Prima Secundae
100. The Irascible Passions Begin: Hope, How It Differs from Desire, Where It Sits in the Soul, and Hope in Animals (ST I-II q.40)
Class of 2013-01-10
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/100-the-irascible-passions-begin-hope-how-it-differs-from-desire/

[0:00] Okay, let's look at the proemium here a little bit. Here, the question beginning question forty one is a little proemium here. Consequenter, huh Following upon this, we're not to consider about the passions of the what irascible, right? I notice now the way he divides this. In first about hope and desperation, right?

[0:30] Secondly, about fear and audacity or boldness, right? Third, about what anger, right? I notice the beginning there with hope and what fear, right? Despair. Yeah, but I mean hope is a primary thing, right? And if you look at this, you know, question forty, which is the one on what hope, right? Because fear begins in forty one. It's almost all about hope, right? Except when you get down to the fourth article there, where there desperation is opposed to hope, right?

[1:07] So it's all about hope mainly, right? Well, hope is one of the four principal passions. Thomas will speak of them as joy, sadness, hope, and fear, right? Okay, I mentioned the fact that when I was working on the definition of comedy, right, I was proceeding through the place of opposites, right, and saying, well, if comedy, if tragedy and comedy are contraries, which they seem to be, right, and tragedy, we know from the part that Aristotle completed and we know from the prologue to Romeo and Juliet, is about pity and fear, right, a form of sadness and a form of fear, right, then comedy should be about a form of joy opposed to pity and the opposite of fear, which is what boldness or audacity, right?

[2:04] And as I studied more, it didn't seem that boldness was quite that prominent like fear is in tragedy, right? And then I read the articles of Thomas. where he talks about the four principal passions, and they are joy and sadness and fear and not hope. And hope, right? You see, and then I started to hope made more sense for comedy, right? And then I was reading, you know, the guy writing on the the book of Terence's comedies, right, Latin scholar and so on.

[2:36] He kind of quotes Saint Paul there, you know, faith, hope, and charity, the greatest of these, charity. But oh, that's not true in poetry. And in comedy, it's hope, you know. Well, you know, it's obviously a theological comedy, right? But but he saw hope as being you know you know so so I started getting more and more evidence, right? You know so. So anyway, so hope and fear are the chief what passions, right?

[3:06] And you see the way it's set here, right? It takes up hope first, and of course, hope becomes the name also of a theological virtue and of an act of the will too. And fear, fear of the Lord, and so on, right? But those two are principal, and then anger is put third, right? Okay. But you talk a little bit about the opposite of desperation, of hope, and the opposite of fear, audacity or boldness, right?

[3:31] And if you see kind of the order the way it is, right? Now, as Thomas will point out in here later on, contrariety here in the irascible means something a little bit different, right? Because the contrariety in the case of the concupiscible is in the object, right? So

[3:55] joy is opposed to sadness because joy is about the good, sadness is about the what the bad, huh? And in the case of the irascible, right, both hope and despair, which are contraries, are about what the good, right?

[4:12] But a good that is difficult to achieve, right? And if you think you can overcome the difficulties, then you have hope, right? If you think you cannot, then you have what despair, right? So you have the same object in a sense, where the contrariety comes in. Well, with you because the difficulty, right? That's why the irascible is because of the difficulties of things, right? And the same way with the what fear and boldness are both with regard to the bad, right?

[4:42] Huh? But they are what when you think you can avoid the bad, then you have boldness, right? But the more natural thing is to fear, and then you know it's a different kind of contrariety, right? But because the good or the bad are the more fundamental objects, then the irascible emotions arise from the concupiscible ones, and they terminate them, right? Huh?

[5:11] So now about the first, namely about hope, eight things are asked. Did you know that eight things are asked about this? First, would it be the same thing as desire or cupiditas, right? Huh? Okay.

