Prima Secundae
85. Aquinas on the Causes of Pleasure: Doing Good to Others, Likeness, and Wonder (ST I-II q.32, a.6–8)
Class of 2012-10-18
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/085-aquinas-on-the-causes-of-pleasure-doing-good-to-others-likeness/

[0:02] In the. Name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray pray for us. And help us to understand all that you have written. Name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit.

[0:31] Amen. Okay. And some of these odd Latin words you're going to have to help me, you know. Okay. I'm too lazy to like the kid in grade school. You don't want to look up the word in the dictionary now and.

[0:49] To the sixth, one goes forward. Thus, huh? It seems to do well to another is not a cause of what pleasure, right? For pleasure is caused from the achievement of one's own good. as has been said above. But to benefit does not pertain to the achievement of one's own good, but more to the giving up of it, huh? The sending it off. Therefore, it more seems to be a cause of sadness than of pleasure.

[1:23] Moreover, the philosopher, you know, that's Aristotle by Antonomasia Messia. Moreover, the philosopher says in the fourth book of the Ethics that illiberality is more connatural to men than prodigality. Okay. Now these are the two vices opposed to liberality.

[1:44] And they're the virtues taken up, the virtues and vices. They are taken up right after what? The beginning of book four, right? Right after he talks about what? Courage and temperance in the third book, right? Well, courage and temperance in some way regard our very body, right? What preserves our body or what destroys our body, right? What seems to be next to that is your money, right?

[2:10] Your possessions. That's kind of interesting, huh? You know, they regard the very substance of us. But we speak of the wealthy man as a man of what substance, right? And so you take away my money, you know, you take away my support, like like the Jew there says in the play, right? Okay. That's what they sometimes joke to somebody who's very large. They refer to as man of substance.

[2:35] Yeah. Yeah. Now notice the word illiberalitas, now that's formed by the what negation of liberality. Now why is one of the vices formed by the negation of the name of the virtue, and the other one, prodigality, is not?

[3:04] Yeah, further away. Aristotle says virtue is between two extremes, but it's closer to one extreme than the other. So courage is closer to foolhardiness than to what cowardice. And same way like intemperance, right? If we speak of intemperance, it's a man who what goes to excess, which is more opposed to temperance than a man who's puritanical. So he gets his own name or something, right? The same way here.

[3:31] So liberality, huh? So the vice which is more opposed to liberality is more connatural to man than prodigality, because you need that money to support yourself, right? Keep yourself in existence, huh? Okay. But the prodigality pertains to benefit others, right? To illiberality, to desist from benefiting others.

[3:58] Therefore, the connatural operation, since therefore a connatural operation is delightful or pleasant to each one, as is said in both the seventh and tenth books of the Ethics. It seems that to benefit others is not a cause of what pleasure, huh? Good argument, huh? Yes. Okay. And contrary effects proceed from contrary causes.

[4:26] But some things that pertain to malefacere, to do evil to someone, right, are naturally delightful to man. What a guy this Thomas is, right? I'm thinking about Richard the Third. Just as to what overcome, right, to win, right, to what redarguere How'd you translate that? Redarguere Yeah. Yeah, to kind of like reprehend in some way. Okay.

[4:55] Yeah. Criticize others. Yeah. redarguere. Okay. And also to punish, right, is pleasant, right, as regards those who are angry with somebody, right? Gets pleasure out of punishing them, as the philosopher says in the first book of the rhetoric. Therefore, since contrary effects are from contrary causes, benefacere must be more the cause of sadness than of what pleasure, huh? Okay.

[5:24] But against this is what the philosopher himself says in the second book of the Politics, huh? That to what pass around a lot of stuff, right? Mm-hmm. And to aid friends or even those who are what extraneous is most delightful, huh? Yeah. It was coming out about Romney, right, that he's been a very generous man, huh? Kind of amazing some of the stories you tell about. And there was some guy was telling about one of them last night, and he said, "well, why is he not sad?

[5:52] He's a very modest man. He's what doesn't want to blow his own trumpet, you know, But uh... Yeah, the charitable giving is low in Massachusetts because it's so many liberals, right? Liberals in the other sense of the word. Yeah, liberals opposing conservatives. Ill liberal, liberals.

[6:16] Now, Thomas, what a mind this guy had. I answer it should be said that this very thing which is to benefit another, right, to do good to another, being in being able to do well to, another, can be in three ways, right? A cause of what pleasure?

[6:36] No, how do you see that? That's amazing. In one way, in comparison to the effect, which is a good constituted in what another, and according to this, in so far as the good of another we regard as our own what good, on account of the union of love,

[7:00] we delight in the good that to us comes about to others, and especially to what our friends, right, so on, as in one's own what good, okay. You see that with parents and children when the children do well, parents are very proud of the children. Yeah, but he's talking about how you're doing a good to the child, right, or doing a good to your giving your wife a nice gift or something, you know.

