Prima Secundae
116. Summa I-II Q.49: Habits in General – The Prologue, the Senses of 'To Have', and Whether Habit Is a Quality
Class of 2013-04-11
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/116-summa-i-ii-q-49-habits-in-general-the-prologue-the-senses/

[0:00] So let's look at the premium here at the beginning of chapter of question forty nine. Thomas says that a what square number has the same symbolism as a number which it is a square. So forty nine is the square of what? Seven, which is a symbol of wisdom, right? Okay. So it's beginning here now. Question forty nine, right?

[0:39] So let's look at his premium. Huh? Very important to see this. Monsignor Dionne gave a course one time what a premium is. A little course. Oh yeah, wasn't it It's a long, course, but it's a very interesting. little course. It's an importance to the premium, right? The longest part was a premium to the course. I noticed in the Second Vatican Council, right? My first copy of the Documents of Vatican Council was an English edition, right?

[1:09] And at the beginning of the Dei Verbum, it says introduction, right? When I got the Latin text, it said premium. You shouldn't confuse the introduction with the premium, right? The Isagoge means what? Introduction, right? Now the Isagoge has its own premium at the beginning. It's a marvelous premium, you know, beautiful one, for for uh porphyry, right. But the premium shouldn't be confused with an introduction. Okay.

[1:41] When Thomas divides the texts of Aristotle, almost every one of them it's into the premium and the tractatus, right? The drawing out of it, right? With the premium, you know, tells you what you're aiming at, right? Another important thing, son. So we can look at the premium here, huh? In question forty nine, now. Post actus et passiones, after the acts and passions, one should consider about the what?

[2:12] Beginnings. Yeah, of human acts, right? And then what's the first distinction he's going to make among these? And first among the about the intrinsic beginnings. Secondly, about the extrinsic beginnings, huh? Okay. Now the intrinsic beginning is twofold: the potency or the power, right? And the what? Habits, right? Now the powers he talked about back in the prima pars, right? He took up the soul, right? Okay, but because about the potencies or powers, one has spoken in the first part.

[2:59] It now remains here to consider about the what habits, huh? Just like Aristotle distinguishes the powers basically in the De Anima right? He talks about the habits in the what Nicomachean Ethics, huh?

[3:19] Okay. And first, in general, right? Secondly, about the virtues and the vices, and other habits of this sort, which are the principles of what human acts, huh?

[3:40] Okay. I notice, huh? Was it question what fifty-five? He begins to talk about the virtues and the vices, right? Okay. So he's going to talk about the habits here for a number of questions, huh?

[3:57] Okay. As Paul Paul the Sixth said, right? This is the principle of all education, right? The general before the particular. I can read Aristotle in the beginning of the Physics, right?

[4:17] Okay. Now, about the habits in general, four things should be what considered, huh? And Thomas, when he's explaining the the premium in the De Anima there, he says, you know, part of the premium here is to give the order, right? The distinction, the order, the treatise, right? So you can what follow it, right? So you can be teachable, right? Okay. Christopher Mangiliano says, and there's two meanings of we're teachable.

[4:56] One is teachable because of your will. The other is teachable inside the mind, right? This is teachable inside the mind, right? You see the order you're going to proceed in, right? This is before that, and so on.

[5:13] But teachable in the will is more being willing to learn from another, right? Who knows things better, right? You got to be willing to learn from Euclid, right? Who sees these things so much better about triangles and kinds of things, right?

[5:38] Okay. So first, that's in order, right? About the substance of the habits. Secondly, about their what. Subjects and that's in question what fifty if you have a footnote there. Third about the cause of the generation, the growth and the corruption of them right. They'll start that in question what fifty one right fifty two fifty three I guess. And then four about what their distinction question fifty four right.

[6:18] Not unlike Saint Francis of Sales' treatise on the love of God, he seems to treat the love of God in that way too. What is it? What's its subject? What's its generation, growth, and corruption?

