Prima Secundae
95. Why the Emotions Matter, and How Desire Causes Sorrow (Summa I-II, Q.36, Arts. 1-2)
Class of 2012-12-06
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/095-why-the-emotions-matter-and-how-desire-causes-sorrow-summa/

[0:00] It goes the natural road because the nature of a thing, or what it is, what's first in that thing. And then the natural road is over the senses and reason. Well, the nature of man is to be an animal that has a reason, right? So because he's an animal, he has senses, right? He doesn't just have senses; he has reason, right? But the general and time comes before the particular, right?

[0:24] So the the road is from the senses to reason. So it's kind of a basic syllogism, right? We're going to apply that to what Thomas is doing in a sense, huh?

[0:47] Okay, let's see our little prayer here. Name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias.

[1:03] God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, brighten the lights of our minds, or illuminate our images, and arouse us to consider more carefully. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand what you've written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen.

[1:30] Now, let's talk a little bit about the importance of this treatise on the emotions, right? Or the Feelings, huh? And the names of the emotions, huh? Are picked up and carried over and placed upon the acts of the what? Will. Okay. But you do so, changing somewhat the meaning of the words, huh? And in more precisely, you drop out the bodily aspect of it, right? Okay. The material aspect of emotion, and you keep the formal aspect, right?

[2:17] Okay. Now, why do we do that, right? Why do we carry over the names of emotions and place them upon and use them to name the acts of the will? Why don't we give names to the acts of the will, right? Independently of the names of the what emotions? Why is that?

[2:51] Are there any languages that actually have done that? So like the Eskimos have seven words for snow or something. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And not that I know of, really. Because the emotions are more known to us. Yeah, And and the emotions are what? They're sensible, right? Huh? Okay, and so we're being led from what's more known, right? And and sensible to something that is less known, and not what sensible, right?

[3:20] Huh? And I can remember as a boy, I was sitting in church at Nativity Church there in Saint Paul, Minnesota, Nativity of Our Lord, and the priest was talking about the love of God, right? Huh? And I was trying to figure out what does that really mean, you know? I knew what the love of candy is, which I had, and maybe had love of girls at that time too, but didn't seem that I had this that sort of thing for God, right?

[3:47] Huh? You know? And of course, I didn't have. You don't have an emotion. in that sense for what? God, right? The love of God is an act of the what? The will. Okay. Now you notice when Thomas when he goes through there, although he's talking first about the emotion, right? He'll sometimes allude, right, and touch upon what corresponds to this in the what will, right? Okay, and that's following this road from the senses into what reason, right?

[4:28] Okay. So you can say that this treatise on emotions is useful not only for what it's directly for, right? Understanding emotions, but it's useful for understanding the acts of the will, right?

[4:49] Now I was reading my reading my favorite book, the Summa Contra Gentiles, right? And Thomas says a chapter there has been going through the will and so on of God. Here's a chapter that there are not these passions or emotions, right? In God, right? And then he talks about how we do carry over the names of these things, but drop out the thing. But then he's saying he's going a step beyond now our own will, right, and going to the will of God, right?

[5:21] Saying, and probably all eleven names, right, of the emotions, and maybe even some of the you know species of those emotions, but all eleven names couldn't be carried over to acts of will in your will and my will, right? But Thomas argues that of the eleven names of the emotions, only two of them can be properly carried over to what God, right? What prevents some of them?

[5:50] None of them can be carried over to God as far as the bodily aspect, obviously, right? But even the formal aspect, right? And Thomas says, well, sometimes it's because of the object, right? If the object of the emotion is something bad, then this emotion, this name, cannot be carried over to God, even formally in its formal aspect, because there's nothing, nothing bad can happen to God, okay?

[6:20] But then Thomas says, but we distinguish the emotions not only by their what object, like good or bad, but how they are towards that object, right? So that say joy and desire or wanting both have the good as their object, right? But joy is in the presence and the possession, the having of that good, and desire or wanting is in the what absence and lacking, the not having that what that good, yeah.

