Prima Secundae
120. Why Habits Are Necessary, and Where They Are: Body, Soul, Powers and Grace (ST I-II Q49 a.4; Q50 aa.1-2)
Class of 2013-04-25
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/120-why-habits-are-necessary-and-where-they-are-body-soul-powers/

[0:00] Fourth article here, right? To the fourth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that it is not necessary for there to be what habitus, right? We're going to find out that man is a creature of habit, right? In a much more profound way than they realize, those who say this, right?

[0:24] For habit is that by which something is disposed well or badly to something, as has been said. But through its form, something is well or badly disposed, right? For according to form, something is good, just as it is a being according to its form. Therefore, there is no necessity of habits, right?

[0:49] Moreover, habit implies an order to act, but potency or ability implies a beginning of acts sufficiently. For also, what natural powers, right, are sources of acts without any habits, right? So, why does my reason have to have all these habits, or my will have to have all these habits?

[1:15] Therefore, it is not necessary for habit to be. Moreover, just as ability has itself to good and bad, so also habit. And just as ability does not always act, so neither does habit always. Therefore, the powers existing is superfluous to have habit.

[1:45] But against this, is that habits are per certain perfections as is seven, as is said in the seventh book of the physics. But perfection is most necessary for the thing, since it has the ratio of a what end, therefore it is necessary that there be habit.

[2:15] I answer: It should be said that, as has been said above, habit implies a disposition, a certain disposition, in order to the nature of a thing, right? And to the operation or the end of that thing, right? According as something is disposed for this either well or badly, right?

[2:46] But for this that something needs to be disposed to another, three things are required. First, that that which is disposed. Is something other from that to which it is what disposed, and thus it has itself to it as potency to what act?

[3:13] Whence is something? Whence if there is something whose nature is not composed from potency and act, whose nature is not composed from potency and act, and whose substance is what? It's operation. It's operation, and it is on account of itself, right? This is a big. This is a big thing. This is important. Their habit or decision has no place, as is clear in God. God is correct.

[3:50] He's luckiness, perfection. He doesn't need it. Okay. Second is required that that which is in ability or points in another is able to be determined in what many ways. Okay.

[4:13] So Heidegger's mind is determined in a different way than Aristotle's mind, right? Many different ways. Many. Yes. And to diverse things, right? Sometimes even the diverse ways of the same. Yeah. Remember, sorry, making kind of a joke. He's saying, "How, when your soul is separated from your body, you recognize this is your friend Joe or your enemy so and so or this guy, that guy, right now."

[4:39] He says, "Some people they just approach the same thing mentally quite different, right? And that's how you recognize." Once something is in potency to another, right? But not, however, that it's in potency what except to it, right? Then disposition habit have no what place,

[5:20] because such a subject by or from its own nature has a suitable what relation to such an act, right? Whence, if the heavenly body is the old physics now, whence if the heavenly body is composed from matter and form, whose matter is not in what potency to another form, right? As has been said in the first, one does not there need a what disposition? Yeah, it has no place there.

[5:50] A disposition or habit to the what form, right? Or even to operation. Because the nature of the celestial body is not in potency except to one determined what motion.

[6:08] To the third is required that the many run together, right? To dispose the subject to one of those things to which is in potency, which in diverse ways can be what measured. Measured, so that one is disposed well or badly to the form or to the what operation.

[6:35] Whence the simple qualities of the elements—earth, hot, cold, wet, and dry—as they thought, right? Which, according to one determined mode, belong to the natures of the elements. We do not say to be dispositions or habits, but simple what qualities. But we call dispositions or habits health, beauty, and others of the sort, huh? Which imply certain what measure. Yeah. Measured together with of many things, right? Which in diverse ways can be what measured.

[7:12] Yeah, like tuning your your what you tune your instrument there. Yeah, There's many chords, though, right, They've got to be commensurate, huh? Whence the kind of which the philosopher says in the fifth book of wisdom that a habit is a disposition, and disposition is the order of something having parts, either according to place, right, or according to what power or ability, or according to species, right. So, according to place, is going back this idea of my sitting or my standing, right?

