Prima Secundae
94. Melancholy, Loneliness and the Replies of a.8; q.36 a.1: Is Sadness Caused More by Evil Present or Good Lost?
Class of 2012-11-29
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/094-melancholy-loneliness-and-the-replies-of-a-8-q-36-a-1-is/

[0:01] has the most expressive meows. Now, it's kind of interesting here. Thomas kind of explains these four that these guys give, but does he try to argue that this is an exhaustive division? No I don't think so Because you know,

[0:30] what about I should talk about these things because, especially when I was working on on the definition, of, comedy and so on, right? Huh? And in my definition of comedy, I said that purges melancholy, right? Huh? Okay.

[0:52] Why tragedy, as Aristotle says, purges pity, right? Huh? Okay. Purifies your pity, right? Huh? And you know, you've probably seen the parents sometimes. You know, being annoyed at the kid, you know, whining about nothing, right? Huh? I'll give you something to cry about. They say, you know.

[1:18] But sometimes we feel sad, you know, in a way for ourselves and for others that it shouldn't be, you know, huh? You know, but when you you see the tragedy, right? Huh? You see, you know, the horrible things that happen to the tragic character, right? Oedipus, the king, right? Huh? Then your your pity is purged of its superficiality, right? Huh? And its inappropriateness, huh? It's a reason to pity somebody for you know.

[1:47] Othello, you know, thinks his wife has been unfaithful, and then discovers that he's been deceived. about this and all like that. So, so how do you distinguish between you know pity and melancholy, right? Huh? You know. And sometimes people talking about tragedy, we use the word melancholy, but that's I think a mistake. Huh? Melancholy should not be the effect of what tragedy, right? Huh? It shouldn't move us to to melancholy, right?

[2:24] Huh? And comedy should what purge or drive away melancholy, right? And you can see this in English comic poets. They realize that's what it's for, right? Huh? Or that's part of it. Part of what it does, right? Huh? It's to purify to our our merriment too, but so so you can think of different kinds of sadness, right? Huh? See now.

[2:52] Melancholy is not mentioned here, is it? In these ones here, right? And the other kind of sadness that's very important to know about is loneliness, right? Okay. And you know, in terms of human affairs, you know, if somebody's lonely, or you know, you try to, you know, you need that loneliness, right? But loneliness, to me, seems to be the sadness over the the lack of a friend or the absence of a friend, right?

[3:26] You don't have a friend, or you what? Or yeah, or your friend is is away or something, right? Are you separated by distance, whatever it is? Um. So,

[3:43] Aristotle says no man would want to live without a friend or friends, right? And so, this is not one of the things you mentioned here, is it? And in melancholy, right? You know, melancholy I think is a kind of sadness over one's own misfortune, right?

[4:05] Or the misery, the miserable state of the world, which one is a part, right? Okay. You know, so people get melancholy in the daily newspaper or something, right? You know, because there's always you know bad news coming out, you know, and and.

[4:31] So, but but but you think melancholy could be about your own miserable situation, right? Huh? See, pity is about sadness over the misery of another person, right? So it's a misery cordia right? It kind of comes from being miserable at heart, right? But because the misery is somebody else, right? But melancholy is more about your own misery, right? Or the collapse of the country, you know, with the election of Obama.

[4:57] So I think melancholy is an important kind of sadness, right? And loneliness is very important to talk about these, right? Right. And so Thomas didn't try to say that these are the only species, in the qualified sense, you know. I don't think he's saying that, Do you? It sounds like he's defending them. Yeah, he's he's he's he's he's kind of expressing what they are, right? Huh. And that they're not.

[5:33] it doesn't seem in the body of the article to say that he's the only kind, right? No. Yeah. Um. It seems to be melancholy and loneliness are common enough to.

[6:00] We always talk about it in Shakespeare's time it's fashionable to be melancholic, you know, a gentleman to be a melancholic. The whole tradition there, you know, people writing about melancholy and so on. And the comic poets all talk about, you know, that they're trying to drive out melancholy, right?

[6:23] I remember, you know, De Koninck, you know, talking about this a little bit, where he said, "You know, there's many of these moderns, you know, who think that the computer, whatever it is, has got a, really got a mind, right? " They can't quite see the difference between these, and these things are pretty serious about this, right? Yeah. And

[6:49] they're interviewing one of these computer experts, what he is, on TV. The one time I saw saw Charlie Charlie what's his name Charlie Rose, you know, he's he's kind of a famous guy for the big people, and he's on, you know, every week, you know, and education on TV and so on. You use important people, you know, heads of government and everything, and so you get kind of this, you know, thing interviewing these computer experts, you know.

