Prima Secundae
93. Summa I-II q.35 a.7-8: Is Inner Sorrow Greater Than Bodily Pain? The Four Species of Sadness
Class of 2012-11-29
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/093-summa-i-ii-q-35-a-7-8-is-inner-sorrow-greater-than-bodily/

[0:00] Name of the Father and the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios gracias. God, our enlightenment, Guardian Angels, to kindle lights of our minds, ordain and illumine our images images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray for us. Help us to understand all that you've written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen.

[0:34] So, whether exterior, what sorrow is greater than the interior? To the seventh, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the exterior pain, I guess, is greater than the interior pain of the what heart, huh?

[0:58] For the exterior pain is caused from a cause as repugnant to the good consistency of the body, in which there is what life, huh?

[1:13] But the interior pain or sorrow is caused from the imagining of the what evil, right? Okay. Since therefore life is more loved than the imagined good, right?

[1:31] It seems, according to the fore said, that the exterior pain is greater than the interior pain. I think those famous words of Shakespeare there, or Hamlet. There's nothing good or bad but thinking makes it so, right? I think thinking I might be just taking really the sense of what imagining, right? Kind of its interior, right? We imagine your situation in life, you know, one way or another way you imagine it.

[2:01] It's not so bad, but some ways, you know, people associate with. They're all depressed about the election, you know, and they're trying to how to get over this. And one guy says to the doctor, you know, I know something. They must be thinking for depression, you know. And so he says to the doctor, he wanted, you know, 13 pills of that, you know. He was just joking, of course, you know.

[2:21] But doctors are really, you know. Yeah, this election. I've got to have this thing to relieve my depression. Moreover, things move more than the likeness of a thing, huh? But the exterior pain is arriving or coming from a real joining of something contrary, right? Like my fist hitting you, or something, right, or my knife, you know, into your flesh, huh? But the interior pain is from the likeness of the contrary thing being apprehended, right?

[3:06] Therefore, more is the exterior pain than the interior pain. Moreover, this is the third one now. A cause is known from its what effect?

[3:24] But the exterior pain has what more strong effects? For more does a man die from what exterior pains than account of an interior pain?

[3:41] Therefore, the exterior pain is greater and is more fled from, right, than the interior pain. What does Shakespeare have the one character say? And I should like it, men have died from time to time, and so on, right? But not from love.

[4:06] Okay, but against this is what is said in Ecclesiasticus twenty-five. Every what plague is the sadness of the what heart, huh? And all malice the iniquity of a woman, huh? It's going to go too much. It's the old saying, "Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned."

[4:39] It's a new version of Anna Karenina coming out shortly, you know. The famous novel, there, you know, interesting. But the iniquity of a woman

[4:55] overcomes other what iniquities, right? I think iniquities. We say iniquity, but iniquities is the word. It says wickedness. Yeah, wickedness. Yeah. Yeah. What's that woman there in the Old Testament, Jezebel? Jezebel, yeah. Yeah, it's pretty pretty bad. But you know Shakespeare, you went to *The Lady Macbeth*, right? She's kind of you know propping him up to the to the deed of killing the king, right? Huh? Of course, she was crazy, funny, but but you know she's talking about, she can take the baby, you know that she hasn't, you know, smashed it, you know, and she's that tough, you know.

[5:35] So I don't know. Therefore, the sadness of the heart exceeds every exterior what plague, right? Huh? It seems to say what omnis plaga. I guess omnis is modifying plaga. So he's saying that the the sadness of the heart is every what plague right isn't that what he's saying right okay

[6:13] yeah now answer it should be said that the interior and the exterior pain come together in one thing and in two things they what differ right

[6:31] they come together in this that both are emotion of the desired power as has been said above right they differ however according to those two things which are required for sadness and what pleasure right

[6:54] to wit according to the cause which is something good or bad that is what joined he says conjunctum because in the case of of pleasure and pain right or joy and sadness the good or the bad thing is now joined to you right in the case of of desire it's absent right in the case of love it could be the one but the love can be even when the thing is not joined you can love right absence makes the heart grow fonder right okay so he says they're going

