Prima Secundae
89. Reason Looks Before and After: Pleasure as the Measure of Moral Good, and Whether Pain Is a Passion of the Soul
Class of 2012-11-08
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/089-reason-looks-before-and-after-pleasure-as-the-measure-of/

[0:00] Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas, dear God. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds. Ordinal images, allow us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, help us to understand all that you've written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen.

[0:35] So Christ in the cross is called Christ. For which reason? He's called Christ. For. What reason? I guess you could say he's united with the divinity. He's united with his own blood. Yeah, I mean, you know, we anoint by the priest and the kings and the prophets, right? So primarily, as a priest, it seems to be he's he's Christ, right? Though Augustine says also the chair of the teacher, right?

[1:13] You know, the cross is also teaching us on the cross, huh? And I suppose it has something to do with his kingship too. But you think of his priesthood most of all, right?

[1:25] Well, on the Sermon on the Mount, there. What do you think? You know, There's just he's a prophet and teacher there, right? Okay. I got thinking

[1:41] of a passage in Shakespeare, you know, and I thought I'd forget in here just to give us a little bit of variety in our life here. But to go back to the wisest of all poets, huh? And to the definition of reason that Shakespeare gives us, huh? His agitation to use reason, and he says it's the what ability for large discourse, looking before and after, right? And we saw that the word before and after had many senses, huh?

[2:19] In the chapter, in the categories, the twelfth chapter, the categories where Aristotle distinguishes in order the four central senses, right, of the word before. And then brings in on the side of the second the crowning sense for the philosopher, the cause before the effect. But what is the first meaning of before and after? Aristotle gives there in the categories, which is that. Yeah, before in time, right?

[2:52] Okay. Now. In the De Anima In the De Anima, when Aristotle gets into the third book, there and he has finished going through the senses in the second book, right, and the vegetative powers in the second book, and then in the third book he's dealing with intellectual powers, and then finally the what? Last thing he takes up is the ability to move yourself around, right? Okay. Now in the course of this, there is a lot of things said, right?

[3:26] And down in the fifteenth lectio I propose some things that have been said. Thomas says at eight twenty-nine there, he excludes a certain objection. Okay, upon what has been said before, where Aristotle has shown that what? Apparently that appetite does not move, right? To this that the what? Those who are continent, do not follow their appetite, huh? Okay.

[4:03] But this argument he says is solved, because in man there are contrary desires, huh? Contrary appetites, one of which the continent follows. It's a type of reason occurs, and the others repugnant, right? Okay.

[4:26] He says therefore Aristotle that because they are there can come to be what? Desires that are contrary to each other, right? This happens when reason is contrary to concupiscence. So you've got the sense desire concupiscence, right? For what is pleasing to the senses, right? And reason can be contrary to this, as we all know, right? But then try to see what Aristotle says, and this happens in those having the sense of time, Aristotle says.

[5:06] Now sense there means really what? Reason, huh? And he's saying that he's thinking of man, right? That we have the sense of time, right?

[5:17] That is those who not only know what is in the present, what is here and now, right, the delectable that tracks the sense desire, but they consider the past and the future, right? Okay.

[5:34] Because the understanding sometimes orders us to withdraw from something concupiscible, something pleasing to the sense desire, on account of the consideration of the future, as when to the man who has fever, right? Example from ancient medicine right now. From the judgment of the understanding, it seems that he ought to abstain from wine, huh? Here and now, right? Lest the fever what boil up becomes hot in kalepoteron but concupiscentia incites one to taking it on account of what is here and now, pro to parachrema okay, that is an account of that which is in the present.

[6:26] It seems that in the present it is delightful, right? It seems that what is in the present, what is here and now pleasant, is simpliciter delectabile et bonum, right? But it's not really simpliciter, but from the fact that they do not consider it as the future, right? That's very interesting because there you have the first sense of before and after, which is in time, right? And you start to see already a little bit how reason might go against the concupiscible, because it looks before and after, not just in the more elevated senses of before and after, but in the very fundamental one of what?

[7:09] Yeah, I used to always tell the students, you know, when we talked about the fallacy of simply and not simply, or sempliciter and secundum quid as they say in Latin, that this distinction is something that you're overlooking all the time in your daily life, right? So you're choosing something bad simply because it's good in some way, right? Or you're

[7:34] avoiding something good because in some way it's bad, right? Huh? Okay, okay and give simple examples of this that they can understand. okay. now, in the Greek of that passage that Thomas is quoting from, huh?