[7:52] So, my have many parts that can be what brought together in different ways, right? Okay, Not a simple thing, right? Because therefore there are many things among the things that are to whose what Nature is an operation is necessary for many things to what come together or to run together, right? Which in diverse ways can be what measured together, right? Is necessary for there to be what habits, huh?

[8:35] Okay. Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that through the form is perfected the nature of the what thing. But it is necessary that in order to the form itself. The subject be disposed by some what disposition, right?

[9:03] But the form itself is ordered further to a what operation, which is either the end itself or the road to the end. And if the form has terminally only one determined operation, right? No other disposition is required for the operation apart from the form itself, right? If, however, it, be such a form that is able in diverse ways to operate, as the soul, it is necessary that it be disposed to its operation through some what habits, huh?

[9:50] Okay. Same way applied in second objection: that power sometimes has itself to many, right? And therefore, it's necessary that it's by something other. that it be what determined, huh?

[10:07] So people don't think the same thing, do they? Right. So you have to be what you need habit to be disposed well to thinking about these things, huh? Okay. I get the example there, the the ancient crooks there that do real estate there, you know. They buy and sell what property by perimeter, right? Well, the dummies who don't know geometry think that if the land has more perimeter, it has more what?

[10:42] Yeah. You're getting more land, right? Is that so? No. Now my one of my favorite theorems in Euclid is theorem five, their second book, right, where he shows that a square, right, for the same perimeter, will have more area than a oblong, right. And it's even possible to have a square that has more area than a oblong that has more what? Perimeter. Yeah, that's kind of an amazing thing to what see, right?

[11:18] So you know, you and I get out there, and we both got a kid who's kind of restless and want to put up a fence, you know, and give him as much land as we can to run around. And so we go down and buy some fencing material, and I use less fence than you did, right? But I took in more land than you did, huh? You're a dummy, right, You didn't realize, right?

[11:44] You're using the wrong, yeah, yeah. So someone would think, right, that if you have more perimeter, you have more area, right? Or something similar in numbers, you know, where you can say that if the sum of two numbers is greater than the sum of two other numbers, then their product will be greater, right?

[12:09] You think so, right? You would think so. If a plus b are more than c plus d, then a times b will be more than c times d. And they feel they'll say, yeah, yeah. But you can see from proposition five, just changing it to numbers, right? That five times five would say is twenty-five, and what? Two times ten is what? Twenty. So two plus ten is more than five plus five, but five times five is more than.

[12:38] Can that be so? Tell you sometimes to the uneducated, oh, these are tricks you learn. Yeah, yeah. Then there's this marvelous theorem in in book three there, where

[13:00] we're talking about when a straight line touches a circle, right? At one point, right? It's impossible to draw a line in between the circle and this from that point, right? Now, a dummy like me, just using my imagination, right, which is the source of error, that's. I'd say, well, above that point where the line touches the circle at one point only, is open space, right? All the way from that line, from that point.

[13:31] Therefore, I imagine it's possible to put. You know, it must be so. Now, just start at that point where they meet and draw a line. There's just open space all around, you know. See, so a dummy like me, I'm ill disposed towards circles and tangents, right?

[14:07] So I don't think well about this, do I? Because you're trying to think with your imagination. Yeah, yeah. So there are some theorems where they're contrary to what you'd expect, right? Now, most theorems in geometry, you know. But even the Pythagorean theorem, you know, if you'd never heard about this, you'd say, "Oh, you know, is it always going to be that way? You know, the square is going to be always exactly equal.

[14:33] " Well it didn't seem to be that way. But you could give me something of a habit, or at least a disposition for habit, right? You know, and so I'm eternally grateful to Euclid, right? I'll be taken care of the next world, huh? Euclid of Athens and Alexandria, studied with Plato, right? Oh yeah. So he ends up there, Greek, work there with the five regular solids, right?

[15:09] Euclid ends up with the five regular solids, right? Yeah, yeah. That's kind of Platonic, and that's the culmination, right? That guy. I'm afraid he doesn't know how to define the one. So he's confused, like Plato was about the one.

