Prima Secundae
104. Fear as a Special Passion, Natural Fear, and the Six Species of Fear (Q41 a2–4)
Class of 2013-02-14
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/104-fear-as-a-special-passion-natural-fear-and-the-six-species/

[0:00] To the second, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that fear is not the name of a what special passion, right? For Augustine says in the book on eighty-three questions, huh,

[0:20] that the one whom what fear is it does not what take away his soul or spirit, right? Huh? Nor does what cupidity, desire, what waste it, nor aegritudo, that is sadness, tears it, I suppose. Nor a vain and what's just the ends there did not ventilate, huh? From which it seems that having removed fear, all other passions are removed, huh? Therefore, it is not a what special passion, but a what general, like a condition, maybe of of passions, right?

[1:16] Moreover, the philosopher says in the sixth book of the ethics that pursuit and flight have themselves in the appetite, the repetitive power, as affirmation and negation in the what understanding, right? Huh? So I pursue something, I'm affirming it, right? And when I see it, I'm negating it, right? But negation is not something special in the intellect, just as neither is affirmation, but something what common to many, right?

[1:52] Huh? Therefore, neither is flight in the appetite, but fear is nothing other than a certain flight from the evil, from the bad, and therefore fear is not a special what passion.

[2:11] Moreover, if fear were a special passion, you would be especially found in the irascible, right? But there's also a fear in the concupiscible This is a bit confusing the issue here. For the philosopher says in the second book of rhetoric that fear is a certain sadness. Strange thing that Aristotle doesn't say that. And the Damascene says that fear is a virtus desiderativa. That's the thing we quoted in the last passage, right?

[2:45] Remember, desiderativa. But tristitia and desire are in the concupiscible, as has been said above. Therefore, it is not a special passion, since it pertains to what diverse powers, right?

[3:04] But against this, that it's divided against the other passions of the soul, as is clear by Damascene or from Damascene in the second book on the Orthodox Faith.

[3:18] Now Thomas's reply is fairly short here. I answer: It should be said that the passions of the soul receive their what species, as opposed to the genus, right? From their what objects, right?

[3:37] Hence, that is a special passion which has a special what object, huh? But fear has a special object, just as hope has a special object. For just as the object of hope is a what good future arduous possible to be attained. So there's four parts in the definition of what hope, right? I mean, excuse me, the object of hope. It's a good that is future but difficult yet possible to be attained, right?

[4:13] I used to tell the students: I say defining is like spelling. Leave one letter out, you've misspelled the word, you know. And remember, there used to be some of those tough assumptionists, you know. They'd say, you know, you hand in the paper, you know, a written thing, one misspelling, your thing is lowered one grade. You can imagine after having that happen to you, each guy reads that guy's paper, and they read your thing over, you make sure there's no misspellings in that thing, you know, just.

[4:50] But definition is a very exact thing, right, huh? And then you know, I before e except after, etc. So if the order of the letters is not correct, it's misspelled too, right? Well, it's like in a definition, a lot more in a definition than that, but I mean to say what? Yeah, you got a number of parts, and if one of them is missing, you haven't fully defined it, and there's a order among the parts, right?

[5:17] So notice the order here, right? Bonum, so something good. That's the most fundamental, right? But it's a good that is in the future, right? Not one that is what present, right?

[5:33] And it's. Now, now, if it's just bonum futurum alone, that would fit what else besides hope? Desire. Yeah, because desire is for a good that is in the future, right? I want to eat, right? Okay, well then, eating is in the future, right? And something good, presumably. Okay. So you have to add then the arduum, right? That's about a future good that is arduous. But would there be hope if you thought you couldn't what?

[6:07] Overcome that difficulty, you couldn't attain the thing, right? No. So four things in the object of hope, right? Now, if you leave one of those out, you have misdefined, right? And if you put them in some different order, you are going to be have your grade lowered when the grade is percolated, okay? So you're forewarned, right? Okay.

