Prima Secundae
86. Aquinas on the Effects of Pleasure: Expansion of the Heart, Thirst for More, and How Pleasure Hinders Reason (ST I-II q.33, a.1–3)
Class of 2012-10-18
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/086-aquinas-on-the-effects-of-pleasure-expansion-of-the-heart/

[0:00] Thomas is looking in the treatise on love, and in the treatise on pleasure, he looks before and after, right? So he takes up, if you remember correctly, love itself, right? And then he talks about the cause of love, and then the effects of love, right? Looking before and after, like Shakespeare says, and he does the same thing with pleasure now, right? He talked about pleasure in itself, what it is, right?

[0:24] And then he looked before at his causes, and now he's going to look after its effects. So he gives a certain full development for love and what pleasure, right? And there is perhaps many reasons why he does that, right? But in terms of theology, what do you have in God? Love and pleasure. Yeah, No, no desire in God Doesn't want anything. doesn't lack anything. He's a man who's everything.

[0:53] I mean, the one who has everything, right? So it's kind of interesting now that the ones that will be carried over to God, right? He's more. That's not the only reason why he does it, but it just does it. You mentioned this before. That's what I think it's in Thomas's commentary in Matthew or whatever. That's what God Himself says. This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.

[1:26] I named those two. Yeah. So then he considers, or not to consider, about the effects of pleasure, right? And about these four things are asked.

[1:40] First, whether it belongs to pleasure to dilate you, right? Now, with the with the with sadness, you know, kind of contracts you, maybe. Second, whether pleasure causes thirst of itself, right? You know,

[2:09] my flesh pines and my soul thirsts. I was studying Psalms one time. I guess there's there's three Psalms of thirst, and there's one in each of the three groups of the Psalms. Interesting. And there's one that's one of the last of the penitential Psalms, I think it is. I don't even remember. Secreta sine aqua tibi. I was like that.

[2:32] We were going through the Psalms. We can only find these three Psalms. It was kind of probably one in each. Okay, whence about the precept of charity in Psalm 1: 18? It is said, Latum, that means wide, I guess. Your command Nimis exceedingly so, right? But pleasure is a different what passion from love.

[3:05] You jumped down there. But pleasure is another passion from love, isn't it? You when did you didn't finish going through the four? Did the the four up at the beginning of the premium? Oh, oh, okay, okay. I went to the premium.

[3:25] The premium. Oh, oh, okay, okay. I'm getting old. You just. I'm 76 years old. I better ask for excuses. Yeah. Well, the pleasure impedes use of reason, huh? And then Aristotle talks about the tenth book of the Ethics, where the pleasure perfects operation, as beauty youth, he says. Okay.

[3:54] I stand corrected, as my mother would say. Okay. So dilating, huh? Would seem to pertain to love more than to pleasure, he says, huh? Okay. So he gives these two quotes. But pleasure is a different passion from love. Therefore, dilation is not an effect of what pleasure, right? Mm-hmm. So if you love, your heart gets bigger, I guess. I fell in love with Marian. It's not even physically, huh?

[4:28] Yeah. Broke his ribs. Yeah. Okay. Maybe some other saints too. Yeah. My dad took me into his place there when he was in Rome. You know, place where they. That makes interesting. Okay. Third, I mean, second. More from this that something is what dilated. It is effected or made more capable of receiving.

[4:57] Some people have narrow hearts and they can't love very many people, right? But some people, you know. A narrow mind that can't know. much. I remember when Paul the Six was made pope. You know, and and they're asking me like these asking stupid questions, you know. But what's it like to be pope? You know, he says, when you get this this this sense of of universal fatherhood, right?

[5:16] He felt like he was the father of. Now he just got beautiful. He said it, you know. But your heart has to expand, right? If you're a bishop or before it's ever if you're the pope, right?

[5:32] But reception pertains to desire, which is of a thing not yet had. Therefore, dilation more pertains to desire than to what pleasure, right? So one argument against that is more love, and the other that is more what desire, right?