[15:34] The one that's convertible to being, and the one that is the beginning of number, right? They ain't the same one. It's a very difficult thing. Even the great minds, huh? Plato and Avicenna, right? Two of the greatest minds around. They're both all mixed up, aren't they? Deficient. So he says in the fifth second objection, potencia quando quasi habet ad multa, right? Sometimes it has itself to many, and therefore it is necessary that by something other it be determined.

[16:20] If, however, there be some power which does not have itself to many, it does not need a habit determining it, right? And in count of this, the natural powers do not what do operations do operations. by means of habits Yeah, because according to themselves they determine to one, right?

[16:41] So my reproductive part didn't, you know, wasn't open to producing dogs or cats or horses, right? You know how to be disposed to producing a human being, but it was naturally determined to that, right?

[16:57] Now to the third, he says it should be said that is not the same habit that has itself to good and to bad, as will be clear below. It's not already clear to you. But the same power has itself to the good and the bad, right?

[17:15] And therefore habits are necessary that potencies might be determined to the good, right? So you can use your mind to what? Determine your acts. Iago uses his mind to what deceive fellow, right?

[17:48] And his will, right? He wills to do this, right? So his wills not disposed to the good. These guys who blew up people there in Boston, right? They weren't disposed towards the good, it seems to me, right?

[18:05] They said they went that way a number of years ago, apparently. You know, they all suddenly got disposed this other way, right? So you can be disposed towards the good or the what bad, huh? Yes, you heard the judge asking the famous bank robber, you know, when he finally appeared for the umpteenth time in front of him, why did he do this? Why did he rob the banks?

[18:28] Well, that's where the money? is. So that's the first question here about habits, right? So is grace a habit? Yeah. No, no. Well, grace is here ambiguous then. Sanctifying grace isn't habit. Sanctifying grace is habit.

[19:18] So it cannot not on a human habit. I'm just using it for this. When it can't be used for evil, can't dispose us. When dispose us to the good. Is that not a habit? The same thing is about justice, right? Or fortitude, right?

[19:41] Dispose us just towards the good. What's distinct from table and chairs, or giants? These are disposed habits. Then there's no grace there. They come from grace, but they're distinct from grace, I think. Yeah, sometimes Thomas would speak as if grace is in the soul, right? And then, just as the powers naturally flow from the nature of the thing, so the theological virtues flow from the grace that's in the soul, right?

[20:21] But let's think about that with the grace that has a habit, right? It's a sound for us right now. Then we're not to consider about the subject of what habits, right? What a thorough mind this guy had, huh? Didn't you say so? Mm-hmm.

[20:49] I don't know anybody who thinks things through as much as Thomas, huh? Or maybe you're a Stahlman, but Thomas had the help of him, right? Mm-hmm. The help of Augustine, right? All these great minds. But

[21:08] Thomas says about the Latin of Erasmus, they speak as if wisdom began with them. Thomas never speaks that way, huh? Then we're not to consider about the subject of habits and about this six things are asked. First, whether in the body is some what. Habit. Yeah.

[21:37] Second, whether the soul itself is the subject of habit according to its what? Essence, huh? Or according to its what? Power. That's interesting for this question of grace that we're saying, right? Mm-hmm.

[22:01] Third, whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be some habit, huh? Do I have a habit in my eye or my ear?

[22:15] Twenty twenty vision metalhead. Let's see what the master says. Whether in the understanding there is some habit, I'm pretty much convinced that there is.

[22:33] Of course, in the powers of the sensitive part could be included the emotions as well as the what? The sensing powers, right? Huh? And it's more apt in the in the emotional than in the sensing powers, right? Huh? Let's see what the master says. Okay. Whether in the will there is some habit, huh? Justice.

[22:59] Six. Whether there is habits in the separated substances, right? In the angels, right? Huh? You know, there's no habits in God, right? But what about the angels, right? It is Aristotelian, right? Huh?

[23:25] Okay. To the first one goes forward. Thus, it seems that in the body there is not any habit. For as the commentator says in the third book about the soul, a habit is that by which someone acts when he wants to, when he wills to do so, right? But the bodily actions are not subject to the will, since they are what? Natural, right? Huh? Yes. Therefore, in the body there cannot be what any habit, huh?