[5:32] It's very close to it, right? Because desire involves a what emotion towards the good, right? But hope towards a what a good that's difficult. They seem to be similar things, all right. Second, whether hope is in the apprehensive power or in the desiring power, that's kind of surprising, right? Huh? But. as Thomas says elsewhere, you know, the irascible seems to be closer to reason than the concupisible, because it's more like getting a reason for something, right?

[6:09] Okay. And I remember when I was first doing my investigations of Mozart, there, you know, and I was seeing the prominence of the pianoforte, right, and the idea that the irascible is in there, right? So I Kasurik, "You know, this is more reason, right? " And you know, when I was working on that

[6:36] balance there of the five last symphonies of Mozart, the thirty-six, the thirty-eight, the being not thirty-seven, as you know, the thirty-ninth, the fortieth, and the forty-first, right? Well, the thirty-ninth, I mean, excuse me, the thirty-six and the forty-first are an imitation of magnanimity, which is concerned with hope, the achieving of great things, huh? And the thirty-eighth and the fortieth are concerned with courage, right? Which is concerned now with fear and so on, and it's in the irascible too, right?

[7:19] So at least four of the five last symphonies are concerned with the irascible. Only the middle one is a little bit concupiscent, but not too concupiscent because he uses E flat, right? So it's still elevated, right? That's kind of that's striking. Nobody would say it does that, right? And the thirty-six and the forty-first are both in C major, right?

[7:43] The thirty-eighth is in D major because that's more the idea of going towards the dangerous, right? And then the fortieth is more like patience, you know, the going of the strongness there, you know. And Mozart, when he does, I mean, Beethoven sounds feeble compared to Mozart. The firmness of Mozart has that nobility, you know. And the thirty-ninth, I mean, is still somewhat, you know, E flat is not, you know, as concubisable as the concubisable keys in Mozart, are, G major and B flat and that sort of thing, right?

[8:17] G major, that's just a E flat is sort of, you know, in between. So you kind of struck by those things, right? Okay. So it's striking. They have this article where hope is in the V apprehensive, and that's just, I mean, why does even arise the question, right? I don't know, you know. But I'm just kind of reminded of the fact that there's a certain proximity there between that somehow the irascible is closer.

[8:56] You see it in Plato, right? You have you know reason, and then you have the thumos, right, which is where the word for the irascible. And then you know, epithymia, you know, down here, you know, you know, and you got to use kind of the rational to control the thing, you know. So when he jumped in the the bush, right, to you know overcome the concupiscible That's that's courage, right?

[9:19] With the hope being the good animals, again the question, right? Why is that even a question? These are things we have in common with the animals, right? And with it to hope is contrary to desperation, right? That's all he has about desperation, you know, officially here in this thing, you know.

[9:44] Fire for the cause of hope is experience, whether in the young and the drunk, right? Hope abounds, right? I can fly. You know, Aristotle in the ethics, in the rhetoric, you know, he talks about the contrast of the young man with the old man, right? The young man who feels all this hope, you know, that's why he's easily deceived, right? The old man is, you know, more cautious, you know, and fearful, you know, and

[10:22] and eight with your hope confers to what operation, right? To the first man, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that hope is very is the same thing as desire or cupidity, right? Huh? For hope is laid down as one of the four principal what passions, right? If you look at the Vatican II, there, the one there on the Church in the Modern World begins with the four principal passions, right?

[10:58] So hope is laid down as one of the four principal passions. Sometimes Shakespeare puts the four of them right together, you know. But Augustine, enumerating the four principal passions, places cupidity in place of hope, as is clear in the fourteenth book of the City of God. Therefore, hope is the same as cupidity or desire. Huh? I don't know about that, Augustine. Now he was more in rhetoric sometimes.

[11:31] Moreover, passions differ according to their objects. But as I mentioned before, that's more what you do in the concupiscible although it enters into the irascible because it arises from concupiscible. But the same is the object of hope and cupidity, namely a future what good. Therefore, hope is the same thing as cupidity or what desire.