[8:05] He's saying here, since orexeis and desires come to be contrary to each other, huh? This happens when hologos reason, and he epithumia—that's the Greek word for concupiscentia that Thomas says, when they are what? In enantia, when they're contrary, right? Huh? And this comes about in tois chronou aisthesin echousin in those having the aisthesis, the sense of time, right? Huh? They look before and after, right? Huh? Now it's interesting when Aristotle takes up time in the fourth book of the Physics, right?

[8:52] He points out that time wouldn't fully exist without reason. Numbering the before and after, right? For he says, ho men gar nous the nous the understanding, on account of the what future, right? It anathelkein kaloue commands one to abstain, right? But epithumia dia to the what? parachrema, what's here and now, right? And Aristotle says, it seems phainetai gar to hedy right? What is pleasant? What's here and now?

[9:32] He do right to be also haplos, simpliciter to hedy and agathon haplos, right? And say, an account of not to see the future, dia to me horan to mellon right? Okay. Okay. Now, now go to the wisest of poets, right? Remember Shakespeare's words in *Agitation*, right? He says, "What is a man if his? Chief good and market of his time, be put to sleep and feed a beast no more, right?

[10:06] And he goes on to talk about sure he that made us with such large discourse, right? Gave him not fusting us unused, huh? Now, who is Shakespeare's greatest comic character?

[10:22] Yeah, Falstaff, right? And where does Falstaff first appear in the books of Shakespeare's plays? huh? Yeah, Henry IV, Part One, here, right? Okay, there's a beautiful edition that you find these, you know, literary editions, okay? Only a couple of them, a few of them, but half a dozen or so, delicious little one, sir. Okay.

[10:48] Now he's introduced in Act One, Scene Two, right? So it's in London, an apartment of the Prince, sir. And enter the Prince of Wales, huh? Whom Falstaff always calls Hal, right? And H-A-L, and Sir John Falstaff, right? So Falstaff begins the conversation. Now, hell, what time of day is it, lad?

[11:18] He's asking about the time, right? Did ever else on mine now that's yours, don't they? And the Prince says, "Thou art so fat-witted, with drinking of old sack, that's sherry, right? And unbuttoning thee after supper, and sleeping upon benches, right? Afternoon.

[11:44] This almost like he says another part, right? That thou hast forgotten to demand to demand that truly which thou wouldst truly know. Well, you ask me about the time, right? You who fat-witted with drinking old sack and eating too much, right? And sleeping on benches and so on, huh? Unless hours were cups of sack, and minutes capons,

[12:16] and clocks the tongues of bods, And dials the sign of leaping houses. Leaping houses means brothels, huh? And the blessed sun himself, a fair hot witch, in flame-coloured taffeta. I see no reason why thou shouldst be so superfluous to demand the time of the day. Isn't that significant that Shakespeare should introduce his greatest comic character, who's obviously a man who lives like a beast to the sense, right?

[12:46] As is indicated by these things said of him, by having him ask the time of the day, and Prince Hal say, "What does that got to do with with you and the life that you're leading, right? " It's a kind of a marvelous thing that Shakespeare should have done that, right? Amazing! It's amazing. That's natural genius or something. Why should he do such a great comic character in that way?

[13:09] What talent is it? What is that to you? You know, unless it comes to sacked hours. Yeah, it's amazing Shakespeare. It's like like our greatest writer there, you know. Washington Irving, you know, says, you know, at the end of his life to his nephew there, right? Kind of idle for us to claim anything for our thing, you know. Shakespeare said it all, right?

[13:39] Okay, so let's go to Article Four here now. To the fourth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that pleasure is not the measure or rule of good and bad moral.

[13:56] We're going to find out it on what sense it is, right? But now we're just going to see why it can't be. For all things are measured by the first of their kind, as is said in the tenth book of what?

[14:12] Yeah, Metaphysics. But pleasure is not first in the genus of moral things, huh? But there go before it both love and desire. Therefore, it is not the rule of goodness and badness in moral matters.

[14:41] As you know from your study of before and after, right? Something can be before something else, and vice versa, in different senses of before, right? Okay.

[14:59] So wine might be better than grape juice, but grape juice comes before in time, right? And bread might be better than flour, right? Huh? But flour comes before time, right? So.