[24:01] Do I will to digest my food, or just goes on without me? Moreover, all disposition, all body dispositions are easily movable, right? But habit is a quality difficult to be made. Therefore, no disposition, no body disposition can be a habit, huh?

[24:30] Moreover, all dis, all body dispositions are subject to alteration. But alteration is not except in the third species of what? Quality. Aristotle shows in the seventh book of the physics, which is divided against habit, right? Huh? Therefore, no habit is in the what? Body.

[24:54] Against this is what the philosopher, the philosopher in the *Predicamentis*, right, in the book called *The Categories*, says that the what health of the body, right, or its incurable infirmity, right, are named a what habit.

[25:20] Interesting, begins the body, right? Then he goes to the the soul, right? For most of the articles, he does say one in the body, right? Doesn't completely neglect the miserable part of us, right? Though sometimes our soul is more miserable than our body, right?

[25:41] Answer: It should be said that it has been said above that habit is a certain disposition of some subject, right, existing in potency, either to what form or to operation, right?

[26:00] Now, according as habit implies a disposition to operation, to doing, no habit is chiefly in the body as in a what subject, huh? For every operation of the body is either from a natural quality of the body, or it is from the soul moving the what body, right? As regards those operations which are by nature, the body is not disposed to some habit because the natural virtues are determined to one.

[26:35] That's what you're referring to there in the ninth book of wisdom, right? The ninth book of wisdom, Aristotle distinguishes between the natural abilities and the what rational abilities, right? And the natural abilities are determined to one, right? Where the rational abilities are open to what opposites, right? Nature not being able to be more than one thing, as Shakespeare says, right?

[27:00] The idea that nature is determined to one, because okay, because natural powers are determined to one. It has been said however, that an habitual disposition is required where a subject is in potency to what multa to many, right?

[27:24] The operations which are are from the soul through the body, right, are chiefly of the soul itself, right? Huh? Secondarily of the body itself, right? So the barbers there, right, is chiefly from their soul, right, that this came, right?

[27:44] But habits are proportioned to what operations? Whence from similar acts. Similar habits are what caused, as said in the second book of the Ethics, and therefore the dispositions for such operations are chiefly in the soul, but they are able to be in a secondary way in the body, right? In so far as the body is disposed and habilitated, conditioned to promptly serving to the operations of the what soul, right?

[28:20] If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to the form, thus an habitual disposition can be in the body, which is compared to the soul as its subject to what form? And in this way, health and beauty and things of this sort are called what? Natural. Yeah. Or excuse me. habitual disposition. Okay. Of course, sometimes we compare them. You know, if you compare the the uh three ones of the body. there health and strength, right, and beauty, right, huh?

[28:59] And compare them to the to courage and what justice and to what temperance, right? Which ones have a likeness to which? Well, courage is obviously strength, right? And

[29:20] beauty is what temperance. Temperance, yeah, yeah. In fact, when you go and you study temperance, that's one of the integral parts of temperance, right? When that stuff, yeah, yeah, yeah. Not naming to you, you chase stars, right? Okay, at least metaphor there in Shakespeare. And then what health is like what justice, huh? A little bit like that, huh? Okay, but they're not really so much for acts as for what the form, right, huh?

[29:50] Okay. My friend Jim used to say to me, "I'm Barquist. " He says, "I'm strong but not healthy. " Maybe a different virtue, right, huh? Jim could have, you know, not be flat, be a golden gloves boxer, right? But he wasn't too healthy in some ways, so strong but not healthy. Okay.

[30:31] So in this way, huh? Is it compared to what the soul is subject to its form, in this way, health and beauty and things of this sort are called habitual dispositions, right, huh? They do not, however, perfectly have the ratio of habits, because the causes of them, from their very nature, are easily what changeable. Yeah. So you know what's the phantom of the opera, something else? They throw acid in your face and you've lost your beauty, right, huh?

[31:01] You know. Okay. Alexander, right? This is not Alexander the Great now, but another Alexander, Aphrodisias, right? That's his hometown, not his character. Alexander however, lays down: in no way is habit or disposition of the first species in the body, as Simplicius notes in his commentary on the predicaments, right? But he says that the first species of quality pertains only to the what soul, and that Aristotle induces the predicaments about health and sickness.

