Prima Secundae
113. Aquinas on Anger, Part 1: Anger vs. Hate, Who We Get Angry At, and the Kinds of Anger (Summa I-II, Q. 46, Articles 6–8)
Class of 2013-04-04
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/113-aquinas-on-anger-part-1-anger-vs-hate-who-we-get-angry-at/

[0:00] In the Name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, our enlightenment. Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand all that you have written. Name of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit.

[0:33] Amen. So, I guess we're up to Article Six here, huh? Question forty-six. We had that strange article about anger being in some way more natural than conc­ upiscence But Thomas made a lot of distinctions there too. See what a little bit of truth there is in that.

[0:55] To the sixth, one goes for thus. It seems that anger is more grave than hate, huh? For it is said in the Book of Proverbs, chapter twenty-seven, the fourth verse, that anger does not have what mercy, huh? Nor the fury that erupts on us, huh? But hate sometimes has mercy. That's not strange, huh? It's a piece of that. Therefore, anger is more grave than what hatred. It's interesting how that in God's course they use the term mercy and anger, but anger for justice, right?

[1:37] Huh? Kind of a certain contrast there. Moreover, it is what more to under the bad than to be sorrowful about it. Excuse me. No, it is more to what suffer evil and to what be sorrowful over it than simply to undergo it. But those who have someone in hate, it suffices that the one whom they hate suffers some kind of what evil, yeah. But to the irate person does not suffice.

[2:16] But he seeks that what. He should know that he should know that he should know. I guess it's of a hatred and should be sorrowful for suffer from it or sorrow. Yeah, as the philosopher says, he that he's done to you. Therefore, anger is more grave than what hate.

[2:36] Moreover, the more things that come together to the constitution of something, the more what it seems to be stable. It seems to be just a reverse of that. Just as a habit is more permanent, which is caused from what many acts, huh? But anger is caused from the running together of many passions, as we saw before. Not over hate, then more pure. Because if it's more pure, it's going to be stronger, it won't it?

[3:05] You and me, yeah. Therefore, anger is more stable and grave than hate. Can't make those arguments. The more power is one, the more infinite.

[3:18] But against this is what Augustine says in the rule, where he compares hate to a what? Beam. Beam, yeah. And anger to a speck. a spectre A speck, yeah Yeah That's two guys, yeah. So Augustine sees hate as being worse, right? Than anger, right? It's better to get angry with your brother than to hate him, right? Yeah.

[3:46] Well, what does the master say here, huh? He says the answer. It should be said that the species of a passion of an emotion and its ratio is weighed from its what? Object. Now the object of anger and of hate is the same in what subject?

[4:11] For just as the one hating desires evil to the one whom he hates, right? So the man who's angry is against the one whom he's angry about,

[4:26] but not for the same what reason? Because the one hating desires evil for the enemy in so far as it is evil. But the man angry desires the evil of the one against whom he is angry, not in so far as it is evil, but in so far as it has the notion of something good. In so far as he estimates it to be what just, huh?

[4:57] In so far as it's good Yeah Insofar as it is what vindicative way, vengeance. So although sometimes metaphorically we do say even hate of God, right? In times Jesus says minus amat, on those letters. But I mean, it seems like anger would be more able to be applied metaphorically to God than hate could, huh? From this reason given here, right?

[5:36] Once also is said above that hate is by the application of the bad to something bad, but anger by the application or applying something good to the bad.

[5:53] Now it is manifest that to desire something bad under the aspect of being just has less the notion of something bad than to wish the evil of someone simply.

[6:10] For to wish the evil of someone under the notion of something just can even be according to the virtue of what justice. So Christ is angry there with their stubbornness of their heart, right? Even there,

[6:31] there's a number of places in the gospel where he says Christ is angry, right? Does he say anywhere that he hates? I don't. Passage. But it's a good thing to hate what's really evil, right? Like sin. Yeah, I mean, in terms of hating some person, right? But he's angry at these people who are so hard-hearted, right?

[7:00] So it says to wish the evil of someone under the notion of something just can be also according to the virtue of justice, if it is what measured, right? Tempered by the precept of what reason, right?