[15:16] Moreover, a measure and a rule must be what uniform, huh? And therefore, the motion which seems to be most uniform is the measure and rule of other motions, as is said in the tenth book of metaphysics. So, for the most part, people measure things by the sun, right? Seems to be kind of regular going around, so.

[15:38] But pleasure is various, huh? And of many kinds, when some of them are good and some are bad, right? Now, therefore, pleasure cannot be the measure and rule of moral things. It has to be something firm and fixed, you know.

[15:59] Moreover, a more certain judgment is taken of the effect through its cause. In the reverse, but the goodness or badness of an operation is a cause of the goodness or badness of the pleasure, because good pleasures are those which follow good doings, good operations. Bad, bad. Okay. So the pleasure I take in torturing you is what a bad pleasure, right? Because torturing you is a bad act, right?

[16:33] But the pleasure I take in understanding God is a good pleasure, because understanding God is a good activity, right? Even understanding the square, right, and the circle, the triangle, right, is a good thing, right? And so I take pleasure in understanding the square and the circle. So that's good pleasure, right?

[17:01] But against this is what Augustine says upon Psalm seven, that God is what scrutinizing the hearts and the what kidneys, yeah. For the end of care and thought is the pleasure to which one tries to arrive. And the philosopher says in the seventh book of the Ethics that pleasure is the what principal end, right, which looking towards each one, what?

[17:37] This one bad. This one bad. We say simply, right? Okay. Now, I think objections are very good because they're showing you the way not to understand the way in which pleasure is a measure. I answer. It should be said. He says that the goodness or badness, moral goodness or badness, chiefly consists in the will, right?

[18:11] But whether the will is good or bad, most of all is known from the end. Now that is had for an end in which the will finds rest.

[18:26] Now the rest of the will and of any desiring power in the good is called what pleasure. And therefore, according to the pleasure of the human will, is especially judged a man to be good or bad. For he is good and virtuous who rejoices in the works of what virtue, seeing justice done, right? Okay. Or rejoicing in the courageous act of a soldier, so. But the bad man is the one who rejoices in what?

[19:02] Yeah. Okay. Like Aaron there in Shakespeare's play, right? Joices in doing something evil, right? But the pleasures of the sense appetite, right, are not the rule of the goodness or badness that is moral, right?

[19:26] For food, communiter, is pleasant to what? Sense appetite. According to sense appetite, both to the good and to the bad, right? But the will of the good delights in them when they are what? In agreement with reason, right? Which the will of the bad does not care about. Okay. Now the first objection was saying you measure something by what is first, huh? Well, first, like Before has more than one sense, right?

[20:03] So he says to the first. Therefore, it should be said that love and desire are before pleasure in the road of generation. They're generated first, right?

[20:17] But pleasure is before, according to the notion of a what? End, which in operable things and actions has the definition of a beginning, right? From which most of all is taken judgment, right? Just as from a rule or measure, right? Just like the grape juice there is for the sake of the wine, right? And the flour is for the sake of the bread, right?

[20:50] Okay. So notice Thomas is touching upon the fact that they're what prior, which is the Latin word for before, right? In a different way, right? In the way in which pleasure is before is what? More the way of judging, because according to the ratio of an end, right? Judge things most of all by your end, by your intention, right? Okay.

[21:21] To the second, it should be said. This is the one saying wasn't pleasure variable? Well, it is, but every pleasure in this is uniform. That it is a what? A rest in some good, right? And according to this, is able to be a rule or a what? Measure. For he is good whose will rests in a true good, and he is bad whose will rests in something bad.

[21:59] So Hitler Hitler's will was resting in the domination of the Jews, right? Okay, so that was a bad will. Okay. Now to the third one. To the third, it should be said that pleasure perfects operation in the manner of an end, right? For that is not able to be a what? An operation that is perfectly or completely good unless there be what? Pleasure, delight in the good, right?

[22:40] For the goodness of a thing depends upon its end, and thus, in some way, the goodness of pleasure is a cause of goodness in the operation. It's kind of an added thing to it, right? Perfects it like Aristotle said, beauty perfects youth.

[22:58] So now we turn the page, and what do we meet? Sadness, huh? Or pain, right? Now let's stop for a second here and just a little bit about Thomas's order here, right?

[23:21] He first talked about love, right? Huh? And then what did he talk about after love? Desire. We talked about hate. Hate, yeah. Then he talked about desire, right? Huh? And then he talked about pleasure. And now he's going to talk about pain. Okay. Now,

[23:52] which is closer to to love, right? Hate or desire? Desire. desire? So why should he talk about hate after love rather than talking about desire immediately after love, right? Or why should the consideration of hate be closer to the consideration of love than the consideration of desire or of what? Pleasure, right?