[6:37] Interesting. The love of God, like the knowledge of God, is amphiboly, right? What amphiboly? So amphiboly is to speech what equivocation is to a word, right? So you could say that the knowledge of God, right, is a knowledge of God, right. You have two different senses. The knowledge of God can mean the knowledge which God has, right?

[7:10] Or knowledge of God can mean the knowledge whereby God is known, right? Okay. So the knowledge of God is a knowledge what of God? Because when you study God's knowledge, you find out that He knows all things by knowing Himself, right? He knows primarily, first, most of all Himself, right? And in knowing Himself perfectly, He knows all other things, right? So the knowledge which God has is a knowledge about God, right?

[7:46] So the knowledge of God in one sense is a knowledge of God in the other sense, right? Okay. The same thing could be said for the love of God, right? The love of God is a love of what? Primarily, the, love of God, right? Okay. So the the love which God has, right, is is a love of this object called God Himself, right? So the love of God is a love of God, right?

[8:16] Aristotle takes up wisdom there in the beginning of metaphysics, and he says this knowledge he says is divine in both senses, right? They could have said wisdom is a what knowledge of God, right? In the sense that it's about God, right? That's about the first cause, he says. And it's knowledge of God in the sense that God alone or God most of all would have such knowledge, right?

[8:44] So wisdom is a knowledge of God in both senses of the phrase or speech, right? Knowledge of God, right. Or like I say about Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? Shakespeare's definition of reason is the knowledge of reason in two senses. It's the knowledge which reason has about itself, right? So knowledge of reason can mean the knowledge reason has, or the knowledge which is about reason. So, by geometry, let's say, is the knowledge of reason in one sense, right?

[9:24] But not in the other sense, okay? So, what is your definition again? To repeat, of amphiboly is is is kind of technical word from the Greek there, where you have more than one word or name, right? And and the whole thing has more than one meaning, right? Okay. That's what I like about about you know the. Second Vatican Council, Verbum Dei, right? Word of God, right? You know, Word of God can mean the Bible, right?

[9:57] The Bible is the Word of God, but the Bible is chiefly about the Word of God made flesh, right? So the Word of God is about the Word of God, right? But the Word of God there has two meanings, right? In the one case, the Word of God means the Bible, right? But the Vatican Council teaches that the Bible is chiefly about the Word of God made flesh, right?

[10:23] In the other sense, right? So I kind of enjoy those union of those two, right? That arises from the the two uses of genitive. What they call the objective genitive and the possessive genitive. So knowledge of God is a knowledge he has; he possesses it. But then the knowledge of God as an object is the object. So that's that's built into a genitive. There's two ways to use it: either as an object or possession.

[10:54] Yeah. See in metaphysics, Aristotle is using the the word rather than the speech, right? So he's saying wisdom is what divine knowledge, right? And why we call it divine because it's about the first cause, and the first cause is God, right? Therefore, it's about the God. And then in the tradition of Greek philosophy, right? You know, the reason why Pythagoras, when they called him wise, he said, "Don't call me wise.

[11:27] Why not? Well, God alone is wise, right? Well, what so we call you then? We'll call me a lover of wisdom. You know, so there's humility there, right? In the origin of the word philosopher, and not just the idea of lover of wisdom, right? But the humility that man is not really wise in comparison to God, right? Okay. Um. So when Aristotle says that wisdom is divine, he says it's in both senses divine, right?

[11:55] It's about God, and it's a kind of knowledge that either God alone would have, or only God would have fully or perfectly, right? Beautifully said, right? Huh? But I could turn it into amphibolous and say wisdom is the knowledge of God, right? In both senses, right? It's the knowledge that God has alone, or most of all, and it's the knowledge which is about God, right? Because about the first cause.