[11:59] So there's no hope in heaven, right? Because good is present there forever. You've got a hold of it You know what's done. You have you know abandon all hope you enter here, right? That's going to hell, right? But in a sense, you know, you go to heaven, you abandon hope too, right? Yeah.

[12:24] Okay. If it be said that hope adds above desire the possibility of obtaining the future good, right? Against this, that which is per accidens has itself to the object. Does not change that. Does not vary the species of the passion, right? Huh? But possible has itself per accidens to the future good. Which is the object of cupidity or desire and hope, and therefore hope is not a passion, differing in species from desire or cupidity.

[13:07] Well, maybe you are not thinking of what the irascible really is. But against this, of diverse powers there are diverse passions differing in species. But hope is in the irascible, in the concupiscible desire and cupidity in the concupiscible right. Now notice the irascible appetite and concupiscible appetite are named from the passions that what, from one passion in them, right? So you got to be careful the way they're named, right?

[13:40] Because ira is just one of the five passions of the irascible, desire, or concupiscence, right? Is only one of the six concupiscible right. But why are they named from that passion, right? Well,

[14:00] yeah, it's because what Shakespeare says, right? Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs. So concupiscence and anger, emotion is very strong, right? That's why, as I mentioned before, when in as you like it, right? He says during the very what, wrath of love, right? Clubs cannot part them, you know, and get them married off right away, you know. That's the idea. But I mean, it's because you can compare those two passions in terms of their what strength, right?

[14:35] Okay. So lovers go at it, and the guys graving each other go at it, you know, you know, grapple with each other, you know, in a loving or irascible way, yeah.

[14:52] Okay. I answer. It should be said that the species of passion are considered from their what object, right? This is the famous point that Aristotle makes in the De Anima, right? That we know the soul through its what powers, and the powers through their acts, and the acts through their what object, right? So by knowing the difference between color and sound, we come to know the difference between seeing and what hearing, right?

[15:38] And then, seeing and hearing, the difference between the ability to see and the ability to what hear. And then, through the powers, we know the what kind of soul we have, whether it's a sensing soul, right, or not, right. So he talks about the plant soul. He talks about what food, which is the object of big theater. Yeah, yeah. Some monks must be plants. That plant life.

[16:10] Yeah, big theater. Christmas time. No, about the object of hope, there are four conditions to be noted. Now, what is this all about? This sounds completely complicated, right? First, that it be something what good, right? For properly speaking, there is no hope except about something what good, huh? And by this, hope differs from what fear, fear, which is about something what bad, yeah. Okay.

[17:03] Secondly, that it be what in the future. For hope is not about something present already had. So I don't hope to understand the Pythagorean theorem once I've understood it.

[17:21] And to this, hope differs from what joy, which is about a what present good, right? Okay. Third, it requires that to be something what arduous, right? Um, attainable with what difficulty? With difficulty, right? Huh?

[17:49] For one is not said to hope something what minimal, which is at once in his power that he have it, right? So I hope to have a drink of water here now. Hmm. There's no difficulty in me reaching over with my hand, taking a sip of water, right? He's just taking candy from a kid. Don't hope for that. Just do it.

[18:24] And by this, hope differs from desire or cupidity, right? How do they translate cupidity there in in English to give a different what? English cupidity. Yeah, they don't know. Even I don't. They don't know English.

[18:42] Which is about the future good absolute, right? Huh? Okay. Whence desire pertains to concupiscible, hope to the what irascible, right? So to do philosophy, you need what hope, and not just desire, right?

[19:09] And fourth, that that difficult thing is possible to be what obtained. For one does not hope for that which he is not able at all to what And according to this, hope differs from what? Despair. Despair.

[19:31] Interesting. huh? Somebody was playing the uh the uh you know violin, It was very very bad, Somebody told him to stop. It's impossible for you to play The man said, it's not impossible for me to play. If it was impossible, I wouldn't start. That gave rise to it, you know, if something's worth doing, it's worth doing badly. Yeah. Yes. hope of doing better. Thus, therefore, it is clear that hope differs from what desire, just as the passions of the irascible from the passions of the what concupiscible, right?

