Prima Secundae
122. Summa I-II Q50 aa4-5: Habits in the Understanding and in the Will
Class of 2013-05-02
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/122-summa-i-ii-q50-aa4-5-habits-in-the-understanding-and-in-the/

[0:00] And one goes forward. Thus, it seems that in the understanding there are not any what habits. For habits are conformed to what operations? huh? I repeat, operations you form a habit, right? But the operations of man are common to the soul and the body, right? As is said in the first book about the soul. Therefore, also the habits. But the understanding is not the act or form of a what body, Body.

[0:41] as is shown or said in the third book of the soul, right? Therefore, the understanding is not the subject of any what Habit. habit.

[0:55] Or everything that is in something is in it through the or in the way of that which it is. There is receives received according to the nature.

[1:12] But that which is a form without matter is act what only? But what is composed from form and matter as potency and act together, right? So matter is to the form as ability or potency is to what act.

[1:34] Therefore, in that which is form only, there cannot be something that is at the same time in potency and in act. But only in that which is composed from matter and what form. But the understanding is a form without matter. Therefore, habit which has potency together with act, as were a middle existing between both, cannot be in the understanding, but only in the conjunction that is composed from the soul and the body.

[2:14] This seems to make sense there to the natural philosopher, right? But maybe he doesn't have universal understanding of act and ability that one gets in the ninth book of wisdom. Moreover, a habit is a disposition by which someone is well or badly disposed to something, as is said in the fifth book of after the book of natural philosophy. But that someone is well or badly disposed to the act of the understanding comes about from some disposition of the body, whence it is said in the second book of the soul that those who are soft in flesh, seem to be what well act by the mind.

[3:00] That's the perfection of their sense of touch, right? So, kind of his lecture there, we talked about the neglect of the sense of touch, right? Of the basic thoughts come from the sense of touch, right? Good and love and so on.

[3:18] Therefore, the knowing power or habits are not in the what understanding, which is separate, but in some power which is an act in some part of the body, right? Your flesh is well, complexioned.

[3:41] I always thought in my teaching years, you know, that the that the more intelligent girls are bad looking too, for the most part. So there's some some truth in what he's saying there, right?

[3:56] You know, this is I found that to be true. Not necessarily. the one at all. No, he said he said Socrates is the ugliest, man in Athens, right?

[4:15] But again, this is what the philosopher in the sixth book of the Ethics lays down: scientia, right? Episteme in Greek, and Sophia, sapientia, and what nous, intellectus, right? What I call natural understanding, which is the habit of principles to be in the understanding part of the soul, right?

[4:45] So does the soul have parts? Yes, it does. Some way. It has potential parts, Thomas says there. It's interesting because when Aristotle takes up the word part there and whole in the fifth book of Wisdom, he just distinguishes between the what integral whole or composed whole and the what universal whole, right? But Thomas says the potestative whole is in between those two, right? He's an outlier. Just like Aristotle in the Poetics, right?

[5:20] He just distinguishes tragedy and comedy, right? Now doesn't talk about the two forms that Shakespeare is in between, right? But Aristotle does speak of part there in the sense of the potestative part, right? Part of the power, right? The soul, right? In the the anima, right? You even quote there, right? Now Augustine doesn't have the quote there, but you say the part the anima, right? Or in Latin, about the part of the soul now which it understands and grasps and so on, right?

[5:51] So you call them parts, right? But he's using the word part in a different sense than the two he distinguishes in the what fifth book, right?

[6:04] Okay. Answer should be said that about knowing habits, some have opined, have opinions that are diverse, right? They have opined diversely. For some, laying down that the possible understanding was something one in all men, right? This is that strange opinion, some of the others. They were forced to lay down that the knowing powers are not in the understanding itself, but in the interior sense powers.

[6:49] By you or what? Supposed to see something from this. But it's manifest that men what are diversified in their what habits, Whence they cannot lay down, right? Knowing habits to be directly placed in that which existing one in number is common to what all men.

