Prima Secundae
105. Aquinas on Fear, Part 1: Fear's Object: Good or Evil, Death, and Guilt (Summa I-II Q.42 a.1–3)
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[0:00] God, our enlightenment, Guardian Angels, stir up the lights of our minds, ordain illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, Pray for us. And help us to understand all the truth for today. Father and Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Before we begin, question forty-two. Just look back at question forty-one, the previous question, and the first article, right, and the point that Thomas is making about the senses of the word passio in Latin.

[0:35] He said, among the other emotions of the soul, after sadness, which he puts first, right, fear has more the notion of a passion, right? For as has been said above, to the notion of passion belongs, first of all, in general, that be the emotion of the undergoing power, to which is compared its object as a active mover. In that passion or passio, undergoing is the effect of the agent, right?

[1:13] So the agent acts upon the patient, right? And in this way, even as Aristotle says in De Anima, to sense, right, and to understand, they said, to be a undergoing, right? Second, he says more properly that is said to be a passion, which is the motion of the appetitive power, right?

[1:40] So it says in scripture they became abominable just as the things they loved, right? So you're more affected by the things you love than the things you what? No, you can know disgusting things, and you're not for that reason disgusting, right? But if you love disgusting things you are ipso facto, you know, disgusting yourself, right?

[2:01] And that's talking about the will, right? And then even more properly, the motion of the appetitive power having a body organ, right? This is the appetitive power now that is the emotions, which comes about with some what bodily change, and even more so now the fourth degree here, right? Said propriissime, right, most properly, those motions are called passions, which imply some what harm, right? And then he talks about fear and what sadness, right?

[2:38] And he says at the end of that thing, right, that verissime, the idea of passion belongs to them, but nevertheless. After sadness, which is about a present evil, for fear is about a future evil, right? Which is not so much move as the present does, right? So sadness is most of all what? A passion, and most of all is causing what? Commotion in the in the person, right?

[3:07] Okay. Now go to chapter thirteen here, the Gospel of Saint John, right? And you know Christ has said to what? Let himself be troubled, right? Huh? Turbatio, right? A commotion in Christ. Now see, Christ's emotions don't come into play unless Christ allows them to, right? They don't surprise him like our emotions surprise us, huh? And but Christ will allow them to function, do their natural thing, to show that he has got to read human nature and so on, right?

[3:50] And as example of this here, where he's talking about what? The Judas Judas Iscariot, right? Huh? And the Latin says, and when Jesus had said these things, turbatus est. He was disturbed or troubled, you might say, in spirit. And he protested and said, Amen, amen. I say to you that one of you will betray me, and so on, right? Huh? So that's causing kind of sadness, right?

[4:19] Well, Thomas comments upon that, right? He says about this one should know that turbatio, this disturbance, right, designates a certain commotion, right? And he gives some examples of this, right? At the time when the water is moved in the temple there, when the water was moved, and thus we said the sea is turbatum, right? when it's commotum, right? Commotion. So the disturbance of the soul designates its commotion, right?

[4:56] But there are certain acts of the soul without the commotion of the body, namely the acts of the understanding part, right? But the acts of the sensitive appetite are with the commotion of the body, right? Whence the affections of the sensitive desiring power are called passiones, On the same thing, he's saying here. But among all the affections or passions of the sensitive power, tristitia, sadness, more has the vim commotionis, as the the power of commotion, right?

[5:33] Disturbance. For the delictatio, pleasure, delight, since it says a certain rest in the present good, right? So he says beautiful is what? How restful, you know? He said beautiful.

[5:50] Pleasure has more the ratio of rest than of commotion, huh? He said, "Mean, it kind of agrees with his text here, but it kind of get a little

[6:01] sharpness to it." Temo, however, fear, since it is about a future evil, minus less moves than sadness. The same thing he says here, which is about the present evil, right? And therefore, it is that the turbatio, the disturbance or commotion of the soul, is especially called what sadness, right? Tristitzi, right? So turbatus est ergo Jesus, Jesus is disturbed. id est tristatus sad at the thought of this, right?