[7:23] You get pleasure doing this, right? Okay. And the giving example last night was at Bain capital, I guess somebody's daughter had disappeared in New York, and they didn't know where she was, you know, you know all these horrible things, and he closed down Bain Capital, took the thirty people working there, and he spread them out over New York in some kind of a pattern. They found the girl.

[7:49] Wow. You know, but no, he just takes charge, and gets something done, It's amazing, you know, Who did that? From me. From me, Yeah, Bain Capital so he was making money. Yeah, that was... But he closed it down and and took the whole staff, about three of them, I guess, and and put them out in the you know in in such part you might say, or the something.

[8:09] Oh, what was that? Oh, I don't know. Back many years now, but but you hear stories like this, you know, So liberal in politics is liberal with other people's money. They say.

[8:29] Okay. So you rejoice in doing what good to another, right? When that other you regard as another self, ho philos estin allos autos friend is another self.

[8:46] In another way, in comparison to the end, just as when someone do this that he does good to another hopes, huh, to achieve some good for himself.

[9:01] Either from God or from some man, right? And we said before, like in the third article, that hope is the cause of one pleasure, right?

[9:16] Okay. Now the third way, in comparison to a what beginning, and thus this which is to benefit another can be pleasant by comparison to a threefold beginning, of which one is the faculty of what Doing well. doing well, and according to this, or the capacity to do well, right? And according to this, to benefit another is delightful. In so far as through this there comes about a certain imagining, right, of an abundant good in oneself that exists, right, from which one is able to communicate it to others, and therefore men delight in their sons and in their own. Works right,

[10:03] as to something that they have communicated their own what good, right? Another way, a beginning is a habit inclining us, according as to what benefit another becomes connatural to somebody. So habit or virtue makes something be kind of what it's second nature to you, right? And therefore, it's in accordance with your habit.

[10:29] It's necessarily pleasant, right? Whence liberals, those who have the virtue of liberality or generosity, delightfully give to others. It's in accordance with their habit, right? It comes natural. Like Saint Paul says, they give cheerfully. Yeah, yeah. And the third beginning is the motive, as when someone is moved by someone whom they love to benefiting another. For everything that we do or undergo on account of the friend are delightful, because love, especially, is the cause of what of pleasure, right?

[11:07] Okay. That's quite a distinction. There are three, right? And he goes no more than three, right? Three is the first number about which you say all. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the emission, the sending out, the giving out, in so far as it is indicative of one's own good, is what pleasant, right? But in so far as it takes away one's own good, it can be saddening, right?

[11:41] Just as when it's immoderate, right? Gave too much money to him, right? And now I have a need, right? Okay, that's the argument from prodigality, huh? Prodigality has a immoderate emission, right? And that's what repugnant nature, right? So he's not saying that liberality or generosity is repugnant to what nature, but prodigality is, right?

[12:12] And in that sense, illiberality is more connatural to man. So I don't give anything or very little. I might not be generous, right? But I said take care of myself, right? But if I'm prodigal and give too much, then I can't take care of myself and my own, right? Yeah.

[12:33] Now, what about to overcome, huh? Conquer, I guess. To reprove, yeah, to punish is not delightful in so far as it is what resulting in the evil of another, but in so far as it pertains to one's own good. Now, how is that? Well, you love your own good more than you hate the what evil of another, right? Now this is good for the games, huh? To venture, to conquer, is naturally delightful, right?

[13:07] What a competitor this guy must have been, right? They tell the story, you know, of when he was being called the dumb ox by his fellow students there. That Albert the Great arranged a what debate between himself and Thomas or a kind of concerto, and of course Thomas won, right? And then Thomas's or Albert's brother said, "This guy you call the dumb ox, I tell you, his bellow be heard around the world, and now it's heard up here, right?

[13:31] " It's kind of marvelous, huh? Reminds me, somebody said that talking about sports, and said, "I mentioned Vince Lombardi's a great coach, " and Pat Riley said, "He put too much emphasis on winning. " He thought winning was everything, and I said, "Winning is everything. " And he said, "What do you mean? " I said, "Well, Saint Paul says, 'Run so as to win. '" What else do you want?

[13:58] Not necessarily football, but winning is everything. Okay. So he says to conquer is naturally delightful, right? Insofar as to this fact of conquering, a man estimates his own what excellence, right? I'm pretty good, right? I won the race, or I did win the game. And in count of this, all games you might say, right? Ludi, in which there is concertatio, so get the word concert there, right?