[20:16] On. On account of this, hope presupposes desire, right? On. Just as all passions of the irascible presuppose passions of the concupiscible, right? So hope, and for that matter despair, presuppose what desire, right? On. And fear and what boldness presupposes what aversion, I suppose. Okay. Why anger arises from what sadness, right? From pain, right? So if I'm stepping on your toe and you say you're stepping on my toe, and I say so what?

[20:59] Well, that should arouse some anger in your part, right? On. But from joy there arises nothing concupiscible. That's why you have this odd number of emotions in the concupiscible, right? Irascible rather, five, right? See, you know, if you want to be Pythagorean, you say why are the concupiscible emotions in an even number? Yeah. And the irascible, yeah, yeah. Well, there's no difficulty arising from the possession of the good, right?

[21:27] Just enjoy it, right? On. Okay. That's why you get end up with five instead of what six, huh? Why, in the case of the concupiscible, you have what the good and the what bad, so between, yeah, yeah. Well, if I'm sticking

[21:57] your toe and you don't think you can do anything about, about it, you just fear, fear the guy like me, right? Wither away. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Just sadness and fear, yeah. Sadness, continuing pain, and fear that it'll continue. See. Okay.

[22:25] Now, to the first is the text of Augustine, right? You got to handle Augustine with reverence, right? Mm. The first, therefore, should be said that Augustine lays down cupidity in place of hope, on account of this that both regard a what future good, right? On. And because a good that is not arduous is regarded as were as what nothing, nothing, yeah.

[22:56] And thus, cupidity most of all seems to tend towards the arduous good, in which also hope quite tends, huh? Yeah, excuse me, Augustine, a bit there, right? You know.

[23:11] That's the same kind of reason that Saint Bonaventure uses in describing the soul as the image of God. He he he talks, he refers to it as "beatificabilis Mm hmm." It's able to be blessed, but you wouldn't be blessed if it was easy to attain. Only you need to attain glory because you did some great thing, a difficult thing.

[23:34] Yeah, one of the little, religious magazines my wife gets there. You know, talking about what is virtue, and I said, "well, let's see what the guy says, you know?" And he's talking about virtue as being the perfection of operation. But strictly speaking, it's not the perfection of operation. But you can see why he says that, right? You know, and so I mean, you got to kind of interpret what these people say, but you know, don't speak altogether.

[23:56] So I don't know if we can excuse Augustine and let him off the hook here, but Thomas's. Well, if he's reverent towards him, I guess I'll be reverent towards him.

[24:09] Anyways, now, second one says you get the same object from both, right? Okay. To the second should be said that the object of hope is not the future good, absolutely right. But with what arduousness and difficulty of obtaining it, right? The kind of way he's in from the text of Augustine, and Augustine is kind of thinking of that, right? You know, and he says, "Okay, then that's."

[24:36] Point out how they how they do differ, right? But their likeness is a cause of deception, right? So you can think that desire and hope are the same thing because they're close, right? They're both about a future good, right? So you would make the mistake of maybe confusing hope with anything but desire. When Augustine makes the inadvertence of of calling one of the principal passions what cupidity was it?

[25:09] He uses the word there in place of hope, right? So excuse Augustine. Now Augustine has the use of words that sometimes really is marvelous. This is one that makes me De Trinitate where he speaks of an immature and perverse love of reason.

[25:32] There's not enough to love reason. There's an immature and perverse love of reason, right? Now, my my old teacher, Kasurik, had a you know passage they used to put from Augustine from Albert the Great there at the beginning of his translation of the first two books of Physics, where Albert says that if you study these things for anything other than for the sake of knowing God, right, and this should be forced to by necessity, he says, study.