[7:35] to differ as regards this both of the things required for it right the one is that the thing be joined to you right we'll see what the difference is and he says that and the other thing there must be a what apprehension of it right okay

[7:55] now he says the cause of the exterior pain is a bad thing joined to one right that is repugnant to the what body right well being body but the cause of the interior sorrow is a bad thing joined that's repugnant to the appetite so these guys who are sad and depressed because of the election, right It's contrary to what they what wanted right okay it wasn't contrary to the body the way that a knife would be right or you know a brand or the torch or something right

[8:39] also now the the second thing the apprehension right the exterior pain follows the apprehension of the sense right and especially of what touch right okay. So the pain you get from what a knife, or the pain you get from you know a blowtorch, you know, going in you, is what felt, but since it touched, primarily, right? The same same way in the you know jab in the eye, you'd be feeling it, but since it touched, the pain in the eye, right?

[9:14] You even get a little stuff in your eye. It's a sense of touch, right? That is apprehending this, right? Okay, something that shouldn't be in the eye, right? But it's okay.

[9:30] But the interior pain follows the what interior grasping, right? Either of the imagination to it, or also of reason itself, right? Okay. So he's mentioning what the difference is, right? Okay. Difference both as far as. the uh The joining, right, and the other is what the apprehension, right? Okay.

[10:16] If therefore one compares the cause of the inner pain or sorrow to the cause of exterior one, one pertains per se to the appetite,

[10:32] of which what both is what, which either is what pain or sorrow, right then? How do they translate that? Through being repugnant to the body. Wait down here now. If therefore one compares the cause of the inner pain to the cause of exterior, right then, one of them per se pertains to the appetite, right? To which both these pains belong, while the latter belongs to the appetite indirectly.

[11:16] To another, yeah. For the interior pain is from this that something is repugnant to the appetite itself, right? To the exterior sorrow, from this that it's repugnant to the appetite because it's repugnant to the what body, right now? So that means by per alia right? To another, right? Okay. Now the one is repugnant to the appetite per se through itself, right? The other is repugnant to the appetite through the what the body, yeah.

[11:59] And then he gives the common principle: always, what is per se is before that which is what to another, right? Okay. That's a very important before, right? Okay.

[12:18] So water is wet before the what cloth is wet, right? Right. Or sugar. Or sugar to the sweet coffee. Yeah, yeah. Okay. Aristotle uses that when he's showing that the friendship of a virtue, right, is better than the friendship, useful friendship, right, the friendship of pleasure, because the person is loved per se, right. In the other case he's loved per alia, right, huh? Another, huh?

[12:54] You could pilot the argument there to the unmoved mover, right, huh? Because the moved mover. Is by the mover through another, because moves another to be moved itself, right? Where the unmoved mover is a mover per se to himself, right, and not to another that's moving him. So, before the moved mover, then there's an unmoved mover, right, which is God. Whence, from this side, the interior pain is preeminent to the exterior one, huh?

[13:32] Because it's per se posed, right? Okay. Likewise, on the from the side of the what grasping, huh? The side of the knowing, for the grasping of reason and the imagination is higher, under higher knowing power, than the apprehension of the sense of what touch.

[13:58] Whence, simply and per se speaking, the interior sorrow or pain is greater than the what exterior, right? A sign of which is that even what the one will voluntarily undergo or receive exterior pains, right? That he might avoid what interior one, yeah.

[14:43] Now you have examples that in your experience of life. Hmm. Losing a man when he's seeking something that he wants very much, right? Is he willing to undergo a lot of travail of the body, right? That's true. He might seek of honor, seek a woman or is right. He might what fight, right, and be injured in that sense, right? Okay. Doesn't want to lose his honor. Doesn't want to lose the woman or something, right?

[15:53] Okay. Or he wants to make more money. He doesn't sleep much anymore. This hour, still the exterior. I don't want to work. Insofar as the exterior sadness or pain is not repugnant to the what interior appetite,

[16:17] it in some way what in a way pleasurable. Yeah, enjoyable by the interior what joy. Sometimes, however, the what exterior pain yeah is with the interior pain, right? And then the pain of sadness is what increased, huh?

