Prima Secundae
84. Motion, Hope and Memory, Sadness, and the Actions of Others as Causes of Pleasure (ST I-II q.32 aa.2–5)
Class of 2012-10-11
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/084-motion-hope-and-memory-sadness-and-the-actions-of-others/

[0:00] It's interesting how that that Shakespeare's plays are called plays, right? That's the word in English. Just kind of a kind of a understanding of what their purpose is, huh? And we speak of play music. Yeah, yeah. Many languages. Yeah, yeah. Thomas says one of the is it is it he have the mytopus where he has a little quote from scripture, you know, run into your house and play there with your thoughts.

[0:31] The scripture says, and Thomas says, well, why do you speak of this as as play? Well, play is to some extent for its own sake, right, and is pleasant to its own. You know, these thoughts are right. So, but uses the word play, right? Doesn't say it in the creation too, there, and then. Wisdom. Proverbs, yeah. Now, is he's playing it before you, right? No, it's just.

[1:03] Flies to wanton boys, or we to the gods? They kill us for their sport. That's in. Now, what about this thing called motion, though, which is an imperfect act, right? I thought another example of that kind of imperfect act is cooking. When you're cooking the roast, has it been cooked? No, but when is it cooked? Better take it off. You're too much.

[1:36] That's the problem. You try to, you know, you got a piece of steak or something left over, you know, you gotta heat it up a little bit, but then you, you're no way to to do it without really, really. Okay. To the second, then one proceeds thus: it seems that motion is not a cause of pleasure. Oh, he's going to say it is a cause of pleasure, huh?

[2:01] Because as has been said, a good in the now, right, obtained, I guess, is the cause of pleasure, right? Hence, the philosopher in the seventh book of the Ethics says that pleasure is not to be compared to generation, but to the doing of a thing already what existing, right?

[2:27] I didn't say doing looks okay now, huh? But that which is moved towards something does not yet what have that does it? But in a way, is on the road, is on the road, or in the road a way of degeneration respect to it, according as in all motion there is involved generation and corruption, as is said in the book of the Physics, right? Therefore, motion is not the cause of pleasure, right?

[3:01] Even the right of the good. Moreover, motion especially induces labor and what acitute, right? It works. I was reading the Gospel of Saint John today. Christ was, he was tired he sat down by the well there in Samaria, right? And had a conversation with the the woman there. He was tired from his motion, right, of walking. Christ himself.

[3:31] But operations from this that they are laborious and what? What? Wearying. Wearying. Tiring. Yeah. Are not delightful, but are more effective, right? Therefore, motion is not a cause of what? Yeah. So how did I enjoy playing games when I was a kid? Playing baseball, playing football, you know, Running around, Wear yourself out. Running around, catching the ball, enjoying doing that.

[4:07] Shakespeare has a beautiful metaphor there. You know, in *Midsummer Night's Dream*, you know, he speaks of the the dead and drowsy fire. The beautiful kind of fire drowsy, you know, the fire is kind of slowing down and drowsy. Beautiful metaphor, though. Drowsy fire. It burns slower. Yeah, yeah, kind of. Tiring. Moreover, motion implies a certain innovation, huh? Which is opposed to what custom, right? But those things which are customary are pleasant for us, huh?

[4:51] As the philosopher says in the first book of the rhetoric, huh? So, different nations of people have different what foods that they delight in, and other people don't maybe delight in them so much, right? Not at all.

[5:05] Therefore, motion is not a cause of what. In the book here on Fennish, and of course, they have a lot of fish there. in them.

[5:18] Wouldn't like to be citizen of Venice, after all. But notice, custom is like a second nature, so just like we spoke of pleasure as being what is connatural to you, right? Well, pleasure, right?

[5:41] I mean, custom is like a second nature, so it makes something pleasant, right? This motion is something new But again, this is what Augustine says in the eighth book of the Confessions, huh? What is this, huh? God, Lord, my God, right? When you are what eternal, right to yourself, right? And you are what joy, right? Huh?

[6:16] And sings about yourself, about yourself. They always what rejoice, rejoice, huh? But this what part of things that is what alternating between defect and progress, right? Right, Lord, yeah. Offenses and what conciliations rejoices, huh? Okay. That's about us, yeah, yeah. And people kind of panicking, thinking you know you are going to be just looking at God and you know kind of. That was my friend. Yeah, it's it's in scripture there, you know, you'll be like a pillar in the church, you know, and you are not glad anymore.

