Prima Secundae
90. Sadness and Pain: How They Differ, Why Pain Is Contrary to Pleasure, and Whether Every Sadness Opposes Every Pleasure
Class of 2012-11-08
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/090-sadness-and-pain-how-they-differ-why-pain-is-contrary-to/

[0:00] Speak of the devil, as they say. the second one goes forward. Thus, it seems that sadness is not dolor or pain, right? For Augustine says in the fourteenth book on the City of God that pain is said to be in the what in bodies, huh? But sadness is said more in the soul, right? Okay, so I think that is reflected in in even our own daily speech, right?

[0:43] Now, sadness is more what spiritual, we'd say, right? Now, than pain. Okay, so if there somebody's taking a pin in you or you're getting a shot, you know it's painful, but sadness is something more spiritual. to cause, Also, moreover, pain is not except about a present evil, right? Okay,

[1:16] but sadness can be about the past, right? And about the what future, right? For penance is sadness about the past, huh? And anxiety about the future, right? Therefore, sadness differs altogether from what pain, huh?

[1:42] Moreover, pain does not seem to follow upon except the sense of what touch, huh? But sadness can what follow from all the senses, huh? Therefore, sadness is not what pain, but has itself in in many many things, huh? But against this is what the apostle, that Saint Paul, right? That's is called the apostle by antonomasia, Ian Peter, huh? So I was married on the feast of Peter and Paul, huh?

[2:18] So we have attachment to that, apart from my attachment to antonomasia And against this, is, what the apostle says to, Epistle to Romans, chapter nine. Tristitia est mihi magna, there is what great sadness in me, and continual what pain in my heart, huh? For the same using what sadness and pain as if he's kind of using the synonyms almost, right?

[2:55] I answer it should be said that pleasure and Pain are able to be caused from a twofold what apprehension or grasping, to wit, from the grasping of the exterior sense, and from the interior grasping, either of the understanding or of the what imagination.

[3:28] Now there is a likeness between the intellect and the imagination, and they both know objects in the absence of them, right? And you know, when you think about something, you form a thought of it, right? And when you imagine something, you form an image, right? Now in English, you know, when you speak of an idea, people are sometimes confused as whether they're talking about a thought or a what?

[3:54] Yeah. And you know, if you read the English empiricists, you know they kind of mix up, you know, thought and image under the word idea, right? And people say an idea, you know. He's a man of ideas. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So I try to say in class. I say if the philosopher says I have an idea, it should be a thought, right? But the girl says you don't get ideas.

[4:24] He's probably talking about images, right? You don't get any ideas. Yeah. I thought that they crossed the idea a little bit, what the difference was. But the inward grasping extends to more things than the what outside, huh? In that whatever things fall under the outside grasping, huh, the exterior grasping, fall also under the what? Inside. But not the reverse, right?

[5:01] Only therefore that pleasure which is caused from an inward grasping is named what joy, right? As has been said above, and likewise that only that what pain which is caused from an interior grasping is called what sadness, huh? And thus that pleasure which is caused from an outward apprehension is named what pleasure, but not what joy. Joy.

[5:46] Thus that pain which is caused, so also that pain which is caused from a what outward grasping is named what pain, not however what sadness.

[6:04] Thus, therefore, sadness is a certain what species of pain, right? Huh? Just as joy, pleasure, right? I don't know if he always uses the words that way, but he's saying here that pain and pleasure are more universal, right? And the pain or pleasure that's in the body keeps that name, pain or pleasure, and the other one that's more inward gets the name sadness in one case, enjoy another case, right?

[6:34] Huh? Okay. So you know, Augustine says, "Beatitudo is gaudium de veritate," right? Huh? He didn't say "delectatio," although he could say that sometimes. You know, Scripture speaks of pleasure and deficiency, right? But could also be called joy, right? And you're getting better, right? C. S. Lewis' book, surprised by joy. It's not the sensual pleasure that is covering, you know, but but something more spiritual, right? Surprised by joy, you know, and it's it's well said, huh?

[7:11] So it's interesting that Thomas takes pain and pleasure. There is more universal, right? Huh? Meaning the words, right? It's kind of interesting, huh? So what did

[7:27] you have from the selection? You know, was it pain or sadness? Say. You'd say both, right? Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said, huh? The text of Augustine there: "The dolor in corporibus dicitur right That pain is said in what bodily things? To the first, therefore, it should be said that Augustine speaks there as regards the use of the what wording, yeah? Because pain magis usitatur is more used, right?