[6:37] So likewise, the object of fear is, and those are those gifts first, malum, something bad, huh? It's an evil that's already been forced upon you. No. It's a evil that is what future, right? But if you stopped with malum futurum, that would fit also what? Aversion. Aversion, the opposite of desire, right? Okay. If you stopped in malum, it would fit even hate, right? Okay. But futurum, and if you stopped with malum, you would figure sadness too, right?

[7:17] But futurum separates it from what? Sadness. Yeah, which is about the present good, right? Okay. And hate is not what. It's for either present or a future. It is, it's indifferently. But then you have to add this fourth part, right? Third part, Difficulate, right? Okay? And then to which the one cannot what? Resist. Yeah. Yeah. Doctor, does it have to be in that the order that you named?

[7:55] The order that Thomas gives it, yeah. There is, there is a future good, difficult, and possible to obtain. Yeah, yeah. That's the order, okay? Well, that's for hope, But for fear. Yeah, now for you, it's it's a malum futurum difficile cui resisti non potest, right? You think you can't resist, you can't.

[8:19] Yeah. Yeah. Hence, fear is a special passion of the soul, right? You get to see that when the object is defined in this way by these four parts, right, then you see that it really is a special object. That. Okay.

[8:43] Now, what about the first objection here, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that all passions of the soul are derived from one beginning, right? To wit, from love, right?

[9:02] In which they have to each other a what connection? So reason looks before and after, right? And it's just an order among these. But then love is before all the rest, right?

[9:21] And by reason of this connection, when fear is removed, one removes other passions of the soul, not because it is a what passion? A general passion would be something said of many passions, right?

[9:45] So if I love steak and I don't have steak, I I want steak, right? When I have steak, I enjoy it, right? And the dog gets the steak, then I'm angry, right? And so on. So you see. All these things are arising from what love, but they're not love, right? My anger at the dog is not love, right?

[10:06] Love is not anger, okay? And my love is not my what desire, right? After I satisfy myself with the steak, then I still love it, but I don't have any desire for it.

[10:32] What about flight now? Say, well, if you just said flight alone, maybe you could argue this way, right? To the second, it should be said that not every what fleeing, you know, of the appetite is fear, but flight from a what some special object, right?

[10:53] And therefore, although fuga is something general, right? Nevertheless, fear is a special passion, huh? To the third, it should be said that fear in no way is in the what inconcupiscible, right? For it does not regard the bad absolutely, but the bad with some difficulty or hardness, right? And one to which one hardly vix is able to what resist, right?

[11:34] But now it's an important thing, because it's a man who looks before and after, right? But because the passions of the irascible are both derived from the passions of the inconcupiscible, like we said that what hope and what despair arise from what desire, right? And fear and boldness from what aversion, right? Okay, and anger, you know, will arise mainly from sadness, right, or pain.

[12:09] So they're both derived from the passions of the inconcupiscible, and they what terminate them, right? Okay. So if you escape, you know, the thing you fear, you might have some, you know, and but if you don't escape, you know, then there is going to be sadness, right? Okay.

[12:37] And because of that connection, right, that they derive from or the indenem, then to fear is attributed sometimes those things which pertain to the what inconcupiscible, right?

[12:51] For fear is said to be sadness. In so far as the object of what fear is something that saddens us, right? If it were present, right, right. Whence the philosopher says there that fear proceeds from the what imagining of some future evil that would be corrupting of one or saddening of one, right?

[13:20] Likewise, also desire is attributed by Damascene to fear, because just as hope arises from the desire for the good, so what fear from the fleeing from the evil, right? Ah, but the flight from evil arises from the desire for the good, right? Okay.

[13:49] So I want to save my life, so I flee the, you know, the murderer or something. So you can see that sometimes in in our our way of speaking, there you can use the adjective to name the what

[14:08] cause or the effect of something, right? What's a vicious blow? When it proceeds from vice, it causes vice in the body. Okay, get down another one here. Okay. Whether there is. Some natural fear, right?

[14:41] The third one goes forward thus. It seems that some fear is natural, right? For Damascene says in the third book that there is a certain natural fear, the soul not wishing to be divided from the body, right? I was just reading about in the Gospel of Saint John there, you know, Thomas is talking about Christ and yeah, the fear of death, right? This is natural. He's letting the natural emotion of the body, right, arise there in him.

