that is no longer what emotion is to sense, huh? It's all at once, right? Okay. So God's understanding Himself and loving Himself is tota simul? Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore, so do our minutes hasten to their end. Each changing place with that which goes before, in sequent toil all forwards do contend.

[1:43] Well, there you see the connection between motion and what time, right? Aristotle says the before and after in the road is before the before and after in the motion over the road, and that before the what time it takes to go, right? But they correspond the three, right?

[2:06] And so he gives the the first sense of beginning, right? Huh? The point is the beginning of the line, right? Huh? To that first sense of beginning is beginning of the motion and the beginning of the time that the motion takes, right?

[2:23] They're very close, right? In the same way, the first sense of before that Aristotle gives in the twelfth chapter, of the categories is before in time, right? But to that sense would be reduced or led back because it's not the same sense, but based on likeness, the before in time, right? Huh? And even the before in the what magnitude, right? Huh?

[2:49] Those are senses that added on the side, right? Rather than in the going forward meanings, right? Just like the first meaning of end is in place, and to that is reduced in time. The second meaning, in the central senses, is part in whole, Then, genus and species, species and genus. Many is the attempt to order those eight meanings. He's

[3:21] reading this difficult article, to Thomas, today. He said, "gee, whiz, Thomas?" I said, "I would have been floundering over the place, here, all by myself." He said, some say this and so do I ask wrong, and some say this. You know, which of those would I have fallen into? You know?" He says, "I need you right now." Like he says in that passage in the Daniel, he needs teacher right to avoid mistakes.

[3:45] Huh? It's amazing. Spend more time in error. Yeah. Moreover, the what lengthy I guess the euternum right, Or the dwelling too long? It's said according to time, right? But some pleasures are said to be morose, huh? Therefore, pleasure is in time, right? And I can't see morose something about that.

[4:25] Moreover, the passions of the soul are of what one genus, right? But some passions of the soul are in time, and therefore also what pleasure, right? But according, but against this is what the philosopher, meaning Aristotle, the philosopher, says in the tenth book and the Nicomachian Ethics. that according to no time does one take what pleasure. I can think of an example of that. If you're with someone you love very much, you haven't seen them for a long time, you're engaged in conversation.

[5:04] It's three in the morning. Where did the time go? There's no time, are there? Yeah, yeah. I mean, it makes it a kind of experience, right? Some pleasures don't last long, right? Brother Mark used to say, you know, the first sip of beer tastes the best, you know. Yeah, first bottle of beer tastes better than the second bottle. The first, sip, the only thing you really enjoy is the first sip.

[5:33] He says. By the seventh, you don't really care. Yeah, something like that. You have two helpings to dessert, you really. The second helping, you know, you don't really enjoy it, you know. Just hunger makes good sauces. Pecan pie. Pecan pie.

[6:02] So Thomas says, "I answer it should be said that something can be in time in two ways. In one way, by itself, right. In another way, right, to some other thing, right. And so we're per accidens, huh? Because time is a number of things that are what successive, or like he says in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, it's a number of the before and after in motion, right?

[6:36] Okay. Those are said by themselves to be in time of whose very what notion it belongs to there be some succession or something pertaining to succession, as motion, right, involves what? Okay, before and after, right? And rest, as he rest in the strict sense is the lack of motion in something that could be in motion and it could be in motion in time. So the the rest, right?

[7:11] Take five minutes, right? Rest. Could keep you working for another five minutes, but okay. So that's in time too. locutio, right? Huh? It takes me some time to say what I want to say. Not in bad sense necessarily, but it takes me some time to say anything. I need to

[7:34] sentence even the word. Okay, but according to another, right, and not through itself or by itself, right? Things are said to be in time whose what ratio whose notion is not some succession, right? Who or of whose ratio is not some succession, but nevertheless they are subject to some what succession, right? Now, notice the example he gives is very interesting. Just as to be a man of its very notion does not have any what succession,

[8:20] for it is not the emotion but the end of emotion or change to it that motion which is called as generation. But because the being of man is subject to changing causes, right? You get old and you die and so on. According to this, man is said to be in time, right? So you know when Aristotle says, "What is it that's in time? "

[8:55] He says something has a beginning and an end in time. Okay. Now emotion is going to have a beginning and end in time, right? But in a different way than my existence does, right? Because emotion, as such, is same, right? Another way of saying per se, right? secundum se per se, as such, emotion is in time. huh? spread out in time, right? Is my existence of that sort?