[7:16] But anger, in this only fails that does not obey the precept of reason in taking revenge. I guess. Whence it is manifest that hate is much worse and more grave than anger, right? So Thomas and Augustine are quite in agreement. Okay.

[7:40] Now the first objection there, right? Huh? Anger does not have mercy. Well, Thomas, let's see a distinction here. To the first, therefore, it should be said that in anger and in hate, two things can be what considered, right? To wit, the very thing that is desired, and secondly, the intensity of the desire, right?

[8:12] Now, as regards that which is desired, anger has more mercy than what hate, huh? As far as that which is desired, right? Because hate desires the evil of another, as such, and is satisfied since it does that. Then it is not what satisfied, huh, by any measure of evil. Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned. No murder,

[8:48] no limit. For those things which are desired secundum se, as such, are desired without measure, as the philosopher says in the first book of Politics, right?

[9:07] Just as the avaricious man desires wealth without limit, right? Sam Walton, he said one day to him, "You've made gazillions of dollars. What do you want to do next?" I want more.

[9:25] Whence it is said in the book of Ecclesiasticus that the enemy, if he what finds time, would not be satisfied, right? With blood, but anger does not desire the bad except under the aspect of vindicative justice, right? Whence, when the evil

[9:52] bestowed upon the person exceeds the measure of justice, according to the estimate of the one angry, then he takes what. Okay So if you beat the kid too much, you know, you start to feel sorry for him, right?

[10:12] Of course, my father used to say, "Sit in that chair and don't move." I'd sit in that chair and not move. My mother was amazed at this. The power. Yeah. Once the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric that the angry man, if what many things come to be right, he takes mercy, right? But the one hating for none, right? Huh? So hate is much more opposed to mercy than what anger, right?

[10:48] Huh? As regards the intensity of the desire, that was the other half of the distinction, huh? Anger more excludes what mercy in hate, huh? Because the motion of anger is more what impetuous, right? On account of the inflammation of the cholera Once immediately subjoined, who is able what to bear, right? The impetus of the spirit that's been what aroused, huh? Okay.

[11:31] So when Thomas takes up the virtue of what mildness that moderates anger, right? He takes it up with what temperance, right? And so I spoke of Shakespeare's metaphor there, right? You know, they are the very wrath of love, right? Huh? That's a metaphor from species to species, right? How can wrath be compared to love? This kind of you know man woman love there, the intensity of it, right?

[11:55] Huh? Okay. So he says the act can be more intense the anger in the man is which fires up and so on, you know, and get out of his way, you know, till it calms down, right? Huh? Okay. The heat is kind of a cool thing, you know. What did Stalin say? You know, you gotta really hate your opponent in order to overcome him, right? I can have that.

[12:34] Okay. Now the second objection, huh? The angry man wants a person to know who's revenging him, right? Huh? So to second should be said that as has been said, the angry man desires the bad of another in so far as it has the definition of something just indicating what has been done. But the vindicta, the vengeance, so to speak, comes about through the bestowal of pain.

[13:16] Now it is of the notion of pain or punishment, rather, that it be contrary to the will, and that it be what afflicted, and that it be inferred for some guilt, right? And therefore, the angry man desires this: that the one to whom he infers what harm, perceives and sorrows, and he knows that on account of the injury he's done, this has happened to him, right? This has come about to him, right?

[13:50] But the man hitting cares nothing about this, right? Because he desires the evil of the other as such. However, it's not true that that about which someone what is sad is what worse, right?

[14:19] For injustice and what imprudence, since they are evils, right? Because nevertheless, since they are voluntary, they do not what sadden those to whom they are in, as the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, right? So Thomas is always running to the second book of rhetoric there, where Aristotle takes up the passions, right? Of course, he says in a well-regulated court they wouldn't allow these emotional appeals, but since they do, this is how to do it.

[14:59] It reminds me of the when I was down in Florida and I saw this second part of Lord of the Rings and the trees that are called the Ents that come and they fight against Sauron in the tower and all these orcs running around or whatever those other creatures are, you got these giant trees and there's this one scene. This one guy, all these little orcs running around, he's just going stomp, stomp, stomp.