[12:22] Okay. So. So about the first four things are asked. First, whether habit is a what quality, right? Well, in the book called the Categories, right, Aristotle has. Quality. He divides it into four. What species, right? And we'll meet this division here. And so Thomas is asking first of all, where the habit is in that genus, right? It's quality. Just like you might say, number, you know, is is number a what quantity, right?

[13:09] Okay, the answer is yes. Okay. Second, whether it is a determined species, right? A determined species of quality, right? So I'll take you back in those articles to what the categories, right? Aristotle.

[13:29] So Aristotle was a teacher of Thomas, huh? But by the what written word, right? So we have teachers by written word and teachers by the what spoken word, right? Saint Augustine is a teacher of Thomas too, but by the what written word, right? Huh? Okay.

[13:50] Um. Third, whether habit implies in order to what to an act, right? What is that? Well, does it have what? Is it a source of habit in some way, right? And does it perfect act in some way, right? Okay. Now you see, habit is going to have in order to act in a different way than the the powers that he mentioned, right? Okay. So the habit is going to perfect the power, right, with respect to that what act, right?

[14:26] Okay. So when I acquire the habit, I can do the act what well and easily and perfectly and so on, right? Of course a habit habit touches upon something that's very important for human being, right? And when Thomas takes up, you know, what grace is, right? Grace is in the way habit, special kind of habit, a new kind of habit, right? But it's something that that fits human nature in that respect.

[14:56] We need that. Creatures of habit. Yeah. Especially us. Yes. That's equivocal. Absolutely. To the first, therefore, one proceeds thus: It seems that habit is not a quality, huh? My goodness, Thomas. He should make up his mind. And he quotes this guy Augustine, right? He's quite a man. For Augustine says in the book of the eighty-three questions

[15:32] that this name habit is said from this verb which is to have. But to have not only pertains to quality, but to what other genera? For we are said to have quantity, right? And even to have money, right? And others of this sort. Therefore, habit is not a what? Quality, right? Now, what's the last chapter of the categories about? Do you remember? To have, to have, yeah.

[16:12] See, Aristotle was aware of the fact that to have is a word that's equivocal by what reason, right? And he distinguishes among the senses, right? And you say it's kind of a marvelous thing, you know, because nobody is fully explaining the what they call the post predicates, right? Aristotle takes up opposites first, right? And then he takes up before and after, right? Chapter twelve. Then he takes up together, right?

[16:42] Which is neither before nor after. Then he takes up what? how motion fits into the categories, and then he has to have, right? What's interesting because you say accidents or substance is said to have accidents, right? Okay. That's one place where the word to have comes in, right? And then the

[17:11] each of the categories you've got a genus, ten genera, and each genus is said to have species, and then a species is said to have a genus. Okay. Confusion compounded here. Okay. That reminds me, you know, when Aristotle was distinguishing the senses of in in the fourth book of the physics, and he says that in the third sense of in the genus is in the species, right?

[17:43] In the fourth sense, the species is in the genus. Well, obviously different senses, right? Okay. So the genus is said to have species in the plural, right? And the species in the singular is said to have a what genus, right? So there you've got now what substance has accidents, right? Genus has species, species has a genus. Got at least three senses there, right? Then there's a category called echein To have, to have, right?

[18:21] That's another sense, right? And then you have in quality here something called habit, right? Which seems to involve, you know, that's a fifth sense, right? And then a a thing is said to have a name, right?

[18:41] That's another sense. And a name is said to have. Meanings, or they have a meaning, or they have meanings in some case, right? You know, how many senses does to have? Is there? Do you got all these? I'd be excused, if my brain is cold. It's a horse-eyed person about this. I didn't hear it, though. So it's interesting. I should have a chapter on to have, right?

[19:11] How many times does that use, and how many different ways does it use in there, right? No wonder so few people study this. Yeah. I'm not studying the word substance there in the categories, you know, and I found out about four senses of the word substance, right? Huh? And I found a touch of Thomas Reid's, which is all four of them, right? What a mind he had, you know.