[7:27] Whence the possible understanding? Whence, if the possible understanding is one in number in all men, like Averroes has said, right? Thomas spends a lot of time and he's always, you know, argue against that position. Then the habits of sciences, according to which men are diversified, could not be in the what possible understanding, which is one, as in a subject, but they would be in the interior sense powers, which are diverse and diverse, right?

[8:04] Got better memories than others and so on. But this position first is against the intention of Aristotle, for it's manifest that the sense powers are not rational per essentiam, essentially so, but only by what Partaking, right? As is said in the first book of the Ethics. I know if that distinction between the essential and the partaking is a little bit like the distinction between the through itself and through another, right?

[8:40] So Aristotle many times says, and Thomas says many times that the through itself is before the through another, and the beginning of it, right?

[8:51] So I think when he says that it's before, he means in the second sense of before. So sugar can be sweet without the lemonade being sweet, right? The lemonade can't be sweet without the sugar, right? And the lemonade is sweet through the sugar, right? Or the dishcloth is not wet through being a dishcloth, but wet through the water, which, to itself, is wet, right? But it's almost like that when you say that the what is so essential is before what is so by participation, right?

[9:26] In some way, it's a cause of that, right? That helps you to understand. You know, some people thought that there had to be something bad to itself, the evil itself, right? And all these bad things partake of it, like in the Manichaeans, right?

[9:45] But if you think about this distinction as being similar to that of the essential and the participation, right? Then you realize that the bad is really what the lack of something you should have. Well, a lack doesn't mean you partake of something, right? So it's not going to be an evil to itself, right? That's a little aside there.

[10:11] This is a very important distinction. God is being through him his essence, right? We're not. My essence is not to be. My essence is, but my essence itself is not to be.

[10:40] But the philosopher lays down the intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, science, and understanding. Those are the ones in the the looking reason or the theoretical reason are in that which is rational by what essence, right? Takes us up in the sixth book. So at the end of the end of the first book of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle determines what human virtue is, right, and it involves reason, right, and then he distinguishes between what the moral virtues and the virtues of reason itself, right.

[11:15] Then he takes up the moral virtues in books two through five, and in book six he takes up the virtues of reason, right. Whence they are not in the sense powers, but in the understanding itself,

[11:32] and he expressly says in the third book about the soul that the possible understanding, when it has thus become each thing, right, that is when it's reduced in the act of what. singular that doesn't mean singular and the individual sense, right? Through the species, right, the intelligible forms, then it becomes an act in that way in which the one knowing scientific is said to be an act, which happens when someone is able to operate to himself, right.

[12:10] I can go to the board and do a few geometrical theories, right? The board, right? It's like able to operate through myself now, right? To it by considering it is then also in potency in some way, but not likewise as before what learning from another from or discovering by oneself, right?

[12:35] Therefore, the possible understanding itself is that in which is the habit of science by which one is able to what consider even when he does not what consider, right? Now, so even though I'm not considering the Pythagorean theorem, I could go to the board and do it, demonstrate it.

[12:57] Moreover, this position is against the truth of the thing, even right. For just as what of that is the power of which is the what operation, right? So also that is the habit of that of which is the what of that is the habit of which is the operation. Okay.

[13:23] But to understand and to consider is the proper act of the what understanding. Therefore, the habit by which one considers or understands is properly in the understanding itself, right? So to understand means the act of what reason, right? Huh? So the habit of which you understand in the Pythagorean theorem must be in reason too, because of what is the operation of that is the habit, right? We got that.

[13:54] Ohs, ohs. The word "of" is sometimes hard, right? I'm singing Kittridge of the day. He's a man of wisdom, right? Huh? Still say he's a wise man. He's a man of wisdom. He's a man of justice, right? So the word "of" there, what that thing is? Boy, saying the adjective, right? Huh?