[6:56] No, that's it, you know. That sounds really boring. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Can we do anything else? Yeah, yeah. We get tired of that. Let's see. All right, so that's that's for the first million. The first first couple million. Okay, all right, but what after that? Yeah, I used to say to you, you know, what what in the old days it made more sense than now, but you know, what's the most read thing in in the world today?

[7:19] What's the newspaper, right? The the new newspaper, the paper that has new things in it, right? Who wants the old things, right? Yeah. That's motion.

[7:30] From which one takes that men rejoice and are delighted in certain alternations, right? Huh? Okay. Variety is a spice of life. We said spice of monastery. And that that motion seems to be a cause of pleasure, right?

[7:54] Now, what's the great master going to say here? I answer: It should be said that for pleasure three things are required, of which, of which two of which are is the what conjunction or joining of the delectable to oneself, I guess, and the third is the knowledge of this what conjunction, right? Okay. And according to these three things, motion is what rendered pleasant, as the philosopher says, both in the seventh book of the Nicomachean Ethics and in the first book of the what?

[8:34] Rhetoric rhetoric, huh? For on our side, who delight, right, or have pleasure, change becomes what pleasant to us on account of this that our nature is what changeable, right? And on account of this, what is suitable to us now will not be suitable to us afterwards, right? Yeah. Just as to warm oneself at the fire is suitable to man in the winter, but not in the summer.

[9:11] Summer. On the side of the what good delighting that is joined to us, transmutation or change also comes about. What is delightful? Because the continual action of some agent what

[9:38] increases the effect of it, right? Just as when some is longer what approaching the fire, he is more heated and dried out. But the natural what condition consists in a certain what measure. And therefore, when the continual presence of something what delightful exceeds the measure of the natural what disposition, there is a removal of its what Of the del- delightful, right? then? So you eat too much of something you don't enjoy it anymore, right?

[10:25] It tastes good after a while. On the side of the knowledge itself, because man desires to know something that is a whole and what perfect. Interesting, he used two words there, right? Because Aristotle, in the third book of the Physics, you know, say "whole" and "perfect" seem to mean almost the same, right? And there's a proximity of those two, huh?

[11:02] Since, therefore, some things are not able to be grasped what tota simul, one delights in these what change, right? That one what. Passes and the other takes its place. Yeah, and that's the whole sense. That's a very piece of music, right? You stop the one note, dong. You know, the thing is. Or a play. Yeah, yeah, it's cocked there, in, the thing. Yeah, the old. You can't even talk that way anymore.

[11:31] It doesn't make sense to kids. The records. Yeah, yeah, but e- e- even the CD there sometimes. it gets a little thing that gets stuck on it. you know, once I once a while record I gotta... You know, it's kind of annoying. I can say it over and over again, right? Clean, just clean. a little bit. Yeah. yeah. Yeah. dust and scratches. Once. Augustine says in the fourth book of the Confessions, "You do not wish what the syllable to stand, right?

[11:58] But to pass that others might come, that you might hear the what whole. Oh. And this always, and this always, all things in which something one is constituted, right, and that are not what altogether. Yeah. They more delight all of them than one by itself, or this and that by itself, right? Singula. If they are what. They sense together. Yeah, one can sense all of them, right?

[12:33] If, therefore, there is something whose nature is what unchangeable, and there cannot come about in it an excess of the natural what. Disposition. Yeah, the continuations actable, and whose what whole is what delightful to all once upon

[12:58] transmutation or change will not be delightful to it, right? I want to be telling about the God himself. Yeah, yeah. I'm supposed to be division too, right?

[13:11] And the more some pleasures accede to this, the more they are able to be what? Continued. Yeah. Interesting, huh? I suppose in maybe insofar as we're created to God's image, and if we have a better understanding of our soul, I guess this will be will take more pleasure, and those things have changed less and less, or yeah, yeah. But I guess, in some way, it's. I'm always thinking in terms of knowledge of yourself, know thyself, and that's what I'm thinking in terms of this.

[13:50] This is a way to go up in your knowledge. But there are some things that can't be joined, can't be enjoyed all at once, right?