[15:21] He's not interested in their their knowing about it, but he just wants to wipe them out. He hates them. So that's the image that came to my mind Yeah I have this joke, right, kid? The grandchildren, you know that my daughter's children, you know that I talk to the trees, you know, at nighttime, two a. m. in the morning. So I hang my mouth up. I went back to I'm just sitting there talking to the tree.

[15:52] Okay. To third should be said that that which is caused from many causes, right? Is then more stable when the causes are taken as a matter of one cause, right?

[16:10] But one cause is able to what prevail over many others, huh? For hate comes from a more permanent cause than what anger, anger, right? For anger arises from some commotion of the soul on account of the injury what we see. But hate proceeds from some disposition of a man, according as he regards it as what contrary to himself, the one what he hates, yeah. And therefore, just as a passion more quickly passes away than a disposition or a habit, right?

[16:51] So anger more quickly passes than what Hate. hate, huh? Even though hate is a passion, what coming about from some what disposition, huh? And on account of this, the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric that hate is more incurable than what anger. How did you apply that to the Middle East there?

[17:19] And sometimes you have these tribes too, you know, that seem to have a long hatred for each other, right, huh? And it goes on from generation to generation. They kind of a permanence, right, huh? Yeah.

[17:32] But Adenauer and De Gaulle can, get together and and Germany and France are reconciled, right, huh? You know, like there is not the hate there, but maybe you know it was anger at the time, you know, but that can be dissipated by unlike De Gaulle and Adenauer, right? But the anger, you know, goes on and on in these countries, right? I think some of the Shiites and the Sunnis and so on they they really kind of hate each other, right?

[18:00] And it's kind of permanent. They used to hate us too, and they can harm us infidels at at will, you know. It's okay, you know. So many people in the public realm, I guess, political leaders, academics, often took Marx's view that everything boils down to economics. But John Paul II would disagree. He would say no, everything boils down to culture. I think culture is cult religion, and whereas all these contemporary progressives might say that all religions are the same, no, they're not.

[18:37] You can see certain religions preach love, whether the practitioners actually follow those precepts, but others preach hate or inculcate hate, such as Islam, especially the serious radical Islam. And so the importance of culture and its influence on the virtues is kind of an interesting interface. Now Christ is saying, "Love your enemies," right, huh? And I don't know whether to bring up these young Palestinians, you know. Eat the the Jews and so on, right?

[19:12] So this this treatise on the emotions is good for an awful lot of reasons, right? Whether anger is to those only to whom there is what justice, right? This is the seventh article. To the seventh, one goes forward thus: it seems that anger is not only to those to whom there is justice, for there is no justice of man to irrational things. You get angry at a tool or something?

[19:58] Yeah, block of wood. For but a man sometimes becomes angry with irrational things, things without reason, as the writer from anger, right, throws the pen, right, it's not working right, or the what horseman strikes the horse, right? Therefore, anger is not only to those to whom there is what justice, huh? So what about this, huh? Trying to think

[20:40] back now and I get angry things. Damn thing won't work. I forget angry at the computer now. They kick the computer to work and do what it's supposed to do, huh? Yeah. Do you get angry at computers? I have. At least once, usually because it's doing exactly what it's supposed to be doing. Yeah, it's more logical than you. This great commercial some years ago where there was a office worker in a cubicle who's having problems with his computer.

[21:12] It froze up or something, and he starts freaking out. He pulls out some sort of like bat or something, knocks the cubicles down. I forget what they were advertising, but it's a good good representation. I saw the same thing. It was the it was the duck who's trying to operate his computer or something like that, and he's got a mallet like this to smash it and under because it says on the computer.

[21:35] If you're having any troubles, just strike any key. Moreover, there is no justice of man to himself, huh? Nor to those which are of oneself, right? As is said in the fifth book of ethics, huh? That's the book where Aristotle talks about justice, right? The fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics. But man sometimes is angry with himself, right? As the one who is penitent is angry with himself on account of his sin.