[6:39] And he goes on to talk about that, but just a little thing that seemed happy reading this, reading Chinese, so kind of struck by that, huh? Yeah. But ties in with this, right? It's like uh Leo the thirteenth says that the scholastics, you know, through the theology, were able to explain things in Scripture sometimes.

[7:06] Okay, let's go now to question forty-two on the the object, the object of fear, right? Then we're not to consider about the object of fear, and about this six things are asked or sought. First, whether the good is the object of fear or the bad.

[7:33] Second, whether the model naturae, the evil, the bad of nature, is the object of fear, right? Third, whether fear is about the evil of what guilt, guilt, culpa, huh? Yeah, culpa, culpa. Fourth, whether fear itself can be what feared, huh? Okay. Can I get a big speaking for the you are afraid? My mother would tell me about you know, she came to a little small town in Minnesota, right?

[8:07] And sometimes they have some kind of a public meeting, you know, and some people get there. They're terrified. They're terrified. But sometimes it seems like you're afraid you're going to be afraid, right? Yeah. Five, fifth one, whether repentina, right, things that are what all at once, right, sudden, are more what feared, huh? Okay.

[8:35] And six, whether those things against which there is no remedy are more what feared. Sometimes, obviously, that's it. That's what we'll see. To the first one goes for it. Thus, it seems that something good is the object of fear. For Augustine, in the book on the eighty-three questions, says that we fear nothing except that which we what love. Either that what we might lose it, right? We might not attain what's hoped for.

[9:12] Yeah. But that which we love is good, right? Therefore, fear regards the good as its own object, or maybe in a remote way, but I don't know, in a proximate sense, right?

[9:27] So if I love my body, I wouldn't fear the bullet, right? I'm not loving the bullet. Fearing the bullet. Moreover, the philosopher says, in the second book of the rhetoric, that power and what. Is terrible. I thought what he said there, the thing was this: fearful to be in the power of another man, because the rule of men do bad whatever they can. He says, very low estimate of human condition.

[10:04] Not a low estimate, a real estimate, an experienced estimate. So here he's saying super, over somebody, right? Oh, super! Sorry, yes, yeah, over another. Okay, so there's another another thing saying. Yeah. But this is a certain good, right? I suppose power, right? That's one of the what five goods that

[10:30] Boethius says in the False Happiness, right? In the Consolation of Philosophy, he takes up false happiness before what? True happiness, because it's more known to us.

[10:46] Moreover, in God, nothing bad is able to be, right? But it's commanded to us that we fear God, right? Well, nothing bad in God, isn't? No. It just says in Psalm 33, fear the Lord, huh? All you his saints, right? Therefore, also fear is about the good, right? But against all this is what Damascene says in the second book that fear is about some future evil, right?

[11:22] Oh, see, Thomas says, huh? I answer it should be said that fear is a certain motion of the desiring power. But to the desiring power there pertains the pursuit of something, right, and the flight from something, huh? As is said in the sixth book of the Ethics. But the pursuit is of the good; the flight is from the bad, huh? Whence, whatever motions of the appetitive power implies some pursuit, have something good for their object, right?

[11:57] But whatever ones implies some flight, have the bad for their what? Object, huh? Whence, since fear implies a certain what? Flight, right? Primo et per se

[12:17] regards the bad as its what? Own object, huh? But it is able to regard also the good, according as it has some relation to the what? Bad, huh? In one way it can be, which can be in two ways, right? In one way, in so far as through the bad, the what one is deprived of the good, huh?

[12:54] For from this something is bad that it is the what privation of the good or the lack of the good, right? Whence, since one flees the bad because it is bad, what follows that one flees it because it deprives one of the good which one pursues in in loving, right?

[13:19] And according to this, Augustine says that there is no cause of fearing except that one might lose the good that he what loves, huh? Okay, that's kind of a remote cause, right?

[13:34] In another way, the good is compared to the bad as its what cause. In so far as something good, by its power, can induce some what harm in the good what loved, huh? And therefore, just as hope, as has been said above, regards two things, namely, to the good in which one tends, right, and to that to which one hopes to obtain the good what desired, right?