[14:30] Concerto, right? You know, struggling, you know, and which there can be what victory, our most what delightful, right? If you win, right? So the Patriots lost there, you know, it was 24-23, you know. It was the last the last play of the game, and the enemy there was there. They threw the long, long pass, and I like 60 yards, something like that. The guy caught it, ran that thing.

[14:52] The game was over, and they kicked that thing, and that was it. Used to have to go. My son was at West Point there. The Army-Navy game was, of course, a big game, and it seemed like when I was there, one year the Army would win, next year Navy would win, and you know, go back and forth. But I saw at least at least two games, you know, where they won by a field goal at the last moment, huh?

[15:14] Wow. And I remember one time the the Navy guy missed the field goal, so you know that's the last play. You know, if he made the field goal, they would have won if they make it. How do you go back? You keep it. Oh, yeah. But one time the the West Point guy, it was down to the last play, and he's going to kick the field goal.

[15:35] And he kicked it and made it, you know, under all that pressure, right? And then the announcer was some kind of a penalty, and so they moved the ball back 10 yards, and now he's got to kick it again. Ten more. After having done once, right? You know all the pressure on it, right? Yeah. You've done it once already, and now you're 10 yards further out. Yeah.

[15:53] And he kicks it again, makes it, you know. Wow. We were being on the parking lot, though, after one of the times the Navy won, you know, of course the. You see our little army stickers, you know, and the guy, the guy works by me, and they put it by my car, you know. Okay. Stories

[16:21] say if they can't win a football game, how can they win a war? You know, And universally all concertationes. How would you translate that, Father? Just struggles or what? Yeah, generally all struggles. Yeah. Yeah. They must be doing that in a concert, I guess. That's how it got its name. Some of the one group of instruments, you know. Yeah, so yeah, it's kind of again, it's like it is a binary kind of thing to struggle with as far as this kind of.

[16:55] According as they have the hope of what victory, right? Now to reprove and criticize someone can be, yeah, can be in two ways. It causes pleasure, right? In one way, in so far as it makes a man to have the imagination of his own wisdom and excellence, and to criticize and to correct belongs to those who are wiser and greater, huh?

[17:26] Of course, it's where the sophist wants to make you fear to contradict yourself and so on. In another way, according as one by what criticizing and reprehending someone benefits him, right? Correcting him, right? Which is what delightful, huh? Okay, brotherly, brotherly, what they call it, fraternal correction. Fraternal correction. I think of. Do you rejoice in fraternal correction, you guys? We try. If a just man strikes or reproves me, this kind, it's somewhere in scripture.

[18:02] But to the angry man is delightful to punish, right? In so far he seems to remove the parent what, lessening himself, right? Which seems to result from the preceding what injury, right? For when someone is injured by another, he seems to be what made less to his fun from or by him, and therefore he desires from this what being made less to be liberated, huh? Through the paying back of the injury, right?

[18:34] Okay. So boys, you see that, huh? You know, snowball fights. You know, we're gonna get those guys, you know. And then, no distinction he makes at the end here, and thus it is clear that to benefit another per se, huh, is able to be what delightful, but to harm another is not what pleasant, except in so far as it pertains to one's own good. If it's not per se, right, kind of precepted and so on.

[19:13] Okay, so now we come to Article Seven, where their likeness is the cause of what pleasure. To the seventh, one proceeds thus; one goes forward thus. It seems that likeness is not the cause of what pleasure. For to what? Oh, excuse me. To rule over. Yeah, to rule over and to stand before, right? To before implies a certain what? Dissimilitude, right? Okay.

[19:51] But to rule over and to stand over is naturally what delightful, as is said in the first book of the rhetoric. Therefore, dissimilitude is more the cause of pleasure than what similitude, huh? As I heard the guy on the radio there saying, you know, you can't really be on radio unless you like being on radio. And so, start with the politicians, though, and say, you know, they should mention they really want the power, right?

[20:18] They like to have the power, right? Just one minute, you know. I mean, instead, you know, I mean, sure, you might want to do some good to other people, you know, but you know, partly this is you want the power, right? Yeah. So it's not just you want to help people by being on radio. You must enjoy getting up there and talking and blabbing and so on, and talking.

[20:34] Yeah, yeah. Okay. Moreover, nothing is more dissimilar to what pleasure than sadness. But those who what suffer what sadnesses most of all what seek pleasures, as is said in the seventh book of the ethics. Therefore, dissimilitude is more the cause of what pleasure than similitude, right?

[21:08] Moreover, those who are filled with something pleasant do not delight in them, but they more grow tired of them, right, or bored with them. Just as is clear in the filling up of food, right, like Thanksgiving time. Oh, get a get comfortable, get comfortable, walk. Don't have to sit around until another hour or so. Yeah, that's all Thanksgiving time. Therefore, likeness is not is not the cause of what pleasure, right?