[26:01] You have perverse attitude towards learning, you know. Well, it's stuck in my mind, right? Huh? You know, someone you know who who uh, uh, studies the lowest things without a view of using them as a stepping stone to higher things, right? That's really perverse attitude, right? And someone doesn't realize the weakness of reason and the need of

[26:23] of help, right? To get somewhere, has an immature love of reason. So they run off and use reason to judge things that they're not ready to judge yet. Yeah, I was thinking about that today, and I'm trying to distinguish between what what would an immature love of reason be and a perverse love of reason be. Because of both, I was thinking about that just today. Yeah. Yeah.

[26:50] One one in the sense of just immoderate. That's sort of characteristic of youth. They don't know the measures of things. Yeah. Yeah. That's one one way anyway. But but immature one, I would say, is one where you don't realize the need of the help that reason has. You need logic, you know, and you need a good teacher, you know, and so on. I just reading Thomas. There, I'm reading the we're reading the exposition of the Gospel of Saint John, right?

[27:17] Just kind of, you know, what did what did uh, uh, Pius XII said? Anybody who doesn't, know, who's a Thomas, he's got to know the the exposition of the Gospel of John, right? And and I just got struck by having read it for a while, you know, and I see how much there is in there, you know. That's absolutely incredible. But our Lord is talking about um

[27:40] um how they're not accepting His word, right? Huh? And it's because they don't what they're not what humble enough to be taught, right? Huh? And I said, well, there's no wisdom without a teacher. He says, you know, you need a teacher, right? And you can see how even Thomas would need Augustine and Albert and so on, you know. And so I mean, it's kind of an immature love of reason if you think you you can do this without all these these helps, right?

[28:11] These things that prop it up, right? And it's partly things like logic and and things like what? A good teacher, right? huh? Dwayne, you know, read very very carefully, as Sirik says to me.

[28:28] Yeah, yeah. I was talking talking to Warren there. I was just saying, you know, that I was comparing the the chapter of Summa Contra Gentiles where Thomas is showing that sense is not reason, right? And how do you show that, right? Oh, where's he? Where's he? Where's that? He's going to talk about that, And uh, really kind of beautiful text. where Thomas gives five arguments to show that.

[29:02] Reason is not sense. I was comparing it Shakespeare's definition of reason, no, where includes and touches upon most of the reasons Thomas gives, plus gives some other reasons in addition, also. So,

[29:18] beautiful things like that. Okay. Yeah, to the third, it should be said that the object of hope not only adds possibility upon the object of desire, right? But also what? Loftiness. Yeah, difficulty, right? Or arduousness,

[29:49] which makes hope pertain to another what? Power, right? Okay. Now, because Plato and Aristotle, used those words, but thumos for the. irascible and epithumia for the concupiscible, right? So they were aware of this difference, right? And so Plato had that in in what in in the schooling of the people, right? Some things were to develop in the irascible, or other he had in some the concupiscible right? The athletes, the irascible, you know, and then what's the the words of Thomas MacArthur there at West Point, there, you know, they had to put over the gym, you know, you know these fields of friendly conflict, you know, they're going to learn how to behave, you know, for these feelings of.

[30:44] He says that I can't recall exact words now, but but then you had things like music and so on, so the soul didn't become, you know, just just beastly. So Plato saw the things.

[31:08] Yeah, which makes hope pertain to another power, right? To the irascible, which regards the arduous, as has been said in the first part, right?

[31:21] And then he says against this objection from the per contrarium, possible, however, and impossible, do not entirely per contrarium have themselves to the object of the appetitive power? For the appetitive power is the beginning of what motion, and that's when Aristotle takes it up as in the third book after he takes it up reason, right? And he's talking about now as the source of what the motion of the animal.

[31:51] For nothing is moved to something except under the aspect of it being what possible, right? For no one is moved to that which he estimates impossible to be what attain, right?

[32:07] So why didn't the Greeks go to the moon? It's impossible, right? I mean, okay. In account to this, hope differs from desperation according to the difference of possible and what impossible, right? And you know, Thomas in Shakespeare, Mozart's sonata developments sometimes he will what put the melody first in the in the major key and then he'll change it to the minor key when it goes into despair, right?