[14:09] Desired to be obtained. So also fear looks towards two things: to the evil that one is refusing or fleeing from, and to that good which, by its power, is able to inflict what. Yeah. So you fear the judge, right?

[14:34] And in this way, God is feared by man in so far as he can inflict punishment, either a spiritual punishment or a what bodily pleasure, right? And to this way also is feared the power of another what man, huh? Especially when it is what Well wounding or harmful I guess you'd say when it is what. Wounding or harmful, I guess you'd say. When is what wounding or harmful?

[15:02] Yeah. Or when is unjust, right? Huh? Because thus it can readily right infer some harm, right? Huh? And thus also one fears to be what. Over someone. You think it's under? Under. That sounds familiar. Yeah, in that sense. Yeah. I understand what you mean.

[15:27] The one be what in his power, right? Huh? So he can infer a what harm to us, right? And thus the one who is conscious of a crime fears lest his crime be what revealed, huh? And to this is clearly replied to be what. Objections, yeah.

[15:53] So you're fearing God, you're fearing the punishment God might store upon you, and more immediately the punishment, right? But that's what you're saying. You have to confess and recognize the more immediate fear, but then the cause is really God's purpose. Yeah.

[16:15] Okay. So let's look at the second article. The second one goes. For this, it seems that fear is not about the evil of what nature, right? The evil done to nature means that.

[16:36] For the philosopher in the second book of rhetoric says that fear makes us what take counsel, right? There's something like that in philosophy, right? That the fear of being mistaken makes one

[16:53] think carefully, right? But we do not take counsel about those things which come about by nature, as is said in the third book of the ethics. Therefore, fear is not about the evil of what nature. Nature.

[17:12] Moreover, natural defects are always imminent for man, as death and other things of this sort. If therefore about these evils there was fear, it would be necessary that man would always be in fear. That's true.

[17:32] No, you're always fearing death, huh? Not actually. Maybe habitually. So that's the thing where the guy sits down and he's, "Oh, she could die, you know, and if death comes along, you know, what they do for you? Oh, just tell me about this law, you know."

[17:56] That's what happened with my mother. I'll tell you later. Moreover, nature does not move to what contraries, right? But the evil of nature comes from. From nature. Yeah. And therefore, in fearing someone, what? Some evil. Some evil. Nature. Yeah.

[18:26] The natural fear is not about the evil of nature, to which nevertheless this evils would seem to pertain. I don't understand the objection very well.

[18:39] But against this is what the philosopher says in the third book of the ethics. He's talking about courage, I guess, right? That among all things the most terrible is what death, which is a malum naturae, right?

[18:57] My answer should be said that as the philosopher, that's Aristotle, by the way, as the philosopher, right? Here in my text, the philosophus is capitalized, right? Should be right. Some of the other texts they don't capitalize it. I think they're anti. Disrespectful. Disrespectful, and they always capitalize the name. Impious.

[19:23] For as the philosopher says, in the second book of the rhetoric, fear arises from the what image of a future evil that is either what corrupting or saddening, right?

[19:39] But now, just as the contrustativa, the saddening evil, is what is contrary to the what will. So, what is corrupt the evil that is corruptive is what is contrary to what nature. And this is the malum naturae, right? When about the evil of nature, there can be what fear, right?

[20:10] But should be considered that the malum naturae sometimes is from a natural cause, and then it is said to be a malum naturae not only because it what deprives the good of nature, but also because it is a what effect of nature. So malum naturae is what Amphibolous Two senses of the genitive. Yeah.

[20:43] Just like you know Aristotle says wisdom is the knowledge of God, but you're saying what two senses, right? It's a knowledge about God, right? And it's a knowledge which God has alone and most of all, right?

[21:01] But sometimes the evil of nature arises from a cause that is not natural, as death, which is violently inferred by a what. Persecutor. Yeah. So what do they say now in these kind of pro-life prayer there these in the church now don't they? From birth to

[21:24] what? Natural death. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Unnatural death. Voluntary death. And in both ways, the evil of nature is in some way feared, right? And some way is not feared, right?

[21:49] For since fear arises from a image of a future evil, as the philosopher says, right? That which removes the yeah of the future evil excludes also the what fear.