[14:05] I go from appetizer to the main course, the dessert, right? Yeah, you know, Or listen to the opera, you know, one aria after another right?

[14:22] So you wouldn't want to just hear this the same aria over and over again, So I go to the next aria. and I'm kind of a changeable person because of my body, right? Tota simul is the definition of eternity, huh?

[14:50] Okay. What about the first objection that says uh, motion is like a coming to be, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that that which is moved, although it does not yet have perfectly that to which it is moved, right? It begins nevertheless to have something of that towards which it is what moved,

[15:20] and according to this, motion itself has something of what pleasure, right? But it falls short of what the perfection of pleasure, for the more perfect pleasures are in things that what, yeah, not perishable things, lest you perish with them. So it says Augustine.

[15:53] Motion also is rendered delightful or pleasant insofar as through it. Something what becomes suitable that before was not suitable, right? Or it ceases to be, right? As has been said above, huh? In the body of the article, huh?

[16:20] What about inducing labor and lassitude, feebleness, weakness? To the second should be said that motion brings in labor and what? Weariness. Weariness, according as it transcends the natural what? Disposition. Yeah. Thus, motion is not delightful, but according as it what? The natural, the contrary things.

[16:54] The thing, but according as it removes things that are contrary to the natural what? Disposition, right? The contraries of the natural disposition are removed. Yeah.

[17:09] So, insofar as it induces labor and weakness, it's not pleasant, right? But insofar as it removes the contraries of, so that's why. Hmm. Physician, I know, because his job is a lot of they say high stress. He doesn't get a lot of physical activity. A physician, a physician, because among other things, we had another one here this weekend who was complaining about how much time he has to spend doing data work on the computer at the end of the day.

[17:40] He's exhausted from patients. Yeah. He's got to sit down on a computer for hours to map out all that stuff. So another physician I know, he says he relaxes by going to work in the garden. He can work out the things that are contrary to his natural disposition. He can get rid of those things. Yeah. relax his muscles, and then he can rest. Yeah. So for him to work in the garden is actually a form of relaxation.

[18:01] He's getting stressed out. So I've heard people have some people have some kind of scruple about that. Well, what if I work six days a week and Sunday I relax by working in the garden? But some people say, "Oh, you shouldn't do labor on Sunday." Well, it's his way of relaxing because his job is stressful. Hmm. And that spelled out usually is that people read about. Yeah, yeah.

[18:22] Well, that's the problem. People don't usually read about it. I think people don't understand what kind of rest you're talking about. Now, to the third, it should be said that that which is accustomed is rendered delightful, right? Insofar as it is made what natural, right? Huh? That's why in Aristotle when Thomas is talking about the existence of God is obvious, right? Huh? And it seems obvious because of custom, right?

[18:56] Huh? Because they're accustomed to call upon him from childhood and so on. And Aristotle talks about that. I think it's customary just take it without, as if it were per se known, right? Yeah. Yeah. Custom is a dangerous thing in the life of the mind in that respect.

[19:23] But motion is delightful, not. Not in that we see some custom, but more according as the wit is impeded, the what? Corruption of natural disposition. Yeah. Which could happen from the. What intensity, maybe? Yeah. Some operation. And thus, from the same cause of connaturality, both custom and motion are what delightful, right? Huh. Okay. Interesting. Kind of, interesting to compare custom and what? Fashion, right? This fashion is from the new, and custom is gets its strength from the old, right?

[20:14] So something can be strong and attractive because it's old, and also because it's new, right? It's kind of a different thing, right? Kind of interesting. Interesting.

[20:27] Certainly with with immigrants, we see it with some of the Lebanese. They come to this country, and they may be here for a couple of generations, but they still want to have the kibbeh and the hummus, and they want to listen to the music, and so they want to have a hafle and do the debka and all that stuff. They want the old customs. It's comforting to them in a country that's even if they were born and raised here.

[20:48] It's comforting to them to have connection to their customs. Should we take a little break now, or what? Hope and memory, right now. That's Obama, right? Changing hope for us, isn't it? Oh yeah. When he ran in two thousand eight, there. Yeah. It was changed, but changed for the worse, as someone said.

[21:15] The third one goes forward. Thus, it seems that memory and hope are not causes of what? Yeah. For pleasure is about a present good, as Damascene said, huh? He says that too, right? There you go. But memory and hope are about an absent good, right? Absence makes the heart grow fonder. Or some people say, absence makes the heart go wander.