[14:32] He's a man of mercy, merciful man, right? He's a man of justice, just man. But here it says, "What that of which something is the what operation of that is the habit, or by that operation is what well performed, huh? "

[14:51] Okay. Now, what she's going to compare to that first thing? To the first, therefore, it should be said that some say, as Simplicius notes in the commentary and the predicaments, that because every operation of man is in some way an operation of the what union of body and soul, as the philosopher says in the first book about the soul, right? Huh?

[15:37] So is is it I, the man, Dwayne Burquist, that understands, or is it my mind that understands? The man. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But you say I don't understand, right? I got a body as well, so. And therefore, no habit is of the soul only, but of the what conjunction of two. And to this it follows that no habit is in the understanding, since the understanding is separated, right?

[16:09] It's not in the body, as the argument proposed proceeds, right? Huh? But ista ratio non cogit this reason doesn't what coerce us, force us, right?

[16:28] For habit is not the disposition of the object to the power, but more the disposition of the power to the object. Whence the habit is necessary that the habit that be in the very power itself, which is the beginning of that what act, right? Not, however, in that which is compared to the potency as a what object, right?

[16:59] Now, understanding itself is not common to the soul and the body, except by reason of the what phantasm or the image, huh? As is said in the first book about the soul. But it's clear that the phantasm or image is compared to the what possible understanding as a what object, huh? As is said in the third book about the soul.

[17:29] Whence it follows that the understanding habit is principaliter He's not denying altogether that it's in the images, right? But it's principaliter right? Huh? On the side of the understanding itself, not, however, on the side of the phantasm, which is common to the soul and the body.

[17:52] And therefore, it should be said that the possible understanding is the subject of the habit, huh? To that belongs to be the subject of the habit that is in potency to many, and this most of all belongs to the what possible understanding, huh? You see that in the history of modern philosophy, right? You know, but how strange everybody's got gone over one direction or another. Whence the possible understanding is the subject of the what?

[18:27] People habits. Yeah. That habit in the intellect is distinct from the intellect's memory. Well, what do you mean by memory now? You see, if you mean how the intellect retains these forms, right? The habitual form you call that memory, right? Well, you're not always using that form, right? But subject to your will, right? So I can I can pull up a definition of reason or a definition.

[19:13] of reason. so there's a distinction between the habit and the intellect and the intellect's memory. There's a distinction between those two things. Well, they're somewhat similar, those two. So,

[19:26] if by memory you mean the habitual retaining of the form whereby you understand, right? And that's so the same thing, isn't it? That's what I'm trying to distinguish because it seems you know when you learn something for the first time, you know if you don't repeat it, you kind of forget it. Yeah. But then if you. But in the area you know activating your memory But but in the there's a memory you know which is a sense power too right on the interior senses and that's kind of tied up with the singular right. And

[20:03] I was laying in bed last night, and I said, "oh, gee, did I forget to pray this for something I should pray for every day." So I'm trying to say these prayers, you know, or I fall asleep, you know. And I said, "I think I might have said them." I guess. I just can't remember, you know, because sometimes I'm delayed in the time I say them, you know.

[20:22] and then I, if I don't say them at a certain time, you know. shouldn't I said them, you know? And, uh, I said, well, maybe to get to get double advantages, and we're going to trace that person. It's like taking your medicine. I take two of these in the morning. Did I take two or did I take one? I got up today I said is it, Tuesday or Wednesday.

[20:44] I opened my little box, and the tea was open. So it's Wednesday. So it must be Wednesday. I got from the box on Wednesday. There's proof. It must be Wednesday. But

[21:00] if you could not, you know, if that was the geometrical theorem, if I couldn't remember, you know, the sense the the image right of the triangle, you know, I couldn't recall my argument, maybe you know. Mhm.

[21:16] It's just kind. of... Aristotle's a beautiful proportion there, right? He's saying that the images are to reason like the exterior what colors, right, are to the eye, right now. And can I see that that monk over there in the wall without it being there? No, see, but my seeing it takes place in my eye, right now. Okay. And so, likewise, reason doesn't understand what a square is without imagining a square, right?