[22:16] Hence it is said, but we say something. I could kick myself, right? Once it said in the fourth psalm, huh? Become angry and do not wish to what sin, huh? Therefore, anger is not only towards those to whom there is justice, right? This is anger to a person now, but not to what? Person who began injustice, justice towards another, right?

[22:49] Whoever justice and injustice can be someone to a whole what genus, right? Or to a whole community, huh? When the city what injures somebody, right, huh? But anger is not to some what genus, but as the philosopher says, to some singular individual person, right? Okay. So Aristotle said we can hate a whole class of people, like we hate the thief, right? Okay, we hate the terrorist or something, right?

[23:24] But you get angry with a particular individual, right? Therefore, anger is not properly towards those to whom there is justice and what injustice, huh?

[23:41] But the contrary of this can be taken, what from the philosopher in that second book of rhetoric, right? Wasn't that the book that what's his name? The English philosopher liked Aristotle's rhetoric. He's a famous English philosopher.

[24:10] What did he do? He said. No, the guy, the guy who talked about you know the state being very powerful and so on. Who's that? Hobbes. Hobbes, yeah. Did Hobbes like the rhetoric? That's his famous. The book of Aristotle he likes, right? You can see why, yeah. Yeah, yeah. You wouldn't like the Nicomachean Ethics or something like that. No, no, no. But the rhetoric, yeah. He wouldn't have control over weak minds.

[24:38] Yeah. Okay, let's see what the master says here. Answer should be said. This has been said above that anger desires the bad in so far as it has the aspect of a just thing vindicating right something has been done. And therefore, to the same is anger to whom there is what justice and injustice, huh? For to infer revenge pertains to what justice, right, huh? But to injure someone pertains to injustice, right, huh?

[25:28] Whence both on the side of the cause, which is the injury bestowed by another. Inflicted upon you by another, as and also on the side of the what revenge itself, vindication, which the angry man desires. Right. It is manifest that to the same what pertains anger to whom also justice and injustice belongs. Right. Okay.

[26:02] So I'm angry with you because you an unjust to me. Right. And I desire to get even with you because justice is is evenness. Right. That's what Thomas does in the body. You're out of court, right? As that answer is getting mad at your ballpoint pen or your computer, whatever it might be.

[26:36] To the first, therefore, it should be said that as has been said above, that anger, although it it is with reason, right, because there's a reason why you're you're angry, right. It can nevertheless also be in what Brute animals, which lack reason, right. In so far as by natural instinct they are moved through the imagination to something like the works of what reason.

[27:08] Thus, therefore, since in man there is both reason and imagination, that's interesting. In two ways, in man can what rise up the motion of anger, right? There is the word motus there, motus irae, right? And we call the passions what emotions, right?

[27:33] In one way, from imagination alone, announcing what the heart from wound. Yeah. And thus there arises some motion of anger even to irrational things and inanimate things. According to a likeness of that motion, which is found in animals against something what harmful, right?

[28:02] So he tried to take a bone away from the dog. He might what might get angry with you, yeah. In another way, from reason, announcing the injury that has been bestowed, right.

[28:19] And therefore, as the philosopher says, in the second book, the rhetoric, in no way can there be angry to what insensible things, nor to the dead, right? Huh. That's to say, the anger that arises ex ratione annunciante, right? It arises from reason, but it could be the way, right? From the rising for imagination.

[28:45] Then, because they do not what sorrow, right? Which most of all, those who are angry seek in those ones with whom they're angry, right? That they will be sad. Yeah.

[29:03] Also, because there is not revenge to them, because it's not of them to what make an injury, right? So did my my ballpoint pen run out? Inflict an injury on you? Yeah, I'm trying to write a check out or something huh? Or did my computer. still an injury upon me by, freezing up. You can perceive it that way. Yeah, Your imagination That's that's more your imagination,

[29:35] right? Not the reason. So, what's the anger of Coriolanus? You know, is that from reason? He's been injured by the rabble, the democratic rabble of the city of Rome. Who are denying him his honors? Right, that he deserves for being the greatest soldier and defender of the whole city of Rome. just because he won't sit there with his showing his wounds to get his award.