[15:15] Now, what does this mean? Is Thomas going to deny that there's a natural fear? Some people, some people are naturally lazy. Laziness is a kind of fear.

[15:41] When somebody say, you know, you know, work fascinates me. I can watch other people working, you know. All day long. Fear arises from love, as has been said, right? But some love is what natural, right? As Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names. Therefore, also there must be some what Natural fear. some natural fear, right? So Thomas is saying there, the error is magna pars miseri, right?

[16:20] He's fearing, huh? He loves truth, he fears error, right? It's natural love truth, isn't it? Yeah. Moreover, fear is opposed to hope, as has been said above. But some hope is of what nature? Which is clear through what is said in Romans 4: 18 about Abraham. And against the hope of nature, he believed in the hope of what? Grace. Grace, huh? Therefore, also there is some what fear that is natural, right?

[17:02] But against those things which are natural are commonly found in both what animate and inanimate things, huh? Strange. But fear is not found in what inanimate things. Therefore, fear is not natural, right? Huh? And you go to the nursery and they say what this plant wants a lot of sun or wants a lot of water or wants broccoli is a big feeder and so on. And so we use the terms like you know desire, right?

[17:39] But we do speak of fear, right? You know, it's flower fears too much or something. We might say, you know, this plant doesn't like a lot of sun, right? Or I guess your cacti, you know, you can't feed them too much or something, or you know, so.

[17:55] But wouldn't say that this plant fears the sun. Would you say that? No. There's something to do with the fact that the irascible is closer to reason, right? You see. And so you're more apt to speak of natural desire in the plants, than natural fear, or you know, to plant hopes to produce this year. No farmer hopes the plants are going to produce. Yeah.

[18:33] Well, let's see. This is Thomas. Interesting guy, this Thomas. I wonder what his table conversation was like. Yeah. What was this light conversation? So, know the one story where Thomas was at the dinner table of the King Louis, right? You heard that story, right? And somehow in the middle of the dinner, he slapped everything and he said, "that finishes the Manichaeans. And everybody's looking at him, you know.

[19:01] And of course, he has to apologize, you know. Yeah. But he was thinking out an argument against the Manichaeans, right? And then all of a sudden, you know. And of course, being a saint, St. Louis, you know, it's not, you know, quickly, somebody write down what Thomas has thought of, you know, that's what he said, you know. So, kind of a marvelous. contact between the two of them.

[19:23] Let me do a nice comparison: Aristotle with Alexander the Great, and Thomas with Saint Louis. Yeah. Aristotle falling out with Alexander later on. Much worse for Alexander. I know.

[19:42] Okay. Well, I answer. Thomas says that it should be said that some motion is said to be natural because nature inclines to it, right? Okay.

[19:57] But this happens in two ways, huh? In one way, that the whole is perfected by nature, without any operation of the knowing power. Just as to move upwards is a natural motion of what fire,

[20:19] and to grow is a natural motion of animals and what plants, huh? In another way, a motion is natural to which nature inclines, right? Although is not perfected except through what Knowing, grasping. Yeah. Let's use the word apprehension, right? Huh? Nobody uses the word grasping for knowing. To

[20:50] grasp something into your mind. Yeah, yeah, because knowing takes place by the known being in the knower, right? Huh? As opposed to love, which takes place by the lover being in the loved. Huh? I left my heart in San Francisco, right? Okay. But learning, you are trying to get something into your mind, huh? So it's kind of a contrariety between the two, right? So we tend to use the word take for the mind, right?

[21:21] Huh? But not to characterize love. Love is more to give, right? Huh? Okay. But to take and to give are kind of what contrary, right? Huh? But shows the kind of kind of contrariety between the movement of knowing coming to know in that of loving, right? Huh? Okay.

[21:45] So love, in a sense, like Thomas says there, it what ecstasy, right? You go outside of yourself, right? Okay. So we always go back to the example of Augustine there, you know, where he's thinking about the Trinity, and he meets the little boy on the seashore, and the little boy is running down to the ocean, and he's dug a hole and he's putting water in there. And Augustine, so what are you trying to do?