[8:20] In bodily what pains, right? Which are more known than in what spiritual what pains, right? Huh? Okay. To the second, it should be said, huh? That the outward sense does not perceive except what is here and now, what is present, right?

[9:02] But the knowing the interior knowing power can precede the present, but also the past and the future, right? And therefore, sadness, which names more the interior, right, pain, can be about the present and the past and the future.

[9:23] But bodily pain, which follows the grasping of the exterior sense, cannot be except about the what present. So, notice how Thomas is kind of judicious there in the way he replies that said objection, right? Because there's something to be said for it, right? The basis for it, right? Okay, now the thing about the sense of touch,

[10:13] that the sensibles of the touch, right, the object of the touch, are painful, not only in so far as they are disproportioned to the grasping power, to the knowing power, but also in so far as they are contrary to our what nature. They're destructive of our nature, right? Heat a man up too much, you cool him down too much, you kill him, right?

[10:43] But the sensibles of the other senses can be what disproportioned to the grasping power to the grasping power, but not, however, contrary to nature, except in order to the sensibles of what touch.

[11:05] Now, it's very interesting what he says here. Whence man alone, who is an animal perfect in knowledge, not as far as the angels, right, but as far as the other animals, right, he delights in the sensible objects of the other senses by themselves, like Berquist, rejoices in the sound of Mozart's music, right?

[11:30] But other animals do not delight in them except in so far as they refer to what the sense of touch. Yeah. Like your cat. Yeah. Then grasp Mozart. Yeah, so he took them delight in Mozart as far as I could see, but if I had wrapped a little sandwich meat, you know, he could hear that, you know.

[11:51] When I was a boy, we had the the cat stay out in the garage, you know, in the garage, separated from the house, you know, by you know, you know, longer than this, you know, on the sidewalk there, you know, and

[12:04] when you opened the door in the morning, the cat would jump out of the garage and went up the the steps to the house. So the idea was, could you open the door so silently, you know, that the cat would not hear it, you know? And we never could do it just like that, you know. Training for that that sort of thing, you know. I need to train that little scratch, you know, not because he rejoices in that sound of the scratch, but maybe it's a mouse or something, you know.

[12:29] That's just like Lucy. Every every morning I come through to get a cup of coffee. Every single morning she's waiting right there, unless she's outside. But if she's inside, waiting right there for me to come in, as soon as I came, meow. First thing. And

[12:51] that's why the the what the the pleasure that you take in the what. Painting or in the music or something like that is kind of raising us above the animals, right? The pleasures that are what, like Aristotle says, right? The pleasures that are properly what, human, right? So the pleasures of eating steak or pork, you know, I shared that with Tabitha, right? She enjoyed that, right? But I couldn't share with her the pleasure of hearing Mozart, you know.

[13:22] And but the pleasure of understanding, I shared that with the angels, right? But they have that pleasure more than me. Okay. And therefore, about the sensibles of the other senses,

[13:54] Pain is not said to be. it was not said to be what pain. Pain, according as it is contrary to what natural pleasure, but more sadness, which is contrary to to animal joy, right?

[14:11] Thus, therefore, if pain is taken for bodily pain, right, which is more customary, right, then ex opposito, right, divided against sadness, right, according to the distinction of inward and outward, what grasping, right?

[14:34] Although as regards objects, pleasure extends to more things than what pain. If, however, pain is taken more generally, then pain is the genus of what sadness has been said. I've talked about that before. That way of naming things, right? Where sometimes the same name is given to the genus and to one of the what species? I was talking to students last night. There, we're talking about the fallacy of equivocation, right?

[15:10] On what equivocation is? But I was talking about the the word that Aristotle uses for equivocal, right, or equivocation. You have it in the Categories, right, as well as in the Book on Sophistical Refutations, and the Greek word is homonymia, right? if you look it up in the Greek dictionary. homonymia, it's got the word onoma in there, you know, and homo, which means what like, so or same, and so they give us kind of the meaning of homonymia, having the same name, right?