[22:10] Now, if something does not appear what as a future evil, right, can happen from two things, huh? In one way, from this that it is remote and what. Distance, huh?

[22:27] For this is an account of distance we imagine as not what future, right? So the young think they're what immortal. The Greek and Latin professors saying, you know, talking about the college students down the table. You know, when you're under thirty, you think you're going to live forever, right? It's so distant, right? So you don't really fear it, right? Huh? You don't think that I'm going to die someday, you know?

[22:50] Huh? But by the time you get to be forty, by the time you get to be forty, you think about it for sure. Yeah, yeah. Start to anyway. Yeah. So, so, so, answer this. as these are the immortal these young men at the college. These are the immortals, young young men, these are the immortals. They were the mortals.

[23:11] Um. And and therefore either we do not fear them or we what harm them to mammals, right? Huh. Okay. Whence the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric that things which are what far away, yeah, valde longe, are not feared, right? Huh. For all know that they will die, but because it is not near, at least they don't think it's near. They don't care. They heal current, right?

[23:50] Another way, some what they estimate some evil that is future as not future an account of its what necessity, which makes it to be estimated as what present. Yeah. Once the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric that those who are what already seem

[24:17] like already or sure are already together. Yeah. Do not fear, seeing to them the necessity of death. What is imminent, huh? But in order that someone would in some way fear, necessary that there be some what hope of what salvation, right?

[24:37] That's therefore the malum of nature, the evil of nature, is not feared because it is not apprehended as future. If, however, the malum of nature, which is corruptive, it's apprehended as near, and nevertheless with some hope of what evasion, then it is what feared, huh? You don't fear Hmm? You don't fear a roller coaster unless you think you can get off of

[25:22] it. You said when those those two dimensional movies, you know, when the first one came out, they had a roller coaster, you know. Oh yeah. Everybody, everybody's screaming, you know. It's like my nephew had a parent. My sister got some kind of goofy goggles that you wear, and you can watch like a movie or something. And it was like virtual skateboarding. Yeah. So he's standing there on his skateboard in the house, motionless.

[25:53] He has glasses on. He fell off. He fell off the skateboard. That's what happens. Dangerous. Too dangerous. To be feared To be feared. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the evil of nature sometimes does not. Come from what? Nature. Nature. It nevertheless, according as it comes from nature, right? Although it is not ex toto entirely able to be avoided, right? Huh? It can nevertheless be what deferred, right?

[26:40] Huh? And under this hope, huh? There can be counsel about the avoiding it I guess avoiding of it, yeah. Somebody's awake through the day. There, one hundred and three. She's one hundred and three. This one. Oh, really? Quite a quite an age, right? Oh, yeah. Um.

[27:12] The second should be said that the evil of nature, although it is always imminent, is nevertheless not always imminent in a near way, right? And therefore, it is not always what Fearing, huh?

[27:34] So the person goes through the whole day not fearing death, right? Because he's just that's far off. Something happens to him as to somebody else, right? I don't die. but other people die. I got. I got too many things to do. I can't think about it. Yeah.

[27:51] Then he lies down and sleeps. To the third, it should be said that death and other defects of nature arise from the universal nature, to which nevertheless is repugnant the what particular nature, so far as possible, right? Huh? And thus, in the inclination of one's own particular nature, there is what pain and sadness about these evils when they are what present, huh? And fear if they are what in the future.

[28:29] Yeah. So, if you are dying now, are you afraid? I'm dying right now. Depends on what you mean by dying. I'm transitioning right now. Yes. You might probably fear the future judgment, right? Yeah. I'm not fearing death. I wouldn't be fearing death at that point. Yeah. Yeah. You'd be sad though, right? That's a present evil, right? Yeah. Not a future one. Okay. How do you put it? Three.

[29:14] Whether there is fear about the evil of what? Guilt, huh? To the third, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that fear is able to be about the evil of what? Guilt, huh? For Augustine says, upon the canonical Epistle of John, that by a chaste fear, right, huh? Man fears separation from what? God, God, right, huh? But nothing separates us from God except guilt, huh? According to that of Isaiah, chapter fifty-nine, your sins divide between you and your God, right, huh?