[9:30] No, I know before and after in my existence, but my body is subject to change and so on, and that can terminate my existence, right? Okay, and I was generated, right? Huh? And that's the beginning of my existence, right? So my existence is in time to another, right? But my walking is in time per se, right? As such, huh? That's kind of a hard distinction, but it's one that Aristotle talks about too.

[10:08] So now he, with that distinction in mind, he says, "Thus, therefore, it should be said that pleasure, by itself or in itself, is not in what time. For pleasure in the good now obtained, right? Huh? For pleasure is in the good now obtained, right? Which is as the term or limit or end of the what motion, motion, right? But if that good which has been attained is subject to transmutation, right, to change, pleasure will be per accidens in time.

[10:55] If, however, it is entirely within, not subject to change, right, the pleasure will be neither in time, will not be in time, neither per se nor per accidens right? So, is a pleasure seeing God as He is face to face, huh? How would that be? That be in time in any way?

[11:19] And the beatific vision is only before and after. No before and after there, right? And as you partaking of eternity, right now, that's what we call eternal life, right? You're partaking of eternal life, so it won't be in its what won't be subject to any kind of change, so the per accidens, right? It's not like Plato said, you know, after a while you get kind of bored or something.

[11:45] You want to be reincarnated, you know, and so on. Tom says, "I'll never be bored. " You can never make the mistake, you know. Your mind is so enlightened, you can never make the mistake of thinking it'd be better to go back in the body, you know, the changeable body, you know. Yeah. So. A friend of mine in high school said that I'll never forget it. Andrew Gorge, he said, "Well, after a few million years, won't we get kind of bored?

[12:16] After a few million years, won't, we get kind of bored up there? We're going to do something else. " It's. " Kind of amazing, you know. You know, you had a passage of Augustine where he says,

[12:33] "Miserable the man who knows all the things but not God, right? Blessed the man who knows God even if he knows nothing else, right? Blessed also the man who knows God and other things, but not for knowing the other things, but for knowing God alone, right? " So I was reading something where Thomas was saying something along the same effect, you know, that. Even if you saw only God and seeing God, but seeing God that's the other thing, right?

[13:03] But if you saw only God and seeing God, that would still be perfect happiness, huh? It's kind of interesting. See, but our thinking in this life is subject to change in some way because we use what images when we think, right? And our body gets tired and we fall asleep, you know. So there's this fantasy about Aristotle holding a steel ball over a metal basin, you know.

[13:37] So if he started to fall asleep, it would drop out of his hand. Boy, well, I'm sure you would do things stupid as that, but people couldn't realize that he got so far that he was thinking, you know. But Aristotle, you know, when he's wondering about God, right? You know, he wonders because God is what always in this state, you know, of understanding the wonderful things, and primarily understanding himself.

[14:04] Aristotle knows that that state we can only be in what sometimes, right? So we got to sleep, or we got to eat, or we got to, you know, do something other, and so we only we're always being interrupted, you might say, in our contemplation of the best things, right? So he says, if God is always contemplating the best thing, and we only rarely can become the best thing, how much better he is than us, right?

[14:30] And and if he he is, he's superior, right, the way he's he's contemplating, you know, even more so, right? He compels he compels our what wonder, Aristotle says, huh?

[14:47] But in beat vision, you won't be what seeing God using images at all, right? So in no way you're going to be subject to to change there, right? So that's what delectatio non erit in tempore, per se, nec per accidens. You can apply that to beat vision, huh? She will do it sometime, right? Doesn't do it here. It's not appropriate to get into it.

[15:19] Now, to the first, therefore, should be said that as is said in the third book about the soul, Aristotle, motion is said in two ways, right? In one way, and this is the first meaning of motion, that it's the act of the what imperfect. And then he's quoting what part of the definition there, right? Where Aristotle says it's the act of it, it's what exists in potency as what such, right?

[15:48] Quantum movis modi modi. So it's by its very definition something incomplete, and perfect, right? And such a motion is what successive. And in time, right?