[30:04] That's what they want him to do, right? You got to go down, humble yourself for the crowd down there, and show your wounds. Oh, look what I suffered! You vote me dishonor. So I've got to do that, degrading thing, right? In the play Shakespeare's Coriolanus. Read it now with great pleasure after the treatise on anger here. You can go and read Coriolanus. But whether it arises from reason or from imagination, the movement.

[30:33] So if it arises from imagination, isn't that movement still anger? It is anger, right? Yeah, like in the but like in the animals, right? But still, the passion of anger. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Well, Thomas is saying if it arises from reason. Then it's only towards those to whom there is what. Oh, I see. Yeah. Yeah. It's not like he's just saying that that one's anger. Yeah, yeah.

[30:55] So, so, so when I throw my pen, that's kind of punishing the pen, in a sense. Yeah, I have to kind of laugh at myself. But you know, that'll teach you. Yeah. If I imagine that it's harming in some way that pen, right? Unless you're an animist. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

[31:26] I think it's kind of interesting the distinction there between imagination and reason, right? So, how is Thomas seeing all these distinctions? Show that he's using his reason.

[31:44] Say it again. How does Thomas seeing all these distinctions show that he's using his reason? Looking before and after. Yeah. yeah. So, in the ability to look before and after, is included the ability to see a distinction, right? You know this from the axiom of before and after that nothing is before or after itself. So, before you can see that this is before or after that, you have to see that this is not that, right?

[32:13] And that's to see a distinction, right? So the fact that Thomas is seeing one distinction after another shows us that he's using his reason, right? Huh? I was reading about the end there. Thomas's life there in Fossanova, you know. And he was just doing this too much. He said, "A man can't keep, up, you know,

[32:34] all day long, right? Huh? So, okay. So that's a beautiful distinction there, primum right? And the body article doesn't touch upon that at all, right? But, but it's important to see that distinction.

[33:01] Krishnaman's dying for the distinction there when he sees the argument, right? And reflects upon the fact he has gotten angry at his Pen or whatever. Yeah, or his instrument, or tool, whatever it is, right? Okay.

[33:15] Or you can like ever kick in the car or something, you know. So those are completely irrational. You leave the light on something and the car battery goes down, then won't start. You know, kick the car. Like it's done you.

[33:33] But there's something that seems just about getting angry in those situations. It seems right. I mean, it's not always. to say that it rises in imagination doesn't mean it's necessarily irrational, right? No, I mean, well, it's pre rational.

[33:57] That's why they say you're taking it out on the dog. You kick the dog you're taking it out. What does that mean? It means there's something else you're angry at. You're taking it out on the dog. Your wife, your wife gave you some lip You hit the dog and the dog gets angry. It's funny my mother used to tell about when she and my father were going out, right?

[34:16] And they got in a little fight or something. My father's angry with my mother, right? But he'd get out and kick the car. She kind of laughed about it. She said, I'm glad he kicked the car instead of me." Yeah,

[34:29] so not entirely irrational. Or when you got a nice piece of wood, you you don't have any other blanket, you cut it wrong, or just do something. You want to just throw that thing on the floor

[34:47] You know about with the higher boss he gets in with this guy, and he gets in with the guy below him all the way down. take it to the last guy, the lowest in the rank, Nothing for him to do. He walks out. He sees a dog He gives the dog. a good kick, you know." It's a certain, imagination that you've done what everybody else has done, you know, above.

[35:16] Okay. To the second one now, right? What about to oneself? To the second should be said that as the philosopher says in the fifth book of the ethics, there is a certain metaphorica, right? That's interesting. Justice and injustice of a man to himself,

[35:39] insofar as reason rules the what, irascible and concupiscible. It's just that reason should rule them, right? And according to this, also a man is said to make what, finish himself, contemplating to be angry with himself. But properly and as such, it does not happen that someone is angry with himself. That's kind of interesting, though, right? This is above all to thine own self be true, right? That being just.