[7:17] The guy was talking about, you know, that the computer eventually going to take the human mind, right? He even had kind of a date, you know, Charlie, you know,

[7:34] the computers take over the world, you know, and all of a sudden, you know. So, but anyway, De Koninck was was was was reading some of these authors, you know, who who think that there's no difference between, you know, basically the same as our mind, right? You know, our mind is just kind of a computer, right? You get computers, you know, that went on a machine that used to be when I got one of my computers, you know, that the checkers game and so on, you know, chess and checkers game, and the machine was beating me.

[8:07] So the heck, I just I raised the, I got to find out this nonsense. So if the if the computer can beat me in checkers or something, right? Can't beat

[8:22] other things, do you? No. So so he's telling Charlie Charlie Charlie Rose is, you know, I don't know, it's about 20 years, I guess, was you know, it actually surpassed my mind. I mean, it's like, So anyway, so the De Koninck was being a little melancholic because people were not seeing the difference between the computer and human mind, you know. And then

[8:47] I guess you saw in Punch, you know, that the journey, you know. Humorous magazine, the English to write the Punch magazine, right? He had a picture of these two scientists in front of a big computer, right? And the it printed out a message, right? And one guy was reading it. What does it say? It says, "I think, therefore, I am."

[9:13] This joke kind of, you know, purged him of his what melancholy, right? You know, so so he's this writer, you know. And sometimes, you know, when a friend is down or something, you know, and you forget the right joke, you know, it kind of relieve him of his melancholy, right? Huh? So I mean, these are things where I mean people do get, you know, melancholy for various reasons, right?

[9:35] Huh? And I know when you go to a mixer there, you know, to go dancing in a mixer, you know, in the old days, you know, and and there's some girl that nobody's asking, you know. Other girls are everybody's wants to dance with them you know.

[9:52] Uh My friend Jim, he always. asked the girl nobody's dancing with you know, just felt sorry for. I mean, I bet you if you go to a dance like that and get all dressed up, and nobody asks you to dance. Even if you're a girl, I mean, you can't go and ask somebody to dance, and so it must be some melancholy or something, you know. Oh, nobody wants me, you know, Sad, you know, so.

[10:22] So I mean, I think melancholy and loneliness are, you know, very important to talk about in human life, right? Right. And and you got to talk about envy. You got to talk about the other ones are important to mention here, right? Mm-hmm. Um.

[10:39] But I do see that this is a universal distinction, right? Huh. See, and certainly not even, you know, I don't. I think loneliness and melancholy are as important to talk about as these ones, you know.

[10:53] Uh. Shakespeare has some very interesting things to say about melancholy, right? Huh. But the kind of connection between, you know, melancholy and despair too is very important, you know, because it's dangerous in this respect, right? Huh. Yeah. People, you know, commit suicide and all kinds of things. So it's really, really

[11:17] important to talk about those things, you know. Mm-hmm. So, what's the big deal about Gregory Nemesius where he is and Damascene, right? Um. Now maybe you know the way it says here. I mean, you know, it seems that Damascene unsuitably assigns four species. Maybe doesn't say any more than that he assigns four species, you know. Mm-hmm. In other things, he assigns these species, I don't know. You know.

[11:49] But let's see what he says here. Yeah. In regard to his objections, right? Because they're interesting things. Um. The first objection here is interesting, and that is why are there species assigned for sadness, whichever they are, and not so much for what? Pleasure. Yeah, yeah. Though I suppose you could, in some way, do that, right?

[12:22] Huh. Yes. But you don't seem to have names, right? I might say you could have like a pleasure, knowing a theorem here, or pleasure, or wine, or pleasure, Shakespeare. You know, I mean, you know, but you don't seem to have names, right? You know, they're not as, as. Yeah. Yeah. Um.

[12:45] It says to the first, therefore it should be said. This is the famous thing that pleasure is caused from the good, which happens in what? One way.

[12:56] And therefore, of pleasure, they are not assigned so many species as of sadness, which is caused from the bad, which happens in many ways, as Dionysus says, huh? Okay. Well, you know, how many species are there of good health?