[16:08] You know, to state in English by saying it's the act of what is able to be, insofar as it's what able to be. So it's still, it's always something incomplete. Another motion is the act of the perfect, that is, what exists in act, and of this kind is intelligere to understand, to sense, right?

[16:33] And to will, and also to delight. And a motion of this sort is not successive, nor is it as such per se in time. Aristotle is contrasting those two things, huh? And just remember about the word motion, right? I mean, Aristotle usually uses the word motion in the strict sense for the act of what is able to be, right? Insofar as it's still able to be, right?

[17:01] But in the third book on the soul, he sometimes will call this more perfect activity, the act of the perfect. He'll call that a motion too, right? I mentioned how Plato, right, says that God moves Himself, meaning he understands and loves Himself, right? Huh?

[17:20] When Aristotle is contrasting these two, right, the first meaning and the second, and Thomas, you know, he'll use motus for the first and and use the operatio for the second, right? But it's not really a good word for it, maybe. You know, Aristotle says that.

[17:40] Just take an example if you want to. When I'm walking home, have I walked home yet? But when I'm seeing you, have I seen you yet?

[17:54] So when I'm seeing you, I have seen you, which implies the perfection of it, right? But when I'm walking home, I haven't walked home yet, have I? And when I have walked home, I'm walking home. No, so so long as I'm walking home, my activity walking home is incomplete, right? And once it's completed, once I have walked home, I'm not walking home anymore, right? Okay.

[18:24] But when I'm hearing the music of Mozart, have I heard it yet? Unfortunately, no, I have. Did I? It's been a very long time. And when I understand what a square is, have I understood what it is yet? Yeah, that's kind of a nice way of kind of seeing the difference between the two, right? So my walking home is something that is by its very nature successive, right?

[18:48] Huh? Okay. Is understanding what a triangle is or understanding what a square is to take some sure examples of things I might possibly understand is that by its very nature successive? No. See, neither you got it, yeah. Yeah. Now, when I'm pleased, have I been pleased yet?

[19:12] See, so it's really like an operation rather than a motion, right? We call emotions in the second sense, which is the act of the perfect, right? Huh?

[19:23] Okay. So man's end does not consist in motion at first sense, because that's something by its very nature imperfect, huh? Is this the the distinction I've often? I've thought about it, and I don't know if I maybe I've read some things about it, but that's the difference in our speaking between in Latin the word labor, labor, and opus. You think of the opus dei, we talk about, but labor is what we do when we go out in the field or we're mopping the floor. or. something like that yeah.

[20:00] I think Heraclitus we use the word maybe entelecheia or something you know for that perfect thing, but Thomas uses the term operatio a lot, you know. But you know, I'm not saying that the words you know get a use necessarily have that meaning. Yeah, I'm thinking. Operation would be could involve you know the use. Well, I'm thinking of in St. Benedict who speaks the opus dei as chanting the office, but then he says ora et labor, pray and work.

[20:29] Yeah. But he means labor. He means. Yeah. I think as he means manual work. Yeah. Yeah. And I sometimes I think of this along the lines of something like the servile arts and the liberal arts. Yeah. Something like different kinds of working. But praying, like if I'm saying our Father, there's a certain movement there, right, from one petition to another petition, right? And so if I have I prayed yet, you know, you might say, well, you know, I'm praying, I'm you know complete my prayer yet, right?

[20:59] Okay. Or if I'm just I start contemplating God, then I have contemplated God, right? Huh? Denotes that operation. Yeah. Yeah. That's the operation. Yeah, that's Thomas used the term operatio. I'm not sure how how much Latin you know, but it's really the word opus obviously, operation, you know. But the opus is something complete, right? Opera of somebody. Yeah. That's when

[21:25] somebody said I put the opera omnia of St. Thomas. Oh, I didn't know he wrote an opera. I said, yeah, just one. It's called Omnia. Yeah.

[21:37] It's like that's when you talk about the trivia in school, you know, and all you can think of as you know trivia game or something. You know, what do you do there? You know, you play trivia games or something. That's all they do all day. Yeah. You got the award recently, you know, from one of the best schools in the country, you know, Catholic school. When was that?