[5:51] Moreover, constriction is opposed to dilation, right? But constriction seems to pertain to pleasure, for we are what we constrict or grasp that which we firmly wish to retain, and such is the affection of the appetite of bodily thing what that's delightful, therefore dilation does not what pertain to pleasure.

[6:21] But against this, it is this is an interesting quote here to the expression of joy. It is said in Isaiah chapter sixty, you will what see and you will become affluent, wealthy, and you will what marvel, marvel, and your rabbi tour, and your heart will be what that is.

[6:46] Moreover, the pleasure from dilation gets the name as what, or pleasure itself from dilation gets the name that it is called what Letitia, right? You know, what you said for a woman's name something Latitia or something that is from as has been said above, huh? Okay,

[7:11] so can argue from those words, right? Is beauty more the the object of of the reason of the will? I'm saying reason. I think so. I think so. Yeah. I mean, I was always thinking about this, and I was thinking of the word lovely as a synonym for beautiful, right? But lovely seems to be named from love, right? So therefore, it seemed that it was closer to what the good, which is the object of the will, right?

[7:47] And Dionysius the pseudo, takes it up together, beauty with the goodness link of God, right, and so on. But I still think it's more more reason, yeah, yeah. Thomas best says so.

[8:03] Yeah. To the end of it. You see that when Aristotle talks about geometry, right, and the mathematical sciences, and there's nothing, there's no goodness there, right? But there is beauty, right? So it's obviously you know logic of the mind there.

[8:28] I answer it should be said that latitude is a certain dimension of a bodily magnitude, right? Whence in the affections of the soul it is not said except by what metaphor,

[8:44] for dilation is said to be as it were a motion to what broadness, right? And it belongs to pleasure, according to two things which are required for, for pleasure.

[9:02] One of which is on the side of the knowing or grasping power, right, which grasps the union of some suitable what good, and from this grasping, a man grasps himself to have what obtained a certain perfection, which is spiritual magniture.

[9:28] And according to this, the soul of man is said to be magnified through pleasure, or to be what my soul magnifies the lord. Another is on the side of the desiring power, which ascends to the what delightful thing and rests in it, huh. In a certain way, lending itself to what grasping it inwardly, huh? That sound okay. that translation. Sure. And thus, the affection of man is dilated, right, to pleasure, as it were, what handing himself over to containing in inwardly the what thing delighting him.

[10:24] on. That's kind of interesting what Thomas says huh? So you gotta have something of the grasping power, right, as well as the will, Desiring power.

[10:48] Interesting. So the first, therefore, it should be said that nothing prevents us in those things which are said metaphorically, for the same to be attributed to diverse things according to diverse similitudes, right? So the common example is a lion there, right? The devil is a lion going about seeking whom he may devour, right? And his cruelty, right, and so on. But then lion is also applied to Tribu Judah, right?

[11:21] But for different similitudes, right? And according to this, dilation pertains to love by reason of a certain what extension, in so far as the affection of the one loving is extended, what to others, huh? That it takes care not only or cares for not only those things which are his own, but for those things which are of others, right?

[11:55] But to pleasure, dilation pertains in so far as someone in himself is what yeah, as as it were being rendered more capable, more capacious. more maybe more capacity, huh? Okay.

[12:20] It's but I have to always remember. what I forget where we learned it, but uh in some place in St. Bonometra he speaks of the in the old law, the good of the Messiah was promised, but it was delayed. So it was, and God did this because it would be more desired, to put off a put off a goodness, desire to delay it, to increase the desire.

[12:41] That was that basic way of understanding. So we can say that both love and what pleasure dilate us, but in different, what ways, huh?

[12:58] Now, what about desire, though, huh? The second, should be said that desire has some Amplitude, huh? Amplitude from the imagination of the thing, what? Desire, huh?

[13:20] But much more from the presence of the thing now, what? Delighting, huh? For the soul gives itself more to the thing now delighting it than to the thing than to the thing not had desired. Since pleasure is in fact the end of what? Desire, huh?