[16:55] And goes on. Not only, for not only is the interior pain greater than exterior, but it's also more what universal, right? Huh? The interior is more universal. Yeah, because whatever is repugnant to the body can also be repugnant to the interior what appetite, right? Huh? Okay. These horrible scenes in the battlefield—they're going to amputate a leg, right? Huh? If they're doing all the time in the civil war, right, where they couldn't save the legs, sometimes they can't even now.

[17:28] See, so that's repugnant to the interior appetite, right? Sure. But so, but to the body, right? And whatever is grasped or apprehended by the sense is also able to be grasped by the imagination and reason, but it is not what convertible, right? Huh? Okay. So

[17:53] imagination, reason can know what somewhat what the pleasure of wine is, let's say, right? Huh? The pleasure of sleeping when you're tired or something, you know. But but the exterior sense can't know the joy of the theorem of Euclid or something, right?

[18:17] And therefore, significantly, in the authority adduced, right, in the sicut contra omnis plaga, right, this time it'd be more universal, right? The sadness of the heart is right,

[18:33] because also the sadness or pains of the exterior plagues are comprehended under the interior what sadness of the what heart, huh? So before I go to the Platonian, he's got some objections to Plato, right? In this case, he's saying that in pleasure and in sadness, right, you have two things involved, right? Huh? And one is what. It joins something bad in case of sadness to you, and and the other case and the other thing is the apprehension of this, right?

[19:15] And he's saying that in the case of the interior sadness, it's joined to the appetite per se, right? Huh? And in the case of the exterior one, it's through the body, right? Huh? Right. Okay. And the per se is more so than the what per alia, the through itself is more so than through another, right? Huh? Okay. Just like we said before, my my examples: the water is more wet than the cloth, right?

[19:49] Or the fire is more hot than the air around the fire, right? Um. So what is per se is more so, right? Than what is per alia. To another, and then he says, "But also the knowing power is a greater knowing power, right? "

[20:08] And then he goes to the second point, right? You know, if I was to take this text there, I'd, you know, put the non-solum in the, you know, leave a little blank there, you know, and then another place, make it, right? It's also more universal, right? Huh? Okay.

[20:29] Because it receives both. Because because the interior apprehension, yeah, you can be sad interiorly about the evil of the body, right? If you lost an arm or a leg or something like that, and I mean, of course, I had a tooth pulled, you know, I lost part of myself, you know. So, but then you can also be what about spiritual things, right? Immaterial things, non-bodily things, right?

[20:58] You can be sad about those as well, interiorly, right? Huh? By the by, the sense of touch, which is the main sense there, doesn't really know about those things, right? Huh? Okay.

[21:23] Or even something like, you know, loneliness. Loneliness is what caused by the absence of a friend, right? Huh? So that's a more spiritual kind of sadness, though, right? Right. Okay. So

[21:43] that's why he says that significantly, omnis plaga, right? Every plague, right? Huh? Okay. Is the sadness of the heart, right? I suppose in the condemned or the damned, right? You know, just that universal, right? To the first therefore it should be said. huh The first argument now is taken from the opposition to the what life of the body, right? Huh? Okay. The argument: the exterior pain is what because something is opposed to consistency of the body, right?

[22:21] And therefore to your very life, right? Huh? What Thomas says: the first therefore it should be said that the interior sadness can also be about those things which are contrary to what Life. to life, huh?

[22:38] And thus the comparison of the interior sorrow to the exterior one should not be taken according to the diverse evils which are the cause of the pain, but according to the diverse comparison of this cause of pain to the appetite one, which is per se, and the other one is per se right.

[23:01] Now, second objection was saying that in one case you're being affected by the thing, the other case by a likeness of the thing, right?

[23:11] To second should be said that the interior what sadness does not proceed from the likeness of the thing grasped, right? But as from a cause, right? For the man who is what sad interiorly, he's not sad interiorly about the likeness apprehended, right? But about the thing of which it is a likeness, huh?