[19:39] When he when he's showing, you know, that there's no member of the Trinity is before or after another member of the Trinity, the Father is not before the Son. and the Son is not before the Holy Spirit, even though the Son is from the Father, and the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son. But Thomas will, you know, enumerate the senses of before in the twelfth chapter.

[20:03] The categories, right? Is that important, right? Okay. Of course, have is very important, right? Huh? He says, you know, what's unusual. about God is everything He has; He is. But what we have, we're not, right? I have some knowledge of geometry, but that's not what I am. You know, I have some health, but that's not what I am. You know, but what God has, He is. You know, unusual sense of having, right?

[20:35] Huh? That's kind of, you know, are we speaking, right? Huh? He said God has wisdom, right? Huh? But He is wisdom. He is wisdom. Yeah, He has life. But what He said, I am the way, the truth, and the life, right? Huh? You know, why I would not be so presumptuous to say I am truth.

[21:00] So God is very interesting, right? So that's really quite a quite a word, this word to have, right? Huh? You know, in natural philosophy, matter is said to have a what? Oh, form, yeah.

[21:16] And the word to have is always connected with the word in. Yeah, yeah. Aristotle points that out in the physics. I think, of the word to have there in the fifth book again, right? Okay. So we have you now, right? I have you, right? You're in my power. I have you. You know,

[21:41] so it's an extremely difficult word, this to have, huh? It's manifold. But the modern philosophers are too proud to stop and figure out what the words they're using mean. Strange, you know. I

[22:02] don't want to be one of the has. Yeah, the has and have-nots. Yeah, yeah. It's interesting. Lieutenant, you speak of the haves and the have-nots with respect to something exterior to you, right?

[22:23] And do I have more of my knowledge or my money? I have a car out there. Do I have that? Do I have? It's not in you. Yeah, it's not in you. But you know, if you ask me what do you have, he'd probably say, "Well, I got some cash." You talk about things that are outside of him that he has, right? Rather, what's inside of him, right?

[22:48] Huh? You know. But do you really have those things as much as you have? What's the idea? I have a soul. Yeah, yeah. You have a soul. You have a soul. I sure do. If somebody has knowledge which is internal and they have a car which is external, but if they're sort of enslaved to their possessions in a way, they love their car more than anything in the whole universe.

[23:21] Would that that would be sort of a? I don't know if it's so much having the car as the car having them. Yeah, yeah, yeah. The difference between having possessions and being possessed. Yeah. Good thing. Once they say about the cat, right? The cat has you, right? And the cat kind of determines where you are going to live. Yeah. When you get up, when you you go to bed, and you open the door, close the door.

[23:47] Yeah. Dogs do that. That was funny. It's kind of interesting. We tend to use the word "have" and "have nots" thinking of the exterior things, though, right? Since they're kind of more manifest to us in the use of the word, doesn't he? He has it all. Yeah. Sweetie, God, who has it all, right? The problem with quality. He is all. He says to Moses, "I'll show you every good."

[24:21] Right? Thomas says, "That is myself." Moreover, habitus is laid down as one of the what predicamentum. On predicamentum is a Latin word they use for the categories, right? I mentioned how the word "category" comes from the what the law courts, right? Okay. And so in the gospels, you know, when they're accusing Christ of something, the word "category" comes up, right? Okay. So I think the way the word was borrowed was that when you categorize somebody in the court, you accuse them of something, right?

[24:57] You are a thief. You are a murderer. You are an adulterer, whatever it is. You know, I've got to say something of you. Yeah. And so then you borrowed it, right? Huh? So my friend Warren Murray says he calls the ten categories the ten supreme accusations, right? It's

[25:16] a good way of emphasizing the origin from the verdict of that word, you know. So habitus is laid so they they call it in Latin though they the word from to be said of right predicare right predicamentum right. And they call the the book of Isagoge right. They call that the predicabilia, right? Okay. So if you look at Albert's treatise on these, you know, the de predicabilibus, right, which is about genus, species, difference, property, and accident.