[32:40] And suddenly he does these he's he's notes. Okay. Now I'm curious about this second. I'm dying to. Now he's going to see an article two here.

[33:00] The second one goes forward thus. It seems that hope pertains to the knowing power, right? For hope seems to be a certain what expectation, right?

[33:18] For the apostle says in Romans chapter eight, if our what we do not what see, we hope for, right? We expect by what patience.

[33:31] But expectation, expecting, seems to pertain to the knowing power. of whom it is to expect something, right? I expect it's going to happen. Kind of looking out for us, I see in the word etymology in some way, anyway. Yeah, that's a good way. Yeah, looking out, expect, yeah. Yeah, looking out for it. Looking before and after, right? Therefore, hope pertains to the knowing power, right? Just like the men on the Columbus's ship, they went out to look to look out for the land, where they were expecting.

[34:09] Moreover, it seems to be the same thing, hope as what? Confidence, maybe. If you do see, yeah, confidence, I guess. Whence the ones that are hoping are we call what? Confident, right. As if using for the same thing that they what are confident in the hope, right? But confidence, just as what Faith. faith seems to pertain to the knowing power, right? Therefore, hope, right?

[34:53] So you're confident about being elected, huh? That means you you think you're going to be elected, right? I'm confident that this will. I think so. It seems like the knowing power, right? Moreover, certitude is a property of the knowing power, right? But certitude is attributed to hope. Therefore, hope pertains to the what knowing power. But against this, hope is about the good, as has been said, right?

[35:29] But the good, as such, is not the object of the knowing power. It means the good as good, right? But of the desiring power. Therefore, hope does not pertain to the knowing power, but to the desiring power.

[35:47] Well, see what Thomas says. The answer should be said that says since hope implies a certain what. Extending right of the appetite towards the good, it's manifest that it pertains to the desiring power, right? For emotion to things pertains properly to the desiring power,

[36:17] but the action of the knowing power is perfected not according to the motion of the knower to the thing, but more according as the things known are in the knower, right?

[36:34] But because the knowing power moves the desiring power, representing to it its own what object, right? According to diverse aspects of the object, what grasped, there follows diverse motions in the what desiring power. Now another motion appears or follows in the desiring power from the apprehension of the good, another from the apprehension of the what bad, and likewise a different motion from the apprehension of the present and the what future,

[37:20] the absolute and the what. The arduous, difficult, the possible and the what impossible. And according to this, hope is a motion of the appetitive power, fouling upon the grasping of a future good that is difficult, is possible nevertheless to be what obtained, right? Get all that in here. Put that in here now. Spes est motus appetitive virtutis consequens apprehensionem boni futuri ardui possibilis adipisci. That's the four things you talked about before, isn't it?

[38:03] To wit, the extension of the appetite in such a what object, right? Now, what about this text here from Romans eight twenty five? To the first, therefore, it should be said that because hope regards the what possible good, right? There arises twofold, in two ways, to man the motion of the what hope, just as what.

[38:40] In two ways, something is possible to someone. In one way, according to his own what virtue, and another according to the virtue or power of another, right? What therefore one hopes through one's own power to obtain, one is not said to expect. But to hope only, right? I know that's something about the Latin word you expectare, right?

[39:10] Inheritance, expect. But properly, one is said to expectare what he hopes from the aid of a what alien power, right? Another power. Then one is said to expectare, as it were, ex alio He takes the ex as being right. Mm hmm Expectare, right?

[39:40] So I guess you translate like look for from or something like that. From another, yeah. Insofar as the grasping power, right, preceding, not only regards the good that one intends to obtain, but also to that by the power of whom one hopes to obtain it, right? According to that in Ecclesiasticus 51.

[40:11] I will be what looking for the aid of a man, right? Where we say our help comes from the mountains. How's it go? Is that song? Look to the mountains. What is it? I can't remember it now, but that's the same.