[22:10] And he says, but but there's the ocean there and the hole here. Augustine, you can't get dead in there. The boy says, you can't fit the Trinity into your mind either, you know. So, but no, you could jump into the ocean, right? Huh? You know, so the so the way is to say the will is more proportioned to God, right? And then the what? Yeah, yeah. See, I can more jump into the ocean, right?

[22:38] Then I can put the ocean inside of me. But to know something, you got to get it into your head, right? So you use the word apprehension, which is in the hand. I'm to grasp something. It's contained in the hand, right? Okay. That's why the end of the parable of the judgment. That's when God says, "Enter into the joy of the Lord, " because we can't get it in us, but we can get it.

[23:08] But in the beatific vision, you see, God is is joined to our mind as that by which we see, and not only what we see, but that by which we see. Because we can't we can't see God as He is by one of our thoughts, but by God Himself being joined to our mind.

[23:31] We should be like him, because we shall see Him as He is, right? As light we shall see, like him. So, in another way, he says, then emotion is called natural, to which nature inclines, although it is not perfected, except through what apprehension, through grasping. I said, did you screw it down? Knowledge, because as has been said above, the emotion of the knowing and of the what desiring power are reduced to nature as to a first what beginning, huh?

[24:19] And in this way also, the acts of the knowing power, as to understand and to what sense and to remember, and also the emotions of the what appetitive animal power are. Sometimes what called natural, right? Huh? Okay. But they're not just natural, right? Okay. And in this way, one can perhaps speak of a what? A natural fear, right? Huh? And it's distinguished from a fear that is not natural, according to the diversity of the what?

[25:03] Object, right? For as the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, now why does Thomas go to the second book of the rhetoric when he's talking about the emotions?

[25:19] Yeah, it's one of the means of persuasion, right? Huh? So rhetoric is the art of persuasion, right? Aristotle distinguishes three means of persuasion, right? The image you project of yourself, you know, as a man who's noble, got your good in mind, feels your pain as clipping climbing, into soil, and then the second means is the way you move the what? Emotions and prejudices and so on of the people, and then the third is the arguments or apparent arguments, which are the least important.

[25:54] And so Aristotle talks about a whole number of emotions there, right? In particular, as to how they are what they are and how they are aroused and how they're what quieted down and so on, right? Huh? And then you that's reason why Thomas refers a lot to the rhetoric, right? You know, because Aristotle says a lot of very nice things there about the emotions, in particular. The De anima doesn't go into the emotions that much in detail, right?

[26:30] For as the philosopher says in the second book of rhetoric, fear is about something bad that is corruptive of oneself, right? Which nature refuses an account of the natural desire of being, right? And therefore, such a fear is called what? Natural, right? Huh? It is also a what? An evil that saddens that is not repugnant to nature, but is repugnant to the desire of the desiring power, and such a fear is not what?

[27:07] Natural in the fullest sense, right? Just as above, love, desire, and what? And what? Pleasure are distinguished by natural and what? Not natural, right? Huh?

[27:29] But according to the first exception or taking of the word natural, it should be known that. Some of the passions of the soul are sometimes what called natural ones like what love and desire and hope. What others are not able to be what. Called natural. Yeah.

[27:59] And this because love and hate, desire and flight, imply a certain inclination to pursuing the good. And fleeing the bad, which inclination pertains to the what. Natural appetite. Yeah. And therefore, there is a love that is natural, right? And desire or hope can be, in some ways, said even in natural things.

[28:34] Yeah. Oh no, it's strange to say hope there. huh, but other passions of the soul implies certain emotions to which, in no way, does the natural inclination suffice.

[29:01] Either because it's of the notion of these passions that there be sense or knowledge, right? Which apprehension is required for the notion of what? Pleasure. Pleasure and sadness, right?

[29:20] So can the tree be? Is the tree ever said to be joyful or or sad? I mean, you can say that about a tree, right? But you have to be in some way aware of this, right? To be joyful or sad, right? But you would say that the tree likes water. When the tree wants water, you know, you see a woman sitting in the house there, you know, the plant isn't in water or something, it's drooping, you know, it wants some water, yeah, yeah.