[23:55] Doesn't a man sometimes, you know, he dreams that somebody he knows has died, let's say, right? And so, is he sad because of his dream or because of the thing of which the dream is a a likeness? He wakes up, he says, you know, someone's still alive, you know, something like that, right? I think we've had something like that, you know, where we dreamed we've lost someone or something, right?

[24:23] He's kind of denying the premise there, right? The guy saying that you're saddened by the likeness of something. No, it's by that which it is a likeness that you're saddened, right?

[24:57] Which thing he says is the more perfectly apprehended through some likeness, the more that likeness is what more immaterial and what abstract, right? Because immateriality is the basis of knowing, right?

[25:15] And therefore, the inward what sadness or pain per se speaking, right, is greater, right? As it were, what? Greater evil. Is being about a greater evil, right? An account of this that by the interior grasping, the evil is more what? Known, huh? You've got cancer. You're going to die. You know, six months to live, right? But the interior apprehension of the doctor's apprehension, which you're going to get to now, right, is is more knowing of what what the thing is, right?

[26:01] Than the exterior senses know, right? Okay, now the third objection, right? He's arguing that he has strong effects, right? And the exterior one. I see. Men

[26:28] die more easily. Yeah. Bodily changes, right, are more caused from the exterior sadness because what? Because of the exterior pain is a what thing that is corrupting you, right? Being joined to you in a body way, which requires the apprehension of touch, right? Huh. Also, because the exterior sense is more bodily than the interior one, right? Just as the sensitive appetite is more what bodily than the intellectual one, right?

[27:10] So when Aristotle takes up the emotions there and the premium to the De Anima right. He talks about how they involve the body, right? Huh. Right. Remember, you're holding my arms and I'm all kicking you, knowing there's a big dog in the car. You had to feel that kind of, you know, shaking your hands, right? Huh. You know, so there's a bodily thing involved with that, fear right.

[27:41] And according to this, as has been said above, huh? From the motion of the sense appetite, more the body is what changed, right? So you get angry, right? Huh? Or you get fearful, and your body is undergoing changes, right? If it's too much, it can piss you off, right? Yeah. Okay. And of course, sometimes you see it, too, that people are said to die of joy. You've heard that, huh?

[28:08] Said you know some truth to that, right? But there's a bodily change, right? It's too much, right? Huh? Shakespeare touched upon that, right? Huh.

[28:18] Yeah. Oh yeah. Oh yeah. That's that's kind of famous thing. It's even in fiction, right? You heard people dying of joy. No. Dying of joy? Dying of love Well, no, no, no. No, but, I mean, I mean, they're kind of overcome by the joy, something has happened, right? You know, and they collapse, right? Yeah, the body's been changed. yeah. But a fortiori, things like anger and what fear, right?

[28:44] Huh? Yeah. So some people, you know, died, you know, getting too angry, right? A lot of people have died of what fear? Fear, you know, the body's changed, right? Huh. Okay. So Thomas is admitting that there might be more bodily change with this exterior sadness, right? Because emotions are themselves something bodily, right?

[29:15] And Aristotle's talking about how to define things in the Dynama, there, right? He's talking about, you know, if you could define fear or something else completely, you'd have to bring in the body as well as the soul, right?

[29:31] And when the names of emotions are carried over to the will from the sense-desiring power, you drop off of the body aspect, right? Okay.

[29:46] Okay. Now we get to what the species of what sadness, right? Okay. To the eighth. Then one proceeds thus. It seems that Damascene unsuitably assigns four species of what sadness, huh? Which are acedia, and that's the one that's where kind of sadness about spiritual things, right, huh? I'm tired of praying. I'm tired of going to mass every morning, aren't you?

[30:27] And this is kind of, you know, this is, you know, I think in the tradition of the church there, you know, the translations they would kind of, you know, you know, kind of not properly translate this word acedia right? They use the word laziness, which is more a bodily thing, right, huh? This is kind of, you know, you're kind of being tired of spiritual things, you know?

[30:46] Right. So yeah, Damascene just kept this acedia Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's its own. All right, remember years ago there, we were trying to get a priest to do something. I know we was having a benediction or something. You know, huh? Well, we'll be all churched out then, he said. You know, my wife was very annoyed at the priest for saying it's churched out. That's kind of an acedia right?