[31:42] He does not induce as if these pertain to the first species of quality, but by way of what exemplifying something. In the sense that just as sickness and health are able to be easily or difficultly changeable, so also the qualities of the first species, which I said are called habitus but it's clear that this is against the intention of Aristotle, both because in the same way of what speaking, he uses exemplifying health and sickness and virtue and what science, and then also because in the seventh book of the Physics he expressly lays down among the habits beauty and health,

[32:29] So some teachers I mean that Alexander's a little bit off there, huh Alexander's got problems too, but it's still important. To the first then, right? Huh? It should be said that that objection, huh? Drawn from a very weak statement there, which seems from habit according as its disposition to operation,

[32:59] and about the acts of the body which are from nature, right? Huh? But not over about those which are from the soul whose source is what the will,

[33:14] the will, huh? To the second, it should be said that bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to be changed on account of the immutability of bodily causes, right? Huh? But they able to be what hard to move in comparison to what such a subject, huh? Because such a subject remaining, they are not able to be what moved, or because they are hard to move in comparison to other dispositions, right?

[33:46] But the qualities of the soul are what simpliciter difficile mobiles right? That's the distinction between simpliciter and secundum quid, right? On account of the immobility of the subject, right? So you know, you know, some kids, you know, some kids are always getting a cold or always getting something wrong, you know, value to go through, you know, months or years without any what without seeing a doctor as they say, right?

[34:12] You know, and so they seem to have, you know, in some way, right, something more stable, right? Maybe not simply stable, right? They can still be go to the wrong place and get the wrong bug, you know, on account of no one coming out of Asia, right? You know, these

[34:32] things just very bad. Okay. And therefore it it does not say that health is what simpliciter difficile mobilis habitus but that is as ut habitus, right, as a habit, right. As is found in the Greek, right? Thomas doesn't know very Greek, I guess.

[34:58] But the qualities of the soul are said to be what? Simpliciter habitus, right? It's a good distinction there between simpliciter and secundum quid Now, look at the third objection. This is a long bite of that.

[35:20] All dispositions that are bodily are subject to alteration, but alteration is not except in the third species of quality, which is something Aristotle shows in the seventh book of the Physics, which is divided against habit, right? It's a different species. Okay, let's try a little longer answer here.

[35:44] To the third, it should be said that bodily dispositions, which are in the first species of quality, as some lay down, differ from the qualities of the third species in this: that the qualities of the third species are in coming to be and in motion, right? Whence they're called passions, which are like motion, right? Or undergoing qualities, right? When, however, they arrive at perfection as regards their species, then they are in the first species of quality.

[36:23] But this Simplicius disproves his commentary in the Categories, because according to this, calefactio heating, right, would be in the third species of quality, but heat in the first. But Aristotle places heat in the third. Yeah. So. Hurray for Simplicius, right? Yeah,

[36:48] He's got a commentary on the Physics too, if I remember right? That's important. Yeah. I think it was I remember the one they gave on Sr. Dionne one time a copy of Latin translation of Simplicius' commentary, right? And the thing he pressed it and he said, "Well, there's nothing here that wasn't already in Thomas. " That's already

[37:11] in Thomas. The guy who really was great commentator in Aristotle among the Greeks too was Ammonius Hermaeus right? And Aristotle, I mean, Thomas says a commentary incomplete on the perihemoneus. I forgot to mention that earlier, and it breaks off. or one of the Latin translations of

[37:46] Ammonius Hermaeus breaks off. huh As if Thomas was not going to go further. That's all. So you know, there are kinds of things about that. It's a pretty good guy Ammonius Hermaeus There's several Ammonius This one was Ammonius Hermaeus When Porphyry says, as the same Simplicius refers, that passio vel passibilis qualitas, this is the way Aristotle speaks of the third species, and disposition, habitus, which is the first species, differ in bodies according to intensity and emission.