[21:46] For memory is of the past, and hope is of the what? Future, right? Therefore, memory and hope are not causes of what pleasure, right?

[21:59] Moreover, the same is not a cause of contraries. But hope is a cause of affliction, for it is said in Proverbs thirteen, the hope which is deferred afflicts the soul, right? So even the saints there are they afflicted by their going to see God yet?

[22:23] Sometimes you see parts of the scene as a conversation with God or something or Christ, and you want to suffer a little more before you go. What do you choose? You know, or you want to go now? He gives them the choice, you know. Saint Catherine of Siena, you've seen the painting. Christ is holding out to her the golden crown. Yeah. And the crown of thorns, and she's choosing the thorns.

[22:45] Yeah. Grabbing for it. Yeah. Therefore, hope is not a cause of pleasure. Moreover, just as hope comes together with what pleasure in this that is about the good, so also desire and what love. Therefore,

[23:09] well, not not to sign hope more than concupiscence, right? Or love as a cause of pleasure, right now. Of course, concupiscence doesn't imply though that you what hope to you know it's not possible. You don't think it's possible, right? But because it's good, I need to make desire steak dinner, but there's no steak going to be there on the table tonight. You know that you have no hope for that

[23:35] thing. But against this is what I see. Everybody counts quotes these things here. Hope Spe gaudentes right Was it? Paul VI had an encyclical right there, Spe gaudentes didn't he? Paul VI I think he did, yeah.

[23:57] Yeah. And in Psalm seventy-six, memor fui dei et delectatus sum. right. Okay. So wasn't I remember this little grandchild? You know, talk about a little kid thing they did there, you know.

[24:20] So answer should be said that pleasure is caused from the presence of a suitable good, right? According as it is sensed, or qualitercumque in some way whatsoever, right? When it is perceived, right? But something is present to us in two ways. It's interesting. He speaks of it being present, right? In one way, by knowledge, in so far as the known is in the knower according to its what likeness.

[24:56] In another way, secundum rem in the thing itself, in so far as one is really joined to what another, in act or in ability, according to some way of being joined. And because greater is the conjunction secundum rem in the thing, then by likeness, which is the conjunction of what knowledge, and also greater is the conjunction of the thing in act than in what potency. Therefore, most of all is the pleasure which comes about by sense, which requires the presence of the what sensible thing.

[25:48] But the second grade holds the pleasure of hope, in which not only is something pleasant, the conjunction according to what grasping, but also according to the faculty or power of obtaining the good which delights them.

[26:11] Third grade holds the what pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction apprehension, right? So he's putting hope ahead of memory, right? Before and after, right? Because it's you're going to attain it. Was that's that's like the old the old man who only has his memories. Yeah. So he has so he has three things here, right? And one is more than the other, right? Huh? That's beautiful.

[26:36] Or it doesn't. Present. Scary looks before and after this guy, right? No question about it, huh? Which is to say, he uses his reason, huh?

[26:48] A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. It's present, yeah. Yeah. Present possession. Present. Yeah. To the first, therefore, it should be said. The first objection is based upon has to be present for pleasure, right? Hope and memory are those things which are what simpliciter absentia, but nevertheless secundum quid sunt what praesentia It's. Interesting. Either according to apprehension only, or according to what apprehension and the faculty of obtaining them, right?

[27:34] At least estimated to be so. I don't. I don't have any hope of obtaining the Heisman Trophy, even though in pure potency, yeah, I have ability to get the Heisman Trophy. I don't think I have

[27:54] it. Keep trying. Now, what about the same thing being a cause of what contraries, right? Well, it seems not, huh? So, you know, we know we teach the great philosopher Empedocles there, right? Huh? And he's talking about how earth, air, fire, and water they come together and then they are what separated, right? Huh? But then he looks for what contrary causes, right? Huh? And he comes up with love and hate as contrary causes, right?

[28:29] I think those people that get I know a guy got a tattoo, you know, L O B E on his hand, H A T E on his hand. That's it. That's all life, right there, as tattoos. You know, Aristotle talks about the four kinds of causes. He has three. I call them corollaries that follow upon the distinction of the four kinds of causes. And the first corollary is there can be many causes as such per se of the same thing, right?