[21:51] So the the proper object of reason is the what it is as something imagined, right, or sensed. And but yet that object is not that in which it sees or understands. It's kind of a subtle thing, right? Mm-hmm.

[22:10] I remember having a student in class there years ago, and he wanted to think he was thinking the brain is organ of thought, like they're told in high school. I guess the brain is organ of thought. He said, "Well."

[22:25] So I was helping him state his argument, right? He said, "You know, a blow in the head interferes with thinking, just like a blow in the eye interferes with seeing, right? " So the brain is the organ of what? Thought, right? Okay. And alcohol going in the brain interferes with thinking, right? The brain is the organ of thought, right now. Okay. Yeah, yeah, that confirms his opinion.

[22:52] I said, "Okay, now." Suppose you and I are in a room with no source of light except the light bulb that's turned down in another room, right? Now a blow on the light bulb would interfere with your seeing me, right? Therefore, the light bulb is the organ of sight.

[23:17] No, no, it's not true. So a blow on the eye interferes with seeing, right? A blow on the light bulb in this example interferes with seeing, right?

[23:31] But both are not what the organ of what sight? Yeah. But there's some connection. If a blow on the light bulb interferes with seeing, there's some connection between the light bulb, which in this case is the source of light, and seeing, right? So I say if a blow on the brain or alcohol going to the brain interferes with thinking, then there's some connection, right? But the blow on the light bulb is interfering with seeing, not on the side of the organ, but on the side of the what?

[24:04] Object. Yeah. So what is the blow on the brain or alcohol going to the brain or drugs going to the brain interfering with the organ of thought or the object of thought? Well, you don't know. You got to give me a reason for saying one or the other, right? It's not kind of obvious in the case of the light bulb that that's not the organ of sight, you know.

[24:27] And then when Aristotle was shown by a separate argument, right, that the understanding can't be what material, right? And the way Aristotle shows it basically, he's kind of inductively, starting from the senses, and the senses have to what lack the object that they know, right? So if my tongue was, you know, sweet, I wouldn't be able to taste things, right? It's got to be without any any any sense of taste.

[24:59] Well, then you get to the to the understanding, and that's able to know all material things in some way, right? Therefore, it must lack any material what nature, right?

[25:13] Or he's got the example there of the what the fact that the understanding knows something what universally, right? And therefore, it's separated from the source of individuation, which is matter is subject to what quantity, right? So there's many ways to show that the understanding is not what Material. not material, and therefore a blow on the brain is not interfering with the what? The object. Sorry. With the with the power itself, but with the object, right?

[25:47] Okay. And that's like you know, if you take a pen out of the room, it interferes with my seeing it, but not because. My power's been interfered with, right? But the object, huh?

[26:06] So if the universal, the understanding of the universal, is not in the body, right, huh? But the habit whereby you are perfected in thinking about that, right, is in the what?

[26:22] Yeah, because the thing that has the operation is also that which has the habit whereby that operation is what perfected, yeah. I'm kind of curious thinking that the intellect actually has habits, where I mean these inclinations to operations in one direction. in the other Yeah, it's probably the there's an order of these what thoughts in the mind, right? Huh? The habit of the mind is basically an order of the thoughts, right?

[26:58] Oh interesting like a Or order of the forms. Okay you go back to the conclusion Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Exactly. In fact. I was at the dinner here. There, at the table there, and they sat me next to a young philosopher there, and so he's talking about teaching ethics and so on. And so I said, "What is the first definition in the first book? " Well, the definition of the purpose of life, right?

[27:21] I said, "No. What's the first definition in the Nicomachean Ethics? " Yeah, yeah, yeah. So you're talking about that. You've got to start there, right? So the habit consists in seeing the what order. Oh, interesting. Oh, okay. that helps. I remember my brother Mark, you know, when he was teaching geometry, right, and then correcting exams, you know, the geometry. And sometimes, you know, a student gets mixed up, right?