[25:52] And then the de predicamentis, right, and that's about the categories, right? So he says unum predicamentum. Somebody might say one of the categories, right? Okay, it's one of the last six.

[26:11] Okay, but one predicament is not contained under another, right? That's it. Therefore, habitus is not a what quality, right? However, every habitus is a disposition, as is said in the predicamentis. And I was capitalizing in the Aristotle's book, right? Okay, but in English we call it the categories, taking on the Greek word, right?

[26:44] But disposition is the order of something having parts, as is said in the fifth book of metaphysics. Well, that's of course one meaning of the word, right? Okay, but this pertains to the predicament of what situs, position. Okay, I'm sitting now, right? That's order of parts and place, right?

[27:07] Okay, therefore habitus is not a quality, right? Okay. So words are dangerous things, wouldn't you say? In the book On Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle considers thirteen ways of being deceived. Yeah. The first six are all from what? From words. But there are some things worth risking. Yeah, some risks worth taking. Yeah, yeah. But against all this is what the philosopher says, right? In the predicamentis, the categories. That habitus is a qualitas, de difficile, mobilis, and not easily, right?

[27:52] Changed, right? Okay. So you're going to find when Aristotle talks about habit and disposition, right? He'll sometimes say that habit is a disposition, as he does in this quote. Other times he'll divide habit against what disposition, right? And this is a way in which a word becomes equivocal by reason, right? Sometimes a word is said of two things, right? And is kept by one of those two things later on as its own, and a new name is given to the other one.

[28:28] So disposition can be divided into disposition that is easily lost, like for example mood, right? You know, and then a disposition that is difficult to remove or not easily lost, right? And because that disposition adds something noteworthy, this idea of some stability or permanence. It gets a new name, right? Sometimes habit, right? And these other ones that are easily movable keep the name disposition, right? Okay. Now you're going to find that way of naming things over and over again, right?

[29:05] And the sooner you get used to it, the better, right? Because otherwise, it's just going to be, you know, lost, right? Yeah. You know, we're always talking. We always joke about that. You know, the priest is saying, you know, you got to treat the girl as a person, not as a thing, you know. But if she's not a thing, then she's nothing, right? She's even worse, right?

[29:29] But obviously, the word "thing" there is being kept for something, right? That a person is, right? In the broad sense, the word "thing," right? And then the person gets a new name because it's a very what? Adds something noteworthy, right? Okay. Now you find this over and over again, right? In In the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, when Aristotle takes up the virtues of reason, he distinguishes between episteme, right, and sophia.

[30:03] In Latin, between scientia and sapientia, right? Okay, this reasoned-out knowledge and wisdom, right? But then when he takes up wisdom in the metaphysics. He calls it a what? Episteme. Episteme, right? Okay. Well, episteme is a reasoned-out knowledge of things by their causes and so on, right? And wisdom is one of those, right? But wisdom is something very special, right? Because it's not about just any causes, but the very first causes of all, right?

[30:41] So sometimes the other ones keep the name scientia or episteme, and sapientia or wisdom gets a new name, namely what? Wisdom, right? You see a little bit in English, you know. If we were to distinguish between knowledge and wisdom, right? Well, wisdom is a kind of knowledge, and there would be another sense of knowledge, right? But you might say that we keep knowledge for the lesser kinds of knowledge, and wisdom, which is the knowledge of divine things, right?

[31:12] Has its excellence, right? So it gets a new what? Name, right? Okay. Now you'll find that distinction over and over again, huh? You know, you gotta find that, right?

[31:28] Now sometimes the one that gets a new name is the one that adds something, what? Noteworthy, like wisdom, right? But sometimes it's because one of the two has only imperfectly what is meant by the common name, and then in that case, the what? One that has fully keeps the name, and the other. Gets the new name. Yeah, yeah. So we say if you divide human beings into man and woman, right?