[24:22] You can know things through opposites. Yeah, yeah. Because the thing that goes back to Plato, right? Huh? Aristotle and Plato are famous for saying that there's the same knowledge of what? Opposites, right? Huh? So when you take up the the virtues, say, and the vices, right? Huh?

[24:46] Like Thomas does in the Secunda Secunda, Secundae, right? Um, does he take up the virtues first and then takes up the vices? So what the virtues are aren't they closer to each other because they're all good, right? And the vices and things along together because they're all bad, right? Or does it make sense to talk about the what? This virtue and the vices opposed to this virtue, and then talk about this virtue, right?

[25:14] You know, so when you talk about courage, you talk about cowardice and foolhardiness, right? And then when you go on and talk about temperance, then you talk about intemperance or you know,

[25:29] don't even have a name as Aristotle since or the other vice. We call it puritanism, you know, puritanism or something like that. And back in the puritans,

[25:39] you could be you know, could be in danger of kissing a girl or something, right? And and so on, you know, to each virtue you take up the vices they're opposed to, right? Because in terms of knowing, one opposite is closer to knowing its opposite, right? Even more so than what is the same knowledge of cause and effect is not as much right, but you go from love to desire, you know, to pleasure.

[26:14] Right? If you invite me to your house and serve me salmon, I will be sad or in pain. Right? But why? Because I hate salmon. Right? So this connection between you know my hate and my my sadness in this case, right? But it's connection of cause and effect, right?

[26:42] But now if you serve me filet mignon, I'm going to be grateful. But in terms of knowing love and hate, one helps you to know the other. It's kind of interesting, right?

[26:58] I think Aristotle does a Nicomachean Ethics, right? Does he take up the virtue and the vices opposed to it, right? The same thing Thomas does in the Secunda Secundae right? But here now with the passions, he seems to do that, right? So he took up love and then hate, and he took up desire. He didn't take up the opposite of desire, but that's important. And now he's taking up he's just taking up pleasure, joy, and now he takes up sadness or pain, right?

[27:32] The same knowledge of what opposites, right? I told you about this kind of a fresh student there we had in California, there where he's kidding us philosophers. You know, we shouldn't be teaching but ethics because at the same time you learn how to be bad as well as to be good, right? Since people are inclined to be bad, you're teaching them how to be bad. We had fun at that.

[28:10] And you know Aristotle has this problem. He raises a question there in the book of the rhetoric, right? Because the rhetorician by his art knows how to persuade and how to what this way, yeah, yeah. And so isn't there a moral problem there about teaching this art, right?

[28:32] So Aristotle explain how to handle that. So I'm just a little worried here about the order here that Thomas has. I suppose he does things in orderly way because he's got a good reason.

[28:58] I fell into my bad habits, I was telling the father before class. There, starting to pick up the Summa Contra Gentiles again. you know. and reading things. It's marvelous the order he has there, you know, just in the in the prologue chapters there. Absolutely amazing. How many times I see this, you know, I just kind of wonder at the the order that he has there.

[29:23] Then we're not to consider about what pain and dolor I guess, and tristitia right? Remember, my brother Richard married a girl named Dolores. I can help fund this.

[29:44] You thought you were sad before. These fiery Italiano, you know. I said, "Put a stiletto in you if you're ever unfaithful." Don't do myself that.

[30:11] And about this, first we're not to consider about sadness or pain by itself. Secundum se, translated by itself. Secondly, about its causes. Third, about its effects. So we saw something like that when he talked about what love, and we talked about what pleasure, right? It's a beautiful way of

[30:38] dividing and ordering your consideration, right? But then he adds some things that are kind of special here. Fourth, about its remedies. They don't look exactly for remedies for pleasure, right, or joy, right? But for sadness, yeah.

[30:59] And then, interesting enough, about the goodness, its goodness and badness, or badness. That's interesting, Thomas. What a rich mind he had, huh? Amazing guy. Now

[31:17] about the first eight things are asked. I'm sure you've asked all these yourself sometime in your life, huh? First, whether what pain is a passion of the what soul. Secondly, whether sadness is the same as pain. And see, he asks the same question about joy and pleasure, right? Is joy the same thing as pleasure, right? But it's kind of easier to consider whether pain is the same thing as sadness, right?