[29:49] But you wouldn't say that it delights in the water. I think so. The roots of the willow tree—they seek, they go after sources of water. They destroy your foundations, your pipes, and everything else because they're seeking water.

[30:10] Whence things that lack knowledge cannot be said to what. To be delighted. To be sad. Or because motions of this sort are against the notion of what. Natural. Yeah. As desperation, despair refuses the good and it comes with difficulty, right?

[30:39] And fear refuses the fighting of the what, Contra evil, to which there is a natural inclination. And therefore, passions of this sort, in no way are are attributed to inanimate things. Yeah, so so so frightened by so so fearful that they they can't resist the man. When they talk about the about wine, I mean about the vineyards, you know, and how they have a poor soil, right?

[31:10] Huh? And they have to make an effort to. A little bit like hope, right? Huh? You know, and that they're they're moved by this sort of thing, right? Maybe hope would be applied a little bit to them at least making an effort, right?

[31:30] In no way would you speak of pleasure, pain, right? I saw off a branch, you know. You're feeling that that makes it stick or something, you know, or them causing the plant any pain, right?

[31:52] When they cut back on the plant, it wants to grow out there, you know. You know, we have got this this thing that goes over the. Yeah, yeah. Cut it! Cut it! Almost got me cut, Rosie. It's going up. It's all underneath the deckens. Music things, some of these

[32:13] things. Time for one more article, or what? Sure. We have to get to this question. here. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Whether suitably are assigned species of fear, right? Well, this is apparently something that Damascene does, huh? To the fourth, one goes forward thus. It seems that unsuitably Damascene assigns six species of fear. To wit. Too wet? What's that?

[32:54] Signitium, what is that? That's like that. Slow, sluggishness, weak, feeble. Laziness or something, I think. Lazy. Okay. Shame, erubusensium, right? Yep. Well, there's another version of shame too. Yeah, so what's the difference between veracundium and erubusensium? What do they say? They say shamefacedness. But what's the other one? There's one after. Laziness, shamefacedness, and shame. Shamefacedness and shame, that's helpful. We'll see that again in the body article.

[33:28] Admiration is what? Wonder. Yeah, okay. Stuper. So you say I admire somebody, right, huh? Okay. Stupor, huh? What is that? Overwhelming, maybe. Yeah. And agonium, huh? That's a Greek of struggle, but I don't know what they, what that would be here. Mm-hmm. Anxiety. Anxiety, okay.

[33:59] Well, this is really getting difficult stuff here now. For as the philosopher says in the second book of the Rhetoric, fear is about a evil that is what? Sadness. Yeah. Therefore, the species of fear ought to correspond to the species of sadness, huh? But there are four species of sadness, as has been said above. Therefore, there ought to be only four species of fear corresponding to them.

[34:28] That's reasonable. I hate to be involved in a debate with Thomas, right? He's polarized. He made me make, I'd have erubicensium and secundium, and I'd be red in the face, and, and, uh...

[34:52] Remember when I was teaching in California there at St. Mary's College there, you know, and the, the University of California, they wanted us to come down there and put on a medieval debate, you know, so.

[35:03] See what it's like. Moreover, number two, that which consists in our act, right, huh, is subject to our power. But fear is about something bad that exceeds our power, as has been said.

[35:26] Therefore, what? We said laziness, right? Shame and so on. We'll see what those are more particularly, which regard our operation should not be what? Laid down as species of fear, right, huh? Because they're... They seem to be related to what we're able to do. Yeah, yeah, I can do the shameful act or not, right? Okay.

[35:53] Moreover, fear is about the future, as has been said, but veracundia is about a, uh, a bad act, I mean, a Shameful. Shameful act, yeah. iam commissum Now that's in the past, right? Okay. So I'm embarrassed to confess my sins, right? But sins are in the what? Past, yeah. Hmm. That's interesting. Okay.

[36:23] Therefore, veracundia is not a species of what? fear, right? Moreover, fear is not except about the bad, but wonder and stupor are about the great and the not customary, right? Whether it be good or bad, right? Therefore, wonder and stupor are not species of what? Fear, yeah.