[29:01] So both Michelangelo and what marble are causes of the Pietà, but not in the same way, right? And then the second corollary, which I find most interesting, is the two things can be causes of each other, but in what different ways, right?

[29:21] And like the maker, right, could be a cause of something, and the end can be okay. So it's making dinner the cause of dinner, or dinner the cause of making dinner.

[29:43] Making dinner is a cause in the sense of the efficient cause, right? But dinner is the cause of the making the dinner, sense of the ender purpose side, right?

[29:55] It's learning the cause of knowing, or knowing the cause of learning. Yes. Just to say this too, is there reproduction the cause of the baby, or is the baby the cause of reproduction?

[30:24] After reproducing, the right reason, and the baby is a cause of reproduction in one way, and the reproduction is a cause of the baby in another way. Yeah. Then the third corollary, though, is the same thing can be cause of what? Contraries by its presence and absence, like the captain of the ship, right? Whose negligence is the cause of the? He's held responsible for the destruction of the ship, but by his tenderness he's the cause of its safety, right?

[30:55] here. He's saying in reply to the second here. Nothing prevents the same thing secundum diversa right to be a cause of what contraries. Thus, therefore, hope, in so far as it has a present what guessing of the future good, right, estimating of its possibility, it causes what pleasure, right, huh? But in so far as it lacks its presence, it causes what affliction, yeah, yeah.

[31:25] So the sailor out there, that's separated from his wife and family, right, huh? He hopes to come to be joined to them again, right, and that causes a certain what pleasure, right, huh? But then the absence, right? So you see, kind of back and forth, right, huh?

[31:45] Get that meat food on the table, causes affliction, right? Yeah. Yeah. Now to the third, right, huh? This is one about shouldn't other things be more assigned, right? Like love and concupiscence. To the third, it should be said also that also love and concupiscence cause what pleasure, right, huh? For everything loved is pleasant to the one what loving it, right?

[32:24] So if I didn't love wisdom, I wouldn't be what pleased with getting some wisdom, right? If I didn't love wine, I wouldn't be pleased with getting some wine, right, huh? I won't be pleased with getting salmon if I didn't have the love.

[32:42] In that love is a certain union or what conformity of the nature of the lover to the what loved, huh? Likewise, everything what desired is pleasant to the one desiring it, since desire is especially a desire for what pleasure, right?

[33:08] But nevertheless, hope, in so far as it implies a certain certitude, right, of the real presence of the good delighting that you'll have it, right?

[33:21] More is notice the word there, majus. He doesn't deny that the others are causes, right? But it is more laid down as a cause of pleasure than those, right? And likewise, more than a memory, which is of that which is passed on, huh?

[33:41] I forget the exact words there Shakespeare in the sonnets says, you know, you know, but the feasts that have gone by and no longer, you know, sadness there because they're gone. That's it, you know, you know. The younger days are gone, right? Yeah. One of the few things I remember, we had a beer stein a big old beer stein on the bookshelf, that said Schön ist die Jugend, sie kommt nicht mehr, and a picture of a young man sitting under a tree with a young woman.

[34:11] Yeah. Youth is beautiful. She comes no more. Oh, and it's gone. It's gone. Now this crazy Article Four, right? Where the sadness is a cause of what? Pleasure.

[34:31] Well, wonder. Maybe, maybe in tragedy, I guess so. To the fourth one goes forward. Thus, it seems that sadness is not a cause of pleasure, right? For a contrary is not the cause of a contrary. But sadness is contrary to what pleasure? It's like saying pain is a cause of pleasure. It's ridiculous. Absolutely ridiculous, right? Therefore, is not a cause of pleasure. I am convinced. Moreover,

[35:09] contrary are the effects of contraries, right? So, if hot and cold are contrary, they're going to have contrary effects on the butter, right? One softens butter, and the other hardens butter, right?

[35:30] But delightful things remembered are a cause of what pleasure? But sad things remembered are cause of what? Pain. Not pleasure. That's that's convincing. Who could who could deny this? Moreover, just as sadness is to what pleasure, so hate is to what love. But hate is not a cause of love, right? My hatred of Sam is not a cause of my getting pleasure. The more the absence, but more the reverse.