[40:32] Okay, the motion therefore hope is sometimes called expectatio, looking for, account of the what inspection of the power. Yeah, the only power preceding, right? Yeah. Okay, that's what you do about that, right? Our eyes

[41:00] upon the mountains, from whence help comes to us, or something. Yeah, yeah, I think yeah, it's one of the psalms here in the Psalms of the Sentinel. Yeah, yeah, I think it's one of those is uh I read something from Francis de Sales. who was talking about. He wrote a letter to a bishop who wanted to design his office. because he was overwhelmed. with that. Yeah. and he tried to encourage him.

[41:21] He said, "All the time we're spending worrying about whether you should step down or not, you're not going to be worried about doing your job. Yeah. Whereas you should put your eyes on the Lord, whence help comes to us, and then you do your job. And he used the example of a man who wants to put away his wife. Says all the time he's agonizing whether he's going to put her away or not.

[41:40] He's not worried about loving her. I think what he should be doing. To the second, it should be said that that which man desires and estimates himself able to obtain, right. He what? He will obtain. Yeah, Predits himself to obtain. And from such faith in the knowing knowledge preceding, the emotion following the appetite is called what confidence.

[42:21] For the appetitive emotion is denominated from the preceding what knowledge, right? Just as an effect from a cause, more what Known. For more does the knowing power know its own act, right? Than the act of the what Petitive power. Huh that's interesting Yeah

[42:53] The way people use this this. um. adverb all the time. Hopefully, what does that mean? They mean they kind of expect it, you know. Yeah. They're not sure about what's going to take place, but they're kind of using more to talk with the mind, really, in a sense, aren't they? You know, than the appetite there. No, and

[43:21] hopefully we'll do this right. You know, I mean, you know, we're not not certain that we can do it necessarily, you know, but. I was curious. I was curious because sometimes, at least in English, they'll often interchange or use that same. I think I think it's the same notion that, and they will speak of it as I believe I'll be able to do that. They use a belief as well, and I think maybe it's rooted in that.

[43:42] that it comes from confidence. Yeah, yeah. I used to be annoyed sometimes when people, you know, would kind of confuse. It seems to me, faith and and hope, you know, and they would.

[43:56] If they were the same thing, you know. What does that mean when you say, "Jesus, I trust in thee"? Is that I have faith in you? Yeah. I hope in you. Yeah, yeah. Because I know that's what in Spanish they use "confido" or maybe in Latin I've got confido" in te, that's how they translate it. Jesus, I trust in thee. Whatever it is, I don't know the Polish.

[44:21] Yeah, yeah. But which is it? Yeah. Is it emphasizing? If I say I trust Thomas, you know, these matters, it's kind of a faith, right? Yeah,

[44:36] I suppose you use trust to mean hope too? You know. Yeah. To the third, it should be said that certitude is attributed to motion, not only of the appetitive, uh, sensitive sensitive appetitive power, but also the natural appetite, right? Just as a stone is tends with certitude, downward, right? Mm-hmm.

[45:15] And this, is an account of the infallibility which it has from the certitude of knowledge, which precedes the motion of the sensitive appetite, or even the what, Natural Natural right Well, I'm just saying about that the irascible is closer to the reason, right? But I mean, the fact that things should arise at all, the question is kind of interesting, right? You didn't think like that in the in the concupiscible appetite, did you?

[45:48] Here in the very beginning of the discussion of the irascible. You find this right. But Thomas says elsewhere, you know, speaking about the irascible being closer to reason, huh? You have that in Plato, you say, you know, the reason's up here, and the thumos is here, and the epithumia is down here, you know. Okay. Can

[46:19] we get time for another article or not? It doesn't look too long. Whether hope is in the brute animals, the third one proceeds thus: it seems that in the brute animals there is not hope, right? For hope is about a future good, as Damascene says. But to know the future does not pertain to the brute animals, who have only sense knowledge, which is not of future things. Therefore, hope is not in brute animals.