[6:55] So desire for a different reason than sadness, right? Or something as bad as an object, even though desire is good as an object, there's something about desire that's for a good that you don't have, right? Well, God is universally good; he has every good, right? So you can say to Moses or Abraham, "I will show you every good." And Thomas says, "Myself," himself, right? And so

[7:32] desire then cannot be what said of God properly, right? But joy can because both the object is appropriate to God, which is the good, right? And the way of being towards that good, right? Which would be what the possession of it, right? Okay.

[7:57] Now Thomas says, now something like fear, he says, right? That could not be in God for two reasons, right? Once, one because its object is a bad, and nothing bad can happen to God, so he can't be afraid of some bad thing happening to him, right? But also because fear is about something that could happen to you, right? That hasn't happened to you yet, and that implies that you're subject to some kind of change in your condition, and God is unchangeable, right?

[8:28] So there's at least two reasons, right, why there couldn't be fear, right? Okay. In the case of desire, just one reason, right? Okay. So can any other emotion or its name be carried over to God besides joy or pleasure? Yeah, yeah. And then you have to realize that love can be both in the what presence and in the what absence of the good, right? Okay. So that's why I think the philosopher is said to be a lover of wisdom, and not just a man who what wonders, right?

[9:17] Because wonder is a kind of desire for for wisdom, huh? And when you acquire wisdom, then you don't have desire anymore. But can still what love wisdom, right? So whether I am pursuing wisdom that have not acquired it yet, or whether I've pursued it and acquired it some way, right? I can still what love wisdom. So it's better to call me a lover of wisdom than one who desires wisdom.

[9:43] Although I am, for the most part, desiring wisdom maybe too, right? Okay. So this is such a beautiful treatise, this is, right? Although it's a treatise on the eleven emotions, and we're going through the concupiscible emotions now. So let's talk about. Those. Six ones, right? And then there'll be a treatise fourth on the five irascible emotions, like hope and despair and fear and anger and so on. But this is also useful for understanding the acts of our will, and ultimately for understanding even what some things about God, right?

[10:22] And why there's love and joy in God, but that's it as far as you know, properly speaking, huh? So this is beautiful. See, how basic it is, how basic it is, right? And you can see we're following the first road in our knowledge, the road from the senses into what reason, right?

[10:48] Now, what else is this treatise useful for, right? Well, obviously to understand human beings, because human beings live somewhat or sometimes very much so on the level of senses, on the level of what emotions, right? And especially the young, right? huh? Okay. Women, perhaps, but even men are subject to their emotions, right? Okay.

[11:21] But then it's also useful for then for what fiction, for epic and drama, right? Plays and stories and so on. In two ways. In one way, for understanding the characters represented is undergoing some what emotion, right? So Othello has some emotion when he kills Desdemona, right? And some people are what Coriolanus is angry and he turns against Rome, right? You know. So you have to understand emotions to understand the characters and why they're acting the way they are, right?

[12:00] Um. It's also necessary to understand the emotional effect that a what work of fiction has on us, right? So when Aristotle defines tragedy, right, it's the likeness of an action that is serious, complete, and of some magnitude, right?

[12:21] Acted out rather than narrated, right? In sweetened language, he says, right? But he says moving us to what pity and fear, so as to what purge these, right? Okay. You see

[12:36] that in the beautiful prologue, or I should say prologue, we call it, to Roman Juliet, right? Because in the it's written in the form of a Shakespearean sonnet, right, 14 lines, but he'll say, you know, whose misadventured piteous overthrows do with their death bury their parents' strife, right? So there he touches upon pity in those lines, right? And then in the third quatrain, the fearful passage of their death-marked love.

[13:06] You see, so you get pity and fear, right? So to understand the kind of play it is, one that moves us ultimately to pity and fear, right? And so as to purge this, right? Well, now I was trying to work out a definition of comedy, I was trying to say what are the emotions that comedy moves us to, right? And what is the kind of catharsis or purgation that it does, right?