[31:56] Because you might suspect sadness. And joy are more spiritual, right? And pain and pleasure are more what bodily, yeah, have the sense of touch and so on. But they're used to some extent interchangeably, right? But they're not all together. you know, perfectly synonyms, huh?

[32:26] Third, whether sadness or pain is contrary to what pleasure? Interesting. you should ask that, right? huh? Because we were saying that's the reason why he considers these two next to each other.

[32:45] Fourth, whether every sadness is contrary to every what pleasure? Fifth, whether to the pleasure of contemplation, there is some sadness contrary, right? Let's tell. This apocryphal story of Thomas having to have some, you know, medical operation, you know, and you know, there's not any painkillers in those days and so on, you know. So get him thinking about something, until even if you're aware of what we're doing, you know, this is one of the things, you know, exaggeration about Thomas's concentration, you know.

[33:30] Remember Caseric, my old teacher there, undergraduate there, describing being in the same room with De Koninck when he was studying, you know, and he he would stop reading until he finished the paragraph. I'm kind of driving Kassurek, you know, mad here, you know, to be in the same room with this guy, you know, the concentration of De Koninck, you know, kind of interesting. Talking about apnea, huh?

[33:55] Yeah. That's waking apnea. Yeah. So whether to the pleasure of contemplation, there is some sadness contrary. That's a very interesting question. Six. This is a very interesting article. Whether one more ought to flee what sadness than to desire pleasure, right? That's interesting.

[34:28] Seven. whether exterior pain is greater than interior pain? Huh? That's very interesting. Huh. And last but not least, about the species of sadness, huh?

[34:46] Well, when I when I was writing my thing on on comedy, right, and going into comparison of comedy and tragedy and so on, well, when Aristotle defines what tragedy, he puts the purgation of pity and fear, right, in its definition, right. So pity is a species of what sadness, right? Huh. Now sometimes you find these authors attributing melancholy, you know, to tragedy, and that's a mistake, I think.

[35:19] Melancholy is another kind of sadness, and it's not really the sadness that tragedy is arousing or purging, huh? But pity is, huh? So that's a big mistake, right? Then envy is another sadness, huh? That's a bad. that's a devilish.

[35:47] That's what the scripture says in the parable about the workers in the vineyard. The vineyard owner, if you often, it's just translated as when the owner of the vineyard says to those who are complaining, he'll say. Or you just um well envious or something like that but the the literal text says or is your eye evil because I'm good yeah wow that's really powerful that's more powerful to put it that way yeah yeah because that's the root word of envy, I don't want to see

[36:22] I can't stand to see that so my eye is evil that's interesting but interesting you know, the Greeks they're, you know I guess they they in their meetings there where they had the plays they'd have two or three tragedies and then they have comedy right yeah so although I don't think the proper effect of tragedy is melancholy because after seeing a number of tragedies you might get a little melancholy And comedy purges melancholy so they know what they do in those Greeks they're pretty pretty knowledgeable about these things okay to the first then one goes forward thus it seems that dolor which I guess means pain huh is not a passion of the soul right for no passion of the soul is in the what

[37:16] body but pain is able to be in the body right huh for Augustine says in the book on true what religion that the dolor the pain which is said to be of the what body right is a what sudden corruption of the safety of something right which using badly the soul what

[38:00] the idea of harm isn't it corruption therefore pain is not a passion of the soul right it's always struck me you know they they speak you know the emotions as passiones animae right and you got to be careful with that right because it doesn't mean that it's taking place in the what soul and not in the body right because emotions are something bodily as Aristotle argues in the beginning of the the De Anima so why do they call it passiones animae right huh

[38:47] well it means that they're what less bodily right than just what a way in which even a stone can be affected right huh it's a way that you could be affected only if you had a soul an animal soul right But anyway, got to be careful with that expression passion, anime. Moreover, every passion of the soul pertains to the desiring power, right?

[39:25] But pain does not pertain to desiring power, but more to the what? Apprehensive. For Augustine says in the book on the nature of the good that what it makes for pain in the body when the senses resisting a more powerful body, and therefore pain is not a what passion of the soul, right?

[39:55] If you any pain that the doctor says, you know, the feeling is a kind of what apprehensive power, right? It isn't isn't isn't pain there something sensitive touch, right?