[13:44] There's a typographical error. I guess they just repeated a line from the other column at the bottom. This one, that's. Did you get those cheap Spanish editions? That's what happens when you get cheap Spanish editions falling apart.

[13:58] No, I like them. My students gave me a copy of Augustine's, you know, de Trinitate, you know, one of those Spanish additions, you know, it's the one I kind of use.

[14:12] To the theory, it should be said that the one who delights constricts the thing delighting when he what? Strongly inheres or adheres to a light. But he what? Widens, you might say, or amplifies his his heart as what? He might enjoy something perfectly what? Delightful, right? Okay, whether pleasure now causes thirst of itself. To the second, one goes forward thus: it seems that pleasure does not cause desire of itself.

[15:14] Why? Because every motion comes to an end when it arrives at what rest. But pleasure is, as it were, a rest of the what motion of desire, as has been said above.

[15:35] So, notice they always compare desire to what motion of the three of them. That's why desiring powers are named from desire; the appetitive powers, because most things in motion sort of catch the eye, Shakespeare says, but not stirs.

[15:55] But the motion of desire ceases when it arrives at what pleasure. Therefore, pleasure does not cause desire. Right? It's not maybe too hard to answer.

[16:11] You want you want to have it again, right? You want to continue, right? All good things must come to an end. That was always said to us as kids when we're playing. You know, you got to go to bed now or something. All good things must come to an end.

[16:29] Moreover, when opposite is not a cause of its opposite, but pleasure in some way is opposed to desire on the side of the object, for desire is of a good not what had, but pleasure is of a good not had. Yeah. Therefore, pleasure is not a cause; does not cause desire of itself.

[16:57] Moreover, fastidium. What's the best translation of that word? Tedium, I guess. Boredom. Boredom. Or not? Boredom is the best. Something that's molestus. What would you say? Unpleasant in some way. Yeah. Here I have a dictionary. Loathing, disgust. Yeah. Then they other senses: squeamishness, scornful, contempt, pride. And then they. Yeah, here, here, scornful would be a little bit too hard. Disgusting.

[17:29] Yeah, repulsive in a way. Yeah. Or disgust as you plug into desire, but pleasure often causes disgust, right? Therefore, it does not make for desire of itself. Too much chocolate, you get disgusted. Yeah. Yeah. So here it's saying if it causes the fastidium, it's almost as causing this. I mean, English even so, like we would say, tedium, boredom. Yeah. Doesn't quite give the same yeah good long term return yeah but it's yeah it's but it's more than just diminished pleasure it's more I I just think of it in terms of food when you've had too much pizza yeah you've had too much pizza you don't even want to smell it anymore

[18:16] yeah right right yeah I mean what he has yeah in fact it seems to be the person is bodily type pleasures you had enough ice cream yeah yeah don't even talk to me about it again this is what the Lord says huh in the fourth chapter of John's Gospel who drinks from this water will thirst again right but the water however is signified according to Augustine the bodily what pleasure right

[18:47] sort that that well there with the Samaritan woman yeah okay I answer it should be said that pleasure can be considered in two ways huh in one way according as it is an act in another way according as it is in what memory huh

[19:08] also thirst or desire can be taken in two ways huh in one way properly according as it implies the desire of a thing not had in another way commonly huh communiter according as it implies the exclusion of disgust or boredom or whatever

[19:36] um so according as it is an act now pleasure does not cause what thirst or desire of itself per se loquendo right but only per accidens if our thirst or desire is said to be of a thing what not had it's a desire of a thing not had right for pleasure is an affection of the appetite about the thing that is present but it happens that the thing present is not perfectly what had and this can be either on the side of the thing had or on the side of the one having it on the side of the thing had in that the thing had is not totum simul well you listen to music there and you listen to watch the read the play or

[20:38] something right it's not totum simul can't be all together once once it is successively received right huh and when one successively what receives and when someone delights in what he has he desires to to drink I guess that which he means huh Just as the one who hears the first part of the verse and delights in this desires to hear the other part of the verse, right?