[15:46] Okay. So Aristotle is distinguishing in the beginning the categories between the equivocal name and the what. The univocal name, right? But but the name in Greek for equivocal is having the same name. So I asked the students. I said last night, but doesn't in the case of the univocal name, don't they have the same name? See? So why is the phrase "have the same name," which in Greek is one word run together, why is that used for equivocal?

[16:23] Right? That they both have the same name. Aristotle's example there of an equivocal name is when the word "man" is said of you and that thing over in the wall. Right? It's a man, you know, or if you had a statue of a man here, you know. Well, it's not a man in the same what? Yeah, yeah. And

[16:48] why, if animals are the dog and cat, it's, univocal, right? They're an animal in the same sense of the word animal, right? Well, you could say you know that in both equivocal and univocal name, you have the same name, right?

[17:07] But now if you divide having the same name, equivocally and having the same name univocally, why does equivocal keep that same phrase having the same name?

[17:23] Usually, no one takes a different name and something similar. Yeah, yeah. But in the text, in the categories, Aristotle says things are named equivocally when they have the name only, right? Okay. You kind of say that too, but the logos tes ousias, the definition of what it is, is not the same, right? So that that's all they have is the same name, right? So they keep that phrase "have the same name," and then the other one gets what a new name because they have in addition, right?

[18:05] Having the same name, they have the same what meaning, right? Okay. But then, what word does Aristotle use for univocal? We got to be careful because the word that has more than one sense, it's synonyma, right? We get the word synonym right? But Aristotle is not using it in the sense of synonym right? Because synonym means you have what two words that mean the same thing, right?

[18:30] And he talks about synonyms in that sense in the in the poetics, right? He talks about language, right? But what does the word synonyma mean, right? Now you get the word onoma in there, but it means in a sense named together, right? That's kind of the meaning of it. Well. When things are named univocally, they're named together, right? Huh? So I say, you know, a man, a man, a man, right?

[19:02] I don't name one of you before the other. I name you together, man, right? I look at you two and say, you kind of, you know, you're all, you know, you're all two footed. You're all biped, you know, and so on, right? And so you're named together, biped, right? Well, in the case of an equivocal one, it's either equivocal by chance, and then you're not named together, right?

[19:25] So one of my students last night was was named Richard, and my oldest brother's named Richard, right? Now were they named Richard together? So so we looked at him and said, "Wait, you want to see something together? No, no. When our brother Richard was named Richard, and this guy was named Richard, right? You know, quite independent, right? Huh? So there was a equivocal by what chance, right?

[19:54] They're both named Richard, right? Huh? But if you have a name that's equivocal by reason, then there's an order among The names, right? And so the name is placed upon one thing first, and then carried over and placed upon a second thing. by reason of some connection with the first, right? There's some likeness to it, there's a ratio to it, or something like that. And and so they're not named together, right?

[20:17] So it's kind of interesting the way Aristotle names these things, right? Some things are named together. See, some things have the same name. That could be very confusing if you don't understand the fact that we do that all the time, right? Right.

[20:41] So my mother didn't want me to call man an animal, right? I said he's not just an animal. He's an animal that has reason. Well, that's better, she said.

[20:54] So, yeah, something of this problem here with pain and what? Yeah, because sometimes pain is used in the broad sense, like a genus, right? For an interior or inward pain and an outward pain, right? But sometimes the outward pain keeps the name what? Pain, and the inward pain gets the new name, which is what sadness, right? Okay.

[21:28] Not sorrow. Sadness. Well, maybe sorrow too would be. Sorrow would be similar similar word. Sorrow, I think, is is. Now, of course, you serve me. You serve me. Yeah, Pain. Yeah. yeah. I'd probably say I'm pained. because you know it seems a more intense thing, you know, huh? But it's more known to us.

[21:58] So sometimes Thomas will, you know, distinguish pleasure and what joy in the same ways he does pain, sadness, right? But like this is more known this distinction, right, than that of pleasure and

[22:17] joy. Okay, let's go on to article three now. Is this a painful treatise? But in some sense of painful, it is what? It's full of pain, right? It's all about pain, right?

[22:47] But in other senses, it's causing pain. I hope not. But causing joy, right? So, so how can that painful thing cause pleasure, right? Insofar as the pain is truthful, to know truth about the pain is pleasure. Yeah, so it can be pleasant to learn about pain, right? But it's not pleasant to be caused. To the third, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that pain is not contrary to pleasure, huh?