[21:54] Just recently, so weekend. I mean, this fall. Oh, wow. The ceremony and so. So not not playing trivia games there. No. But they don't know trivium and quadrivium That's the meaning of all these people. Okay.

[22:19] To the second, it should be said that a pleasure is said to be diuturna linktiaria, vel morosa, according as it is per accidens in time, right? Huh?

[22:37] Now, what about the other passions? Are they more emotions? For the other passions do not have for their object the good obtained as pleasure does, right? Hence,

[22:49] they have more of a notion of motion imperfect than what pleasure, right? And consequently, it more belongs to pleasure than to them to not be what in time. Okay. So it's kind of a difference between Aristotle and Plato. Aristotle. The story is told you know Aristotle coming down to the academy and when he got there that day was Aristotle. He says, well, he's a whole school in himself.

[23:21] Now I admire you know the the I think I mentioned this before, but I admire the thing when the older man right who's in a you know in a superior position in some way is not envious of the younger man being greater than himself. So Albert the Great, for example, he was called Albert the Great, right? And he arranged a kind of a debate between himself and Thomas, but Thomas, of course, won, right?

[23:46] And he said, now this guy you call a dumb ox, you know, his bellow will be heard around the world, you know, but no, no what envy, right? And that's the beautiful relation between Haydn and Mozart, right? And when they played the when Haydn in a musical evening, you know, when they were playing Mozart's quartets, and Haydn came to Mozart's father and says, honest man, you know, your son is the greatest composer known to me, you know, so on.

[24:13] That's when Mozart went home and dedicated those six quartets, so they call the Haydn quartets now, you know, dedicated to Haydn, you know. But Haydn actually no jealousy at all. Haydn says he wrote Don Giovanni for me, my friends. You know, I could really appreciate, you know. You know, he said he went over to England, you know, and told him how how ignorant they are. that they haven't hired Mozart, you know, for a year, and, so on.

[24:39] So those are three beautiful examples that I know, right? You know, you saw something like too, you know, in in De Koninck and Dionne, because De Koninck was more famous than Dionne, right? You know, come around his lecture tours and so on. But he he was very clear, you know. I know, Warren Murray tells me he went up there, you know, and Dionne, or De Koninck said, you know, Dionne is the greatest mind up here, you know, and made it very clear, you know.

[25:05] And I know Mary Shane went up there, you know, and she lived with Mrs. De Koninck, and he'd made perfectly clear to his wife, who admired her husband very much, you know, that Dion was the greatest mind up there, you know.

[25:19] I always remember walking by on the sidewalk there, and one day Dion was going to go into De Koninck's house. They're going to discuss something, you know, and Dion was going back and forth, and he just finishing his thought about, you know, I knew he didn't want to be bothered, so hello, I just walked on quickly, didn't engage in any conversation, you know. But but it's good to see that, right?

[25:39] Now a man who's older, maybe the teacher in some sense, you know, and the younger man maybe is learning, you know, things from him, you know. But when he sees this guy is superior and he has no no envy, that's beautiful. It seems to me. Opposed to the modern philosophers, you know, everybody trying to excel the guy before him, you know, And uh...

[26:02] With respect that Thomas has for Aristotle, and respect he has for Augustine and the others too, of course, but those guys stand out, you know.

[26:13] You've read John Paul II's got one of those, I don't, know, it's an encyclical letter on Augustine, you know. It really kind of lays out the importance of Augustine, how great a part he plays, you know? in the catechism of the Catholic Church, you know, the number of quotes of Augustine, there's lots from Thomas too, but Augustine most of all, amazing, you know. So it really, you know, and and Augustine didn't have the advantage that Thomas had, you know, knowing Aristotle, really, and so, Mm-hmm.

[26:46] So, I have to really admire. Mm-hmm. I have this movie out about Augustine. I don't know if it's going to be any good. I'm afraid, but it's going to, yeah, it's going to. With liberties all taken, it's going to be out in October, I think. You know, I'll probably go see it if it is. but Is this a Hollywood movie or something else? I don't know who made it exactly.

[27:06] I don't know, but I think it's made under fairly, you know, church I don't know. Respectable. I think so. but I don't know, they must take some liberties, you know, and so on.