[21:39] But against all this nonsense is that likeness is the cause of love, as has been said above. But love is a cause of what pleasure. Pleasure. Therefore, likeness is a cause of pleasure, right? It's a cause of a cause.

[22:02] Now Thomas replies. I answer: It should be said that likeness is a certain unity. Whence that which is like, in so far as it is one, is what delightful, just as the what lovable, as has been said above. And therefore, that which is like, and therefore, if that which is like does not corrupt one's own good, right? But grows it increases it, It's simpliciter delightful. As man to man in youth to what youth?

[22:48] But if it is corruptive of one's own good, then per accidens it is made what wearisome or saddening. Not in so far as it is like and one, but in so far as it corrupts that which is more what more one. It's kind of subtle thing you say. But now, how does this take place? That, however, something similar corrupts one's own good can happen in two ways.

[23:23] In one way, because it corrupts the measure of one's own good through a certain excess. For the good, especially that is bodily, as health consists in a certain commensuration. In account of this, excessive food or bodily pleasures. What? Nausea That's what I'm saying Yeah. I think that one was pretty good. Nausea She might get pretty tired of turkey you know if. There's a lot left over and so on.

[23:54] Can we get something else? Another way through a direct contrary to one's own good, just as the what? Potters. Potters, yeah. About many other potters, that's Aristotle's famous example. Not in so far as they are potters, but in so far as to them they lose their own proper excellence or their own lucrum, right? Which they desire, which they desire as their own what good?

[24:28] The competition between Dickens there and Thackeray, right? Who could write the greatest novel? You know there. I guess there was a kind of you know enmity between them because of that you know. And I guess towards the end of their life there, you know, they pass each other on the steps of this building, and one of them turned around and extended his hand. That guy turned around, extended his hand.

[24:47] Kind of beautiful gesture, right? But Washington Irving, you know, speaks of the friendships between painters and poets, and how they have enough affinity or likeness to be drawn to each other, but they're not in competition, right? Why? Why two painters might be in competition or two poets, you know? It's kind of interesting, huh? Human human weaknesses all over the place, I guess. And

[25:21] what about the ruling over others? The first therefore should be said. That since there is a certain coming together of the one commanding to the subject, right? There is there a certain what? Likeness. Yeah.

[25:39] Nevertheless, according to a certain what? Excellence. In that to what command and to stand before pertains to the excellence of one's own good, for it belongs to the wise and the better to rule and to preside. Preside. Yeah. Sapientis est ordinare right? Okay. Whence through this there comes about in man the imaginatio, the imagining of his own goodness. Huh? Like that choice of the word imaginatio, right?

[26:14] Doesn't say the understanding of his own goodness, but the image of it, right? Huh? That's like an old imagination, right? How you imagine yourself to be. Um. Or through the fact that man rules and and is over others, he benefits others, right? Which is what delightful, right? Huh? Okay.

[26:41] So you go back to the previous articles, cause of of pleasure, right? But also. Now, last one. Okay. To the second, it should be said that that in which the

[27:00] delights, yeah, even though it is not like sadness, right, is is nevertheless another way like the man what was saddened, right? Huh? Because sadness are contrary to one's own good or to one's own good of the one who is saddened, huh? And therefore, there is desired pleasure by those who are in sadness as conferring or contributing to their own good, huh? In so far as it is what.

[27:29] Medicine. Yeah, the contrary. And this is the cause, wherefore bodily pleasures, to which are contrary certain what sadness, are more desired than intellectual pleasures, because they do not have the contrariety of sadness, huh?

[27:48] That's a very interesting thing. I was convinced I was on the right path in my vocation in life. You know, I read that, you know.

[27:59] Let me know sadnessness. Oh, you know. That's right. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But you can always you can always. Thomas quotes scripture there at the beginning. Superintendent tells us about that. You know, all delighting in wisdom, right? Yeah.

[28:14] That passage in Aristotle in the parts of animals there, where he talks about the object is more the cause of what. More delightful than the the mode, You know. In the first book, in the proemium there to the parts of animals, right, he says that one knowledge is better than another because it's about a better thing, or because it's more certain, right? He doesn't say which of those criteria is is is more important.

[28:41] But then, in the proemium to the parts of animals, he says that even imperfect knowledge for a better thing is more delightful than a leisurely knowledge of something that is not done to the great end. So people are, he gives example, you know, a glimpse of someone you love is more to you than a leisurely view of the boss or something like that, right?

[29:05] See, see, but you don't care about it or you dislike. When I was in college, there we had a course in the philosophy department. Which was called natural theology, huh? And that was the excuse for doing the Summa up to the treatise on the Trinity, but not the treatise on the Trinity, right? So you did the parts that natural reason could do. It was like my favorite course, you know.