[13:30] So this treatise is basic to understand both the emotions that are at play in the characters represented in the plays, right? And are responsible for some of their what actions and and and their tragic mistakes and other mistakes, but also for understanding the what emotional effect that this kind of fiction has, right? Then it's useful as a background for rhetoric, right? Because the second means rhetoric is the art of what persuasion, right?

[14:06] And there are three means of persuasion: the image I project of myself, you know, as a knowledgeable man who is your good interest, and so on. And then the way I move your what emotions, right? And then finally the arguments and the pair of arguments I use, right? And so Aristotle, and this is true in in all kinds of rhetoric, but both in political rhetoric, right? And in the rhetoric in the courtroom.

[14:34] Okay. My mother always tells me about being on jury duty, knowing she was young, and there's an accident there involving a taxi cab and some, you know, somebody's other car. And it looked like the taxi cab driver was not guilty, you know, was not responsible for the accident. It's the other guy, you know. But the jury all wanted to vote the other way because they said the the taxi cab company can afford to pay.

[15:02] So feeling sorry, right, for the other guy, right? And my mother said I wasn't right that they they tried to do that, but that's the way they were they were. So you see the way the jury is influenced, right? So if I get the jury feeling, you know, angry towards somebody, they're going to be more apt to fight him guilty or more guilty than he is, right?

[15:23] Or feel more severely. I get them feeling sorry for him, you know, having pity, though. In law school, they have an advocacy writing course where they teach you how to put a spin on basic facts in a case. Yeah. You can't ethically change the facts in the case, but you can put a lot of emotionally laden verbiage around the facts so that you sway the jury one way or the other with a judge.

[15:50] Can't you? So Aristotle in the rhetoric on the second book of the rhetoric, there he has a whole section on the emotions, right? Now it's more particular and aimed towards persuading a jury and persuading. You know the the political assembly, right? But this is kind of a background for that consideration, right?

[16:12] And then for the science of ethics, because the ethics is about the virtues and the vices, and a number of these virtues and vices are about the emotions, right? So courage is about, and and magnanimity are about irascible emotions, right? And temperance about concupiscence, you know, and mildness about anger and so on, right? So it's a foundation for all those what sciences, right? The science about the poetic art and the to which you join to music, right?

[16:47] Because music is representation, part at least of the what emotions, right? So in classical music, you know the the minor key, other things being equal, you know the minor key is more suitable for an emotion like sadness or an emotion like fear or an emotion like what anger, right? You know Mozart's what concerto's have anger in D minor and C minor, right? And the sad quintet is a G minor quintet, right?

[17:18] Why the major keys are for joy and for hope and sometimes Mozart takes a melody in the concerto, he turns it from the major key to the minor key, but the things turn from a kind of hope to kind of despair, right? So to understand in a sense what music, right? This is the foundation for that too.

[17:42] So you realize how how universal this is and important, huh? Okay, now we're reading this treatise here right now of about pain, right? Sadness, right? And like he did with love, he's going into the What causes and the effects after he's talked about the thing itself. So we left off last time I said. Question thirty six, right? Article two.

[18:13] Whether concupiscence is a cause of what sorrow, right? To a second, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that concupiscence, which a word for wanting, right, is not the cause of pain or sadness. For sadness, per se, as such, regards something bad, as has been said. But concupiscence, desire or wanting, is a certain motion of the appetitive power towards the what good. But the motion which is in one contrary is not a cause of the motion which regards the other contrary.

[19:04] Therefore, concupiscence is not a cause of what pain or sadness, right? Moreover, pain or sorrow, according to Damascene, is about something bad that is present, right? But concupiscence, wanting or desire, is about something in the what future.

[19:32] Therefore, concupiscence is not the cause of what pain. Moreover, that which is per se delightful is not the cause of what pain. Pain. But desire is in itself pleasant, as the philosopher says, in the first book of the Rhetoric right? So, guy's thinking about drinking the beer, you know, and desiring the beer, you know, or something like that, or favorite food or something, you know, and it's giving him some pleasure, right?