[21:11] As Augustine says in the fourth book of Confessions. And in this way, almost all what bodily pleasures cause what thirst to themselves until they are what consumed, and that such pleasures follow some motion, right? As is clear in the pleasures of foods, you can't eat the ice cream sundae all at once, right?

[21:43] On the side, however, of the one having them, just as when someone, when something what does not perfectly have something existing in itself perfectly, but bit by bit he what acquires it. That word paulatim, bit by bit, is what we kind of translate in English, right? But that's the way our mind gets the truth, you know, paulatim That's what we always like the word. He says that that's what he says in the beginning of his commentary on Job.

[22:14] I remember he talked about it Very interesting comparison he makes I'll have to remember it now, but he, I know he uses this explicitly in comparison. I can't remember what it is. though.

[22:33] Just as in this life, receiving something imperfectly of divine knowledge, right, we are delighted, and this pleasure excites or arouses thirst or desire for a perfect knowledge, right? According to what, according as one can understand what is had in Ecclesiasticus twenty four twenty nine, who drink me will still what? Still thirst. Thirst, yeah.

[23:08] If, however, by thirst or desire one understands only the intensity, right, of the affections, taking away what boredom, thus spiritual pleasures most of all cause thirst or desire of themselves.

[23:30] But bodily pleasures, because they are what, when they grow too much or continue for too long, right, they cause a superexcess of the natural habitude, right, and they become disgusting or painful, as is clear in the delight of what foods.

[23:55] In account to this, when someone arrives at what. Perfection now in bodily pleasures, he becomes what bored with them, right? As called the diminishing returns. I say it's evolved diminishing returns. Thanks to God.

[24:16] And he sometimes what desires other ones, right? But spiritual pleasures do not what exceed the natural what disposition, but they what perfect nature, right? Whence, when one arrives at A consummation in them, then they are more what.

[24:45] Except perhaps nisi forte inquantum as to contemplative operation are joined some operations of bodily powers, which through the s the the uh Continuation might say of offering become what? Weary. Weary, yeah. And in this way, can be understood what is said Ecclesiastics twenty four twenty nine the same quote, right? Who drink me will still what Thirst Thirst, huh?

[25:21] Because also the angels who perfectly know God and delight in Him, it is said in one Peter one that they desire to look upon Him right down. The desire of the everlasting hills. That says there it should be like a temple right? Won't go out anymore. No, no, I'm going to be cabin fever. You can't understand it very well, I don't think. Why Don't you get bored?

[25:53] Same sight over and over again. It's like going to the theater and seeing the same movie every time you go there? Little do you know? little? Do you know?

[26:09] If, however, one considers what pleasure, in so far as it is in memory, not in act, then per se it's naturally apt to cause thirst and desire of itself. When a man returns to that disposition in which was what delightful to him, what has already passed away.

[26:35] If, however, he is changed from that disposition, the memory of the pleasure does not cause in him delight, but with disgust. As the full existing memory of. food.

[26:54] It's like uh, Father John Murray's father. I remember when his uncle died. Father John Murray's uncle, so it's the brother of the man who's talking to me, Roland Chouinard. We were cleaning out the house where his uncle had lived, and but I was cleaning up and breaking down the bed, which was the place where Roland's parents used to stay when they were alive, which was a long time ago.

[27:18] And he just he looked at the place, he's you know kind of reminiscing, and he said he said you know the longer they're gone, the more I miss them. This is why his desire to see them has grown over the years. This is his past memory, of loving his parents. After the first objection, right? But from the rest that is pleasure, right? Seems to be opposed to motion, right?

[27:52] Huh? Can't be at rest and motion at the same time, can you? Not at the same time. Not if you're completely at rest. To the first, therefore, it should be said that when pleasure is perfect, then it has in every way rest, huh? And there ceases the motion of desire tending in what is not had, right?

[28:16] Isn't isn't that also the reason why hope would not be in heaven? What's the kind of desire there, It satisfies what you got. But when it is imperfectly had, then not altogether ceases the motion of desire tending in not had, huh? So I think I understand the text fully, you know, which I don't very often. think, that I'm at rest, right? But I think I don't fully understand it.