[13:15] One. It seems like you know there's one thing, right? If you are in good health, right? That's you know, you know. But you know, you could have a heart problem. You could have a cancer. You know, all kinds of cancers. You know, they all have names, right? And there is other things that was going wrong in you besides heart trouble and cancer, but you have all these names with diseases, right?

[13:41] Huh? You know. And you don't have species of good health, right? This good health seems to happen in one way, right? Everything's got to be good, okay, right? Right. Right. Well, that's why, since there aren't these names, right? That's kind of interesting. These are nice little things that Thomas is saying, and you reflect upon them, you see. But instead, you have these things, right? This monk, you know, Friar.

[14:10] By samples, um, Bartholomew Thomas, right? you know, Friar Thomas Aquinas. that's what it's called friar. " But he has a great understanding, you know, what's the passions are.

[14:30] Now, what about penance? Huh? We said that that's left out of this, right? This one seems to be saying that the division is not exhaustive, right? Now, and Thomas says, "Well, penance is about one's own evil, right? The sins you've committed, right? That's your evil, which is per se the as a sadness, right? Whence is not contained to these species which are taken from something what extrinsic, right?

[14:55] Huh? I suppose if I say, what about melancholy, Thomas? you know, if, I was in class here with my teacher, Thomas. That was the same, huh? Same thing you'd say, right? Not extrinsic, and same with loneliness, right? And what? Loneliness. Yeah.

[15:13] Now, jealousy or nemesis are contained under envy in some way, as will be made more clear later on, right? This affinity, anyway, between them, right? Huh?

[15:26] Is jealous is a kind of envy, right? Huh? Okay. Okay. So, to some extent, this division might be, but more exhaustive of these kind of extrinsic, you know.

[15:46] He says to the third thing about opposites: this division is not taken according to the opposites, oppositions of species in the strict sense, but according to the diversity of extraneous things to which is drawn the what. Ratio of sadness, right? Yeah. That's kind of interesting. If you go back to the bottom of the article where he talks about the mathematical sciences and the comparison of that, right?

[16:14] They use the word perspective and what, which might be tied to geometry, and then what? Music. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But something's perspective would be taken as different from astronomy, right? Well, they got astronomy here, right? Right. See, but you know the kind of the in the Middle Ages you had the so-called liberal arts, right? And they would divide it into trivium, right, which was grammar, logic, and rhetoric, right?

[16:44] And then the quadrivium, which is the mathematical sciences, right? And the quadrivium was arithmetic and geometry and astronomy and music, right? So it wasn't perspective, right? You know, so there's a little give and take there, right? There's a little bit of as the great authority of Pythagoras, I guess, right behind it, right? Okay. Of course, they would defend sometimes, you know, music and astronomy because of the what importance of those, right?

[17:15] Astronomy, you know, aroused what wonder, right? You know, and the heavenly bodies, at least to the ancients, what seemed to be what eternal, right? And they were superior to the bodies down here, right? So this was a very noble thing, right? So it got in there because of its great nobility, right? And music was extremely important for for the virtue, right? Huh? To have the right kind of music, right?

[17:42] And you know Aristotle talks about music in the Book of the Politics, right? The importance right kind of music for the young, right? Something not paid too much attention nowadays, you know.

[17:58] But reason for taking those two in particular, right, and seeing this very important for education. So he answers that third objection then, right? It's not the per se division, right?

[18:27] But according to diverse and extraneous things to which is drawn the ratio of sadness, right? Kind of strange little thing there, isn't it? I think he should have talked about melancholy. We'll give him a pass on this, right? Yeah.

[18:50] He should have, you know, divided the ones that are per se, right? Please take a little break here now before we move on to a new question on the causes of sadness and the effects, huh? We're Question thirty six. Then we have to consider about the causes of sadness, huh? And about this four things are asked. First, whether the cause of sadness or pain is the good missed or lost, or more the evil joined to one, right?

[19:41] Second, whether concupiscence, desire, I suppose, wanting, is the cause of sadness, huh? Third, whether the desire for unity is the cause of sadness. That's a strange one. And fourth, whether power to which one cannot resist

[20:05] is the cause of what sadness, huh? Reminds me of Aristotle saying, one of the things to be feared is to be in the power of another man. For as a rule, he says, men do evil whenever they can. Not too optimistic a view of mankind, huh?