[29:37] Very interesting to hear about, to learn about God, even though you see it very imperfectly, right? More delightful, you know, than the leisurely knowledge of the stock market or something. That kind of kind of reduces your mind.

[29:58] And and from this it is that all animals naturally desire what pleasure, right? Because always the animal labors through sense and motion. On account of this, the young most of all what desire pleasures, on account of the many what changings going on in them, existing in them, when they are in the state of what growing, huh? Their body's all in turmoil.

[30:23] And also the melancholy ones, vehementer, huh? Strongly desire, huh, pleasures, huh, to expel their what sadness, huh? Because the body of these is corroded with a bad humor, huh? As it's said in the seventh book of the ethics, huh? And that's what to say In some way, you can say the literal sense of that passage of Psalm, "vinum laetificat cor hominis." Right. It's in the Proverbs too, where it talks about drink wine to get rid of sadness.

[30:54] I can't remember the exact word but to. uh let's see, Paul says for your stomach, there in one place. Well, that's that's a medicinal use. This is kind of remedial.

[31:08] To the third, it should be said, huh? That bodily goods consist in a certain what measure, and therefore the excess of similar things corrupts one's own what good, huh? On account of this, one is rendered what?

[31:28] Wearisome. Wearisome and saddening, in so far as it's contrary to a man's own what good. Okay, now it gets into the philosophy. Now, boy, whether wonder is a cause of pleasure.

[31:49] To the eighth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that wonder is not a cause of what pleasure. For to wonder is of an ignorant nature, as Damascene says, huh? Aristotle says too, Plato. But ignorance is not what delightful, but more knowledge. Therefore, wonder is not the cause of what pleasure. Talk about an argument, then this is the point, huh?

[32:31] So Aristotle talks about wonder in the what? *Premium* of the metaphysics, huh? And Plato talks about it where? Wonder. Yeah. In the. There's a passage in the *Theaetetus on wonder, isn't there? Where else?

[33:00] It's in the dialogue called the *Theaetetus*, right? Yeah. In the beginning, of the dialogue with Theodorus, who's a teacher of Theaetetus, he's introducing his pupil Theaetetus to Socrates, huh? And he says that his pupil is something of a philosopher, just by way of introduction, right? Well, then, in the course of the conversation between Socrates and Theaetetus breaks out in wonder. And then Socrates stops and he says, "Theodorus seems to have guessed right about your nature.

[33:31] " And then he says in very strong words, "Huh? There is no other beginning of philosophy than wonder. " Very strong, you know. So, you realize how much you know Aristotle got from from Plato, right? Both both Albert the Great and Thomas, you know, they say that Plato and Aristotle are the chief philosophers. To be a complete philosopher, you have to know Plato and Aristotle, even though Aristotle might be, you know, something greater.

[34:00] But Plato is really, along with Aristotle, the the chief philosophers. Amazing. That's a beautiful text in the *Theaetetus*. A lot of things in the *Theaetetus* besides that, of course. But but these things are kind of scattered around in Plato. That's a beautiful beautiful text. Theaetetus was a real guy in the history of math, you know. So it's appropriate to ask him, you know, what his episteme is, because maybe he had some experience of that.

[34:37] Okay. Moreover, wonder is the beginning of what wisdom, huh? Because it is a road to inquiring what Truth. truth, huh? As is said in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, huh?

[34:58] But it is more delightful to contemplate things now known than to seek what unknown things, as a philosopher says in the tenth book of the *Ethics*, huh?

[35:13] So God is more delighted in knowing Himself than we have in trying to know Him. Right? There's no wonder there. Right? Since this inquiry has difficulty and what impediments, right? But the other does not have that.

[35:36] But pleasure is caused from operation that is not what impeded, as is said in the seventh book of the Ethics. Therefore, that's the first thing we talked about. The first article, right? Where operation is the cause, right? Of pleasure. Therefore, wonder is not the cause of pleasure, but it more impedes pleasure. Right?

[36:04] I think what's interesting here is it discloses these arguments obviously go against one's experience, right? Of the pleasure one gets when one what wonder, right? And of course, experience is a starting point in ethics, right? When you get the objection that goes against experience, then you're kind of forced to understand your experience better, right? And see how these objections can. However,

[36:32] each one delights in things that he's accustomed to. Hence, operations of habits acquired through what custom are what delightful, right? But customary things are not wonderful, as Augustine says in his work on John. Therefore, wonder is contrary to the very cause of what pleasure, right?

[37:01] But against all this nonsense is what the philosopher says. Now, who's the philosopher? The capital P. Sorry. No, no, wait. Wait, try again. Pale.