[23:28] I'm surprised he should, you know, an article on this, huh? That was obvious, huh? For one of two contraries is not the cause of the other, right?

[23:46] But interesting, true per se, anyway, right? Gratianus. But sadness can be a cause of what pleasure? For it's said in Matthew five, "Blessed are those who what? Mourn. Yeah. Because they shall be what? Consoled. Therefore, they are not what? Contraria.

[24:19] Moreover, one of contraries does not name, denominate the other, right? But in some things, the what? Pain or sadness is pleasant, right? Huh? For Augustine says in the third book of Confessions that pain in what? Delights. Spectacles, huh? Delights, huh? Okay.

[24:47] So people enjoy crying at the tragedy, right? Huh? Have a good cry. And in the fourth book, Confessions, that weeping is a what bitter thing, right? Huh? He wept bitterly, right? Think Peter went out there, right? Bitterly. And nevertheless, sometimes it what delights, huh? Okay. Therefore, pain is not contrary to what pleasure, huh?

[25:22] Moreover, one of two contraries is not the matter of the other, because contraries are not able to be together. simul. But pain can be the matter of what pleasure. For Augustine says in the book on penance, always the one in penance is what pain, is sorrow, and he rejoices over his sorrow. Right? Huh?

[25:54] So I rejoice that I'm sad about my what sins? Huh? And the philosopher says in the ninth book of the Ethics that a converso, the bad man, what is sad about that that he what has been pleased? Right? Huh? He's lost that I guess. Therefore, pleasure and pain are not contraries. Huh?

[26:25] Those interesting objections on will get corresponding interesting distinctions. But against this is what Augustine says in the fourteenth book about the city of God. That laetitia, right? That's a name for some joy expanding like this, making you wide, right? Huh?

[26:51] The guy goes like this. Beautiful morning. The laetitia is the will in what the agreement or consent to, right? Huh? Of those things which you will, right? Huh? Sadness is the will in dissention from those things which we but don't want, huh? But to consent and to dissent are what contraries. Contraries. Therefore, Laetitia, joy, and justitia, sadness, are what contrary, right? Huh?

[27:31] What Thomas says. I answer. It should be said, as the philosopher says in the tenth book of the metaphysics. There's a long consideration of what contrariety there is. The book on the the one and the many, right? That contrariety is a difference secundum formum, in form, right? Now the form or species, huh, of a passion or emotion is taken from its what object or its end, yeah.

[28:10] When, since the objects of pleasure and of sadness or pain are what contrary. To it, a present good, right, and a what, present evil. It follows that pain and pleasure are what contrary, right?

[28:35] Desire and aversion are what the bonum and bonum, malum, what absent, right? Huh? Not there yet, right? So they're contrary because they're what objects are contrary, right?

[29:26] Now, to the first objection, nothing prevents one of two contraries to be the cause of the other. Per accidens So Aristotle, in the what chapter on cause, right, distinguishes between the cause per se and the cause per accidens. Thus, however, sadness can be what? Thus, sadness is able to be a cause of pleasure.

[30:05] In one way, in so far as what about the absence of something, right? Or of the what presence of its contrary makes one what seek more vehemently, more strongly, right? That in which he delights, right? Huh? Just as the one thirsty, huh, more vehemently seeks the pleasure of what drink, yeah, as a remedy against the sadness when she what undergoes, huh?

[30:56] In another way, in so far as from the great desire of the pleasure of something, right, one does not refuse someone to undergo, right, Sadnesses, right, They might arrive at that what? Yeah.

[31:18] And in both ways, the present what? Lictus? Is that pain or Mourning or something. Present struggle, I guess, huh? Leads one to the consolation of the future. What life?

[31:44] Because from this, that a man what mourns Mourns for his sins or for the delay of glory, he merits eternal consolation. Well, that must be what purgatory is like. huh? Delatio. Yeah. Delatio gloriae. huh? Likewise, also what someone merits it

[32:18] that from what this that in order to attain it, he does. Not refuse the labors and the difficulties you must sustain on account of it. huh

[32:35] So, when I was in high school, I was on the track team, and I'd go out with my friends and run eight miles in the hot sun. I didn't think about it. My mother said, "If I asked you to walk one mile to the store to get a loaf of bread, you'd tell me I was torturing you." I found more pleasure in being with my friends doing that than walking to the store to

[33:01] get a loaf of bread. Now, to second it should be said that pain itself can be what pleasant, right? Practicing that sounds very strange, right? Insofar as it has a what?