[36:19] Sometimes people say, you know, you're not being just to yourself. Don't you hear people say that? So there's kind of a you're closer to justice here than you are with the rational thing, right?

[36:37] You owe it to yourself. You owe penance to yourself for your sins. Yeah, So you're talking about vacations. You owe it to yourself, right? Yeah. You know. You deserve it. Yeah. Or you owe yourself some sleep, right?

[36:53] You get to get some rest. You know. You owe yourself a vacation. Ice cream. Ice cream. Yeah. Some people talk to themselves too. Yeah. That's what I'm just trying to think of this in terms of, like, penance for your sins. You owe yourself penance. Do you owe it to yourself, or is that justice? You really owe God, right? Yeah. Kind of the tool of God's justice there, right?

[37:32] Yeah. Yeah. I think where Thomas is speaking there, he's speaking of if you inflict punishment upon yourself, then this is satisfaction. Satisfaction, right? If God inflicts it upon you, like purgatory, that's purgative. Satisfaction. It's purgation, he says, right? Purgation. Yeah.

[37:53] If you do it yourself, then you're satisfied. That's what that's what St. Bonaventure says that we do satisfaction, but purgatory is satispassio. You undergo that rather than doing it yourself. Yeah. But purging is the word that Thomas uses there in the Summa Contra Gentiles.

[38:12] Yeah. Um. So, what's the difference there? Then, that term metaphorica, right? There's a much greater likeness there, right? Justice. There's a ball player, you know, when he makes a bad mistake or something, you know, or I shouldn't have done that, you know, I could have won, we could have won the game, I could have, If I'd only done, onto the right or to the left or something, if I had,

[39:01] you know, threw the wrong pitch. Yeah. Yeah. Be angry with yourself. right? There's a lot, There's a lot of talk about that now about forgiving yourself. Yeah, I don't know about that?

[39:20] That's what we should be doing. Yeah, that's it. I I, I refer to it it's not really forgiving yourself, it's accepting the humiliation of your sin. That's what. it is. That's what you need. When people won't accept the variation of it, that's the problem. But they talk about this for doing something. Scratching my head, I forget what that is.

[39:52] Now, to the third, it should be said that the philosopher in the second book of the rhetoric assigns one difference between hate and anger: that hate can be to some class, right, to some genus, just as we have in hate the whole genus of thieves, right?

[40:11] But anger is not except to something what singular, right? The reason for this is because hate is caused, right, from the quality of something when that is grasped as being dissonant to our disposition, right?

[40:30] And this can be either in the universal or in the what particular, particular, right? But anger is caused from this: someone injures us by their own act. But actions are of the singulars, and therefore anger is always about something singular, right?

[40:54] When the whole city, the whole city injures us, the whole city is computed, right, as one singular, and that's Coriolanus there, right? He's going to punish Rome, join with the enemies of Rome now to destroy Rome, right? Until his mother comes out to beg him, right? But all the other citizens go out, you know, and he turns them down. He's cold, right? Finally, his mother comes out, you know, and it's quite a scene.

[41:24] Shakespeare, there, nature goes back and forth, you know, he kind of collapses. His mother comes out to give into him too. Okay. Yeah. So suppose a man who's coming out, people loathe themselves when they dislike, they don't like themselves to the point where they want to do harm to themselves. Yeah. What is that? It's not hatred or anger.

[42:02] Maybe some hatred, maybe something like sloth or something. Yeah, see, a woman hates herself when doesn't like her looks or something. It's kind of metaphorical in a sense, isn't it?

[42:22] Maybe it's kind of. I think it was colored by sloth and something like that. Yeah, but the person looking himself in the mirror and saying, "You know, he's a little too fat," right? Hates his looks, you know, right, and he. Starts going on a diet or something. Takes it out of himself. Yeah, yeah. This sounds like a natural thing to say. Well, I'm really angry with myself for letting myself become so fat.

[42:47] Yes. Yeah, yeah, yeah. He calls that metaphorical justice, right? There in the fifth book of the Ethics, right? Is your likeness there? Are you

[43:07] being you know so called objective about yourself? It's like another person judging yourself, right? Strange beings we are. No, I didn't know there was a species of anger, Did you?