[46:55] before and after. The dog, when he broke his leg, he had no idea he was going to get an X-ray. He had no idea he was going to get surgery. He had no hope.

[47:06] And he pulled this. Probably cool. Is everybody coming home? Yeah, he thinks he's going to be stuck with that cast now. Moreover, the object of hope is the good possible to be obtained. But possible and impossible are some differences of the true and the false, which are only in the mind, as the philosopher says in the sixth book of metaphysics. Therefore, hope is not in brute animals, in which there is not mind.

[47:32] Moreover, Augustine says, upon Genesis to letter, that animals are moved by the things seen, but hope is not about what is seen, for what someone sees, who hopes, right? This is said in Romans eight twenty four. Therefore, hope is not in brute animals. But against this is that hope is a passion of the irascible, but in brute animals there is irascible, right? That dog is an idiot.

[47:59] Yeah, it's an anger in the dog. Yeah. Therefore, hope. You can see how this question kind of falls from the other. one. I answer: It should be said that the interior passions of animals can be what apprehended from their exterior motions, huh? from which it appears that in brute animals there is hope. For if the dog sees a what? Is that a is that a leopard? I'm not sure.

[48:32] Oh, here. Here, yeah. Or a what? Some kind of a bird there. What? Hock, yeah, a bird. Nimis distantem, far away. Yeah. He does not move to it, right? As it were, not hoping to what? To contain it. Yeah. I mean, the cat walking around under the tree there, you know. Don't make me to me like that. Because the birds are mocking him or something. He has to get them.

[49:02] Because the cat doesn't try to jump around the tree to catch the bird, but he should go over there where the neighbor had kind of a little thing, a water thing, for the birds come down and get into the kind of flowers around there, you know. That's possible to get up there. Yeah. Short distance, right? Yeah. Yeah, I'm losing that one.

[49:31] Okay, if however it be in propinquo, right, is moved as it were under the hope of attaining it, right? For as has been said above, the what, sense, the sensitive appetite of brute animals and also the natural appetite of insentient things follow the grasping of some understanding or some intellect, just as the what,

[49:59] appetite of the understanding nature, yeah, which is called the will. But in this there is a difference that the will is moved from the apprehension of an understanding that is joined to it, but the emotion of the natural appetite follows the apprehension of a separated intellect, which instituted that nature, right? And likewise, the appetite of sensitive appetite of brute animals, which act by certain natural what, instinct,

[50:33] when in the works of brute animals and of other natural things there appears a similar process as in the works of what art, art imitates nature, and in this way in brute animals there is hope and despair, right? How grapes, right? That's about the other part. Yeah, he's trying to jump there to find he despairs.

[51:04] The first, therefore, it should be said that although brute animals do not know the future, nevertheless, from a natural instinct, the animals move towards something in the future, as if it foresaw the what future, right? Aristotle speaks there in the De Anim of man as having the sense of time, right? In the sense of time, the animals.

[51:28] Yeah, that's what Saint Francis de Sales distinguishes. He says animals are, yeah, animals seem to cast themselves towards the good they want, whereas we can forecast. Yeah, that was a good expression.

[51:50] So although they do not know the future, nevertheless, from a natural instinct, the animals move to something in the future, as if it foresaw the future. But this instinct is in them from the divine understanding, foreseeing future things.

[52:08] The second, it should be said, that the object of hope is not what possible, in so far as that is a certain difference of the what true. True. For thus it falls upon the habitus or the relation of predicate to the what subject. So it's possible for a triangle to be green, right? Possible for a triangle to be a circle.

[52:38] But the object of hope is is possible that is said according to some what potency, huh? And this is the famous distinction Aristotle makes of the word possible in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, huh? In the two possible, the one is said according to the order of the predicate to the subject, and that is said according to some ability,

[53:04] huh? To the third, it should be said that although that which is future does not come under sight, nevertheless, when those things which animals see in the present, his appetite is moved to something future, either to pursuing it or avoiding it, right? So they go down south, they get

[53:30] some. So we have a class next week, you said.