[33:22] Admiration wonder joined to it, yeah, as in spectacles, right? That's kind of interesting, huh? because you know Aristotle when he talks about tragedy, talks a little bit about what wonder, right?

[33:40] And isn't isn't the wonder that you have in tragedy connected with the fact that it's the downfall of a man who's in some eminence, right? He's a long way to what? Yeah.

[34:04] So the the person who is tragic must be in some kind of eminence there, and you don't you don't have somebody just a ordinary Joe, you know, starving there by the by the roadside because that doesn't arouse any wonder, right? But you know, Othello's in such happiness there with Desdemona, right? You know,

[34:28] or or you see what in Creon there, right? In Antigone, right? He loses everything, right? His son is terrible. What happens to him, right? But you know, call no man happy till he be dead, right? You know,

[34:49] Oedipus, you know, Whom all men call the great, you know, Oedipus. So we saw before that the wonder arouses, gives us pleasure, right? Don't people, you know, sometimes when they when they read these these these

[35:13] the paper and they see somebody down some crazy accident, you know, and so on, you know, Some wonder, you know, kind of unusual, you know.

[35:23] About ten cars, I guess, in Worcester. They're colliding today, you know, because it was a little slippery earlier, you know. I said I said to Rosie, "they probably voted for Obama.

[35:46] It wouldn't make a human interest story on the evening news, you know. Ten people who voted for Obama crashed. today. Okay. Um... Or, insofar as it makes for a what, recalling Recalling of a thing loved, right?

[36:15] Or, insofar as it makes one perceive the love of that of whose absence. Now, what's famous words in Romeo and Juliet that parting is such sweet sorrow, right? So sweet, you know, is the idea of being pleasant, right? Huh? So how can a sorrow be sweet?

[36:41] Mutual maybe Well, the sorrow you have in parting is a sign of the love you have for each other, right? Huh? You realize how much this person loves you, right? Huh? And therefore, you what that's pleasant to be loved, right? Huh? So you recognize how much this person loves you, right? Huh? You know, I always tell the story. You know, where I was going off to give a talk someplace, they're going to fly out of the Worcester there and go give a talk.

[37:12] And so, saying goodbye to the kids, you know, and so on. The boys, said, oh, I, see dad, you know, and so on. And they went off to the bus, and then my daughter was saying goodbye, and you could see she was fighting back, you know, breaking into tears, you know, and so on, and then finally she went off to the bus, but she got off the And so Chris, and I just said goodbye to my wife, and she says that's a hard act to follow, she said, you can see, how real you know, she's so so upset by my going, you know, and and I remember getting an airplane, you know, and she always said, get off this day.

[37:41] I remember playing you know, because you never know to get on the couch. see that poor little girl, you know, with her daddy being dead, you know, what a horrible thing it would be, And uh, but that's the idea, right? You know, when Romeo and Juliet parting or whatever it is, parting is such sweet sorrow, right? That the the

[37:58] it's protracted in a sense, right? It's not that the sorrow itself is pleasant, right? Because it's a sign of the love that they have for each other, right?

[38:12] Because it makes a recalling of a thing loved, right. Since love is what, delectabilis is delightful right pleasant, pleasing. That what. Sadness or pain and all the things. that you're talking about That follow from love, right? So you're sad when this person you love, is leaving you, right? In so far as in them one senses what love, they are what pleasant, right? Okay. So that's very interesting, isn't it?

[38:49] An account of this also pains, dolores and spectacula right? Spectacula. So that means you know plays, and things, of this sort, Are able, right, to be pleasant, right? In so far as in them is what. Sensed some love. Conceived towards those who are what. Um, remembered or presented, I guess. Yeah. In the spectacle. Yeah. As Augustine talked about that too, and I don't know if it's in the Confessions, but he talked about in some way the vanity of the people who spend an excessive amount of time with that, because especially with tragedy.