[43:28] To the eighth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that Damascene unsuitably assigns three species to anger, right? To which what? I don't know. What fell? What fell? To speak, I don't know. The way they translated it: wrath, ill will, and rancor.

[43:52] Mania is like madness, isn't it? Frenzied. Mania is what I would think. Yeah. And furor, I guess. Intensity of it. Gall, bile, poison, bitterness. That's what fell is.

[44:12] It seems to be mixed. It's almost an eighth, though, you know. Yeah. And then mania, they just translate as craze. It's like just crazy. Well, he says the species of no genus are diversified according to something accident, right? Accidental. That's what Porphyry would say, right.

[44:35] So, red, white, and blue are not species of triangle, right? Because they're accidents. But these three are diversified according to something accidental. For the beginning of the motion of anger is called what? Gall. Yeah. But anger that is permanent, persisting, is called mania, right?

[45:05] Furor is anger observing. What? Time. Time. You're going to wait for the right moment to strike. Maybe that's what it is. Therefore, they are not diverse species of anger.

[45:19] Okay. Moreover, Tully in the Cicero, in the fourth book of the Tusculan Questions, says that what excondicencia. Bruning up, huh? It's called burning out, maybe. Yeah. Claiming out. In Greek, it's called thymosis sounds like the word thymos thymos which is used for irrational appetite, right? But it's named from anger.

[46:00] And is in anger what? Just now rising and now stopping, yeah. But thymosis, according to Damascene, is the same thing as what? Furor, huh? Therefore, furor does not seek time to avenge, but it what? Fails or goes down in time, right? Okay. So some question about the naming here for us. Moreover, Gregory in the twenty-first book of the morals lays down three grades of anger, right? Anger without voice, and anger with voice, huh?

[46:49] And anger with word expressed. According to those three things, which the Lord lays down in Matthew chapter five, huh? Who is angry with his brother, where he touches upon anger without voice, and afterwards, then who says to his brother, "Raka, you know, you fool" or something like that, where one touches upon anger with voice and not yet fully what formed by word, huh? But who says to his brother, "Racha huh?

[47:24] You fool," or there is explained a voice in the perfection of speech. Therefore, insufficiently does Damascene divide what anger, laying down nothing on the side of voice, huh? Not only Thomas can clear up all this commotion here with the words, right? Okay. Have to be eye upon Thomas too. Clear out the muddy

[47:52] thoughts. But against this is the authority of Damascene, right? And of Gregory Nyssa huh? Okay, and they say down Nemesius, right? Whoever he is. Okay.

[48:09] So Thomas is deceived by the fallacy of equivocation, right? Even the Greek Thomas. That may be a lesson to all of you. Most frequently, kind of fallacy, right? It was

[48:27] kind of deceit from words, right? Fallacy, equivocation. Okay. I answer. It should be said that the three species of anger, which Damascene lays down, and also Gregory something rather, right, are taken according to those things which give to anger somewhat growth,

[49:02] which happens in three ways. In one way, from the facility of the motion itself, and such anger is called fell, which quickly is what kindled.

[49:19] In another way, on the side of what sadness causing what anger, anger, right, which long remains in the what memory, Memory right, huh? And this pertains to mania, which is from manendo, I guess, which means remains. Is said, right? It doesn't mean necessarily madness, but.

[49:45] Third, on the side of what the man angry desires, to wit, revenge, right? And to this pertains what, furor, right? Which never rests until it what, punishes, huh? So there've

[50:04] been some famous movies there where people's going to revenge, you know. Maybe somebody's killed his parents or something, or killed his wife or something, you know, and.

[50:14] Even Batman is after you know those who, killed his parents, right? So. Okay. Even Batman can be illuminated here with the, prima, secundae and Batman.