[37:01] Now, the fifth article. Moreover, the philosophers from wonder are moved to inquiring the truth, as is said in the beginning of the physics. But fear does not move one to inquire, but more to flee. There you go. Therefore, it's wonder is not a species of fear. No. What are we going to do with this? I mean, my goodness. But in the contrary, suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory Nyssa, which is apparently not Gregory Nyssa.

[37:34] Well, this one didn't make reference to it. It says Nemesius at the bottom of my page. Oh, oh, wait, wait, not there. This is 6. Yeah, up above they said that, yeah, with the third objection. Okay. So what fallacy is that, young man down there? Which one? Thomas thinks it's Gregory of Nyssa, and the footnote says it's Nemesius Accidental equivocation? What? Accidental equivocation? Equivocation. Yeah, equivocation, yeah.

[38:06] Yeah. Yeah. There's a lot of examples of this thing, right, huh? In history, you know, where even scholars, you know, have got the wrong person, right? Thank you, yes. Yeah, yeah.

[38:26] They talking. I saw somebody over... a friend there, he and his wife had died they had the same name as the other man and his wife, you know, they're not the two men of the same name, but but each man the same name name for his wife, you know. I mean, there's all kinds of things, you know. Yeah. And, uh, I remember at Assumption there, the guy whose name was was Michael Joplin, something like that, and said Joplin has died.

[38:58] I guess it's some kind of a band guy, you know. So it wasn't the guy they thought was their their friend, you know, and a little bit, right? That's a common thing, right? I think the Greek commentators sometimes they'll take the example of the individual man's name, right, to illustrate the facility of this. This.

[39:24] Of course, my brother Mark and I were teaching, what's this D Berquest, M Berquest? Confusing the students. Okay. Well, Thomas, we need you here now. Answer, it should be said that, as has been said, fear is about a future evil that exceeds the power of the one what? Fearing. That he is not able to what? Resist it. Yeah.

[40:01] Now, just as the good of man, so also the evil of man is able to be considered either in his what? Operation itself or in exterior things, right?

[40:20] Now, in the operation of the man himself, a twofold evil can be what? Feared, right? First, a labor weighing down the what? Nature. And this, and thus is caused what? Laziness. Yeah. Signitias, is that the way you translate it? Laziness?

[40:48] Okay. When one refuses to operate on account of fear of the excess of what? Labor. Labor, huh? Too hard. Okay. Secondly, the what? Disgrace, I guess, turpitude. Mm-hmm. Which, uh, what, destroys one's Reputation. Reputation.

[41:19] And thus, if turpitude is Feared. Feared in committing the act, there is what? Shame. Shame. Huh? Yeah. If, however, it is about something Past or done. Yeah, it is veracundia, right, huh? Yeah.

[41:41] We might call one embarrassment. You're embarrassed when something happens, whereas Yeah. it's past, you're ashamed of your past. Yeah. So may pretend shame and embarrassment for me? Embarrassment, I would think of embarrassment as something present. Mm. It was embarrassed because I got caught doing this. I was really embarrassed, whereas I'm ashamed of something I've done. Okay. Ashamed of my past. That's, uh, I think we speak that way, but...

[42:11] Yeah, yeah, like, like the politics now, they're always looking around, you know, see if something shameful in the guy's past that they can, they can bring forward, right? Yeah. Okay. Yeah, Where do they elect the next You shouldn't You shouldn't say more I'm more ashamed of some things in my past than I'm embarrassed by them, right? Mm By you know, I'm embarrassed by something by something happening right now, you know?

[42:45] Okay. So, we'll translate verecundia by shame? I would think shame, and that one by embarrassment. I think. Okay. Well, I mean, the one that looks to the future is kind of, I don't know. My experience is like, you know, a teacher calls on you in class. Yeah. And you are scared of messing up the answer. Yeah. Get red in the face, or yeah. So you're scared about what you're going to do, embarrassed.