[32:03] That's the I hope exhaustive division. At least to the point. Yeah, yeah. But then you might divide man into man and boy, right? Because man has fully what defines a man, right? And the boy has imperfectly, so he gets the new name because he has imperfectly, right? And woman is divided into woman sometimes and girl, and the woman has fully what is meant by woman, right? Huh?

[32:37] But the girl's on the way there, right? Huh? Still good ones. Definitely on the way. So they get the new name, girl, right? Okay. So you gotta find over and over again, right? Sometimes you know. We divide man against the animals, don't we? And sometimes we say man is an animal. So when we divide man against the animals, animals have kept the animal, but man, this animal, has been given a what?

[33:09] Yeah. So would you call man an ape? Well, you know, Homo sapiens, wise, you know. So you're gonna find those are two ways it takes place, right? But you find this over and over again. So sometimes they call this power of understanding. They call it what? Understanding, right? Or intellectus in Latin, right? But then sometimes they keep for the angels or for God the word what? Understanding, and they give us a new name because we have a defective understanding.

[33:54] A they call it in Latin there, Isaac, they call it the intellectus umbratus, the overshadowed understanding, right? Overshadowed images and all these other things. So we get a new name called what? Reason, right? Okay. That's why Shakespeare defines you know reason as reason as looking before and after. Rather than seeing the before and after, right? Because we have a hard time seeing that, right?

[34:27] And so you might say reason is the ability to look for distinctions. Well, it's ability to see distinctions too, but we have a hard time seeing distinctions, right? And our mind breaks down. You know the word to have even. You have a hard time distinguishing the senses of the word to have, right? Our mind breaks down, and so we get a new name, right? Because the common meaning of understanding, the ability to understand, we have in a very imperfect what?

[34:59] Way, right? So you're gonna find it over and over again, huh? So I just mentioned here because it comes up here at the omnis habitus est dispositio, right? Of course, disposition has got other meanings too, even the categories, right? You find this over again.

[35:23] I answer. It should be said that this name habitus is taken from having, right? From which the name of habitus is derived in what two ways?

[35:42] In one way, according as man or any other thing is said to have something, right? Huh? In another way, according as something in some way has itself in itself or towards another, right? That's a hard thing to say, huh? Kind of streaks. That's kind of strange to have yourself, right, huh?

[36:10] Now about the first, however, it should be considered that to have, according as it is said with-respect to anything that is had, is common to what diverse genera, right, huh?

[36:28] Whence the philosopher, huh, among the post Predicamenta, right? So when they divide up the treatise of Aristotle called the what categories, right? Or in Latin the Predicamenta, right? they divide it into three parts, right? The ante Predicamenta, before Aristotle distinguishes the ten and takes them up, and then the what Predicamenta themselves, and then the things that are taken up after the predicamenta, which are the opposites before, you know, together motion, right, and then to have, right, huh?

[37:04] Okay. Whence the philosopher, among the post Predicamenta, lays down Haberi, to have, right, huh? Which follow upon the diverse what genre of things, right? Just as opposita, right, huh? So actually takes up the distinction of the four kinds of opposites, contradictories, contraries, right? Having and what lack, right? And then relations, right? And then before and after, which he uses Latin words here, of course, Prius and Posterius, right?

[37:45] At alia huyus modi, right, huh? So motion or change is found in what substance in some way and in quantity and growth, right? Quality change of quality is found in ubi or where, right, huh? Aristotle. You can't put in just one category, right?

[38:08] But among those things which are had, such seems to be a distinction, right, huh? Thomas again is seeing a distinction, right, huh? He is never quite?

[38:24] That there are some in which there is nothing in the middle, right? Between the having, the one having and that which is had, just as between the subject and the quality or quantity, there is no middle, right, huh? But there are some in which there is something in the middle between both. But only a what? Relation. As one is said to have a companion or a friend.