[27:57] And he takes a later theorem to prove an earlier theorem. And so maybe it does follow, you know, if you assume the later theorem, you know, the earlier theorem follows, right? And so you got to be careful when you're correcting, right? So this makes sense, right? Then the guy's really taking the less known to prove the more known, right? And what was unknown when the other thing was known, and so the order has got to be there, right?

[28:28] Huh? See Monsignor Dionne says to me one time, you know. I'm getting a little personal there, and he says, "Why don't you go see Father Boulay more often? " He says, "You know, why don't you pay more attention to Boulay? " You know. I said, "Well, he doesn't have the order you have, De Koninck and Dionne have the order, there right? Yeah, I see. After when you, yeah, I see.

[29:01] that You wouldn't have to have the habit of science. Yeah, and these terms I was talking about earlier, you know, there are other theorems that lead up to those, right? So you can see these ones first, you know, it's kind of marvelous the way you rise in it, but because the habit of understanding, even among those things, I naturally understood there's an order, right? Among them, So being is before one, and one is before the true.

[29:46] and true is before the good, right? You only understand something one. Okay. So we cut the first. We apply to the first objection here in Article 4? Okay, now we apply to the second one. The second should be said that just as the potency or ability for esse sensibile, right, belongs to what bodily matter, so the potency to understandable being belongs to the what possible understanding, right? So it's a different kind of what potency.

[30:49] Because it's a different kind of act, there, right? Once nothing prevents, in the possible understanding, to be a habit, which is something in the middle between pure potency and perfect act, right? But there can't be anything like a habit in God, right? Because there's no potency whatsoever, any kind in God, right?

[31:14] So Thomas, I mean Aristotle, talk about the mind, right? That the soul, before you learn or discover, right, then your your reason is in potency, right? And then after you learn or discover something by not thinking about it, I mean potency in another way, right? Then it was the first act, and then the second act, right? But God is always in the second act, is right? The you know, so God's you know understanding is actually understanding.

[31:42] Actually, understanding everything, right? He's, as Chesterton says, he's being being all the being could possibly be. Okay. I mentioned how in the ninth book of Wisdom, right, Aristotle begins with what the act called motion, right, and the ability for that act is the ability to be moved or the ability to move another, right? And it's not to the second part of Book Nine that he talks about act and ability, what universally, right?

[32:34] Then you see other senses of act besides motion, and then other kinds of ability besides ability for what motion, huh? Okay. But this objection, in a sense, shows you where the human mind goes, right? Because the man here is kind of stuck on the first what occurrence, right? So you studied the first book of Natural Hearing, the first book of the so-called physics, right? You you learned that form is act and what.

[33:02] Matter is what, potency, right? And you know Aristotle's beautiful. Stigma, you know that form is something godlike, right? And Plato shares that opinion with Aristotle, right? Thomas says, "Well, yeah, God is pure act, right? " So form being an act seems to be godlike as opposed to matter, right? And that's interesting the argument, so on. Say, oh my goodness, you know. But you know, you've got to realize that your knowledge of act and ability there is somewhat limited, right?

[33:36] There's not the universality of the wise man, right? You know, the the order of natural philosophy. It goes from what the general to the particular, as Aristotle shows in the proemium to natural philosophy, and goes towards matter, right?

[33:56] And it does that twice, right? When it goes from you know the physics to the De Caelo and then to the book on generation corruption, it's going towards matter, right? And it's going from the general to the particular. As in the physics, you talk about motion in general. You talk in the De Caelo about locomotion, which is more general than alteration and substantial changes. You talk about generation corruption, right?

[34:27] And then you take up the soul, right? And you do the same thing, right? You go towards towards the body, right? Well, what do you do in wisdom, huh?

