Prima Secundae
126. How Forms Admit More and Less: Species as Numbers, Health, Substance and Figure, and Knowledge That Broadens and Deepens
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/126-how-forms-admit-more-and-less-species-as-numbers-health-substance/

[0:00] So. So, therefore, that the truth of this thing might be made known, it should be considered that that by which something obtains a certain species is necessarily something fixed and what? And standing, standing, right? Okay. And as it were, indivisible, right?

[0:32] Whatever things arrive at that are contained under the species, whatever things recede from it, either more or less, pertain to another species, either more perfect or imperfect.

[0:54] Whence the philosopher says in the eighth book of the metaphysics that species of things are as numbers, right? And Plato had said that before Aristotle, right? In which the addition or diminution varies the species, huh?

[1:17] So now they'll take things like this. What is a man? If his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed, he beast no more, right? Okay. Notice the word "no more" there, right? So, what does man have more than the beast, right? Well, we go on in the agitation, and we find out that it's reason that man has more than the beast, right?

[1:59] Okay. So I told you how my mother didn't like it when I said one day that man is an animal. She didn't like that at all. I said, "Well, I don't mean he's just an animal, right? He's an animal that has reason." She says, "Well, that's better. My mother never got into college and like that, right? I went to secretarial school, right? I thought she landed my father.

[2:29] He hired her as a secretary. But notice the word "more" there, right? Okay. So you take away reason from man, and what you have is just a what? Beast, right? Now, if you take away from a beast

[2:53] sensation, right, or sense, well, you have nothing more than a plant, really. And you take away what life from a plant, and you have nothing but just a body, right? Okay. So the body is like one, and the plant is like two, because the body plus life, right? And then the beast is like what three? You add sense, and then man is like four. You add reason, right?

[3:29] Huh? So the natures of things are like what numbers, right? Huh? And by adding or subtracting, right? Huh? If you add reason to animal, you get a man, right? You subtract sense from animal, and you get a plant, right? Huh? Okay. So in that sense, it's like numbers, right? Okay. And

[3:56] this is how we kind of explain in a simple way how God knows other things by knowing Himself, right? You know, if four knew itself, then it would know also three and two and one, right? Huh? So you can partake of four more or less, right? And the creatures partake of God more or less, and He knows them in that way, huh? Knowing Himself, right? Because He's everything.

[4:28] Right? Yeah. So it's kind of a subtle thing, right? Well, there's nothing between four and three, right? Huh? Or three and two, right? Huh? And of course, the nature of a thing is what makes it to be what it is, right? Huh? Okay. So can there be more or less in regards to what the nature of the thing is? No, they have different nature. Okay. So

[5:08] if therefore there is some form or some thing by itself or according to something of itself, it sorts the what notion of that species is necessary that considered by itself it has a determined what ratio reason that neither in more exceeds nor is able to what less

[5:37] fail, right? Huh? To be more or less than that, right? Huh? And of this sort are what heat and white and other qualities which are not said. This is the distinction I'm making. Cannot said in order to another, right?

[6:05] There's something kind of what absolute, right? And much more substance even than them, which is being per se by itself, right? Okay. But those which receive their species from this, that they are what ordered to something, right? They are able by themselves to be diversified in more or in less.

[6:42] And nevertheless, they are the same in species on account of the unity of that which they are ordered from which they receive their what species. This is a difficult. thing he's saying here, right?

[6:57] But now he gives an example here, right? Just as motion, right? Now, motion is towards what? Another, right? Right. See. So, when I'm coming into this room, right?

[7:18] This activity of coming into this room is ordered to what? Another, right? To being in this room, right? And so I can be what coming more or less into the room, right? Right. Nevertheless, it's still the same species you're talking about. I'm still coming into the room. Right. Strange, right? Okay. And then,

[7:59] nevertheless, they are the same in species and account the unity of that which they ordered, from which they receive their species. Okay. Then the example of motion.

[8:09] And the same thing can be considered in what? Health. For the body pertains to the notion of health. Why? Because according to what it has a what disposition suitable to the nature of the what animal, right?

[8:32] To which there can be diverse dispositions that are what suitable, right? Okay. Whence it can vary decision in more or in less, and nevertheless always remains the notion of what? Yeah. The idea of health, right? Okay.

[9:01] So can one of us, you know, get our arms? Can one of us be stronger than the other? Right. Yeah. But can one of us be healthier than the other? Yeah. Yeah. Because it's we're better disposed towards the same thing, right, than the other.

[9:24] Okay. Whence the philosopher says in the tenth book of the Ethics that health itself receives more and less, for there is not the same measure in all things, nor in one the same thing always.

[9:43] But being less, the health remains usque ad aliquid, right? I'm still healthy, right? Now, but not as healthy as I was. So I genuflect now. I got to have a little support of the pew or something, right? You know, if I try to genuflect all by myself in open space, so to speak, huh? I probably tumble over, right? Okay. So I joke I'm becoming unhinged.