[43:19] Or the present. Being embarrassed? I don't know about that being future. I think embarrassment is like you got caught with your hand in a cookie jar, and you're you're suddenly embarrassed. That's that's the present. He says it's the deed yet to be done No, iam facto is

[43:44] well, it's either in acto committendo, in the act being committed, while it's being committed, is this what? I'm calling embarrassment, but the other one's already done. Iam facto is already done. That'd, be my shame, you know. Shame, yeah, I'm ashamed of my past. Those may not be the best translations, but it's a good idea. It's a good idea. Yeah. Okay. Where, where is this headed? It says, and thus if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is shame fazedness.

[44:17] There's talk of future. No, that's not what it says here. That's not what it says here. So no, no, no. So he's dividing these six. You know, he has to follow the rule of two or three, right? He's limited by that, huh? And so the first three are about a what? Something in man's operation and doing, right? And the last he's going to say are in what exterior things, right?

[44:43] So you can divide them into two, and each of the two. Okay. But then when when you divide the first three, he divides segnitia, which I guess is laziness, right? Huh?

[45:01] Against the other two, right? And they're subdivided. like in the way, we've been trying to see them, right? The fact, we have a difficult time naming those two. is a sign that they're closer, right, Embarrassment and shame, right? Make? Sense. Okay.

[45:29] Now the evil that is in exterior things, for a what, threefold reason, is able to exceed the faculty of man to what resist, huh?

[45:45] And first by reason of its magnitude, as when someone considers some great evil, whose way out, it's not not sufficient to consider a way out, and thus it is what admiration, huh? I remember seeing the thing there, where the guy's talking about the emotional effect of Shakespeare's plays, you know, and he's quoting the thing there from the end of Hamlet, "Woe or wonder," is the name of it.

[46:17] Notice the idea that wonder is brought in there to taking the effect of all these bodies on the stage there, right? Okay. Kind of wonder there, right? Huh? What's happened here, right? Second, by reason of what? Unaccustomedness. Yeah. Because some unaccustomed evil is offered to our consideration, and because it's unaccustomed, it seems great in our what? Our estimate, or something. Yeah. And this way is stupor, which is caused from.

[46:59] Unaccustomed imagination. Yeah. Okay. So Monsignor Dionne used to talk about these two, you know, on the intellectual life, right? Because admiration is a help to the intellectual life, and stupor, you know, yeah, like that that student I was talking about who gave up being an undergraduate at Minnesota, there, right? I told you that story, you know. I think so. I was at a function there and got talking to I don't know some doctor's wife or something, and what are you studying, philosophy?

[47:29] Oh. Tells about this young man you know who went to the University of Minnesota and read author A, he said one thing, and author B said something else, author, you know, C, and got more and more confused, and finally he he junked the whole thing, and he goes off and lives on a farm now, and he refuses to pick up a book.

[47:50] Maybe he should have read Euclid first. Yeah, yeah. But it happens a lot, right? You see, there's kind of a stupor there, right now, or you know if you see all these objections here, you know, huh? Yeah. You know, Thomas doesn't use as many objections for beginners, you know. But you may have, you know, twenty, thirty in the disputed questions, you know. He said, "Well, that'd be, but it was stupor in the student, right?

[48:13] " And he said, "How could you ever? " My cousin used to be bothered by all the different opinions there in the. Catena Aurea, right? Huh? You know? To that.

[48:26] Well, which one is it? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, he made up his mind. Yeah. That's like being upset because there's too many kinds of food on the table, or something, you know. Yeah, yeah. Well, I can't, I can't do it. I can't handle it.

[48:48] Too many desserts. Can't handle it. Okay. Third way by reason of what? Improvision. Lack of foresight, maybe. Yeah. Because not able to what foresee, right? Huh. Just as future infortunia, unfortunate things, are feared, right? Huh. And such a fear is called. Anxiety, I guess. Anxiety. yeah. That's the way you translate it? Anxiety.

[49:33] Yeah. So this is like like in Sophocles' play there, right? The Women of Trachis, right? Where she's she's this young, beautiful princess, right, who was very happily living in her father's palace, and then when her husband stormed the place and and enslaved the the ones he didn't kill, right, and then she's now a slave, right? Before she was a happy princess, you know, heir to the throne, or whatever you call it, her, And now she's a slave, right?