[28:45] Then, still have that kind of desire, right? Like De Koninck said, you know, that I've been teaching the physics since 1930s, right? And I had him in the what 19 late

[29:01] 1950s. But he still saw something new when he went through them, right? Huh? Sometimes Monsignor Dionne pointed out something he didn't see. Kind of say, how could I have taught this? 20 years and not seen that. It's kind of nice humility, you know, on his part, huh? You know. I went to ask him for my thesis what he thought about this question, you know. He says, you know, why do you ask me when you got Dionne as your advisor?

[29:31] So I still want to hear what you say. Okay. um where are we now? Secundum Secundum yeah Oh, I'm sorry. To the second, it should be said that that which is had imperfectly is had secundum quid. There's a famous distinction there. Simpliciter and secundum quid, huh? And according to this, secundum quid, right? It is what not had, right? Huh? And therefore, together about it, there can be both what desire and pleasure, right?

[30:27] It's the woman, yeah, it's the woman. What was it, John of the Cross? saying? And I think Saint Teresa has a her version of it. I'm dying because I do not die. What you desire, you're dying to have it, but that's what's making

[30:51] it. But that's that's the expression of the poem. Dying, I do not die. I'm dying because I'm not dying. You're dying to die, aren't you? Yeah, dying to die. Yes, yeah, yeah.

[31:19] Now about causing opposites. Well, pleasures in one way cause disgust, another way desire. Right. So it's like that, like in the third corollary, the four kinds of causes. Right. The same thing can be a cause of opposites by its presence and absence. Right. So it's not the cause the ship captain is a cause of safety of the ship or of the destruction of the ship, but not exactly the same way.

[31:57] The guard is a cause of the safety of the camp, right, by his diligent guarding and seeing the enemy approaching, and the administration's in trouble here, you know, that business down in Libya, Right. Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Should we do another article or get done? Okay. Because I want to know here about this. Maybe important for me to know whether pleasure impedes use of reason, huh?

[32:29] To the third, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that pleasure does not impede the use of reason. For rest, most of all, confers or contributes to the suitable use of reason.

[32:47] Hence, it is said in the seventh book of the Physics, Natural Hearing, that in what calming down and coming to rest, the soul becomes knowing and prudent. Of course, notice the word understanding, right? It comes from the word stand rather than from motion, huh?

[33:09] And in wisdom, eight chapter chapter eight verse sixteen, going into my house, right? I rested, right, with it meaning wisdom. But pleasure is a certain rest. Therefore, it does not impede, but more aids the use of reason, huh?

[33:36] So then, I could have been late some days. I laid down completely at rest, and then I can take something out that I couldn't get out before. You're getting late, though. I couldn't for thirty-six hours. I was in the lab last night and had this thought. Yeah, it does keep you awake, though, night. You're resting in some way, but. Okay. Moreover,

[34:09] those things which are not in the same, even if they are contrary, do not impede each other. But pleasure is in the desiring part of the soul, and the use of reason in the grasping part. It's amazing how Thomas, you know, often uses that term. Didn't say the knowing power, but the grasping power, right? The thing known is in the mind, huh? That's yeah. No, who else would do that?

[34:36] I don't know who else would would use so consistent like he does. Identify that part as the grasping part. Therefore, pleasure does not impede the use of what reason, huh? So does digesting my food there impede my thinking? Depends on what you eat. If you had salmon, it will. Yeah. More.

[35:06] More of that which is impeded by another seems, in some way, to be what changed from it. But the use of the what grasping power. More moves us to what pleasure, right? Or more moves pleasure than it moves us from pleasure, right? For it is a cause of pleasure, right? And therefore, pleasure does not impede the use of reason, huh?

[35:36] But against all this nonsense is what the philosopher says in the sixth book of ethics. That's the book devoted to the virtues of reason, right? And he says, "Watch out for pleasure, right? Pleasure corrupts the what? Estimate of what? Prudence, huh? " So, here are some examples then of us in society. Quite a quite a few. And it should be said that as Aristotle points out in the tenth book of the ethics, the pleasures that are proper, right, to them increase their operations, right?