[27:20] I think when Augustine died, wasn't the city being attacked by the Vandals, and then he stayed there, but he died before they captured the city. Yeah, I don't remember it. But I just heard a little thing about the thing. It's representing him as, as you know, there was an offer for him to be removed, you know, or to escape, whatever it was, and he decided to stay with the flock or something, you know, which maybe he did, I don't know, but but, uh, this may be accurate now.

[27:49] Could be, I guess, anyway. It's kind of interesting, you know, when Thomas is talking about the the the Psalms, right? And the Psalms are most of all a book of prayers, and prayer is what tied to what theological virtue most of all. Hope. Hope, yeah, yeah. And Thomas talks about, well, you know, David made some serious mistakes there, like with Bathsheba's husband, you know, and so on.

[28:18] There were very serious, you know, sins he fell into, right? But this is part of giving us hope, right now, that that he could, you know, be converted, right now, you know. And I think that's probably the pop- popularity a little bit of Augustine, right? That he was, you know, led a somewhat dissolute life, I guess, and then, you know, there's hopes for the rest of us if there's if there's.

[28:41] It reminds a little bit of David in that sense. I mean, the fact that why was David given, you know, the authorship for the most part of these Psalms, right? If not for our hope, right?

[28:54] It's like Thomas, you know, was doubting for for our faith, you know. Yeah. You know, allowed and Peter was allowed to fall, you know, to

[29:04] the humble and so, on. Okay. Okay. we'll break. Oh, yeah. To the third, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that gaudium, right, which we translate, gaudium, as joy in English, is altogether the same as what pleasure. Well, we'll see what Thomas says about that.

[29:37] For the passions of the soul differ by their objects, but the same is the object of joy and of pleasure. To wit, the good that has been obtained. Right.

[29:53] So love is just of the good. Period. Right. Whether you have it or don't have it. Right. By desire is for the good that you don't have yet. Right. So pleasure is has its object the good obtained

[30:11] of both joy and pleasure? it's meant to be the same thing. Therefore, joy is altogether the same thing as pleasure. Right. Moreover, one motion does not end in two ends, but the same is the motion which ends at what joy Joy and pleasure, to wit, concupiscence.

[30:38] Therefore, joy and pleasure and joy are altogether the same thing. Moreover, if joy is something other than pleasure, it seems for like reason that laetitia, right, and exultatio, right, and jucunditas, right, somebody's got the idea of what overflowing, you know, and so on, signify something other from what pleasure, and thus these will be altogether what different passions, which seems to be what false, right. Therefore, joy does not differ from pleasure.

[31:20] But against this, this is very interesting. This is a counter. Against this is that in the brute animals, on the irrational animals, we do not speak of joy. That's interesting. You don't speak, you know. I used to, you know, give the cat, you know, little tidbits on the table, you know, huh? And I got a cat there. My daughter is now, and I'm the guy that's giving little tidbits of like, you know.

[31:48] But you know, you don't, you know, they're pleased with this, you know. And with the other cat we had at the house, I'd say to her, you know, we're having steak tonight. You know, she seemed to understand. Oh. Pork chops. They like pork chops. I mean, they're pork, you know. And so you can see they they have something in common. We both like steak. And but but I would never think of saying that you know it was joy here right you know it was pleasure right you know.

[32:21] I suppose interesting to get sadness. I suppose in the beasts, you know, the dog, you know, as master dies or something, you know, they have something. But in the beasts, we speak of what pleasure, right? Therefore, joy and pleasure are not the same thing, right?

[32:45] The answer it should be said that gaudium or joy, as Avicenna says in his book about the what soul, is a certain species, a particular kind of what pleasure, right?

[33:05] For it should be considered that just as there are some concupiscences that are natural and some that are what not natural, but it's kind of fun distinction that's made here, but follow upon reason, right? Huh? So there are some pleasures that are natural and some not natural, which are with reason, right? Because sometimes we distinguish reason and nature, right?

[33:35] Or as Damascene and Gregory Nyssa say, some are bodily, right? Huh? And some are what? Yeah, the soul. Yeah. So we more speak of joy over the truth, right? And? Augustine says, "A beatitude is gaudium de veritate." It doesn't say delictatio, You know. So it's a connotation of being more spiritual, right? The gaudium than delictatio, right?