[20:29] So to the first, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the good lost is more the cause of what pain than the good what than the bad joined, right?

[20:45] For Augustine says in the book on the what eight questions of somebody, right? Dulcitius huh? The name of a proper person. It's just just a abbreviation. Dulcitius Okay. Okay. Bring you back to the introduction to thirty five. So anyway,

[21:29] that there's sadness about the loss of temporal goods, huh? So the stock market crashed there in 1929. They're jumping out of the windows. They said, "That's really really terrible, right?" For the same reason, therefore,

[21:48] any sorrow happens from the loss of some what good, huh? Back to have loved and lost. What was that thing the Truman said he liked the best? Not enough. Yeah, yeah. At least I was wise. Moreover, above it has been said that sadness, which is contrary to pleasure, is about the same about which pleasure is. But pleasure is about the good, therefore sadness is chiefly about the loss of the good.

[22:29] Right? Huh? So, what's contrary to good? Is it the loss of the good, or is it the bad? The bad. Yeah, but is the loss of the good also something bad? In a negative way. Yeah. Yeah.

[22:53] Am I sad about my sickness or my loss of health? Are they the same? Are they the same thing? Moreover, according to Augustine, the fourteenth book of the City of God,

[23:11] love is the cause of what, even of sadness. Right. Just as of other affections of the soul, but the object of love is the good. Right? Huh?

[23:24] Therefore, sadness, pain, or sadness more regards the good lost than the good joined. So I have to love something before I'm going to be sad about what is takes that away or is opposed to it. Right? Huh? Both these things seem to be opposed in some way. Right? Huh?

[23:49] The loss of the good and the. The evil joined. Yeah. Yeah. So if I love virtue, then I'm sad in the loss of virtue, or I'm sad by what vice? But are they not the same thing exactly? Are they?

[24:13] Because the absence of virtue isn't always vice, right? What? Because the absence of virtue is not necessarily. The vice. No. No. But against this is what Damascene says in the second book

[24:34] that the evil expected constitutes what fear, right? But the present one sadness, right? I answer: It should be said that if, in this way, privations or lacks, right? Huh.

[25:05] Have themselves in the grasping of the soul, just as they have themselves in things. This question would be of no what moment, huh? Would seem to be of no moment. There's no importance.

[25:20] Now the bad, as is had in the first book, is the what? Lack of the good, right? Okay. Now lack in rem natura—that's the expression in reality. We'd say reality today, you know, but Thomas is saying rem natura, right? In things, huh? In reality. Nature, natural things. Yeah, well, not not naturally narrow sense, right? And you know, natural things, particular, right? But in reality, we'd say, you know, in the nature things, right?

[25:57] Okay. So reading the whole thing here, the bad, as is had in the first thing, is the lack of the good. But lack in rem natura is nothing other than the lacking of the opposite thing that could be had, right?

[26:22] And according to this, therefore, it would be the same thing to be sad about the good what lost and about the bad what had, right? Huh?

[26:35] But sadness is emotion of the desiring power following what upon apprehension of something, right? Now in the grasp, in grasping or knowing, the privation has the notion of a certain what being, right? Huh? Once it is said to be a being of what reason, right? Okay.

[27:07] So, in my old professor, there Kasurik said, you know, philosophy is the only subject where you can get paid for talking about nothing. You say when you say nothing is nothing, right? Is that true? What does is mean there, right? Huh? Is nothing something? Well, in reason, is taken to be what as something, right? Huh? It has a kind of being, a kind of being of reason, right?

[27:34] Huh? So when you talk about nothing, are you talking about something or not? You're talking about something in the mind. Yeah, yeah. It seems at first sight to be a contradiction, huh? To say that when you're talking about nothing, you're talking about something, right? Huh?

[27:54] But maybe nothing in reality is nothing, right? But it's something in what? Reason, right? Huh? It's kind of unusual thing this kind of being, right? Huh? Now, when Aristotle distinguishes the senses of being, there in the fifth book of Wisdom, right? Huh? One sense of being is this being in affirmation, negation, right? Which includes then beings that have being only in the mind, right? Huh? That's that's an unusual thing, right?

[28:29] But Aristotle sees that, right? Okay. So he says, in the in apprehension, in knowing, the privation itself has the notion or the aspect or the ratio of a certain being, whence it is called a being of reason, right? Huh? Okay. He also said it's something, right? But something of reason. Okay.