[37:22] Aristotle calls Homer the poet, and in the I mentioned in the. Washington Irving? No, no, in the defense of the American Constitution, Madison and

[37:41] the Articles of the Federalist Papers what you call those things. Can't even think of it now. Yeah, yeah. At one point, they say, you know, time about the importance of the Union. They were arguing for it, you know. And if we don't have this union, then, in the words of the poet, a long farewell to all my greens. Who is the poet? Not me, right? But the poet is obviously Shakespeare, right?

[38:05] It's like the talk, you know, when he describes reading. I think it was Henry IV, the first time in a log cabin in the United States. Now he found in these log cabins was maybe a Bible and a play or two of Shakespeare, right? This kind of shows you the the the excellence of Shakespeare, right? That he's only a finer beside the Bible, Marcus. That's why he first read one of these plays that Shakespeare made me read out of page me, but Mark said.

[38:34] Okay. So the philosopher says that wonder is the cause of pleasure. I answer: It should be said that to obtain things desired is what delightful, as has been said. And therefore, the more for something what loved, that desire increases, right? More through the obtaining of it does what pleasure grow, right?

[39:19] And also in the very growth of desire, there comes about a growth of pleasure. That's kind of strange he's said, right? He's saying that. According as there also is hope of the thing loved, huh? Just as has been said above, that the desire from hope is pleasing spagodentes the man wants the woman, but he has no hope of getting her. That's not going to give him any pleasure.

[39:53] But if he wants the woman and and he seems to be you know accepting this, then there's hope of you know. Now wonder is a what desire of what knowing, huh?

[40:22] Which happens in man from this that he sees the effect and is ignorant of the what cause, huh? Now notice the second thing he says though. This is kind of a different kind of wonder. Or from this that the cause of such an effect exceeds what the knowledge or the ability of him.

[40:49] Now when you read Aristotle in the *Premium* and he's talking about wonder being the beginning of philosophy, then he says that it's going to end in the opposite of this, right, huh? And the geometer no longer wonders whether it's going to be so because he knows it is so, right? When Aristotle arrives at the first cause in the twelfth book of wisdom, right? And then he realizes that God is always in this wonderful state that we can only sometimes be, right?

[41:15] And in a much better way, then he says it compels our wonder, right? See, that's kind of wonder in a somewhat different sense, right? Because the first wonder is corresponding to ignorance of something, right? And therefore, to kind of desire to know what we don't know, right? But the kind of wonder he has in the twelfth book arises from the excellence, the beauty of this thing, right?

[41:40] Okay. When I see a really beautiful girl, I wonder, you know, I'm filled with wonder, you know. When you something I was talking with one of my grandgirls, you know, grandchildren, you know, it's just, yeah, it's beautiful, you know, huh? You know, and you kind of feel wonder, right? But this proceeds from seeing something that's so so beautiful, right? Augustine says, you know, too late have I come to know the you know ancient beauty, and the way he begins the the uh confessions, you know. There's a movie out about Augustine I don't know anything about it.

[42:10] Do you? It's done well, or not? The Pope praised it. I heard. Yeah, I saw where I saw it. Maybe it was in the register or something. The Pope praised it. The Pope said. It's done well. It's done well. That's good. American film? I don't even know. Yeah, I think it's in our theaters now. I think. Yes. Come on, come in. So I said, "Great deal. You want to see it or not?

[42:33] " You know, it is done well. That's good. Double, double check that. We're not in that loop on those things. And therefore, wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as it has joined to it the hope of what? Obtaining knowledge of that which one desires to what? To know. That's what the first kind of wonder, right? And account of this, all wonderful things are delightful, right?

[43:06] Huh? Just as those things which are what rare. huh? And all representations of things, even of those things which in themselves are not what. Pleasant. Pleasant, huh? For the soul rejoices in the bringing together of one thing to another, because to bring together one thing to another is the proper and connatural act of reason. That's the discourse of Shakespeare speaks. As the philosopher says in his book on the Poetic Art.

[43:42] An account of this, to be freed from great dangers is more delightful because it is more admirable, as is said in one what rhetoric, huh? And what does that play there? A Winter's Tale there by Shakespeare, right? Huh? At the end there, you know, when the long lost daughter's thing, the way Shakespeare describes the wonder of people, it was perfect description. I've ever seen it. You know?

[44:08] Do you know that the one is just amazing? He's. It's like a whole world to discover. It's the way he says it. I can, you know, do just a few words here and there, but oh, just easy.

[44:27] Sometimes, Aristotle speaks a little bit of wonder as being proper to, you know, to tragedy, right? More than say to comedy, right? Huh? And you know, in the arguments of Zeno, you know, Aristotle says about one of the arguments, you know, this doesn't really substantially differ from this other argument of Zeno, but it's said with a certain tragodia.