[36:07] Therefore, sadness is not a cause of what pleasure. But against this was what is said in Psalm forty-one. I can go back and check that.

[36:20] For my what tears were for me what bread, day and night, day and night, huh? Through bread, however, the what refreshment of pleasure is understood, right? Therefore, tears which arise from sadness can be what painful. I don't know what this comes. Sounds like our manager. He needs to see a

[36:48] shrink. Yeah. And it should be said that sadness, in two ways, can be considered. In one way, according as it is an act, I am actually sad, I guess. Another way, according as it is in what memory. I thought he was going to say one is and one is not, but now he says, and in both ways, sadness can be a cause of. Oh my goodness, what this guy's up to!

[37:23] Sadness existing in act is a cause of pleasure, in so far as it makes memory of something what loved, whose absence what said. Nevertheless, about its what grasping alone one is what. Yeah. What is what is same Romeo Juliet? Parting is such sweet sorrow. What a guy that Shakespeare! Parting is such sweet sorrow.

[38:09] I suppose it's the sadness that parting is a sign of that you love each other, right? And that's that's pleasant to remember to know that, right? Okay. Ros and I

[38:23] was always joking, you know, and I was going off on some trip, either with some conference or something like that. And the boy said, "Bye, Dad," and I didn't even know. And really, you can see she's she's trying to hold back the tears, you know, and try to keep from breaking down, you know, and so on. And if I said goodbye to her, you know, and then she left, and Rosie says that's a hard act to follow.

[38:43] She says, "You know, you see that, you know." I was thinking, I shouldn't get on an airplane. You know, what happens if something happened to me for that poor little girl? You know, but you see, obviously, love you know. Yeah.

[38:56] That's when my my father watched him come down the aisle with my sister. I was serving the meal with my brother, and I I never saw my dad's face so emotional. His face is all red. His eyes are getting real watery. He looks so serious. He's trying to contain himself. But you're so proud, marching down with my sister. But I could see it was just about to break out, break out into tears.

[39:25] Okay. So he says the sadness existing in act right is a cause of the pleasure. I'm reading over again. In so far as it makes memory of the thing loved, right? About whose absence one is what sad, sad, yeah. That's

[39:49] interesting. I suppose when a friend or someone has died, you know, you can be a certain pleasure in remembering that person, right? That makes one remember the person. I suppose the sadness. Is

[40:16] is one of the sons of Shakespeare where where he's saying, you know? Don't weep for something over me after I am gone. You know that's the way we're looking to you and Mackie. You know for that. You know. Interesting, yeah. Memory of of sadness, right? Now this is something more apt to cause, pleasure. is a cause of pleasure on account of the subsequent evasion, right? Huh? That's what I suppose you are thinking of the fact that you, you know, how miserable about that time, and I am glad to be free of this thing right now.

[40:50] I was very upset to go and go out or something. No, no. That's how I met my wife to be. Once, according as a man grasps or knows himself to have what evaded or escaped from some what sad or painful things, right? Huh? There comes to him a what matter of joy. Yeah, according as Augustine says in the twenty-second book of the City of God,

[41:24] that safety often, huh? We remember what joyful lately, right? We remember Christian sad things, right? Huh? And and healthy of sadness pains without pain, right? And then further, we are rejoiced and grateful, And the eighth book of Confessions that the more there was danger in the battle, the more there is joy in the triumph. That's what Saint Bonaventure says that the saints in heaven think about hell because they think about what they deserve and God's mercy spared them.

[42:04] So it increases their joy. Yeah. Who says that? Saint Bonaventure. Yeah. Interesting. Okay. Just remember that next time somebody says it's inappropriate to talk about hell, well, they talk about it in heaven.

[42:21] So can a contrary cause a contrary? The first paragraph should be said that the contrary sometimes per accidens right? That's a very important distinction, right? Is a cause of contrary, just as the cold sometimes what heat? Heat, as he said in the eighth book of the Physics. I still see how how you know you put it on your house and you in the winter time you are going to be cold.

[42:47] So the fire is a cause of what being cold, right? But per accidens, right? Not the fire as such. Fire as such is going to warm you, right?

[42:57] And likewise, sadness per accidens is a cause of pleasure in so far as through it there is a knowing of something what pleasant, right? Okay.