[31:15] You know. Father Robert gives us good homilies by fighting against the acedia Yeah, yeah. Spiritual life. I'm tired of praying. You know, it's just too much work. Okay, achthos, huh? Or anxiety, according to Gregory Nyssenum, right? Yeah, and then a little footnote down there, Nemesius, right? It's a different guy, right? Yeah, right. Who's this guy? Nemesius Nemesius N e m e s i u s. Do you have a text?

[32:14] There's a footnote on your book or not? Yeah, Gregory of Nyssa. Yeah, but there's another guy named Nemesius. and they're saying that that's him, right? Sui divis. No, doesn't say his name. You see, and then

[32:37] later on in the in the third objection right? Nam secundum Gregorium, and then down below they say Nemesium right? So apparently there's deception here in Thomas, right? I was talking to the people who were talking about the fallacy of equivocation last night there with the students doing the, you know, sophistical refutations, and I was saying now. A word can be equivocal by reason, right, or equivocal by chance, right.

[33:10] And in philosophy, it's the words that are equivocal by reason that are deceiving us for the most part, right. But the words that are equivocal by chance don't have much influence on philosophy, right. But upon history and things of that sort, right. So I was taking an example of Gertrude the Great, right. In my you know my old edition of Gertrude the Great there, there's a picture of her in the front there, as an abbess, right.

[33:40] So they're confusing Gertrude the Great, who was not an abbess, right. Right. With Gertrude Hackeborn, I guess, who was the abbess in her convent, right. Mm-hmm. So they're confusing the two, right. And I was saying we run into this regarding Thomas a lot, right. Where they're confusing the two, right. Okay. And even Thomas, you know, if you go to the the Navarre thing there, you know, you can still get the the pseudo Thomas, right.

[34:11] There's some guy Thomas Anglicus, must be Thomas of England or something, you know, who's confused with the Thomas Angelicus, right. Yeah. And and so they kind of identify some of these things, right. But sometimes you know there are two people who have the same what. Name. Name, yeah. Yeah. Yeah that is by chance Yeah. And you know, you know, I was going through these things where I was looking at the paintings there, but the you know the portrait of Charles, I mean, Cardinal Guevara, you know, Menendez Guevara, you know.

[34:44] If I keep seeing these names coming up, you know, you know that in contemporary, you know, people, you know, so sometimes people what Mix up those two, right. Yeah. Okay. But that's not really the the philosopher's problem because he's dealing with the universal, right. So the names that get him will be the names that are equivocal by what reason, right. But just just an example, you know, where it comes up, right.

[35:10] It's not really strictly a philosophical thing, but but a name like that, huh. Okay. So. Misericordia, which would be what. Pity or mercy, right. Okay.

[35:38] And invidia, which is what. Envy, right. Huh. Okay. Now, the first objection is interesting, huh. Sadness is opposed to what. Pleasure, right, or to joy. But of pleasure, they are not assigned any what species, right? And therefore, neither should species of sadness be assigned, huh? Okay.

[36:17] Second objection: Moreover, penance is a certain species of what sadness, right? So, penance is sadness over your sin, isn't it, right? Okay. And likewise, what? nemesis and zealous, what?

[36:38] How do they translate nemesis? Indignation and jealousy. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Because zealous has that one sense, you know, of jealousy, right? Huh? But nemesis would be what? Indignation. Yeah. Yeah. Aristotle was distinguishing between envy and indignation, right? Huh? Because envy is is sadness over the good fortune of another, right? Huh? Okay. But indignation is I'm indignant that Obama's reelected, right? This is unworthy of this honor, right?

[37:14] You know, you know, it's a different kind of sadness, right? Huh? Okay. Um, which are not comprehended under these species, right? Huh? Therefore, insufficient is the fourfold division, right? Huh? You wonder if Thomas is going to, you know, what's he going to say about this division, right? Is he going to accept it as being sufficient, you know, or is he going to say, you know, this just a partial thing, or is he going to, you know, what's the authority of this division, right?