[30:01] Therefore, fear is able to be about the what? Evil of guilt. Yeah. You might fear you're going to be separated from God by your guilt. Guilt, huh?

[30:14] Good argument, isn't it? Yeah. Trying to figure out why he's arguing this way in the opposition. Moreover, Tully no that's Cicero, right? Says in the fourth, you notice how in Scripture sometimes arises, you know, a man having two names, right? And you find the same thing here with his beat Cicero as Tullius, right? Moreover, Tullius says in the fourth thing on the Tusculan questions that we fear those things when they are future about which we are sad when they are what?

[30:54] Present. Present, right? But about the evil of guilt, one can what? Be sad or in pain, right, huh? Therefore, also one can fear the evil of guilt, huh? Interesting, right? So the person, you know, is contrite, right? He's sad about his guilt, right, huh? So if you fear the things that you are sad when they're present, well then. That's kind of interesting argument, right?

[31:31] Moreover, hope is opposed to fear. Okay, not the contrary, but the principal passions. But hope is able to be about the good of virtue, as is clear through the philosopher in the ninth book of the Ethics. And the Apostle says in the Epistle to the Galatians, "I am what? I trust about you, I'm confident about you in the Lord, that you save nothing else, right?

[32:05] Okay. Therefore, fear is also able to be about the evil of what? Guilt. Yeah. Moreover, verecundia, which we translated as what? Shame. What was the other word? Erubescentia Erubescentia is embarrassed. Shame. It's a species of fear, right? But shame is about some ugly thing done, which is the evil of guilt, right? Therefore, also fear.

[32:45] Against this is what the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, that not all bad things are what feared, as if someone would be what unjust or what slow. Yes, yeah, yeah.

[33:06] No, tell me what to say about these things. I answer: It should be said that as been said above that the object of hope is a what future, a good that is in the future, but difficult, right? That someone is able to what obtain. So that was the four things there, four letters in definition, right?

[33:31] So likewise, fear is about a malo, something bad, futuro, future, bad, right? Difficult, right? That is not able to be easily what avoided. Avoided, huh? So in the Latin, you can give the proper order there, right? I mean, the grammatical order can follow the logical order, right? Huh?

[34:00] Just like in Latin, you could put the genus before the difference, right? We have to say not that I am an animal rational, but yeah, but animal is more basic, right? The genus.

[34:19] Aristotle is a wise man, not a man wise. We can say he's a man that is wise, you know. But we have to do that grammatically. We want to follow the order. So fear is about a something bad that is future. To avoid. It's difficult. No, or difficult and not easily avoided. Yeah. That's interesting As I didn't think of those two together. It's difficult and not easily avoided.

[34:54] The difficulty is not just about avoiding it, but it's difficult in some other way too. It's difficult and not easy to avoid. From which it can be taken that that which is altogether subject to our power and to our what will, right? Does not have the notion of something what terrible, terrible, right?

[35:28] But that alone is terrible. That has a what extrinsic cause, right? But the evil of guilt has as its own cause the what human will, the human will, and therefore properly does not have the notion of the what terrible, terrible.

[36:04] So can you fear that you might take your own life? I'd qualify that maybe a little bit and say since my I'm not entirely in control of myself in some way, yeah, it's true. So given certain circumstances, I remember somebody telling me that she was given a medication for something by a doctor that gave her suicidal thoughts, and she she was scared of that. Yeah, because they advertise on TV a lot, you know, when they give out possible dangers of taking their medicine.

[36:35] Yeah, yeah, yeah. Suicide thoughts. I don't know. I don't know. She had sleeping problems, and that's one of the yeah, yeah, those things. Yeah, it's dangerous. She said it was terrifying. Yeah, I can't imagine being. I mean, I've never been that way, so I can't imagine. You know,

[36:57] and it's outside your power. You think it's outside your power, right? But our guilt. Yes, but because yeah, yeah. But because the human will is able to be inclined to sinning from something outside, right?