[34:08] And so if I stick a pin in you, you know, we speak of pain, you know, and then I move the pin, so pleasures with the pain.

[34:17] So we delight, take pleasure in those things which we naturally what desire, In attainment. In attainment, right? And in those which we what desire Desire according to reason, now because just the word pleasure could be more broad, right? Okay. But the name of joy does not have place except in what the pleasure which follows reason, right? So I might say I'm pleased with thinking about God, or I'm pleased with you know philosophy, but but I might also say I have joy, right?

[34:59] Huh? Okay. But I don't think I would use the word joy so much. you know, having my favorite meat tonight or something, you know, or lemon meringue pie or something. I like, you know, okay. Whence we do not attribute joy to brute animals, but only the name of what pleasure, right? Huh?

[35:21] I mean, the way she's playing it now, pleasure can be divided into pleasure and what? Joy, right? And joy is, you know, the name given sometimes to the pleasure that follows upon reason, right? And the other ones that don't follow upon reason, are tied to the senses, keeps the word pleasure, right? Okay.

[35:51] But he said everything that we desire according to nature, right? Huh? We are also able with what? Pleasure. A reason to desire, right? Yeah. But not the reverse, right? Whence about all things about which there is pleasure, there can be joy in those having reason, right? Huh? So, isn't one joyful that one's favorite food is being served tonight? Mm. Pleasure.

[36:28] Although not always about all things is there what? Joy, right? For sometimes someone senses some pleasure according to the body, about which he does not rejoice according to what? Reason. Reason, right? And according to this or in this way, pleasure is in more; it's more universal, right? Than what? Joy, right? Huh? Okay. So he's careful at times; not speaking too precisely, right? But joy seems simply to be what more narrow in its meaning than than pleasure, right?

[37:04] Okay. Did you enjoy your dinner? We speak that way. No, but there, there, enjoy got the word. Yeah. I don't know if enjoyment is the same as joy so much. Yeah, yeah. I wouldn't say so much. I had joy over it. Yeah, yeah. You wouldn't say, yeah. I didn't rejoice over the steak. Yeah, yeah. I enjoyed a good meal. Yeah, yeah. That one thing is it always comes to my mind when I think about this is a few years ago with Pope Benedict got elected.

[37:41] I remember that afternoon. I was euphoric. It was just that was joy. I was joyful that he was elected. But I don't have that kind of experience when I have a nice big bowl of ice cream or something. I don't have quite the same experience. What's wrong with you?

[38:05] You know, the first objection was that joy and pleasure had the same what object, right? And Tom says, "Well, not altogether, right? " To the first therefore, it should be said. That since the object of an animal desire, as opposed to the natural desire of plants for the sun and so on, is a good apprehended or known in some way, right? And that was one of the causes of of love, knowledge, right?

[38:32] A diversity of apprehension, a diversity of what, knowing, right, of knowledge, pertains in some way to the diversity of what, object, right? So the object of the animal desire is an object known in some way, right? So to be known in some way pertains to the object, right? If you recall when he talked about love and he said that the first cause of love is a good, and the good is a cause of love because it's the object of love, and then he added what, knowledge is a second cause of love, but it's a cause of love for the same reason that the good is, because it's on the side of the what, object, right?

[39:13] huh? And then he goes to the other cause, which is likeness right? huh? That's what's inside of the what object, right? Huh? Inside the subject, huh? So he's saying, if there's a diversity of apprehension a diversity of knowledge, then something pertains to diversity of what object, right?

[39:35] And thus the animal pleasures, which are said or called gaudia, right, joys, are distinguished from the bodily pleasures, right, which are called only delectationes, right? Just as above it was said about concupiscences.

[39:57] Now the second thing is saying, well, you have one end for emotion, right, And concupiscence is, like a movement. Now you're seeking something. We said a like difference is found also in concupiscences, right? Thus the delectatio responds or corresponds to concupiscence concupiscence and joy to what desire, right? Which more seems to pertain to the animal concupiscence. So the one is a more spiritual desire, right?

[40:33] So the concupiscence we saw had more the bodily sense, concupere, right, with the body, right? And thus, according to the difference of motion, there's also a difference of the the rest. So he's not denying the principle, but showing how it can be applied even in this distinction, right?