[28:58] And thus the bad, since it is a privation or lack, is kind of the Latin, word, but the English word is lack, right? Huh? Right. It has itself by way of what being kind of like a contrary, right? Some similarity, right? And therefore, as regards the appetitive motion, it differs whether it regards chiefly the evil what joined, or the good what lost, right?

[29:42] Now Thomas finds a way of putting this, and because the motion of the appetite, the animal appetite, in this way has itself in the works of the soul as natural motion in natural things, from the consideration of natural motions, the truth can be what taken.

[30:09] If therefore we take in natural motions approach and what receding, receding, yeah. Excess or approach, per se regards that which is what suitable to nature, right? If, therefore, by recess or withdrawal, per se regards that which is what contrary. Just as the heavy per se recedes from the what higher place, right? Things fall to the ground, right, maybe? But it approaches naturally to the what lower place, right?

[30:57] But if we take the cause of both motions, right, to it heaviness, right? I'm not seeing now. That is what we call gravity, data, right? That's something extrinsic.

[31:13] The heaviness before per prius inclines to the what place below, then it withdraws from the place above, right? What he's saying there, it what because it tends towards the what lower place, right? It withdraws from on above, right? Right. So it's more tending towards the lower place than what withdrawing from that, right? Okay.

[31:43] When the man seeks knowledge, right, he withdraws from ignorance, right? But is he more withdrawing from ignorance or seeking knowledge? Seeking knowledge. Yeah, that's more per se, right?

[32:01] At least it's more before, right? Okay. It's because I'm seeking knowledge that I'm fleeing from ignorance, huh? Very closely related. I'm thinking of Aristotle there in the proemium of the wisdom there, you know, where he says that the first philosophers were fleeing ignorance, right? Therefore, they're seeking knowledge. Interesting. You speak to me.

[32:42] Thus, therefore, since sadness in appetitive motions or among appetitive motions has itself by way of what flight or recess, pleasure more through by way of pursuit or excess, right? Just as pleasure before regards the good what obtained, right, as its own object, so sadness regards the evil that is what joined, huh?

[33:32] But the cause both of pleasure and of what sadness, to wit, what love before regards the good, then the what, then the bad, yeah. And thus, therefore, in that way in which the object is the cause of the passion, more properly is the cause of sadness or pain the evil joined to one than the good what?

[34:09] Missed. Yeah. Why do you say that? Because it's per modum fugae vehementius? Because it's a what? The way of fleeing. Fleeing, yeah, and therefore it's more what

[34:33] fleeing the the evil that's joined to one than what? Approaching. Yeah. Or or the then it is a loss of the good, right? Come back by the table. Let's go there. Reply to objections

[34:54] here, and come back to the article again. If you could do that. The first one was a text from from no no less a person than Augustine, right, huh? And he speaks of what sadness being about the loss of what temporal goods, right, huh?

[35:18] Or he says that there is maybe I mean that's a bit of a way of translating it in the Latin getting me down here. That there is sadness over the loss of temporal goods right now. Therefore, for the same reason, every sorrow or pain is from the loss or happens from the loss of what some good right huh? He says the first therefore it should be said that the loss of the good is grasped or apprehended under the ratio of what something bad right.

[35:55] Just as the loss of something bad is apprehended under the ratio of something good right. So your cancer disappeared right? Okay. Well, that's apprehended is to make something good, right? Okay.

[36:13] And therefore Augustine says that pain or sorrow arise from the what? Yeah. Of temporal goods, right? What was he saying? That it's it's that the loss of of goods is apprehended or grasped as something bad, right? So isn't the bad more than the object right? In other words, that the loss of something good would not cause sadness unless it be grasped as being something bad. So isn't something bad more the cause of what sadness?

[37:00] Right. Yeah, yeah. By vice versa, you know, the the loss of something bad, right? Like the disappearance of your cancer or something like that,

[37:15] is causes pleasure, right, or joy, right? Because it's apprehended as something good, right? So wouldn't the cause of of pleasure delight be more the good than the loss of the bad? Because the loss of the bad causes pleasure only because it's apprehended as good as a good, right? So the good is more per se to pleasure, right? And wouldn't the loss of something good cause sadness because it's apprehended as something what Bad.