[39:33] Oh, they go and they weep and weep and weep over the tragedy, of the play they just saw, but they see the poor man on the street, they don't care. Yeah, yeah. That's kind of a weird They'll tell the story of the great tyrant going into the theater, you know, and he's gonna, you know, tears and he's gonna see that he was he was feeling sorry for this fictional character, you know, and he's you know cruel in real life, That'd be like it'd be like seeing seeing the communist Politburo or something, and they're watching some Shakespeare playing all weeping.

[40:03] You can see though, nevertheless, how this is nevertheless good for the tyrant, you know, to feel some kind of pity, even if it's produced by a tragedy or something. In this case, the moral effect of great fiction, right? Another communist. Somebody, what was that about? Stalin? I don't remember. Was it one of the communists They wanted to go into plays and have a good cry.

[40:39] And then then he go purge the politburo. That's inversion. Now, to the third, it should be said that the will and reason come back upon their own acts, right? In

[40:59] so far as these what acts of the will and the reason are taken under the notion of good and bad. good and bad, yeah. And in this way, sadness can be a what matter of what, Pleasure. Yeah, or a reverse.

[41:17] So I can rejoice that I'm sad over the election. We can rejoice with you. Yeah, yeah. Shows your will is right. Yeah, let's have a good cry. Yeah.

[41:33] I'm saddened by the rejoicing of the enemies. Yeah. And in this way, sadness can be the matter of pleasure or the reverse, right? Not per se, but per accidens so that's a great distinction there, per se and per accidens.

[42:01] Insofar as both are taken under the aspect of good or bad. That reminds me of that that great that great scene that's in the last part of The Lord of the Rings. I read when I read it in the book. I saw the third part of the movie, and I don't remember that they showed this, but when the city of Gondor is being attacked by all the.

[42:23] bad Bad guys, and then, unbeknownst to the bad guys, you know, the ships come up the river there, the corsairs of Umbar or wherever they are, and they thought they were there to help them, and they said this roar went up to the point of it, and oh, I remember just my heart sank when I read that. I said, I could imagine this rejoicing the Indian. No, no.

[42:46] Yeah, it's a great scene. So, we say to somebody, "You should be sad that you did that, right? " You know. But if a person regrets what they've done, you know, what they've done, right, then you might rejoice in that, right, that they are repentant of what they did. The Greeks, tend to call it repentance. or joy making sorrow.

[43:18] time for another article? Yeah, why don't we do one? Yeah, okay. Can't take home and then be sad, any of them? Okay. Okay. Whether every sadness is contrary to every what pleasure, right?

[43:53] Just as whiteness and blackness, white and black are contrary species of color, right? So pleasure and sadness are contrary species of the passions of the soul. But whiteness and blackness are universally opposed, right? Therefore, also pleasure and what sadness, huh? Moreover, medicines come about through contraries. But every pleasure is a medicine against every what sadness, huh? So the cops give the kid who's lost for home and crying because he wants to get home and give him an ice cream cone, right?

[44:36] Calm him down. That was the New York police all the time, right? They give the guy ice cream cone till they find his mother or wherever he's lost.

[44:46] As is clear through the philosopher in the eighth, seventh book of the Ethics, the discussion of pleasure and pain. There, therefore, every pleasure is what contrary to every what sadness, huh? Moreover, contraries are what things that impede one another, right? But every sadness impedes some pleasure, right? As is clear through that which is said in the tenth book of the Ethics. Therefore, every sadness is contrary to every what pleasure, right?

[45:20] But against this of contraries, there is not the same cause. But from the same habit, it goes forth that some rejoices about one thing and is sad about its what opposite. For from charity, it happens that one rejoices with those rejoicing and weeps with those weeping, as is said in Romans twelve fifteen right.

[45:48] Therefore, not every sadness is what contrary to every what pleasure right. I answer: It should be said that as is said in the tenth book of the Metaphysics, contrariety is the difference according to form. But a form is both what can be general and special right. Whence it happens that some contraries according to the form of the genus are are contrary according to the form of the genus as virtue and what vice.

[46:26] And according to the form of the what species as justice and what injustice right. But is cowardice and temperance opposed according to the species? Maybe according to the genus right. Ones of virtue, ones of vice. It ought to be considered, however, that some things are specified according to forms that are what absolute, as substances and what qualities. Some are specified by comparison to something outside as passions and motions receive their species from their ends or their objects.