[38:30] Right. When something receives a heat, according to being heated only, not that it is able to, what heat other things, then it is a what undergoing, if it is easily passing away, or undergoing quality if it is remaining. Whenever it is all brought to this part, or is. led. To this extent, that is able to heat another thing, right? Then it is a disposition. If our, further is confirmed that it's difficult to remove, then it's a habit, right?

[39:07] That thus the disposition is a certain intention or perfection of passion or passable quality, habit of disposition. But this Simplicius disproves, right? Because such an intensity and remission does not imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but from a diverse participation of the subject, and therefore these are not diversified, and not through this a diversified species of what quality? You see the objection, right? It's about how the subject is what receiving more or less perfectly some form, so it's not a distinction of form, right?

[39:49] But species is a distinction of form, right? So in English, we sometimes use the word form for what species, right? Yeah, yeah, that's we use it a lot. Forms of government. We commonly speak that way, right? I just speak of forms of fiction because they alliterate form and fiction, right? Forms of fiction, right? So epic and drama and novel and short stories and so on are forms of fiction, right?

[40:29] And therefore, it can be said another way that is hasn't said above. The commensuration of these qualities that are undergoing qualities, right? According to their agreement to nature, have the notion of a what disposition, right? And therefore, when alteration has been made about these passable qualities, which are hot and cold, wet and dry, there comes about as a consequence an alteration according to what? It's in health.

[41:00] Yeah. Too hot or too cold, heat a man up too much, cool him down too much, you kill him, right? But first, in per se, there is not alteration according to what habits and dispositions of this sort.

[41:18] So should we stop or go on from the moment? Hmm. It's short. It's short. Yeah. To the second one goes forward. Thus, it seems that habits are in the soul. More according to its essence than according to its powers. Like, must be going to be taking the opposite side then, right? He's arguing that side. Dispositions and habits are said in order to what? Nature's has been said, but nature is more to be noted according to the essence of the soul than according to its powers, because the soul, according to its essence, is the nature of such a body, and it's what form.

[42:12] No, so he speaks there of the soul as being the nature of the body, right? Huh? Now sometimes we divide the soul against nature, and in that ninth book of Metaphysics (wisdom) Aristotle speaks of the what? The powers in the soul, right, is being kind of distinct from the powers of what nature, right? And in the De Anima too, he talks about growth, right? How a plant grows up and down, which are contrary directions, right?

[42:41] Huh? So already he's starting to rise a little bit above nature, which is determined to one. But you can also say the nature that the soul is the nature of such a body, right? So you can divide soul against nature, he does sometimes, right? And then sometimes he says soul is a nature, right?

[43:04] But it's not just a nature, right? But even the soul, in some in some ways, is determined to one, right? And in that respect, it is a what? Nature, right? Huh? But it's not just determined to one; it has some openness to things, as you see, in reason and in the will, right? The good and bad, right? Huh? Reason can be mistaken, as well as no, right?

[43:34] Huh? The will can be good or bad, the willing, right? Okay. Here he calls it a nature, right? Therefore, habits are in the soul according to its essence and not according to its powers.

[43:53] Moreover, of an accident, there's not an accident, but habit is a certain accident, right? But the powers of the soul are of the genera of what accidents, as is said in the first book, right? Hmm. It's in the second species of quality, right? Therefore, habit is not in the soul by reason of its powers, and you have an accident of an accident, though. Of course, that due to ignorance of the fact that one accident belongs to a thing with another accident sometimes.

[44:27] So I'm taller than you through what my quantity or size, right? Huh? I'm your teacher through my quality of my mind, that has any quality. Okay. Moreover, the subject is before that which is in the subject. But the habit, since it pertains to the first species of quality, quality, is before power, which pertains to the second species. Therefore, the habit is not in the power of the soul, as in a subject.

[44:59] There you get some prius, huh? Some before and after to think about it, huh? But against this is what the philosopher in the first book of the ethics lays down that there are diverse habits in diverse parts of the soul. So foresight is in reason, and justice is in the will, and courage is in the irascible appetite, and temperance is in the concupiscible appetite, and so on.