[20:02] This anticipation, right? Therefore, concupiscence is not the cause of sadness or pain. If it's the cause of what pleasure, right? But against this is what Augustine says in the Enchiridion sub in tranquilis huh? Entering in, I guess, the ignorance of things to be done, and the desire for what bad things, huh? Malignous things. They what infer for their followers error and what pain, right? But ignorance is a cause of error.

[20:55] Therefore, concupiscence is a cause of what pain, huh? So if you have ignorance and concupiscence, right? Augustine says you're going to have error, which seems to follow from ignorance, right? And sadness, right?

[21:18] Well, what does Thomas have to say about this? I answer: It should be said that sadness is a certain motion of the animal desiring power. That means a sensing desiring power, because the animal is defined by senses, right? But the emotion, the appetitive motion, has a certain likeness with the natural desire, right? And notice we use the word wanting sometimes, even of the what? Plant, right? See the plant wants sunlight or wants water, right?

[21:58] And so, if you give a plant water for a while, you'll hear it, you know, absorbing the water, right? Okay. Oh God, you are my God, whom I seek for you, my flesh pines, soul thirsts like the earth parched. Life is without water, right? Can we compare it, right? The thirst of the soul for God with the water, thirsting for the soil, thirsting for for water, yeah.

[22:30] Now he says you can assign a twofold cause of the natural what? Desire, right? And one by way of end, or the end is one of the four kinds of cause. And the other is, whence there is a beginning of motion, which is the definition of the mover, huh?

[22:54] Just as the descent, huh, the cause of the descent of the heavy body has an end that, for the sake of which it seems to be falling, is the place down below, right?

[23:08] But the beginning of the motion is its what? Natural inclination, which is from what? Yeah, yeah. Notice those two words there, right? Although principium can be used for any kind of cause, you think first of all of the cause in the sense maybe of the mover, right? Okay. And finis, right? End is the cause in the sense of that for the sake of which, right? Okay. So in the Apocalypse, God says, "I am the Alpha and the Omega, right?

[23:45] The first and the last, huh? The beginning and the end, right? " And the Greek word he calls arche, right, which is the word for principium, beginning, and telos, right, the word for end, right? So God is a beginning and an end. Of all other things, right? And therefore, he's a cause in two different ways, right? And this is the way Thomas, you know, divides the first three books of the Summa Contra Gentiles huh?

[24:16] Because in the first book, he considers God by himself, right? In himself. And then in the second book, he considers God as the principium the arche, the beginning of all creatures, right? And then in the third book, he considers God as the end, huh? And then he takes up, you know, the providence of God directing things towards this end, which is Himself, right?

[24:49] Thomas then applies this to the motion of the desiring power. The cause of the motion, the appetitive power, in the manner of an end, is its what object, right?

[25:05] And as has been said above, the cause of pain or sadness is something bad joined to you, right? Affected upon you. But a cause, in the sense of whence there is a beginning of such emotion, is the interior inclination of the desiring power, right? Okay.

[25:33] Now he says this is before inclined to the good, right? And as a consequence of being inclined to the good, secondarily, it what? Repudiates huh? Goes against, right? The evil that is contrary to the good, you want, huh? So it's you desire health before you what? Rejects sickness, right? Okay. Is that true in philosophy too? I mean, that you it's because you desire knowledge that you flee what?

[26:10] Ignorance, right? Ignorance is to be avoided because knowledge is desirable, right? So it's more fundamental to desire knowledge than to flee what? Ignorance, yeah. Okay.

[26:34] And therefore, of this motion of the appetitive power, the first beginning is what love, right? Which is the first inclination of the desiring power to achieving something what? Good, right.

[27:00] But the second beginning is hate, right? Which is in first inclination of the appetite to fleeing what evil, right? But because concupiscence or cupiditas, he's taking that as a synonym there, this text is a first effect of love, right? By which we most of all take pleasure, as Iain said. And therefore, frequently, huh? Augustine, huh? Now, Augustine, go watch this guy. Lays down cupidity or concupiscence for what love?