[37:45] Huh? Moreover, every division ought to be through what opposites, Opposites, right? Huh? But the four said do not have opposition to each other. For according to what Gregory, whoever Gregory is, Gregory Nemesius Um acedia is sadness. What? Stopping the voice. Amputans? Amputating the voice. Stopping the voice.

[38:20] Anxiety is sadness. What? Weighing one down. Envy is sadness in alien goods and the goods of another, right? Huh? Okay. And misericordia is sadness, right, in alienis malis, in the evils that you know you're sad over what's happened to another, right? Okay. Envy or sorrow,

[38:51] what's the goods have another, right? Okay. I don't know. You remember those things when they had the love and friendship course, and if you were there, but yeah, but for the English novelists, right? Huh? How they're talking about friendship and how they saw. Envy is what. Opposed to friendship. Yeah, yeah, and this is what was corrupting friendship, right? Huh. Now, when I was first studying these things, there and, I was kind of influenced by Thomas, when he talks about friendship, I mean, about charity, caritas, as a kind of what friendship, right?

[39:24] Huh. Okay. And then when he talks about the vices opposed to the virtues, right? Well, one vice that's opposed to what friendship or charity is envy, right? Huh. But you could apply this to human friendship too, right? Huh. Because if I'm your friend, I love you, and therefore I wish well to you, and as a friend, I should rejoice in the good that happens to you, right?

[39:48] Right. Okay. So if I'm sad over the good that happens to you, that's really what. Sign that you don't love. Yeah, or or it's a defect, right? It's like a temptation, right? Right. But if you keep habitual. you destroy the friendship, right? Huh? Right. And so I used to take with the students, you know, assumption there. I'd say, you know, allow them live on campus, you know, and they have a roommate, right?

[40:11] Huh? And so I say, you know, and you're two girls, and then you share a room, you know, and and so the other girls got real nice boyfriend, right? Who's going places, you know, and he's handsome, you know, so. And no. Yeah. Or or or there's two guys, and they're both going to graduate. One guy, you know, has already landed a good job, you know, and you know, and you're you're struggling to find a good job or something, you know, or any job maybe, and you see a little envy.

[40:38] I say, you know, the good has happened to your roommate, you know. I thought that would you know you know kind of you know make them aware of the fact that this is lurking there, you know. I remember your your your saying,

[40:53] "I was like, oh, that success is hard on a man, but it's even harder on his friends." Yeah, yeah, yeah. That was one of the novelists saying that. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's hard for a man to take, you know, good fortune, you know, without getting you know irrational. You know, they they just talking about the the big game, you know, everything. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Pranks. 180 million something.

[41:17] Something's got a winning ticket somewhere. There's someone from down in Missouri, I guess, got a winning ticket, you know. So my son-in-law called up, said to my wife, you know, I want to know it's not us. Can't be talking about it down there. He's very on edge, you know, where we're going, you know. This is thing, you know. But but they you know made a study of people you know who won these big prizes, you know, maybe not that size.

[41:42] And most of them are less happy after winning the prize than before they. Because they went kind of crazy, you know, and they had divorces and all kinds of things you know involved. And and so. The television special. They were interviewing past lottery winners, and everyone was miserable. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So it's not really the punishment to win in that sense means you don't have to do that thing.

[42:14] So think you won a huge amount of money, you know. Not think of spending any of it until you know another year or something, or six months or something, you know. until gradually, you know, all these crazy things that you're going to do with it disappear, and and you you know realize what you should do with all this money, you know.

[42:39] Okay. It can happen that someone is sad both about what alien. Even, even in alien goods, and together with this, to be what, weighed down inwardly, right, and to lose his exterior voices. If these things are really opposed, right, they can have both of these. Therefore, the force of division is not suitable, right? But against this is the authority of both Gregory Nicene, but probably not him, and what Damascene, right?

[43:31] Okay. Now, what is Thomas saying? I answer. It should be said that to the definition of a species pertains what it has from addition to the what genus, right?

[43:58] Now, how what does Porphy define difference? There, you know, these kind of three definitions, kind of difference? difference. Difference is what what separates species under the same genus, right? And then he has another one, you know, the differences sort of many differing in kind, right? How they are, what they are, but then he has it's what the species has in addition to the genus, right? Huh? He's kind of touching upon that, right?