[50:04] It's happened to me, you know. Suddenly, you know. Of course, it is going to happen, you know. She finds out her husband is in love with the princess he's brought back to the castle, so she's trying to regain the love of Heracles, you know, and well, he's to his destruction, her destruction, but see that fear, you know, this could happen to me.

[50:41] So. To the first, he says, "It should be said that those species of sadness which are laid down above are not taken according to a diversity of object, but according to what effects, and according to certain special rationes. And therefore, it's not necessary that those species of sadness, or to those species, that they respond those species of sadness to these species of fear, which are taken according to a proper division of the object of what fear, right?

[51:25] So. To the second, now it said that operation, according as it has already what Done. come to be, or it's coming to be, I guess, is subject to the power of one acting, right? But something about the operation can be considered as what exceeding the ability of the one doing it, on account of which he then what refuses the action, right?

[51:59] And according to this, a laziness, embarrassment, yeah, and shame are laid down to be species? Of fear, Fear. My son gives me this book there about generals there, you know, and how how many generals who were removed from action there in the Second World War we don't realize that, Oh really and uh this. guy was not too hesitant, or something, you know, or you know, we bring just like that, you know.

[52:29] So, so. Strike while the iron's hot. Yeah. So I guess I I can't do that. Well, we're replacing you. That's it. Well, done. Finish.

[52:51] What about the past now, right, The third objection is taken, you know, from the definition. It seems what the object of fear is, right? So how can I have fear about the past? Unless you're going to do something with it. Yeah.

[53:11] About a past act can be what feared, a what opprobrium or a convicium as a conviction or something. Yeah. I'm not sure it's convictium That is the future, right? Okay.

[53:26] So I'm ashamed of my past act, so I fear they might be revealed, right? By the reproach. Yeah. Trying to defeat me in office, right? Running for office, right? Yeah. Like I found purposes back there, there must be something that purpose is ashamed of, you know, and and then we bring it up at his press conference. That'll be the in the hunt you know. It's. Like bringing these women to, not Obama, but Clinton was involved with, you know, to his press conferences.

[53:57] Okay. And he says not just any. The fourth one is more saying, well, can't wonder and stupor be about, but the good as well as the bad, and so on, right? So he says not just any wonder or what stupor are species of fear, but the wonder which is about a great what evil, and the stupor which is about a. Unaccustomed. Yeah. Unusual. Yeah.

[54:35] So you have to be kind of careful there about that, right? Or it can be said that just as laziness refuses the labor of the exterior operation, right? So wonder and stupor refuse the difficulty of the consideration of a great thing and an uncustomary thing, right? Would it be good or bad, right? And in this way, wonder and stupor have themselves to the act of the understanding, as significant as laziness to the exterior act, right?

[55:16] Hmm. Now this is the text Thomas I mean that Thomas used to always point about quintum here right. To the fifth it should be said that the man wondering refuses for the present to give a judgment about the thing that he what wonders huh, fearing what a defect right huh. But in the future he inquires right huh. But the one what stupefied fears both in the present to judge and in the future to inquire.

[55:50] Yeah, so he goes back to the farm and refuses to pick up a book the rest of his life. Whence admiratio is a wonder is a beginning of philosophizing right. But stupor is an impediment of philosophical consideration right. Okay.

[56:14] It's interesting how that Aristotle has in the third book of the Metaphysics a kind of universal doubt. A doubt about all things right. I used to point out that for Aristotle universal doubt comes in the last part of philosophy right. While for Descartes it comes at the beginning right beginning of all things. Yeah. So when it comes at the beginning universal doubt he doubt everything, then you have stupor right.

[56:47] Frozen. And that prevents you from. And being philosopher yeah yeah. Right Aristotle waits to the end there right when the mind has been already what formed in the lower and more proportional disciplines right. And then he does it at the the third book of wisdom right.

[57:09] Interesting comparison between Descartes right and the father of modern philosophy right. My one my teachers there at Laval there used to make fun of the title of Descartes the father of modern philosophy because he has no children.

[57:37] So we'll start with question forty two right The object of fear. Father and Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios, gracias.