[45:26] Answer: It should be said that, as has been said above, habit implies a certain disposition in order to nature or to the operation. Right. If, therefore, one takes habit according as it has an order to nature, thus it is not able to be in the soul.

[45:48] If, however, we speak of what human nature, right? Because the soul itself is the form that completes what human nature, right? Whence, according to this, there is more able to be some habit or disposition in the body, right? In order to the soul than in the soul in order to the what body, right?

[46:16] But if we speak of some superior superior nature, of which man is able to partake, according to words of Peter, 2nd Epistle, of, Peter, Chapter One, Verse Four, that we might what be consortes, right? Partakers, you might say, of the divine nature, right? But sometimes we say grace or sanctifying grace is, you know, to share in the divine nature, right?

[46:43] Thus, nothing prevents in the soul, according to its essence, for them to be some habit, to with grace. as in Peter, chapter. one Yeah very bold right?

[46:58] Yeah, yeah. But that's with respect now to another nature, right? That's interesting, right? Because grace is not the substance of the soul, right? Something in the soul, right?

[47:15] But by that grace your soul is well disposed towards God, right? Here, however, we take habit in order to operation. Thus, maxime, most of all, right? Habit is found in the soul, right? In so far as the soul is not determined to one operation, but has itself to many, which is required for habit that the. Thing that is a habit of right has itself to many, right, and because the soul is a beginning of operations through its powers right, therefore according to this habits are in the soul according to its what powers right.

[48:01] So for the most part when we take up the the the virtues right they'll be in some power of the soul right. So, fides or faith now is in the reason right. And there's a beautiful text of of Augustine there, the one that Fulbert used I think one case. Somebody's asking, are reason and faith opposed right? Augustine says they can't be opposed because we're capable of faith because we have reason.

[48:35] Kind of interesting he begins right huh? Okay, so faith is in reason why hope and what charity are in the what the will. But then foresight is also in reason right, and episteme huh? Reason now knowledge is also in reason right, and wisdom is in reason the highest perfection of reason right, and but justice is not in reason it's in the the will, and courage is in the ability for emotion but the what they call the irascible right, and then temperance is in the concupiscent right,

[49:22] and then what mildness right? Is in the what irascible too it seems huh? If it moderates anger right which is gives its name to the irascible appetite right huh? Okay. So,

[49:46] so he says to the first therefore it should be said that the essence of the soul pertains to human nature, not as a subject right to be disposed for something further, but as a form and a nature to which someone is what disposed huh? And also I use the word form there like Aquinas does for nature right huh? Of course when who's the epistle of the Philippians is it where he says he's in the form of God right, and then he imputed himself thinking on the form of man.

[50:21] But form there means what nature right huh? Okay. To the second about accident being an accident. To the second should be said that accident per se cannot be the subject of accident it's going to be substance. But because also in the accidents there is a certain order. The subject, according as it is under one accident, is understood to be the subject of another, and thus it is said that one accident is the subject of another, as the surface of the body is the subject of color, right?

[51:00] And this way, a power can be a subject of habit. To the third, it should be said that habit is sent before power, according as it implies a disposition to nature. For power always implies a order to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the beginning of operation. But a habit whose power is what The subject does not imply an order to nature, but to an operation.

[51:38] Whence it is what Potency. Or it can be said that a habit is placed before potency, as the complete before the incomplete, and act potency, huh? For act is naturally before, right? Although potency is prior in the order of generation and time, as is said in the seventh book and also in the ninth book of the metaphysics, right?

[52:12] So, potency is before in the first sense of before, right? Time, right? But in terms say of goodness, perfection, fourth sense, then act is always before ability, because act is the perfection of ability, right? Perfection, the thing is, it's good, right? So that in what its perfection consists is before in goodness, huh?

[52:46] But it's interesting about grace, though, isn't it? There, huh? I'm always being struck by when I first read it, guys. I've been thinking about grace all my life, and I find that sanctifying grace is what a habit of the soul itself, right, whereby it's disposed towards a higher nature, the divine nature.

[53:09] After you asked the question, I was going through the different qualities. Yeah, yeah. You know saying I can't be that one I can't be that one. He's going to talk more about it later on, you know. but I mean, it's kind of interesting.