[40:58] So the first objection is solved by pointing out that there was a difference of object, huh? And the second one that there was even a difference of the motion to that object, huh? So my desire to know the truth is somewhat different from my desire to eat. Okay.

[41:23] Now what about all these other names? Well, to the third, it should be said that the other names pertaining to pleasure are imposed from what the effects of pleasure, right? For the laetitia is placed upon pleasure from the dilation of the what? Heart. Did you know that? As if one was saying what laetitia right? I suppose you know it doesn't. Don't we speak of sadness as kind of narrowing, pinching you?

[42:07] If you're kind of oppressed. Yeah. By pleasure, kind of what? I just, yeah, yeah, yeah. Exultatio, right, is said from the outward signs of the interior what pleasure, right, which appear exteriorly, right.

[42:30] In so far as the interior joy bursts forth, right, to the outside. I remember I was working on comedy there, and you say, "What's the difference between mirth and merriment?" Well, mirth names more the inner what passio, right, by merriment, the outside. You're making merry, if you say, right. Yeah, yeah. And so they'll stay outside sign, right? Yeah.

[43:03] Ah, Shakespeare's a play is called "The Merry Wives of Windsor," right? They're playing jokes on on Hamlet. I mean, on Falstaff. Merry Wives. iucunditas is said from some special what signs or effects of what they did see, right? Doesn't say anything what they are. And nevertheless, all these names seem to pertain to what joy, yeah.

[43:44] For we do not use these except in rational natures, huh? So what would the prayer of Thomas after communion, there, right? where he end up by asking for the beatific vision, right? The spirits, the spirit lovers, there's one of them. Yeah, Gaudium, yeah, Gaudium Spiritum. Yeah, iucunditas consumata. So he does use that word. See, iucunditas is more spiritual than than the animal does. And iucunditas iucund Yeah.

[44:19] Well, that's what that bonum et iucundum as that psalm we did last week. It's good and pleasant. I don't know how we translate that. Okay, now whether pleasure is found in the. intellectual. If everything just think things would be like everything was in real life like it is on TV, then he says, "Well, if everything in real life was like it was on TV, what would TV be like?"

[44:54] That's that's a perversion of the mind. That's not all. Once the philosopher Aristotle in the seventh book of the Ethics says that God rejoices by one simple operation, right? That's. That's a beautiful text. Thomas often quotes that one, you know. Deus uni simplici operatione. There you have the word operatione, right? Got it.

[45:30] God rejoices in himself. Self-sufficient. And Dionysius says at the end of the book on the celestial hierarchy, that's the one Albert the Great commented on. Thomas did on the divine names. His master Albert the Great on the celestial hierarchy,

[45:59] that the angels are not susceptible of our what undergoing of passibilities, but they what rejoice with God, right? According to the joy of incorruption. Beautiful.

[46:20] So heaven will be right. Congaudent Deo secundum incorruptionis laetitiam. You wonder what in heaven you'll ever think about this life, you know? My my my dear mother, she asks me more and more. What's it going to be like? She's going to say Well, ma, think of the best thing you can think of, and it ain't good enough. That's all I can say That's all I can do It's not that.

[46:48] It's much better than that. Whatever you can think of. So she thinks about more and more. Now what about us the brutes, right? To the third should be said that in us not only is there pleasure, the pleasure in which we what communicator having in common with the brutes, right? But also that in which we come together with the what angels, right? Whence there Dionysius says that holy men, right, huh, many times enter into what partaking of the angelic what pleasures, right?

[47:32] So they call this guy the angel doctor, right? And thus, in us, there is pleasure not only in the sense-desiring power, in which we, which we have in common with the beasts or beasts, but also in the intellectual-desiring power, in which we communicate with the angels, right?

[47:59] You know, it's kind of interesting thing there. It was in Locke, you know, his idea of good is very limited, you know, to pleasure, right? And someone object to Locke, you know, that that's a philosophy for beasts, you know? And he says, well, he had a good defense. He says, no, you're the what? You're the beast because you think we have only pleasures in common with the beasts, right?