[37:25] If that thing inclining one has a great power to incline one, right? According to this, there can be fear about the evil of guilt insofar as it's from a what exterior cause. Yeah, as when someone fears to what spend time with a yes, huh? Yeah, bad company. To dwell with in society evil, right? Huh? Lest they be induced from by them to what sinning, right?

[38:02] So parents must to worry about their who their kids are associating with, right? And if they're associating with the wrong crowd, right, they're probably going to get into some kind of trouble, right? This This reminds me of a rebuke Saint John the Cross gave to a prostitute in the proposition that if she. Made her offer. He said, "Ma'am, I'd rather spend the night in hell with the devil than with you, because basically I wouldn't be sinning with the devil, but I would be with you."

[38:31] That's a good answer. Who said that? Saint John the Cross. Yeah. He was propositioned. He came into some town, and he was just a little bitty guy too. And he came into the town, he blew her away with that one. That's a good answer.

[38:47] He knew what to fear. But properly speaking, in such a disposition, right, a man fears more what seduction, seduction than guilt, according to its what proper definition. That is, insofar as it's voluntary, huh? For this it does not have that it be what feared huh I know why Thomas is writing this article. Yeah, yeah.

[39:17] That's very helpful. That's very helpful because a lot of the addictions that people have today, they subject themselves to this kind of seduction all the time, and then they habituate themselves to that. That's hard to get out,

[39:33] but it's not impossible. That's where you. That's where it deals with the exterior things, outside, you know, occasions of sin that are strictly voluntary. But I told a gentleman that we knew was an alcoholic, and one of the things he said that was it was God's grace in him because he didn't learn this from somebody. He was just kind of reasoned it out himself. He said, "I knew if I was in this part of town, I had to make an errand over here, and the bar was in between.

[40:07] If I went down that street, I'd be in it. He said, 'I knew it, but so if I had to get to there, I'd have to go over here, over here, over here, over there. Then I'd be safe. But if I went by it, I'd be in it. He said he didn't do that for himself. He didn't have the strength to do all that. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the separation from God is a certain what punishment, following upon what Sin.

[40:53] And every punishment, in some way, is from the what exterior cause. Yeah, I wonder how many murders would be committed if there was any punishment for murder. How many husbands? A lot of

[41:23] people eat too, yeah. A moratorium on death penalty for or penalty for murder. Bar yourself in your house and have your gun ready. You chuck that over against assault

[41:46] rifle. The second argument is that's a nice one from Tully, right? To second, should be said that sadness and fear in this one thing come together because both are about the what Bad something bad, right? But they differ, however, in two things. In one, because sadness is about a present evil, but fear is about a what future evil. In another way, because sadness, since it is in the concupiscible appetite, right, regards the bad absolutely,

[42:36] whence it can be about anything bad, whether small or what great, great, huh? But fear, since it is in the irascible, regards evil with a certain arduousness or difficulty, huh? Which is taken away, in so far as something is subject to the will, right?

[43:07] And therefore, we do not fear all things which are future, about which we would be sad when they are present, but some things which to it are what arduous and difficult, right?

[43:30] To the third, it should be said, huh? That hope is about a good that one is able to what obtain, huh? Now, one is able to obtain a good either through oneself or through another, right? And therefore, hope can be about an act of virtue which is

[43:55] in in our power, yeah. But fear is about something bad that is not is not subject to our power, and therefore always the evil that is feared is from a what extrinsic cause, huh? But the good which is hoped for can be both from a intrinsic cause and from extrinsic cause, huh?

[44:29] An existentialist always afraid, you know, they better do something crazy. Father Peter founder said, "The existentialist says, in the end, they die stupid." Sounds like that. Just keep that in mind. Next time you have to read Sartre something.

[44:59] To the fourth, it should be said that as has been said above, huh? That shame is not a fear about the act itself of sin, but about the ugliness or the ignominy, yeah, which falls upon it, right? Which is from an extrinsic cause. Every time there's some politician who got caught with another woman during his campaign, he had to drop out. Yeah, he was sorry about the whole thing, and my mother said, "Yeah, he's just sorry he got caught.

[45:34] He's not sorry about the whole thing. He's sorry he lost the campaign." Okay, now with