[27:48] And in this way, he says concupiscence is universal cause of what sadness, right? Because what comes absolutely first is what love, right? then? Okay. Because you love the good. Then you reject what is opposed to it, right? Okay. I got to be careful what Augustine is saying, here, right? Thomas says in one place that Augustine tries to follow Plato as far as he can without coming into conflict with the faith.

[28:20] Well, I don't know if you read the Symposium, right? Which is the dialogue on love, and there's six people who speak at the Symposium, and they go around the table, each person speaking in turn, right? And of course, it happens that the speeches get what better as you go around the table, right? And last is what Socrates, right? Just before Socrates, the man in whose honor the Symposium is being held, because he won the prize for his tragedy, right?

[28:59] Is the great tragic poet Agathon, right? A real poet, right? And right before him was what Aristophanes, right? The comic poet, right? That's interesting. He puts the tragic poet next to Socrates, and then the comic poet is further back, right? So I used to say to students, who's more profound when he talks about love? Because they both essentially talk about love. The comic poet does, and the tragic poet, right?

[29:29] But who seems to be more profound when he talks about love? Yeah, because everybody thinks of Romeo and Juliet, right? You think of love in Shakespeare, you think of some tragedy, right? Rather than what comedy? Yeah, yeah. So it's very interesting, you know. And Agathon's speeches is better than Aristophanes, right? And before these two guys, they have the rhetoricians speaking, right? But who's more profound about love, the poets or the rhetoricians?

[30:05] Who do you think would know more about love? I think the poets, right? That's that's their subject, so to speak, right? Well, then when Socrates gets to speak, he touches one of the two places where he touches that I know offhand here and in the Apology, right? Where he touches upon the amphiboly of to speak well,

[30:32] and Socrates, you know, says, "I thought we were when you said we're trying to speak well about love, right? You didn't mean we're just going to praise love without, which is one sense of speaking well, right? If I say, you know, he spoke well of you, right? That implies he said good things about you. It doesn't say that they're necessarily true, you see. But Socrates says, I thought when you said to speak well of love, you meant to speak truly.

[31:05] I thought that's what we mean to speak well, right? And he has the same, you know, glance at the amphiboly of speaking well in the apology, right? Where those who have voted for his condemnation, the prosecuting attorneys, you, might say, "They have warned the jury now. Watch out, Socrates, a good speaker." And Socrates, I don't know what they meant, say I'm a good speaker. You know, I'm certainly not a good speaker in the way they are, right?

[31:36] Because they're rhetoricians and they're very what persuasive, right? And that's one sense of being a good speaker, and the one we usually have in mind when we say somebody's a good speaker, right? He can persuade the crowd or persuade the jury and so on, right? But he says, if he means by a good speaker that I speak the truth, well, then I am a very good speaker.

[31:56] And he goes and tells the truth, right? So Socrates says now, and maybe put it in a formal kind of a syllogism because most people would admit this: the premise you say, if you love something, right, then you want it, right? That would seem to be probable. But if you want something, you lack it. So therefore, if the lover loves the good or the beautiful, he must lack goodness and beauty, right?

[32:36] Because the lover wants right what he loves, right? And the one who wants something lacks it, right? Of course, in the beautiful, you know, English language, the word "want" can mean what sometimes desire and sometimes lack, and they go together, right? So I used to use kind of this syllogism with students there, just get them thinking. I'd say, "Is God really love?" See, well, they admit the premise that the one who loves something wants it, right?

[33:09] So if God loves the good, then he wants the good. Who wants the good? He lacks goodness. Well, In a sense you say that there's a mistake here right? Because as Thomas explains in the article here here,

[33:29] if you love some something, then if you have it, you have what joy. If you don't have it, you have wanting or desire, right? So love can is not necessarily followed by desire or wanting. It's followed by desire or wanting in the absence of what you love, right? But in the case of God, what he loves is himself. He doesn't lack himself, right? He loves his own goodness, right?