[44:28] So the species is the genus with the addition of the difference, right? Or difference is. But now he makes a distinction here, or points out a distinction. I should say, try to avoid saying he makes a distinction. Makes a talk a little arbitrary, right? He points out a distinction. Now, points out a distinction. But to a genus, something can be added in two ways, right?

[44:55] In one way, what pertains to it per se, right? And that's what we usually talk about when we talk about a difference in the strict sense, right? So you divide triangle into what equilateral, scalene, and isosceles. but not into red, white, and blue. See, but it's per se the triangle. They have three sides, right? And this seems to determine what's per se the triangle, right? So, three lines can be all equal, or just two of them, or what?

[45:30] None of them, right? But red, white, and blue is not different ways of being what? Being three lines, right? Just as rational adds to what animal, right? And such in addition makes veras, true species, right, of some genus, right? As is clear by the philosopher in the seventh book. In the eighth book of the, of wisdom, right, from the metaphysics.

[46:13] But something is added to a genus, in another way, as something extraneous from its what. Definition, right. Just as if white is added to what, animal, right, huh? Or something of this sort, right, huh? Okay. Or green is added to triangle, right, huh? Okay.

[46:39] And such an addition does not make true species of the genus, right? According as we commonly speak of a genus and species, right? Go back to, the Isagoge of Porphyry, right, huh? Yeah. It's taken from Aristotle, brought together, the Isagoge but sometimes, right, huh? Something is said to be what species of of some genera, on account of this, that they have something extraneous to which is applied the ratio of the genus, huh?

[47:19] Just as what. Carbo and flama flame, right? Are said to be what species of fire, right? On account of the application of the nature of fire to some what. Exterior matter, right. Okay.

[47:42] In a similar way, we speak of what astrology and perspectiva, right? As species of what mathematics, in so far as mathematical principles are applied to some what natural thing. So you go back to Pythagoras, right? And Pythagoras is kind of a big name in math there, right? Huh? Pythagorean theorem and so on. Even down to our day, they still call the Pythagorean theorem, right? And so when I read read my friend Euclid of Alexandria, right, huh?

[48:15] Now a lot of these terms go back all the way to Pythagoras, I think, right, man. There's all kinds of discussion we really foresaw, right, huh? Well, but Pythagoreans divided the mathematical sciences into what four, right? Rhythmaticate. geometry, music, and astronomy, right? See, but music and astronomy are not purely mathematical, right? Right. But they take the principles of arithmetic, in the case of music, and they apply it to what physical sounds, right, huh?

[48:53] And they take the what? Precisely. Geometry and apply them to the sun and the moon and the stars and so on, right, huh? Okay, so in a sense, that's that's closer to being a species, right? Now, okay. But if you said mathematics is about quantity, right? Now, well, it's a per se division of quantity into discrete and continuous that you have in the categories, right? And numbers are discrete and continuous.

[49:26] It would be like line and surface and so on, right? That seems to be more per se, right? Now, how much you are, right? Okay.

[49:38] And in this way of speaking, right, the second way of speaking, right, there are assigned here species of what sadness through the application of the notion of sadness to something what exterior, yeah, right.

[49:55] Which extraneous thing can be taken either on the side of the What cause, right? Yeah. Or on the side of the what? Effect. Yeah. Now I think it says ex parte causae Does he mean the cause of the object, or does he mean the object is the cause? Because before we said that the object of the passions is their cause, right?

[50:26] So the object of my fear is the cause of my fear, right? The object of my sadness is the cause of my sadness, right? Okay. Or from the side of the what effect he says, right? Now what does this mean?

[50:48] Now the proper object of sadness is one's own what? Evil, right? huh. Whence the extraneous object of sadness can be taken, either what? According to another. Only. Because.

[51:14] It is bad, right? But not one's own evil, right? Huh. And thus there is what. Mercy, right? Huh. Or pity, right? So I don't strictly speaking pity myself. See, But I pity the what? Evil of another. I pity another person because of the evil right that's happened to them, right? Which is sadness about a what? Alien evil, right? So it's kind of extrinsic matter, right?