[48:24] But we have pleasures in common with the beasts, don't we? But sometimes I will divide pleasures into what three instead of two. So the pleasures we share with the beasts, pleasures of eating steak, and the pleasures we share in the angels, which is pleasures of understanding things, right? And then there are the pleasures that are what fit man, right? Huh? And using that phrase from Austerely, right, in the towards that I raised in music, that the pleasures of the fine arts are too high for the beasts and too low for the angels, right?

[49:10] But they kind of involve one's body and soul, right? Huh? So they're kind of the human pleasures, right? I think it's important that that point, huh? And therefore, the pleasures of the fine arts are kind of a what stepping stone to the pleasures of philosophy of pleasures of what understanding, right? Huh? We have in common with the angels, right? And then you know you can compare these and say, well, we don't understand as well as the angels do, right?

[49:42] So we share those pleasures of the angels, the pleasures of understanding God, but in an inferior way, at least in this life, right? Okay. Now the pleasures we have in common with the beasts we have in a little higher way because we we we have our wine sauce and we have our we cook our meat, you know. We don't eat the mouse raw, you know, that the cat does.

[50:11] I think my dad was trying to discourage me to feed the cat. No, you want the cat to catch any mice and so on that bother them around, you know, the barn sometimes, you know. And if you feed the cat the yachts, he's going to mouster against or something. But but but but we have the pleasures of the table and so on, and a little more refined way than the animal has, right?

[50:35] We cook and season our food with the salad dressing, you know. And the rabbit doesn't put salad dressing on, but then these other pleasures, you know, are the ones that seem to be what properly what human, right? The pleasures of the fine arts. So you have to kind of be led from the lower pleasures to the higher pleasures, huh? And Aristotle, you know, and Plato talk about that, right?

[51:06] And Thomas himself says no man can live without pleasure, right? So if you don't appreciate the higher pleasures, right, you're going to go to excess in the lower pleasures, you know. And we can talk about all the obesity in our society, you know, and and other things, you know, people taking drugs and so on. But but they're seeking, you know, excess of the lower pleasures because they have no taste taste for the higher pleasures, right?

[51:34] But the pleasures of the fine arts are kind of stepping stones to the pleasures of philosophy or the pleasures of theology, right? Huh? But they're easier for us, right? It's interesting that we can enjoy the the pleasures of the fine arts longer in time than the pleasures of of eating, right? You eat so much and you because you're gone, you know. And I I always see you know somewhere else at Thanksgiving now people can eat more than they should, you know.

[52:09] Oh, I'm so uncomfortable, you know. And so, and the yeah. Or the guy at the party who's drunk too much and now he's gonna you know throw up, you know. Well, you know, it's like Socrates says in the dialogue there, you know, that these are tied to pains, you know, huh? So, but you can also, you know, listen to say Mozart opera longer maybe than you can philosophize, right?

[52:34] Because you're not straining your, you know, your body, you know, because your imagination and even your senses are kind of like a slave of reason in in philosophy or even theology, right?

[52:51] And so we we can, of course, we sit down and the people sit down and they're engrossed in a novel or something and they and they read you over three or four hours, you know. This is what that sit down and read you for hours. Yeah.

[53:07] So in some sense, the pleasures of the fine arts are the human pleasures, right? Huh? But they're the in between, so something is nice to to make a three four division rather than just like Thomas is saying. Ones we have the beasts and we have the angels, right? And my great angel takes me to like the Shakespeare. I doubt very much. Within the human realm of pleasures, yeah.

[53:32] Could you say that there are active pleasures and passive pleasures, like reading a novel as opposed to studying philosophy? Being the novel being more passive. With most people, when we read, yeah, I mean, the novel involves the imagination more, right? And and in fiction too, right? You're trying to please the imagination, right? Now you use your imagination. You philosophize because you have to, but but you're not trying to please the imagination.

[54:03] And kind of pitiful that the modern philosophers sometimes try to please the imaginations if that's the the purpose of philosophy. You know, it's not to please the imagination; it's to enlighten the reason, right? And it's delightful.

[54:23] So I like to use that three-four division. I'm influenced by Austen. Even pray for him, you know. It's an influence upon me. You know, got me reading those things, getting into those things.

[54:38] Okay. So we're up to Article Five. Do you want to start that or maybe we'll wait? Yeah, it's kind of long. Okay.