[33:59] He's goodness itself, and therefore there's kind of you might say a little mistake there. In Socrates, right? Okay. Well, it's interesting here. He says,

[34:17] "Frequenter Augustinus, huh? Frequently Augustine places for love what cupidity or concupiscence, right? A little platonic there, right? Huh? I mean, let's say he's he's getting into exactly his position, but it'd be a problem, right?

[34:38] Huh? Okay. But if you take concupiscence to mean what, not really strictly speaking, wanting but loving, right? Then love is the cause of all the emotions, right? And therefore, it's going to be a cause even of what sadness, right? So if I if I love my my wife or if I love my children and something happens to them, right? Huh? Then I'm sad because of the love I have for them, right?

[35:05] Huh? If someone you know, I read the newspaper, someone dies, I don't know at all, you know, so I don't have any particular love for this person, right? I don't have that same sadness, a little bit of something, you know, terrible you read about, but you know, it's not like it's someone that you really love and know, right? And love very much, and then that's a cause of your sadness at their funeral or the learning of their death, right?

[35:29] Maybe injury or whatever it is, right? Okay. But then Thomas goes on to talk now about concupiscence or wanting properly, right? And not confusing it with love, right? Okay.

[35:51] But concupiscence, considered according to its proper ratio, right? Okay. Is sometimes right a cause of what sadness, right? For everything that impedes motion, lest it arrive at its what end or term, is contrary to the what motion, right?

[36:20] And that which is contrary to the motion of the desiring power is saddening, right, or causing sadness, huh? And thus, by its consequence, concupiscence is a cause of sadness in so far as by the what, retarding the what? Of the good desired, right? Huh? The delaying of it, right? Or of the total absence of it, we are what saddened, right? Huh? So notice I was saying before, if you desire something and then you lack it, right?

[36:59] Huh? And if that desire is what prolonged, right? Then you're Suffering what? The absence of this good, right? And that's going to cause what? Sadness, right? Okay.

[37:26] So if you want to understand something, right? But you just can't make sense of it, right? Then there's some what sadness there, right? Okay.

[37:44] You want a beer and there's no beer available. It's going to cause some sadness, right? Okay. You want a friend and there's no friend available, right? Some sadness there, right? So in that sense, right? But it cannot be the universal cause of what sadness, like love, would be, right? Huh? There is always some love behind sadness, right? Because the evil that's inflicted upon you is contrary to something you love, yeah.

[38:22] Because we more are saddened about the subtraction of what present goods in which we delight than of future ones that we what desire, right?

[38:35] That's interesting. See, the first article is a little bit proportional to the first article about the causes of love, right? The first cause of love is the what good, right? And the first cause of what sadness is the bad, right? Huh? And Thomas says more the what the bad joined to you than the good lost, right? Because the good lost is is cause sadness insofar as it seems or understood as something bad, right?

[39:07] So, the bad is the fundamental cause. But it's interesting that he brings in a bit of sense here, right? Kind of a subtle thing, huh?

[39:22] Now the first objection is based upon not seeing how the what love of the good and the desire of the good is behind, right, your opposition to the evil that's opposed to this, right? To the first, it should be said that the inclination of the desiring power to achieving some good is also the cause of inclination, the appetite to what fleeing something bad, right?

[39:57] If I didn't love life, I wouldn't what flee death, right? Huh? If I didn't love to be healthy, right, I wouldn't you know flee sickness, right?

[40:09] If I didn't love wisdom, I wouldn't flee folly, foolishness, huh? They had some and I tell you earlier there on TV last night they were interviewing people. What do you think of this? You know, debt. You know, going over the cliff. You know, and they had no idea what he was talking about. You know, you know, they think it's a real cliff. It's a real bad thing.

[40:33] I know what it is, but didn't have a size idea what it was. You know, it's kind of funny, you know, the way they interview these people. You know, I remember during the campaign interviewing people, you know, and and they were asking real really stupid questions, saying like, you know, do you think it was

[40:53] good for Obama to take what was Republican vice presidential candidate? Ryan. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Did you think it was a good idea for him to take Ryan as vice presidential candidate? Well, I don't know. Maybe was. This is so crazy. Obviously, he doesn't have any experience as a presidential candidate. It seems wrong, right? But just, just you know, to reveal how how what. ignorant ignorant. These people are, you know, what's going on, right?