[34:41] Well, as Monsignor Dionne said, "ferre et separare." You're going towards the immaterial, right? So just the exact opposite in a sense from what you do in natural philosophy, right? So in a sense, the more a man immerses himself in natural science, the further he goes, the more he goes down into matter, right? Just makes it kind of hard for him to be a wise man, right?

[35:08] You know, you know, each science has only a proceeding, right? So Aristotle proceeds a much different way here, right? He goes towards matter, right? When he gets into wisdom, he's going towards the immaterial, right? So he goes from material substance towards immaterial substance, ends up with God, right? But also to some extent, he's going from the what particular, meaning the less universal, towards the more universal. You see it most clearly in the ninth book, right?

[35:36] The ninth book is we see in Thomas's exposition, right? It has three parts, right? And in the first part, he's talking about act and ability about in a particular way. Second part, he completes the universal way. Third part, the before and after of act and ability, right? Then you see that God's going to be the first act, right? Really beautiful way proceeds, right? But when you go for the first and second part, you're going from the less universal, right?

[36:06] Just the accuracy, meaning of motion, and ability in reference to motion, right? And you're going to act in a pretty universal way in the second part. Then you see ability in a more universal way, right? And this objection, you know, from here is following the order of the ninth book, right? But when you take a, you could say, with substance like that, now when you take up substance in the seventh and eighth books, you start from what material substance, right?

[36:35] Huh? And then you come to a kind of a general knowledge of substance that you can use even in talking about the the angels, right? Huh? So to some extent, you're going from the particular towards general. And when you take up the one and the many, right? Well, I mean, everybody's got the one that's convertible with being mixed up with the one that's the beginning of what Number.

[36:57] number, right? And you have to rise, you know, it's very difficult. And as Thomas points out, even those two great minds, Plato and Aristotle, really, really great minds, they haven't quite seen it, you know. And again, the difficulties, right? So it's hard to rise, you know. But you go from the one that's convertible with being to the one that's, I mean, excuse me, the one that is beginning of number to the one that's convertible with being.

[37:25] You're going towards the more what universal, right? Universal. And you have to do that in order to know that God is the one, right? And so

[37:40] there are examples of that, but kind of see that the way it's almost contrary the way that it proceeds, huh? And now geometry is a third way of proceeding, right? There, the what simple is before the composed,

[37:59] and the equal before the what unequal, unequal, right? And that you know the great Euclid observes that even in his definitions, right? So he's going to define equilateral triangle, then isosceles triangle, then scalene triangle, right? Or he's going to define square, you know, and the other then rhombus and rectangles, so on. And last, last quadrilaterals, right? You know, because the first four are all what parallelograms, where the opposite sides and angles are equal, right?

[38:33] But then you know beyond that in the square, all the sides are equal, right, and all the angles equal, so on. And he states the axioms, right? Quantities equal the same or equal to each other, if equals are equals, and so on. And finding the whole is more than the part. That's unequal. And then you get, you know, the first book of of Euclid ends up with the forty seventh theorem at the end is the Pythagorean theorem, right?

[39:02] And then the converse of it in the forty eighth, right? Well, then it's not until the what second book. In the twelfth and the thirteenth, that you get the theorem about the obtuse angle triangle and the acute one, where the square of the obtuse angle is more than the sum of the one, and it's the exact amount that it's more. And and in the acute angled one, it's less, right?

[39:28] It's the exact amount that it's less than. So those come later, right? The theorems are more about unequal. And he proves them by the Pythagorean theorem, you know. So so the equal comes before, right? Or like I was saying about, he defines even number before what? Odd number could be divisible into two equal parts, right? The other one is divided into can't be divided into equal parts, right?

[39:57] And he defines it as different from the even number, right? So you know, you kind of see it in modern science, though, you know, because in modern science we're accustomed to something called the equation, right? And the equation is used to calculate everything else, but the equation is a statement of equality, right? E equals mc squared, right? Force equals mass times acceleration, and so on, right? So that's kind of marvelous to see that, right?