[37:49] bad, right? So the bad is what is more the cause, right? Okay. Let's go to the second section here. However, the Bhavudha said that sorrow or pain, which is contrary to pleasure, right, is about the same about which is what pleasure, right? But pleasure is about the good; therefore, pain is chiefly about the loss of the good.

[38:45] What Thomas says. To second, it should be said that pleasure and pain, and the pain which is what. Contrary. Yeah. Yeah. In the in the sadness, contrary to right, regard the same, but under a contrary what definition, right? For if pleasure is about the presence of something, then sadness is about the absence of the what? Same thing, right? Mm-hmm. In

[39:29] one of each contrary is included the privation of the what? The other. The other, right? As is clear in the tenth book of metaphysics, that's the book on the one and the many, right? He talks about contraries.

[39:46] And hence it is that sadness, which is about the contrary, is in some way about the same, but under a what? Contrary reason. Is that going back to the fact that it what is apprehended as something bad, right? Mm-hmm. And therefore causes sadness, right? Right.

[40:15] Now the third objection is taken from Augustine in the City of God, where he says that love is the cause of what? Sadness, just as it is of all the other affections of the soul, right? The object of love is good. Yeah. The object of love is good. Therefore, pain or sadness more regards the good loss than the what? Evil. God. Yeah.

[40:46] Thomas says that when from one cause, huh, there comes to be many what motions, right, huh? So he's saying, you know, Thomas talked about this before. He talked about love, right, as being kind of the fundamental thing, right, huh? But my fear arises from my love, right, huh? Right. If I love my children, I fear they might get hurt, do you know, or something, you know. Mm-hmm.

[41:12] And when I lose the things I love, I have sadness, right? It seems to give rise to all these passions, right? But he says nevertheless that when from one cause there come to be many motions,

[41:31] it is not necessary that all chiefly regard that which what? The cause principally regards, right? But only the first of all them, right? So so love, the main cause of love, is the good, right? Mm-hmm. Is good the good the main cause of sadness or fear? No. No. The bad. No. No.

[42:01] For each of the others, chiefly regards that which is suitable to it according to its proper what definition, right, huh? Okay. So, is isn't it true that that sadness or fear and so on chiefly regards a what something bad, right? Doesn't chiefly regard the good, right? If regards the loss of the good, it's the loss of the good under the as something bad, yeah, yeah. But it's kind of interesting.

[42:37] I mean, if you take those two things, where you can love the the loss of something bad, right, or the going away of something bad, you know, just you can be sad over the loss of something good, right? But for contrary reasons, in a sense, right.

[43:01] So I I love or rejoice in the the loss of something or the going away of something bad because it's apprehended as something what something good, right? The loss is something bad, yeah. And then it's reversed with the you know can be sad about the loss of something good because that's seen as something bad, yeah.

[43:25] Let's go back over by the articles here to you know kind of things. I answer Thomas says that if in this way privations had themselves in the grasp of the soul, just as they have themselves and things themselves, this question would seem to be of no what momentum, right? Huh. Before we learned in the first part, in the first book, in the parts that the bad is the lack of the what good, right?

[44:23] That's kind of the fundamental meaning of the the bad. It's the lack of something, right? Something good. For privation or lack in rare nature, in reality is nothing other than the lack of the opposite habit. Meaning not to say habit, since the virtue, right? But I mean the quality, but in terms of the thing had, right? Um, and according to this, therefore, is the same thing to be what sad about the good lost and about the bad had, right?

[45:03] Huh. But sadness is the emotion. But sadness is the emotion of the appetitive power fouling upon what? Some grasping, some knowing, right? And in the grasping, we're in knowledge, right? Thomas uses the word grasping in terms of knowing, right? Because in knowing, the known is in the what? Grasp of the of the mind. It's in it's in the knower, right? The knower. Okay, so that act of knowing is said to be a grasping, right?

[45:43] So now, it's first studying logic, we used to call the first act of reason simple apprehension, you know, simplex apprehension, right? Simple grasping, right? But your why why love is more in the thing what? Love. Yeah, I left my heart in San Francisco, right? Where your treasure is, there your heart will be, says I.

[46:08] But in apprehension, in grasping, in knowing, the privation itself has a notion of a certain what? Being, right? Whence it is said to be a being of what? Reason. Reason, right? Huh?