[36:18] So, if you take delight in in hearing something, you'll hear it a little more intensely, right? Huh? Delight in seeing something, you'll look, you know, more intensely, right? If you delight in what understanding something, you'll understand it more, right? More intensely. But extraneous pleasures what impede, right? It's not pleasures that are tied to the operation itself, huh? Now there is a certain pleasure which is had about the very act of reason itself, just as when some odd guy delights in contemplating or reasoning, right?

[36:59] And such a pleasure does not impede the use of reason, but more aids it, right? Now that's why the students had such a hard time, you know. Didn't take any pleasure in these things, right? So, yeah, because that more we more attentively we do in which we what delight, huh? But attention what is what operation, right? Huh?

[37:32] But bodily pleasures impede the use of reason. Oh, this is the heart of the matter now. Here, for a threefold reason. Can I leave now?

[37:46] For a threefold reason, huh? First, by reason of what distraction? Now, what did the great de Tocqueville say about the greatest vice of the mind in democratic times? Huh? He says, "A distraction, right? Yeah, yeah. " And he didn't even know about cell phones. Yeah, yeah. That's interesting. Biggest distraction. Did that have something to do with democracy? Yeah, yeah, yeah. All these. Commotion in society. Yeah, because I guess as opposed to aristocratic society where no, your father was a carpenter, you'll be a carpenter.

[38:21] You know, things are fixed and more stable in society. Yeah. Yeah. Interesting. Yeah. And I think some of that is the. Well, I'm going to jump into a big, bigger thing, but I guess in some ways the competition, as I might say, in in a capitalist type society, too, the competition is more intense and sort of unrestricted. Which is what I think is based on, or from Belloc, what Protestantism introduces is the isolation of the individual.

[38:55] So then you have every individual is competing against another, and and and I guess that's kind of that distraction from it destabilizes everything. Everything competing for your attention in our society, you know, is advertisements, you know, admiration and so. on That's what the three steps in every sin is distraction, attraction, contraction. That's the same, by the way. That's the three steps. It was like Eve. She was distracted.

[39:28] She got attracted, and she contracted. Yeah. That's every sin. Well, I wonder about you know the saying of the devil being you know Beelzebub, you know, you know, the, Lord of flies. Yeah. You know the you get a lot of flies around you know they really aren't distracting. Trying to read your book and the flies in here. It's like the devil, you know, behind this, you know, the idea of distraction.

[39:51] He sees that. Most people lead a very distracted life. It seems to me now. Just. So. Okay, first by reason of distraction, because as has been said, to those things in which we delight, we pay what more attention, huh? But when intention is strongly what. Cleaving. Adhering to something, it's debilitated about other things, right? Or even is totally what called back from them, right? And according to this, if the bodily pleasure is great, it either wholly impedes use of reason, drawing to itself the intention of the soul, or it multum impediat, it much impedes, right?

[40:46] Moreover, I mean secondly, rather, by reason of what contrariety, this is something a little different, right? For some pleasures, especially those that are excessive, right, are counter against the order of what reason, right. And in this way, or through this way, or in this way, the philosopher says in the sixth book of the ethics that bodily pleasures corrupt the estimate of prudence, right? Not, however, speculative estimation, right?

[41:24] Ah, there's a little saving for me there now. To which they are not contrary, right? Huh? As example that the triangle has three angles equal to two, right? So that's not going to corrupt my thinking about whether it does or does not have that. eating too much, right?

[41:43] But. what to do? But in the first way, it doesn't feed, right? Huh? I actually say about about alcoholics, you know, that I've known and so on. They don't really deny the principle you shouldn't drink too much. What they deny is that they drink too much. Is that a couple of ousy drinks, I heard them say, you know, And they've always obviously had too much, you know, and making kind of fool themselves, you know, but but okay.