[40:26] So the three looking sciences—natural philosophy, mathematics, and wisdom—they each have a different order of determination, right? But wisdom and and natural philosophy seem to be almost contrary in some ways, right?

[40:44] Well, you can see the opposition there between geometry, where you you do the simple, you know, plane geometry before solid geometry, but even in plane geometry you do the triangle first, you know, the simplest of figures, these sides, right? Before you do the more complicated ones, and even the fourth book when he's inscribing squares and circles and circles and squares before he has pentagons, in and out, right?

[41:12] Hexagons, right? It's always the simpler one first, right? But then you get to wisdom, right? And the simplest thing is the last thing, right? God, right? So you don't start with the simplest, right? And so it just kind of contrary, right?

[41:33] You know, there's so much influenced by math there, you know, in modern science, that when you pick up a a a book on life, there, you know, they start with the cell, right? Where life is not nearly most known. Yeah. You see, but that's the simplest thing, right? Because the cells make up the tissues, make up the organs, or make up the whole animal, right? You're trying to imitate mathematics as if yeah, you know, that's a mistake.

[41:58] As though cell was a simple thing, too. Yeah. Well, I mean, we shouldn't start with the cell. We should start with the molecule. Well, no, yeah. Protons.

[42:10] But Aristotle starts with the soul as known by inward experience, right? And life as life is more known by what inward experience than by exterior experience, by chemistry and so on, right? Looking in a microscope. I think a biology major used the first course of biology major was a chemistry course, right? You're studying life, they start with chemistry, right? You're kind of you're kind of imitating it if you're doing like in math, right?

[42:39] So take a little break here now for sure. Finish the last objection, I guess. Article four. We're just looking at article secundum anyway. Okay, we look at secundum. Yes, secundum. I think we finished the second. Yeah, yeah. So, to the third, should be said that because the

[43:03] grasping powers inwardly prepare what for the possible intellect its own object, right? Huh? Because the agent intellect separates out what's common, right? Huh? Therefore, from the good disposition of these powers to which what the good disposition of body cooperates, man is rendered what capable, suited to understand, to understand. And thus, a intellectual habit secundaria, right? Huh? Okay, he's not denying something there, right? Can be in these what powers, right?

[43:44] Huh? Chiefly, however, in the possible what understanding. I remember when I was doing the years ago the last books of Euclid there to get into solid geometry. and I was having a hard time imagine these things, you know. So I make these little things in cardboard. You had one hanging down from the the table, you know, so I can look at the thing, you know. Now my son you know, some little things.

[44:11] the other solid figures, the five regular figures, you know, each with you know in metal, right? Each nice little things and one of his daughters, you know, and my grandgirls catch each one of them, you know. So, but if you can't imagine that you know solid figure, you know, very well, then you have a hard time what following the argument step by step, you know, and so on.

[44:34] So, in some secondary way, at least, right? Huh? My knowledge of geometry is in my what? My reason. Yeah, the lack thereof is is due to some lack there in my thing, but primarily in my my reason, right? My knowledge of geometry, right? But in my powers of imagination, so it's some way there, right? Huh? Okay. Article five: Whether in the will there is some habit?

[45:15] To the fifth, then one proceeds thus: It seems that in the will there is no habit. There is not any habit, for the habit which is in the understanding are the understandable forms, right, by which it understands and acts. But the will does not act through somewhat species, huh? So species is one of the names applied to what second person of the Trinity, right?

[45:46] And of course, beautiful is more applied to the second person of the Trinity than to the third, right? Species, speciosa, speciosa. Therefore, the will is not the subject of any habit, right? That's going to be in some other way, maybe though?

[46:06] Moreover, in the acting upon understanding, the agent understanding, there is not laid down any habit, as in the undergoing, the possible understanding, because the agent intellect is a active power, right?

[46:26] But the will is most of all an active power, right? That's what the modernists like the will more than reason, right? It's the mover, because it moves all the powers to their acts, right?