[40:15] Moreover, every passion of the soul pertains to a what animal appetite, but no, it's animal, it counts as an animal, right? But pain does not pertain to the animal desire, but more to natural natural desire. For Augustine says in the book on Genesis to the letter, unless some good would remain in nature, right? Have no good lost, would there be what? So punishment. Yeah. Or pain and punishment.

[40:54] So some good would remain in nature. It's nature that is punishing you, so to speak, right? Making your punishment possible. Therefore, pain is not a passion of the soul.

[41:10] But against this is what Augustine says in the fourteenth book of the City of God, where he lays down pain to be among the passions of the soul, bringing in that of Virgil. This they what fear. This they desire. This they rejoice in. This they are pain, right? Okay.

[41:37] So we need to be illuminated Thomas huh enlightened, huh? Answer. It should be said that two things are required for what pleasure, right? To wit, the joining of the good to you, right? And secondly, the perception of this good, this joining. Okay. So, for I take pleasure in the music of Mozart. The music of Mozart, the sound of his music has to be joined to my ear, right?

[42:22] And I've got to perceive this union of this beautiful sound with my ear. Then I have pleasure and delight. I said, "How beautiful this is! Magnificent!"

[42:35] Going to go to the Boston Symphony Orchestra. Somebody's paying my way for it this Friday. They're going to play Mozart's Jupiter Symphony. Ooh. Yeah. And remember, finishing an exam with De Koninck conversation with him. I said, "Do you think the Jupiter Symphony is a representation of magnanimity?" And he says, "Probably right." There he says. Aristotle, interesting enough, in the eighth book of the Politics he talks about music.

[43:07] He says it's a likeness not only of the emotions, but of the what virtues, huh? And you think he means the virtues are concerned with the what, with the emotions, right? Okay. So when I was a little boy, used to always try to find the march and read it, but ever since the march is a what likeness of what courage, right? You know. Well, the Jupiter Symphony is a likeness of what?

[43:37] How did he get the name Jupiter? You know, English gave that name, nickname, right? It's a likeness of the virtue of magnanimity. I think the thirty-six Symphony too is the Linz Symphony is a likeness of magnanimity. For why I try to pretend that the the Linz was philotimia the lesser virtue, considering the honors, and then magnanimity is Jupiter, but I think both of them are right. I always remember the first time I heard the thirty-six Symphony is at the Saint Paul Public Library, they had a music room where you could go listen to these things.

[44:12] It was one of these days where the beautiful blue sky, you know, these puffy, you know, powerful-looking things, and he had the beginning opening of the thirty-six Symphony, and as one critic said, you know, if all that had survived of Mozart was the beginning of the thirty-six Symphony, it would be enough to establish his greatness. It's that impressive, you know, huh? I mean, just just magnificent.

[44:35] I used to have. I remember, you know, first, you know, thinking about music, and so I had a a debate with my brother Richard there, you know, which was greater, Mozart's piano concertos or his symphonies, right? And I was arguing, kind of, from my influence of the you know the Poetics of Aristotle that the piano concertos were better, right? Because when Aristotle talks about, say, the plays, right, he says that the plot is the soul of tragedy, right?

[45:07] That it's higher than the character, right? Okay. We have more of a plot in the what in the concertos than you do in the symphonies, right? And you have that at the beginning of Linn, right? In in and especially like a concerto like the twenty-third piano concerto on A or the twentyth concerto, twenty-seventh, and so on. And actually, I don't know what happened to me, but now you know the the plot of these things, you know, and so on.

[45:41] And used to show it to Father Baumgartner there at the seminary. You know, he was impressed with that. So Richard was saying, "Oh, yeah, but that's you know, plot and the emotions is kind of a not worthy thing, right? " And and of course the the symphonies, you know, are more noble, you know, huh? You know, the Jupiter Symphony and the so on and. But I was kind of influenced too much by the poetics, you know.

[46:06] Maybe thinking too much along the lines of drama, right? Huh? Where the character is not as the soul, like the like the plot, right? But now I I come around to my brother Rich's position, right? That the symphonies are higher, right? Huh? And certainly in terms of moral education, Aristotle talks about in the book of the Baltics, the symphonies are more, you know. I mean, to give you a love of these virtues that you represent, you know, divested, Mozart.

[46:34] But in in a sense, the you know Aristotle says the magnanimous man does great things and all the virtues, right? So it's a very great virtue, magnanimity, but still a virtue that is concerned with the emotions, right? Which is what music can represent, right? Music can represent. I don't think justice very well or or foresight, right? But it can represent courage and it can represent temperance and magnanimity.