[46:24] And thus the bad, since it is a privation, has itself in the manner of a what? Contrary, right? Huh? And therefore, as regards the appetitive motion, it differs wither. It regards chiefly the what? Bad Bad joined or the good lost, right? Now Thomas says we've got to look here at the natural motion to understand this because it's some way maybe more known.

[47:00] And because the motion of the soul's desire, right? huh The animal appetite, as opposed to the natural desire, right? Right. Okay. Um. In this way, has itself in the works of the soul, just as the natural motion in natural things, we can take what truth can be taken from the consideration of natural what motions.

[47:34] Now, if we take in natural motions, approach to and receding from excess, per se, regards that which is suitable to the nature. Recess, per se, regards that which is what contrary to nature. Just as the heavy per se withdraws from the superior place, the higher place, and it naturally exceeds the lower part, right? But if we take the cause of both motions, to wit, heaviness, this heaviness before inclines one to the body to the what lower place, then it withdraws from the place above,

[48:27] from which it recedes that it may tend towards the what place below. Thus, therefore, since sadness in appetitive motions has itself, in the manner of a flight or a recess or withdrawal,

[48:49] just as pleasure before regards the good obtained as its proper object, so sadness regards the bad what joined. But the cause of both pleasure and sadness, to wit, love, before regards the good, then the bad, right? But he's... Answering one objection there that is not what going to be carried over to everything that is affected at first cause right not everything has to have that whatever is the object of love primarily right is not primarily the object of everything that depends upon love right as a cause

[49:44] thus therefore in that way in which an object is the cause of a passion that's true of all the passions right what I fear is the cause of my fear

[49:57] yeah but in general I'm just saying that the object of a yeah the object of any passion is the cause of that passion right okay so as you say the the cause of fear is the thing is the object of fear okay the cause of love is is the good I love right okay so is applying that thus therefore in that way in which the object is the cause of the passion right more properly is the cause of sadness or pain the bad joined to one than the good what lost that's more the object of it right so bad is the object of sadness right and if it's more the cause of sadness right then the good which is not its object anyway lost but

[50:59] the other side of the coin to that is is that the the good loss is not a cause of sadness except insofar as it takes on the ratio of of what of something bad yeah just like the the bad lost or disappeared is not a cause of joy except insofar as it's apprehended as something good good yeah okay stop now who is it Dean I don't think we could do with the other you've done awful lot of smart stuff this in here you know it takes a while to absorb this huh he's a pretty smart guy I think you know

[51:51] yeah I was talking to the to the student last night he was asking me about the Eucharist you know before we got into our class you know and I was giving my famous distinction between spiritual food and material food and I used to speak of three differences right and say well in material food the lower is the food of the higher So I eat the the cow or I eat the carrot, right?

[52:23] Near below me, right? But in case of spiritual food, the higher is the food of the what? Lower. Lower. And then the second difference is that in material food, the food is dead, right? Yeah. Yeah, I tell the joke about my cousin down like the steak, kind of rare, you know. And so I remember him saying to the waitress, you know, he's trying to emphasize the fact he wanted it rare, you know.

[52:55] And he wanted it rare that when I took my fork, you know, say, MOO! I don't think you know. In the case of spiritual food, I mean the the food is alive, right? Then the third one is that in material food, the food is changed into the one fed, right? So the I don't become like a carrot. I don't turn orange when I eat carrots, but it's turned into human flesh and blood and so on.

[53:25] But in the case of spiritual one, it's the what? Reverse, right? And so you know, in Thomas's prayer there for communion, know one of the things he asks, you know, the Father, you know, Omnipotens sempiterne Deus that he might so receive the body of that our Lord got from Mary, right? That he would be in incorporated in the mystical body of Christ, right? So one in a sense is being assimilated to the higher one, right?

[53:57] You know. So he asked me, "Is any you know spiritual food besides Eucharist?" Well, I was quoting Dionysius there, you know, where he says the higher angels are what? As as who are food for the lower angels, right? Because the enlightenment, right? Huh. And you know, Socrates speaks about feast of reason, right? Huh. When it says Thomas is what feeding my mind, right? Huh. But Thomas, in his mind, his mind is more alive than my mind.

[54:28] You know. The text says our minds are almost dead. You know. So so so it's the superior mind, right? That's feeding our mind, right? Huh. And and he's assimilating us to his way of thinking, right? Huh. Which is superior to our way of thinking, right? Huh. Right. You know. So I.