[46:41] Therefore, there is not in it any what habit. Moreover, in the natural powers, there is not any habit, because by their very nature they are determined to something. But the will, by its very nature, is ordered to this that it tends into the good, is ordered by what reason, huh? Therefore, in the will there is not any what habit, huh?

[47:14] So Thomas says, the will naturally wills beatitude, right? And when you see God as He is, reason cannot be deceived as to what beatitude really is. Therefore, you can't change the will. anymore. It's all over. So if you want to enjoy the freedom of will, you better.

[47:38] But against this is said that justice is a certain what habit, right? But justice is in the what will? will, Aristotle devotes the fifth book of Nicomachean Ethics to justice, for justice is a habit according to which some people what will and do just things, both, as is said in the fifth book of the Ethics. That's the one about justice. Therefore, the will is the subject of some what habit, huh?

[48:12] Well, Thomas says, "I answer. It should be said that every power which, in diverse ways, can be ordered to acting needs some habit by which it is well disposed to its what act. But the will, since it is a rational power, is able to be ordered in diverse ways to acting, right? Huh? And therefore, it's necessary that in the will to lay down that there is some habit by which it is well disposed to its what act.

[48:54] And from this very reason that habit appears that it has a what principle order to the will, insofar as the habit is that which someone uses, right? When he wishes, huh? He's quoting the Averroes, right? The commentator, right? So he takes over some things from the Arabs, right?

[49:26] When you see the definition of moral virtue, has got what choice in there, right? Huh? And there's a reason for saying that what sometimes the moral virtue has more the character of what virtue than the virtues of a reason, right? Huh? Because they incline you to use your things well, right? But my knowledge of logic does not incline me to use it to deceive you. To teach you rather than deceive you, right?

[49:55] Huh? Depends upon my will, right? To the first, therefore, it, should be said that just as in the understanding is some species, some form, which is a likeness of the object, right? Huh? So it is necessary in the will and in every what each desiring power to be something by which it is inclined to its object, right? But that's not a simulitude of the object, right?

[50:47] Now, to those things towards which it is sufficiently inclined to the nature of the power itself, it does not need some quality what inclining it. But because it's necessary for the end of human life that this desiring power be inclined to something determinately, right? To which it is not inclined, for the nature of the power, which has itself to what many and diverse things as shown by the actions of men, right?

[51:19] And therefore, it is necessary that in the will and in the other desiring powers that there be some qualities inclining, which are said to be what habits, right? There can be a habit where the will, or the emotions are inclined to follow what right reason, right? And they're inclined to follow right reason. Okay.

[52:07] When the grandchildren, they call DDD, the director of destruction. You know, Department of Destruction. No problem. He's a boy. Yeah. He's a boy. Dennis, Dennis the Destroyer. David, David the Destroyer. They call. It was my mother's lament when I was a kid. She always said whenever I would destroy something, I don't destroy your things. Why do you destroy mine? Why? Why do you always take my stuff and wreck it? To the second, it should be said that the acting upon intellect, the agent intellect, is acting upon only and in no way what undergoing.

[53:06] But the will and any desiring power is a movens motum, a moved mover, as is said in the third book about the soul, where the good is the unmoved mover.

[53:21] And therefore, there is not the same reason about the intellect, the agent intellect, and the will, right? For to be susceptible of a habit, to be the subject of a habit, belongs to that which is in some way in what potency.

[53:44] Now, to the third, it should be said that the will, from the nature of the power itself, is inclined to the good as known by reason, right? But because this good is diversified in many ways, it is necessary that to some determined good of reason, the will be inclined to some what habit, in order that there might follow a more prompt operation

[54:18] Time to find what the angels are not. I don't think so. This one looks kind of old. Oh my goodness! Well, can we can we survive another week? Mr. Power, next week's Holy Thursday. Next is Ascension Thursday. I mean, Ascension Thursday is a holy day, right? We have a different schedule, yeah. So you can't you can't a class next Thursday.