[41:21] One of my brother-in-law's friends was working for in a governor, you know, governor race here many years ago now, but happened to be talking to him and he's amazed. He's going, "Oh, he's sticking with the governor candidate, " and people, you know, who maybe are for him but are opposed to his don't realize he's for the thing opposite to they stand for, right? And face it first, you know.

[41:44] Just complete, complete madness out there, you know. Just. You don't realize so. Is there a shadow talk about this? Okay. And from this it happens that the motion of the impeditive power which regard the good are laid down to be the cause of the motions of the impeditive power which regard the what, the bad, right?

[42:19] To the second he replies, huh? It was about the argument from the future, and the present, right? To the second should be said that what is desired, although really it is what, future, it is nevertheless in some way what present, in so far as it is what hope. speaking of things hoped for Paul says, huh?

[42:55] So when you when you have hope in the strict sense, right? You see this thing is not only desirable but it's what possible for you, right? Huh? Going to come to you, right? You got to rejoice, right? Huh? Okay. This guy went and speaks super ticket thinger, you know, one hundred forty billion million or something like that. His wife calls him up at work, you know, and says, "You got the winning ticket, you know."

[43:19] It's about 140 billion. I said, "Don't say it. Come home and check out." Can he want to come home and check the numbers himself? Why'd you see the numbers? One one one one. You know, you know, you go over it, you know, and you give it to your wife or your, you know, friend, and yeah, you got the right numbers. Yeah, yeah. And then, then you know, it's like you have the money, right?

[43:42] You know, even though you haven't gone down. Some guys know they call the police station. Have the police escort them down there with the winning ticket because they're afraid to go down there. Take a second. Someone's going to grab him.

[44:01] Yeah, they broke in at the at the St. Anne's there in Schusbury. You heard about that? You have all the presents here for the kids. You know that they collect during the fall. You know, somebody broke in and stole it all. You know, and it even got in drudgy parts on the national news and so on. Yeah, but some some some toy manufacturers say they replace it all.

[44:23] You replace all the that's a yard, yeah. So I don't know. I assume they take them up on it. You know, is that your parish? No, no, we're it's the other parish in in uh Shrewsbury. I we're Saint Mary's and it's Saint Anne's is is down there in Out nine there. You know, we're putting a set of town with a big parish in there, diocese. You know, the biggest contributor to the bishop's fund and that sort of stuff.

[44:46] You know, we're wealthy. We're wealthy. Some people say we're snobby. You know. I thought yours was the daughter's parish. Yeah. So, or it could be said that although the what good desire is future, nevertheless, it is a impediment that in the present is opposing the right, huh? It's delaying the right, which causes what sadness, right?

[45:22] So thirst can cause what pain, right? Especially if your thirst is, you know, delayed a long time. Huh? Brother Mark used to say, when you're out there in the desert, you know, get thirsty, fristick, and ice cream soda, you know, and then after what you think you just did a soda, then finally just some water. Staying desperate.

[45:53] Now the third one here about what hope. This is the thing concupiscence is desirable according to what Aristotle says there, as long as there remains the hope of achieving what is what desired, right? But when the hope is what lost, attracted through the impediment that's opposed to it, then the desire causes what? Pain. Yeah, yeah. Pangs of unrequited love, as Hamlet says, right? Okay.

[46:29] I mean, is it Buddhism? they say desire is the cause of all pain. There, all desire. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's kind of admitting the truth of this, right? Yeah, desire is the cause. But the same time, the same desire is also the cause of pleasure too. Yeah, it's not universal. Yeah, it's not prolonged, and there's hope of achieving. You know that you're going to get the good, right?

[46:52] So if you kill all your desires, then you're also depriving yourself of possible pleasure. Yeah. Yeah.