[43:11] So I think that's the meaning of you know parting is a sweet sorrow, right? Because through that sadness that you have in parting from the person you love, you you both perceive that you love each other, and that's what. Pleasant, right? Okay, it's a mixed thing, nevertheless, right? But I mean, it's not unalloyed joy, right? There's a certain joy in recognizing that.

[43:38] It brings you to realize that you love each other. To second should be said that sad things remembered, in so far as they are sad and contrary to pleasures, do not cause pleasures, right? But in so far as man is freed from them, right?

[44:04] And likewise, memory of delightful things that one what from this that they are lost can cause sadness, right? You're coming over young. So these young people enjoy themselves. I can't enjoy myself in that. way anymore huh Yeah

[44:25] To the third, should be said that hate also, for accidens, can be a cause of what love, Insofar as some love each other, in so far as they come together in hatred of one and the same thing. Yeah, like the. Anybody here hate hate salmon? I think I'm. Now I feel close to you. You hate salmon, too. I hate it.

[44:51] When you have somebody, they like a Red Sox fan. He hates the Yankees, but maybe he hates the Phillies too. But the Phillies fan hates the Yankees too. So the Phillies and the Red Sox fans together hate the Yankees. Yeah, so put a sticker, you know. I'm for the Red Sox. Anybody who's fighting the Yankees, I'm for the same. It's against the evil influence.

[45:20] I first met Warren Murray over I think sophomores in high school. You know, and walking down the thing there. You know, and I was, you know, my anti-Roosevelt thing. You know, he said I don't think too highly of Roosevelt either. So I don't think I hated him, but he just had a little picture of him. That was the beginning. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

[45:42] Somebody can't stand Obama. You know, I felt drawn to him. You know, he's got sense. I'll keep thinking of one here. Maybe. Whether the actions of others are to us a cause of pleasure. To the fifth, it should one proceeds thus. It seems that the actions of others are not for us a cause of what pleasure, huh? I guess in heaven they're supposed to rejoice in the good deeds of the saints who meet up there, right, huh?

[46:16] Okay. You know we don't have much deeds that they can rejoice in, but we can rejoice in. We don't. We don't feel envious of their good deeds that they did, and they're martyrdom or something, you know, huh?

[46:32] Um. Well, the cause of pleasure, the first objection says, the cause of pleasure is what one's own good joined, right? But the operations or the doings of of others are not joined to us, right? Therefore, they are not for us a cause of pleasure, right? We can find something they're joined to us, but.

[46:59] Moreover, operation is the what? There's no one doing it. Yeah. And so, its own good. If therefore the operations of others are for us a cause of pleasure, for like reason, then all the other goods of others would be for us a cause of pleasure, which is clearly what false.

[47:28] So it makes me pleased that you won the lottery. If you're generous-hearted, yeah. You're disinterested. Moreover, operation is delightful in so far as it proceeds from a habit inborn in us, right, or natural. Whence it is said in the second book of the Ethics that a sign of the generated habit of the virtue, right, one must take that one takes pleasure in the deed, right? So if you don't take delight in eating and drinking moderately, you have not yet acquired the virtue of moderation.

[48:10] Of course, you always ask, "What about courage? " Right? You know, does he take delight in these dangerous things? Well, not really, but anyway, take no exception there. But the operations of others do not proceed from habits which are in us,

[48:27] but sometimes from habits which are in the ones operating. Therefore, the operations of others are not delightful delightful to us, but only to the ones doing them. Yeah.

[48:41] But against this is what is said in the canonical of John Is that the this one of his? I think it's the second one. Gavisus sum valde I have rejoiced greatly, huh? Because I have found my sons walking in the truth. That's beautiful. So he's rejoicing over what others are doing, right? Of course, parents rejoice, you know, when they find their sons or daughters walking in the truth, right?

[49:11] Huh? People, the parishioners, they've had sons or daughters who've gone off, you know, from the faith, and you know they. But those who have, you know, their children still going to church,

[49:30] they rejoice. I answer: It should be said that as has been said, two things are required for pleasure, right? One is the achieving of one's own good, and a knowledge of the what one's own good having been attained.

[49:54] In three ways, therefore, the doing of another is able to be a cause of pleasure, right? In one way, in so far as through the doing of another we achieve some good, right?