[46:58] But seems like magnanimity would be the greatest that you could represent. And this is what you have in Mozart's thirty sixth and his forty first, huh? And they're both in the key of what?

[47:12] C major. C major. Yeah. Why the Prague symphonies in the D major? That's more representing what courage, huh? And the forty something crisis, C major, but C major. But you get kind of the key, you know, sense of Mozart's keys, right? Huh? You know, Mozart and the significance the keys have for him, right? So some keys are more to represent the irascible, right? And others to represent the what?

[47:48] Yeah. So C C and D are a little more. I mean, I don't say this absolutely because this time everything, but they're more for the irascible, right? And and B flat or G major, something, you know, more towards the irascible, right? E flat is a little more in between, you know. But Mozart's real understanding of the the keys, you know, it's a very subtle man, right? The operas, you know, written the key too, huh?

[48:17] In the beginning, built in harmonically, and in size, probably beginning built in all the way down to the to the last thing, huh? But I mean, it's not by chance that Don Giovanni say or Maria Figaro is in D major, right? But Così fan tutte is in C major, huh? Beautiful.

[48:39] Okay. Carried away thinking about it. Mozart. I told you, Tabby, he kind of was classy, and he mentioned Mozart and Bach together, right? So I caught him after class. I said, I know you you studied in class. You mentioned Mozart and Bach together. So would you put them? Equal, and the De Koninck says, oh no, Mozart's a separated substance. It's like you call Thomas the angelic doctor so he said, "you can separate, you know."

[49:16] Yeah. But when I read about the Kynig's life, I think as a younger man, he was he was attracted to Bach, you know. Okay, so also he says for pain, two things are what required, right? One, the joining of something bad, right?

[49:42] And it's bad because what? For that reason, it's bad because it lacks some what good that should have, right? And certainly the perception of this conjunction, right? So as in the restaurant there with Warren Murray there, you know, and the playing this awful background music. Once, let's get out of here. You get this awful sound, and it's joined to your ear, right? And now you're trying to carry a conversation with what it is, and you perceive that sound, you know, Or you, can do what Father Valais did there?

[50:16] You know, he sent the Christmas machine. They're playing, I mean, it was a live thing. He sends up in some money to have him stop playing. Not request, request. It's a usual request, you know. Stop playing. Which is salt of enough? You can then you turn the stuff.

[50:41] Now, whatever is joined, if it does not have, with regard to that which it is joined, the aspect of something good or bad, right, cannot cause what? Cause hunger and pain. Yeah. Yeah. So you sniff the wine, then you taste it,

[51:03] and your pleasure, right, because you perceive the union of something that is suitable to the tongue, right? From which it is clear that something under the aspect of good or bad is an object of what pleasure and what pain.

[51:24] For good and bad, as such, right, are the objects of desiring power. So good is to the appetite, bad, but true and false are to reason, right?

[51:42] Whence it is clear that what pleasure and pain pertain to the what desiring power, right? Now he says every appetitive motion, right. Or inclination following upon what apprehension as opposed to natural desire, right? So the the guy who studies the plant might say this plant wants a lot of sun, or this plant wants a lot of food, right? Or broccoli is a big feeder. Did I read the book?

[52:24] Can feed broccoli to make a video, you know thing. Okay. But everyone that follows upon some knowing, some grasping, right? It's wonderful what Tom uses that word, right? So should translate the word by apprehension or by grasping. I think grasping. It pertains either to the intellectual desiring power or to the sense desiring power, right?

[52:55] For the what inclination of a natural desire does not follow the apprehension of the knowing. Of the one desiring, but of another who is made that nature, right?

[53:13] When sense pleasure and pain presuppose in the same subject sense or some grasping, right? Some knowing is manifest that pain, just as pleasure, is both in the what? Intellectual, the understanding desire, yeah, or the sense desire, right? Now, every motion of the sense appetite is said to be what? A passion, right? As said above, and especially those which what? Sound to be in some defect, right? Okay.

[53:55] Because passio means what? Originally suffering, right? The passion of our Lord, right? Means the suffering of our Lord, right? And as Aristotle, you know, you can see in the De Anima, he carries the word suffering over to what?