[51:49] In so far as it is estimated or considered to be what one's own, right? Huh. So when I pity you, I take your evil as if it were my evil, right? Because it's kind of extraneous thing to me, right? Okay.

[52:07] But in a very real sense, right? Friend is another self, right? Yeah. So. That's the way he explains what pity is about. There. Or as regards both, because neither is it about one's own, nor even about something bad, right? Huh. But about the what? Alien good, right? Huh. In so far, nevertheless, as the good of another, is. Thought to be what one's own evil, right? Huh. Okay.

[52:56] So you and I go into the store and we both buy a ticket for the the game, right? You pay the same amount and so on. Then when you scratch it to make sure the number is called the next day, I'm the winner, you know, thousand dollars or a million dollars, whatever it is, right?

[53:14] Well, you know, could have been me instead of you, you know. Okay, so maybe I'm what sad about you winning, huh? So it's not my evil. It's not even evil, period, right? It's it's it's good, right? Yeah.

[53:34] You got the good girl, right? The beautiful girl, you know. You know, everybody wanted you. know? She's going out with you and not with me. So I'm sad about your good, right?

[53:49] Another consciousness has then between mercy and envy, right? Huh? Because mercy is about the evil of another rather than one's own, right? Although in some sense one estimates it as one's own, right? Why envy is not even about an evil, right? But about a good, which is for some perverse reason thought by you to be what? To yourself. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You won the prize, right? But you got the girl.

[54:35] I'm very suspicious, you know, of psychologists, you know, and what they think, you know. Because we're understanding of the psychology people here, you know, they invited these you know psychological manuals and so on,

[54:52] There are some, I heard there's, well, actually I have talked to a couple of psychologists who go back to St. Thomas. Mm. And they they build their their theories on him. Yeah. Um. Unfortunately, there are few. Yeah.

[55:29] So that's the end. So that's an envious, right? Huh? Okay. Now, those are both in terms of what the object, right? Huh? Okay. Now, next one is in terms of the effect, I guess, huh? The proper effect of sadness consists in a certain flight of the desiring power, right? A certain run away from, right?

[55:58] Whence the extraneous about the effect of sadness can be taken as regards another only because it is taken what because the flight is taken away the possibility of flight. You see no way out of it right huh? okay and thus is anxiety which thus weighs down the soul that does not appear any what refuge yeah yeah

[56:47] yeah it got used to like in this thing you know where we get the word from philosophy you know but then applied to human situation you're in a predicament A predicament comes from predicamentum right category right well in logic if you're in a predicamentum if you're in one of the ten genera right to talk about the categories you can't get out of there right so like say if your virtue which is a species of habit which is a species of quality right then you can't get out of that and become a substance see and you can't go over into quantity and be a quantity right now you're stuck in that what in that predicamentum in Latin you'd say right so Aristotle's work what he calls

[57:41] the categories in Latin they call them the predicamenta right or singular predicamentum right huh so for some reason this abstract word got carried over and we say that somebody's in a predicament he's in a situation that's bad he can't get out of it he sees no way out of it you know I'm ruined you know

[58:03] I'm in a predicament huh So uh, apparently this is what he's talking about anxiety right huh you know I'm in a mess and I don't see any way out of it you know this is anxiety right

[58:20] which by another name is called angustia I think that's the idea of being narrowed doesn't it huh angustia you know got no room to move

[58:39] if however it proceeds the the weighing down proceeds so much that it even what immobilizes exterior members from their work then this pertains to acedia right huh okay For this, it will be extraneous regards both, because neither is there what flight, nor is it in the what the appetite. Yeah.

[59:15] And therefore, especially acedia is said to what amputate the voice, because the voice, among all the exterior motions, more expresses the interior conception and affections, right? Not only in man, but also in the what other animals. The dog barks, and the cat meows, right?

[59:44] I see with studies, you know, they they tell them they they meow for different things, you know? Yeah, that's like our. like our Lucy.

[59:55] This a cat now, or a dog, or what? Yeah, our our our orange cat, our orange tabby Lucy. I know you. I know you've met her Yeah She