[42:08] But the first thing is is talking about something that is not necessarily what contrary to virtue, right? But you know. i i If if uh you know the Shakespeare play is on the TV or something, you know I can't sit there with the book and read, you know, or I get the music, you know, and listen to Mozart, and you know a little bit distracted, you know. You know, it's not that the Mozart is contrary to reason, like you know, but but it's distraction, right?

[42:43] That's the second one is tied to what when you're talking about moderation is the greatest virtue from Heraclitus. Yeah, That's in order to wisdom. Yeah. Because of what? That's what is it they say St. Thomas has a commentary here talking about the Greek name for moderation or temperance is saving reason. Selfism Subsum yeah that's what it means saving reason I remember when you're teaching a kind of a seminar class, you know, and you have the boys and the girls, you know, on both sides.

[43:17] There's a nice-looking girl there, you know. You know this guy is. He's paying some attention to her, you know, and you know how she's drinking in your words, you know, because he's distracted, right? You know.

[43:34] In the third way, he says, according to a certain what binding, huh? Okay. Insofar as too bodily pleasure there follows a certain transformation of the what body.

[43:50] More also in some passion, right? More more vehemently. Yeah. insofar as that the appetite is more vehemently affected to a thing that is present than to a thing that is what absent. So avoid this

[44:12] circumstances of what they call it. What's the word? Thinking of the occasions of sin, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. The things that are present, right? So

[44:24] he says these bodily disturbances here impede the use of reason, as is clear in vinolenti that's the drunks, huh? Who have the use of reason bound or impeded? St. Thomas gives a really powerful example. He says that certain sins of the flesh, in particular, blind the mind so much. Yeah. If you if if a man knew that the object of his desire was right before him, but as soon as he touches, goes straight to hell.

[44:53] he doesn't stop. And it's how blind a man becomes. isn't it? Mm-hmm. That's it. Now he says to the first, it should be said that bodily pleasure has the rest of the what appetite. In the pleasant thing, right? Huh? Which rest is sometimes what? Contrary to reason, huh?

[45:28] But from the side of the body, it always has some kind of what? Change, huh? And as regards both, it impedes the use of what? Reason.

[45:44] So you ever get, you know, somebody gets kind of angry in a conversation or disagreement, you know, and when you calm down a little stage, then they kind of, you know, see the light, you know. For the time being, they can't, because of the body.

[46:06] Now he says it's true that the desiring power and the grasping power are diverse power parts, diverse potential parts of the soul, but they're one soul, right? And therefore, when the intention of the soul is vehemently applied to the act of one, it's impeded from the act of the other, right? Huh? So they describe Mozart as being, you know, entirely in his what ear, right? Huh? You've heard that kind of time when Mozart first got to hear some piece by Johann Sebastian Bach.

[46:37] who wasn't playing much in those days, you know. What is that? You know, you know. But he he just kind of in his ear, right? Huh? My brother Marcus describing these artists there in in Detroit there, where he says you know they come into a room like this and say, Oh, I've never seen a a shade of blue just like that. Yeah, yeah. Oh, they're entirely in their eyes, you know.

[47:02] It's like they're you know, doing the ears and things else. Oh, Anthony Weiler's like that. He talks about shades of color. I'm just dull. I can't see them. Yeah, yeah.

[47:17] Okay. The third one, huh? The third should be said that the use of reason requires the suitable use of the imagination. That's why you need fiction, right? To refresh the imagination, huh? Because it's a slave of reason, and also the other sensitive powers, which use the bodily organ. The imagination uses the bodily organ too. And therefore, from the bodily change, the use of reason is impeded when the act of the imaginative power and the other ones are what?

[47:52] Impeded, right? Okay. I remember when I was trying to do with the regular figures there in the solid geometry there, trying to imagine, you know, find little cutouts, you know, hanging from the lights. Help your imagination a bit. Okay, time for the last article in this question, right? Was that to feed Matthew dinner or something? Another pleasure or something? You want to stop now or what? Yeah, I think maybe we should.

[48:33] Yeah, we don't get in trouble if the power is it. It'd be right. It would be unpleasant. Yeah.