[44:54] And Thomas says, you know, certain magnification of words to arouse wonder, you know, the Achilles, you know, the fastest of the Greeks, you know, can't catch up with this law, and it's really the same argument as the other one about you can't get out of the room, you know, but but it arouses more wonder, you know, huh? You see, and.

[45:13] But no, the word tragodia, right? The word tragedy, right? As if it's more proper to tragedy. And at the end of, I remember seeing a book there where it was called War or Wonder, but taken from the words at? The end of Hamlet, right? If you would see War or wonder, you've come to the right place. It's all these dead king, queen. No, these are literally dead bodies.

[45:34] Yeah, yeah. He says War or Wonder, right? You know, but he's talking about the emotional effect of the Shakespearean thing. Wonder is more an effect of tragedy than comedy, right? Just a question about these two senses of wonder, particularly Aristotle here. It's interesting because they're so closely united. I mean, he uses "Vel" here, so you either have it because you see the effect and you want to know the cause, or you've seen the cause in some way, but it exceeds your ability to understand.

[46:07] Yeah, yeah. It's almost univocal. I mean, this kind of these kinds of wonders is kind of that way in Aristotle as well. In other words, when we. When do I see Aristotle says in the proemium that when we get to the end, right, and know the cause, then the wonder what disappears? Now that's the beginning, right? He says we're going to this opposite thing, right, which is to know, and and the better thing, right?

[46:31] You know, it's better to know than just to wonder, right? But then when he gets to the first cause in the twelfth book of wisdom, then he what? He just wonders about God, right? And this proceeds more from knowing the excellence of God. How could be something so excellent? You know, how could be something so superior to us? You know, how could it be? You know, he says, you know, God is in this state.

[46:58] You know that we can only sometimes be in knowing some wonderful truth, right? We can't be thinking about you know, we got to eat, we got to sleep, we got to do this, you know,

[47:09] right to these, and and we can't do this very often, right? But even when we're in that, we're not in the way he is, right? Always, right? So he says this compels our wonder, right? But is it because the second kind of wonder you you realize that the cause exceeds your capacity of knowing the full? so there's still that? Yeah, yeah, yeah. But it's not so much a desire to know, but to kind of flabbergasted by by the excellence, the beauty of the excellence of this wonder.

[47:38] Yeah, and even in Latin, I was thinking of this. We have the word expression in English. If you suddenly realize something in terms of like a cause, you say, "Well, no wonder." Now you know the cause. No more wonder, And then the name Miram in Latin is the same expression. No wonder, no wonder anymore because I know the cause. I mean, sometimes in English, you know, to use the word curiosity for wonder, which you've got to be careful, because it's used for the name of vice, there for Thomas, right?

[48:03] Curiosity to us, right? But sometimes we use the word curiosity, you find scientists using and so on. They're not using it for the vice, you know, but just simply for the desire to know, right? That's that's the one kind of wonder, right? Sometimes called curiosity, not not in the bad sense. And then the other kind of wonder, they use the word sometimes admiration, right? Okay. So when I admire somebody, I admire much of the honor of.

[48:27] Somebody I admire them because of what I I know about them, right? Okay. I'm curious about you know something that I don't you know if this thing went up you know suddenly you know I'd be curious as to why it went up you know. Yeah. And but I don't admire it going up.

[48:51] I was sure I would seem to be what contradicting himself unless you saw this distinction between these two, huh? So he says, but there's a similarity there because as you said, it goes beyond you, right? Huh? You can't comprehend it, right?

[49:10] That's based in somewhat. That's based more on what you know. Yeah. Whereas the other is based more on what you don't know. So that's what I was wondering about. When when you come to the knowledge of the first cause, and you come to the you come to see that the first cause exceeds your capacity to know him, that you cannot know him as he is. Is that is that ignorance?

[49:32] Is then is that the first cause? Is that the first sense of wonder? Well, see now, see, I may as a Christian want to see God as He is, right? Huh? I that desire maybe from studying theology, right? Desire to see God as He is, right? But when I see God as He is, I'll never get bored because I'll always be filled with this kind of wonder to see something that's excellent, right?

[49:54] Because I never comprehend fully, right? But it's not so much a desire to know at that time; it's something resulting from knowing how excellent He is. Yeah, that's why because your ignorance in the first sense causes this kind of wonder is not not it's it's a lack. Whereas it seems the second one is more that you can't grasp it. It's not just it's not a lack on your part.

[50:19] It's you can't even you can't comprehend it. You're not even able to contain it. So in a certain sense, it's not a lack on your part; it's an excess on the other part.

[50:29] And they are very close because in a sense there's there's a little desire there, right? Huh? The angels never they always want to contemplate the face of God because they're not comprehended. You know, they don't know it as much as is knowable.