[50:11] And according to this, the doings of another, which produce some good for us, right, yeah, are pleasant for us, right, because to Will undergo from another is pleasant, right? Huh? So when you win the lotto, you give me a piece of the pie. I'm happy you won the lotto.

[50:35] Another way, according to the doings of another, are rendered what for us or make possible for us, I suppose, some knowledge or what estimate of one's own good.

[50:52] In account of this, men delight in this that they are praised or honored by another. Right? These type of things are less, they're more selfish, shall we say? Less noble. Yeah, because through this they get a certain estimate that in themselves there is some what Good, right? huh? Dr. Monsignor Dian agreed with me, that I was delighted, right? Huh? He disagrees with me, then I'm sad.

[51:30] And because this estimate is more strongly generated from the testimony of the good and the wise, therefore in the praises of these and in the honors, men more delight. That's what Aristotle talks about, right? Huh?

[51:48] So if Tom Dick or Harry thinks it's done something you know, it's done, but Monsignor Dian thinks it's good. then it's good, you know. If the Pope honors you, it's more pleasant than Obama honors you. Now I quote Heisenberg and other people in class sometimes from time to time, you know. And so the rumor got around that Berkeley has a Ph. D. In physics or is about to get one.

[52:12] No, it's far from Ph. D. In physics it could be, you know. No, I'm for it. They have all these ideas, you know, about you know that you certain things you don't have. And because the flatterer is an apparent what praiser, right? Huh? In account of this also, you know, flatteries are just some delightful. Flattery gets you everything, as the woman says. And because love is a some good, and wonder is a something what great, right?

[52:48] Huh? Therefore, to be loved by others and to be had in admiration, huh, is delightful, right? Huh? In so far as through this there comes to be for man an estimate of his own what goodness or magnitude, huh? We saw that in the inauguration of Obama there, you know, we had all these people there, and they've been showing some of these things on TV now, you know, these little things about them, and you know, just to be crazy, you know, these women down there, and so I just you know, and I remember seeing it stuck in my memory because my father was dying in the other room, and I go into this room to get some refreshments at the hospital there.

[53:27] And I walk in and I see they just show his car going down the street at like one mile an hour, and everybody was going bonkers. I mean, they're just screaming and falling over each other, and you can't even see him. He's in the car; it's all bulletproof glass, and everybody was just going bonkers. It was unbelievable. Wow.

[53:53] Okay, but now the third way, right? Insofar as the doings of others, if they are good, are what estimated as one's own good, right? On account of the strength of love, which one makes one estimate a friend to be the same as oneself, another self, right, or a second self, as Shakespeare says. An account of hate, which makes one estimate the good of another to be what? Contrary to oneself.

[54:27] Yeah. The bad doing of the enemy is what? Pleasurable, right? Once it is said in 1 Corinthians 13 that charity does not rejoice over iniquity, but it rejoices with truth. huh Scan that line there too huh Propter odium quod facit isti mali bonum materius esse cibum turn. So the good of your enemy is bad for you. If Obama's reelected, yeah. It's bad for you. Yeah. So. So his bad performance in the debate there, which kind of turned things around.

[55:20] Now you know some of the polls are putting you know Romney in. Gives me a little joy. Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the doing of another can be joined to me either through its effect, if he's giving me something good, right? As in the first way, or through grasping, as I what he praises me right or he admires me right in the second way, or through the affection whereby he is another self.

[56:00] I remember that from my Greek book Philos estin allos autos. Your friend is another self. Next, the Greek book used to have little quotes you know, things in the Bible, you know. Arkei ho logos, you know, it's very similar because it means the same thing, you know. And uh ho philos estin allos autos right? Friend is another self. Greek proverb. It stuck in my mind. To the second, it should be said that that argument proceeds as regards the what?

[56:32] Third way. Third mode, right? Huh? Not always regards the first two. huh? Well, I know, suppose the good of the other, If you take him as being another self, you rejoice in his good, right? Is in your own. Mm-hmm, mm-hmm. Or any of his good you might say. Yeah. yeah.

[57:24] The third, it should be said that the doings of another, although they do not proceed from habits which are in me, they nevertheless cause in me something. What delightful, right?

[57:39] Because either they make what in me some estimate or grasping of my own habit, right? Or they proceed from the habit of the one who is one with me through what through love, huh? I guess we gotta knock off now, huh? Parting is such sweet sorrow.