[54:14] To the to the senses, right? But you drop off the idea of it being what? You're receiving something that's not destructive, but is perfecting the thing. And then he carries it over finally to what? Understanding. Understanding is going on. Now the English word suffering, of course, is stuck on its first meaning, right? And you know, I always made a joke about the guy who was teaching, you know, philosophy there out west, and he says to me, you know, I look down at the students, and they seem to have a face.

[54:46] Why are you doing this to me, you know? Because they're they're suffering, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But the student should suffer in the in the Greek sense, right? You know, he should undergo something, right, from from the teacher acting upon his mind, right? And but he should act upon the mind in a way that is what good for the mind, huh? Okay, the same with music. Mozart acts upon the you know the emotions in a way that's good for them, right?

[55:17] Okay. That's why he says quod ... in defectum sonat, right? That because the word passio originally has a sense of something bad, right? Now I translate passio sometimes, but undergoing, right? You know, I think undergoing has originally a bad sense, right? So we say about someone he's undergone a lot, right? There's been good things. Okay.

[55:52] But you sit in the class of Monsignor Dionne, and you undergo something, right? Voyez-vous, you know. Someone's too much, you know. It's one case. Makes me nervous. Just yeah, but he's so delighted, but he's he's he's bringing out you know. Get you, get you.

[56:23] That's kind of marvelous, you know. Deanna, would take a little text that you were maybe, familiar with in some way, you know. But you would see so much in it that you didn't see, you know. Same with De Koninck you know the first time I went up there, you know. De Koninck was always teaching the first year students either the first book of the physics or the second book, right?

[56:41] So you get them in your first year or certain. And he was teaching the first book of the physics, and I, of course, have read that book a million times, Thomas's commentary, and I proofread, you know, Kasurik's translation of the Thomas's commentary. So I said, "This is something I know or I'm familiar with. This text. Let's see if you can see anything that I that I think in my own mind, you know, huh?

[57:00] " You know, you know, I always describe this being a quantum leap in understanding of the text with De Koninck, you know, just amazing those guys. But

[57:14] been teaching that since 1935. De Koninck says I still see something new every time I go through there, right? See that. Okay. Whence pain, according as is in the sense appetite, most properly is said to be a passion of the soul.

[57:40] Just as what bodily harmings, right, listing, are properly said to be passions of the body, right? But you know, in the third book, say of the of the of the physics, right, Aristotle takes up motion, right, and then he takes up acting upon undergoing, right, and they don't necessarily have the bad sense there, right, but there is the active and the passive sense there.

[58:10] But here he says, "What molestiae, right? " This the bad. Whence Augustine says in the 14th book of the City of God that pain especially is what called a sickness, right? You're sick, we say, huh?

[58:36] Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that pain is said to be of the body because the cause of the pain is in the body, right? Huh? As when we suffer something, what harmful to the body, huh? But the emotion of what pain is always in the soul because the body cannot what. Sorrow without the soul, sorrowing. Augustine says, right?

[59:08] Now we don't care for that. Now he says, "motus doloris semper est in anima." I don't think he means in the soul alone, right? By itself,

[59:17] it's not really until you get to understanding and willing that you have an activity of the soul that is not in the body. And Scarty was poking the guy's head, you know. What do you imagine? I imagine steak. I imagine chocolate or something, you know. But he couldn't get he said, and imagine an active will, He couldn't, you know, he couldn't have any active will when he had his head.

[59:41] So the Canadian doctor concludes, you know, that the will was not in in the brain. It wasn't there, you know. Must be some other part of the body.

[59:53] No, it's an experiential, right? Yeah. That was in what? So when your soul separates from your body, your will is said in Scripture to fall towards God or some other way, and then that's where it lays for the rest of. eternity. Yeah?

[1:00:18] Okay. to the second, huh? that pain is said to be of the sense, not because it is an active sense power that's a pain of what sensing, right? But because it is required for bodily what pain that it perceives the fact that this pin is not suitable to you, right? It's being stuck in you, right? Just as what it's required for what pleasure, right? There has to be the union of a good or a bad thing for pleasure or pain, right?

[1:00:48] And the perception of this union of something good or bad, right? To third, it should be said that pain or sadness over the loss of some good demonstrates the goodness of nature, right? Not because pain is a act of natural desire, but because nature desires something as good, huh? Which, when it is what sense to be taken away, there follows what the passion of pain or sadness in the sense appetite.

[1:01:27] So when the electricity goes off and Mozart stops, oh, endless sorrow. Okay, should we take a break or should we go on.