[50:49] So in answer to the first objection, right, is ignorance pleasant? Some people I think in this country, yeah. That's the way to live. Ignorance is blessed, they used to say, but now I don't hear that expression. It was blessed, and ignorance would make you happy, but I mean, doesn't? Yeah. To the first thereof, it should be said that wonder is not pleasant in so far as it has what ignorance, huh?

[51:18] But insofar as it has a desire of learning the cause, right? And insofar as the one wondering learns something new, right? To it, something to be which he did not what estimate to be, right?

[51:38] So I want to study angels. I was saying to be certain, an undergraduate. Any time he says, he starts. Now, isn't it more pleasant to to know than to wonder and so on? To the second should be said that pleasure has two things. One is resting in the good, huh? And secondly, the perceiving of this what rest, huh? Now, as regards the first, since it is more perfect to contemplate truth known than to inquire the unknown, right, huh?

[52:28] The contemplations of things known, per se, speaking, right, are more delightful than the investigations of things what unknown, huh? Nevertheless, Nevertheless this is important as regards the second, it sometimes happens, right, that investigations, inquiries are sometimes, right, more delightful according as they proceed from a greater what desire, right? For desire is more what excited from the perception of ignorance, huh? For opposites alongside each other stand up more.

[53:11] Whence most of all, man delights in those things which he newly what finds or has learned, right, huh? So something you didn't know before, is important, and all of a sudden you see that, Oh, get more rejoicing out of this than all these other things, you know, right? You know, just didn't expect that.

[53:36] Now, what about the customary things, huh? Shakespeare calls what custom, old custom. Custom has made things pleasant sometimes, huh? So different nationalities are accustomed to different foods, and they take pleasure, you know, pleasure in those foods, usually, right, huh? Yeah. Though sometimes you know, other people take pleasure in the food because it's something they haven't really tasted yet, huh?

[54:08] Yeah. Yeah. I first went to Quebec days to go out these two guys, and and there's kind of a mixture, you know, American food, so to speak, and some Chinese food, you know, and because I had to eat Chinese food, you know, and so these two guys ordered a little Chinese food, and I ordered that stupid American food. It looked kind of interesting, if you had, you know, and finding up, you know, a, pineapple chicken and so on.

[54:26] Yeah, it's kind of good, you know, but. truth, should be said that those things which are customary are delightful to do in so far as they are what connatural, right? So the saying is it, custom is a second nature, right? So Aristotle talks about that, huh? That's what Thomas says, you know, he's talking about whether the existence of God is per se known, right? He says some people think it's per se known because they're accustomed from childhood to call upon God in prayer and so on, right?

[55:07] And so it becomes kind of connatural to think that there's a God, right? And so it's custom rather than nature, right? That makes it seem to be what obvious, right? So that shows a tremendous force of custom that something that is not obvious can seem obvious because of custom, right? where Aristotle in the second book of wisdom talks about how custom makes the method you use seem to be the way to what proceed, right?

[55:38] Used to be amused, you know, in faculty committees, you know, you have a guy from this sociology and a guy from philosophy and a guy from history and so on, and they all approach the same thing differently, you know, and I remember a sociologist saying, you know, I suppose you're doing a word count in Thomas, just trying to give me something I understand. And so what the hell are they doing a word count in Thomas?

[56:02] That's the last way I'd study Thomas. Nobody does these, but that's what they do, you know. That's what I can imagine. I mean, lots of people just be doing the making big word counts. Kind of

[56:17] funny though, it shows the force of custom, right? He didn't realize how. That's how everybody today, a lot of people, they approach everything in life is in terms of computer programming. And so that that kind of that kind of statement sounds to me that's a programmer statement. He's going to do a data thing and blah blah blah whatever, yeah. As one thing that just from my experience with working with wood, it's curious that wet when they call Western type tools versus Oriental tools, Western saw.

[56:45] I've told you this before. You you cut when you push, but the Orientals it's when you pull, and they also have we have hand planes that you cut when. You better watch out what you're doing there. You're going to run a hand off or something. But the Japanese, the Japanese make hand planes that they pull to shave the woods on. It's just it totally the opposite. of.

[57:04] What we expect. I don't think it makes really any difference. It's just whatever one you sure should acquire a hand. You see that language, you know, and these idioms and so on. Remember the French teacher used to say now, don't fight it, just accept it. That's the way they say it in French. I know it's crazy, but that's what they do it. Okay. But nevertheless, those things which are rare are able to be what delightful, either by reason of knowledge because one desires knowledge of them, right?

[57:42] In so far as they're wonderful, or by reason of what operation, because from desire the mind is more inclined to operate intensely in something what new, new, as is said in the tenth book of the ethics, and a more perfect operation will cause a more perfect what pleasure. Take our little break here now.