[47:21] In those things, therefore, whose species are considered according to forms of absolute. It happens that what a species which are contained under what. Not to be contrary according to the what notion of species.

[47:48] Not, however, does it happen that they have some what affinity or agreement right to each other. For intemperance, and justice, which are in contrary genera, in virtue to it and what vice right. They are contrary in what because they belong to contrary genera, but they are not contrary to each other according to the notion of their own what species right. But they rather would be that intemperance is contrary to temperance right, injustice to injustice and like that.

[48:29] But do not have any what affinity or convenience towards each other, right? Agreement to each other. But in those things whose species are taken according to their relation to something extrinsic, it happens that the species of contrary genera not only are not contrary to each other, but also they have a certain what agreement and affinity to each other. In that, in the same way, they have themselves to contrary, right?

[49:08] It induces a what contrariety, just as to what approach to the white and to approach to the black has the notion of contrariety. But in a contrary way, to have oneself to contraries has itself the ratio of similitude as to withdraw from the white and to what exceed or approach to the black, right? To leave your vice and tend towards virtue, right? And this most of all appears in contradiction, which is the beginning of opposition.

[49:51] For an affirmation, negation of the same, this opposition consists, as in white and what not white. In the affirmation, however, of one opposite and the negation of the other, there is what tend to a agreement or similitude, as if I say black and not what not white. That's quite a lot of distinction. I just think about to absorb this here. I mean. Sorry that you got into this late town today.

[50:25] Huh? Maybe sad because of that, right? Are you even paying? Huh? This is quite a distinction here, you know. But sadness and pleasure, since they are what passions, are specified from their what objects, and because according to their genus they have contrariety, right? For one pertains to the pursuit, right, and the other to the flight, right? Which have themselves in the appetite, as Aristotle says, like affirmation, negation, reason, as is said in the sixth book of the Ethics, right?

[51:10] And therefore, pleasure—I mean, sadness and pleasure, which are about the same thing, have opposition to each other according to what species, huh? Sadness, however, and pleasure about diverse things. If these diverse things are not opposed, but simply what other right disparate, they do not have opposition to each other according to what notion. Yeah, but they are also disparate, right? Just as to be saddened about the death of a friend and to delight in contemplation, right?

[51:57] If, however, those diverse things are contrary, then pleasure and sadness not only do not have contrariety according to the ratio of species, but they also have what convenience and affinity, just as to rejoice in the good and to be what Sad sad. Yeah.

[52:22] Thomas says that error. is magna pars miseria right? Error is a great part of misery To the first, therefore, he answers the first objection that whiteness and blackness, being qualities, right, do not have their species from their relation to something exterior, as do pleasure and sadness. Therefore, there is not the same reason, right? That's a distinction that he he saw in the text.

[52:58] Now, to the second, it should be said that genus is taken from matter, as is clear in the eighth book of the metaphysics. That's the book on substance, according to its parts, matter and form, right? Now, an accident, in place of matter, is their subject. It is said, however, that pleasure and or pleasure and sadness or pain are contrary, according to their what genus, and therefore, in any what, yeah, there is a contrary disposition of the subject to the disposition that he has in any what pleasure.

[53:47] For in every pleasure, the appetite has itself as accepting that which it has. In every sadness, it has itself as fleeing from it. And therefore, on the side of the subject, every pleasure is a medicine against every what sadness, and every sadness is impeding some what pleasure. But especially when the pleasure is contrary to the what sadness, according to what? yeah. What does Hell say about Prince Hell?

[54:25] You know, he's you know lost his horse and he's larding the lean earth as he walks along. He says, you know, if it's not for laughing, I should pity him.

[54:41] Well, laughing is a kind of joy, and pity is a kind of sadness, right? Not for laughing. So he'd be laughing at some of these predicaments, you know, and they want us to get serious about it, you know.

[54:54] Once is clear the solution to the third, or in another way, it should be said that though not every sadness is contrary to every pleasure, secundum speciem, right, huh? Nevertheless, as far as their effect, they are contrary, right, huh? For from one of them is strengthened the animal nature, from the other, in the way it's molested, right? You can look at this article again if you want to.

[55:20] It's kind of interesting. Pretty heavy on a rainy day. At the end of the day, a lot.