[50:40] Whence the philosopher says in the fourth book of the ethics, huh? Now in the fourth book of the ethics, he talks about the virtue concerned with what, anger, doesn't he? In the third book, you have just what the first two, fortitude and temperance, the two cardinal virtues there, in the emotions, right? Then anger is taken up, after what? The

[51:06] one's concerned with money, right? And honor, right? Then you take up one concerned with anger. Appropriate way of taking them up, right? Okay. So that of those who are angry, he calls what? Acutos, right? Who are cheeto, quickly, right? Angry, right? Some he calls bitter, amaros, because they long retain what, anger, right?

[51:38] Some difficult because they never rest until unless they punish, right? To the first, therefore, should be said that all those things to which anger receives some perfection, right? Do not have themselves entirely praesidens to anger, right? It's not like red, white, and blue to triangle, right? And therefore, nothing prevents, according to them, for the species of anger to be assigned, right? So it's maybe not perfect example of a species, right?

[52:22] But they are things to which the anger itself receives somewhat perfection, right? Why green triangle is not a special way of being a triangle anyway.

[52:43] To the second, it should be said that ex condescentia how do they translate that anyway? Just your residential Okay. I think it has a sense of it. Flaming out. Yeah. Which Tully lays down more seems to pertain to the first species of anger, right? Which is perfected according to the quickness or swiftness of the anger, right? Then it seems to pertain to what furor, right?

[53:13] But nothing prevents that thymosis Greek, which in Latin is called furor, implies what both, right? Either swiftness to becoming angry or the firmness of the proposal to what punishment. I will get even, right?

[53:45] I don't get angry very easily, so don't be afraid, see. I remember when I lived up at the fall there, and, I was working on my doctoral thesis there, and a guy I'd gone to high school with came up there to pursue some philosophical studies, right? So we hadn't seen each other for years, you know. So we went out to dinner and all, and we're sitting there and having dinner.

[54:08] So I could talk about my thesis, was you know. His remark, first remark goes. that's a back-asset way of proceeding, he said. So I just kind of laughed, you know, and went on to discuss it, you know, huh? Some people would have you know, cheeto, you know. Yeah. What do you mean by that? Quite a bit of news for me nowadays. Sometimes they look at kind of,

[54:42] you know, sudden anger. What's going on? Okay. So a certain leeway there at the words, right? So we'll get too upset about that, huh?

[55:19] See, is Iago angry with with Othello? What do you think? He's angry with Othello. Iago. Yeah. That was just passing me by, you know. Just giving this to Cassio, you know, just a playboy, you know, giving it rather than to me, you know. Been in the battles and know how to really conduct myself in a war or a fight, you know. But it's not like he's what?

[55:52] Cito, right? Quickly getting angry, right? But he's going to get even with Othello, right? You think there might have been something with Othello and his wife too, you know? That comes out and play a little bit. It's kind of a cool, you know, but he's going to persist right until he gets his thing right, his revenge.

[56:28] That's a much more subtle example of his anger, there, right? Does Othello, you know, does he hate? Does Iago hate Othello, or does he? Is he angry with him in some way, right? It's kind of a cool anger in a sense, but kind of do that guy, you know. Kind of a frightening thing, right? So, so which is it? Well, it's certainly not the guy who gets angry.

[56:59] It seems to me it's a little bit like anger, right? You know, because he's been passed over, right? He thinks I should have got the promotion, right? Shouldn't give this Cassio. Casca doesn't know nothing. He's just a ladies' man or something. Yeah, yeah, and and this thing about you know the Iago and Othello maybe fool around a bit with Iago's wife, you know, and he just you know suspicion he says enough to make him seal the deal.

[57:32] Yeah, yeah, yeah. So it's not getting angry, you know, suddenly flaring up or something like that, right? But it is about injury. It is about perceived injury. Yeah, yeah, but he never rests until he punishes, right? So to go back to Shakespeare, this in mind, see.

[58:02] Okay. To the third, should be said that those grades of anger are distinguished according to the effect of anger, right? Huh. Not, however, according to the diverse what perfection of the motion of anger itself, right?

[58:25] Well, he's saying in the Bible, the article the different ways that anger is perfected, right? Right. Yeah. Take our little break now here before we go into question forty-seven.