[39:01] There are some hover among which there is some middle, not an action or a passion, but something in the manner of an action or a passion. In so far as one is what, adorning, huh, or covering, right? Another is adorned or covered, right, huh? Okay.

[39:27] Whence the philosopher says in the fifth book of metaphysics that habitus is said as it were a pseudo-action of the haver and the had. That's the way they explain that category of the have, right, huh? Just as in those things which we have about us,

[39:44] and therefore in these they are constituted one special genus of things. Which is called a predicamentum. It's a highest genus. It's a supreme accusation, right? And that's called echein in the Greek, right?

[40:03] About which the philosopher in the fifth book of metaphysics says that between the man having the what, gown, the clothing, and the clothing itself which is had, there is a habit in the middle, right? That's the way of speaking, right?

[40:23] If ever one takes to have, in so far as a thing is said in some way to have itself in itself or towards another, then in this way of having, according to somewhat quality, right? In this way, habit is a what quality?

[40:45] So in some way you have yourself what to yourself or to another, right? About which the philosopher in the fifth book of metaphysics says that habit is a disposition according to which one is disposed, right? Either well or what badly, right? Either according to oneself or to another, as health is a certain what habit, habit of the body. And thus we speak now about habit. Whence it should be said that habit is a what quality, right?

[41:28] If you look at the five objections, or is it terrible, okay. Because we're going to do this first article again next week, you know, but we'll just look at it here this time. To the first objection, then, right? Taken there from Augustine, right? That objection proceeds from to have taken commonly, right? And thus it is common to many genera and is not tied to one, right?

[41:59] To the second, it should be said that that argument proceeds from habit, according as is understood as something in the middle between the one having and that which is had, and that gives rise to that one predicament that is called to have, right?

[42:19] For thus it is a certain predicamentum or category, as we'd say in English today. Now, to the third, about disposition, this text from the metaphysics. To the third, it should be said that disposition always implies the order of something having parts, right? But this happens in three ways,

[42:45] as the philosopher there immediately adds, right? Either according to place, or according to power, or according to species. In which, as Simplicius says in his commentary on the Categories of Aristotle, he comprehends all what dispositions, right? Bodily ones, in that he says, according to place, and this pertains to the predicament of we usually translate it as position, right? Okay. Which is the order of parts in place, right?

[43:28] So Aristotle is distinguishing, or Thomas is distinguishing, the categories. There's one called where, right? And one called when. And then in where and there, I mean, there's another one. Where is tied up with place, right? When with time, but then there's another one called position, which is tied up with place too.

[43:53] And that is because there's a distinction for us, right, between being in this room, and I'm in this room now. What? Sitting. When you say I'm in this room, you don't indicate that I'm sitting or I'm laying down or I'm standing or something, right? See. Because to be in this room doesn't say anything about the order in which my parts are, right? So when I'm standing, my parts are arranged in in this order.

[44:22] I'm sitting down. I'm like this. If I'm laying down, I'd be in another position, right? But there's no category corresponding to time that's analogous to what position. And that goes back to the definition of what time, right? That implied in the idea of time is already order before and after. That's just first sense of before and after. Yeah. You see, so there's no two categories there tied up with time, just one.

[44:54] But there's two tied up with place, right? Where, and then the order of parts in place, position, right? Okay. So. So we when we call it our position, right? Position, right? Okay. But you call it disposition too, huh? And that's another category. Crazy stuff, right? Okay.

[45:31] Those are said according to potency, right? Includes those dispositions which are in preparation and a suitability not yet perfectly, just as knowledge and virtue in inchoata, right? Okay. Yeah.

[45:47] And that which is said secundum speciem includes perfect dispositions, which are called habitus, as what Science and Virtue complete. yeah. We'll come back to this first article next time again, right? But you get to the second article, he'll talk about what the whole category of what quality, right, and how it's divided up, and that falls upon seeing that habit in some way is a quality, right? Okay.