[10:23] So these diverse dispositions or measurements of health have themselves, according to exceeding and exceeded, right? Huh? Whence, if the name of health were imposed only to the most perfect commensuration, then that sanity or health would not be said to be more or what less, huh? Okay. Not very. She's a beautiful girl, but aren't some girls more beautiful than others? You know, but I still might say, you know, despite the fact that I think this girl is more beautiful than that girl, I still think this girl is what?

[11:07] Yeah, when you said sometimes, right? Okay. Not going to say this girl's ugly than others, huh? They are ugly, but but they're not beautiful, right? Huh? Okay. But two girls can both be beautiful, and yet one can be more beautiful than the other, right? Huh?

[11:31] Two men can both be what strong, but yet in the match, one may be a little better, right? A little stronger, a little faster than the other guy, right? Okay. Or two guys can both run pretty fast, you know, They're good runners, but one can run a little faster, you know. Two horses, right? Okay. Whence

[11:57] he says, if the name of health were to be placed upon only the most perfect commensuration, right? Then health itself would not be said to be more or less, right? Huh? Okay. The same thing about beauty, beauty, right? Huh? Okay.

[12:21] Thus, therefore, it is clear in what way some quality or form can be said, according to itself, to what grow or diminish, and in what way what not, huh? Okay.

[12:37] But he seems to be saying here that the quality that is ordered to another, right? Huh? Like like health that's ordered to the preservation of the body and so on, right? Huh? Can be more or less in itself that. Health, right? Huh? But something like what? Heat, right? Which is, as such, not ordered to something, right? Huh? You can partake of it more by the subject this other way, but the heat itself is not a different kind of heat, right?

[13:11] Very different. Yeah, it's kind of hard to see, right? But think about it. Different cultures have different approaches to. Well, I don't know if that's such a great example, but I've heard that there are numerous different words for snow that some of the Eskimo tribes have. Yeah. Which, whereas we just have snow essentially. Yeah. But that's would be different, I guess, than just heat. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

[13:39] Sorry about that. If, however, we consider quality or form according to the subject's partaking of it, right? According to the partaking of the subject.

[13:54] Thus, also, there are found some qualities and forms to receive more and less, and some not, right? Huh? So he's making the same kind of distinction in both of these, right? Huh? He's saying some forms can be more or less in themselves, right? Some cannot. And some forms can be partaken of more and less, and some cannot be partaken of more or less.

[14:22] Now, Simplicius assigns as the cause of this diversity this fact that substance by itself cannot receive more or less. So can you be more a man than I am? Not necessarily be equivocate, right? Talked by man, so can you be more courageous than me? Or you know, but then that's that's not substance, right? That's a quality, right? Courage is a virtue, right? Huh? Right. Okay. But you can't be more a man or less a man than I am if by man you mean just the substance, right?

[15:03] Huh? Okay. And one dog is not more a dog than another dog, right? X Y Y. And therefore, every form which is substantially partaken of in a subject lacks intention and remission, right? So my soul is not more a soul than your soul, right? Right.

[15:33] Whence, in the genus of substance, nothing is said according to more and what less, huh? Remember one time we were discussing, you know, are all men created equal, right? You know, talking about about the Declaration of Independence, right? Huh? What does it say there? We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are what? Created equal. Yeah, he says. Well, you know, so you don't have the same size, right?

[15:57] You know, don't have, you know, we're not equally healthy, right? We're not equally strong, not equally beautiful. So, what was any truth to this at all?

[16:14] Yeah, in different senses. What? The different senses. Well, maybe it's the sense in which, yeah, yeah, substantially. You know, we're not we're created equal, but not equally. Well, you got to be careful. See, in terms of our substance, right, is one man more a man than another man?

[16:34] No. If you're thinking of qualities though, like courage, right, one man is more a man and more courageous than another man, right? But that's not to substance, right? Right. Yeah. So maybe it's true. One dog is not more a dog than another dog, right? Huh? My cat may be more healthy than your cat, or my dog may be more. You know, strong than your dog, right? But my dog is not more or less a dog than your dog.

[17:03] Okay, that's when we're all equal. That's the way we can figure out, right? Because I said, you know, if you get up in in slave owning Athens and said, "All men are created equal," what do you mean? Some are free, some are slaves, right? But that's not our substance, right? To be slave or not, right? And that understanding has been lost today with the egalitarianism, where we're created equal by God as men, yeah, by substance.

[17:31] But they see it; everybody has to be equal. Everybody has to have the same Boethius says says. Therefore, every form which is substantially partaken of in a subject lacks intensity, and remission Whence in the genus of substance, nothing is said according to more and less. And because quantity is propinqua near, right? Substance, right? This is very interesting, he says. You know, in the the book on the categories, right?

[18:04] The first highest genus Aristotle gives is what substance, right? The second one he gives is how much quantity, right? The third one is how quality, right? Huh? Okay. So quantity is placed nearer to substance, right? Okay.

[18:23] And because quantity is propinqua right, near to substance, and figure, which is the what termination of quantity, and figure follows quantity. Hence, it is that neither, even in these, is something said more or less, huh? Okay.

[18:46] So is one line ten ten feet long? Another line ten feet long. Is one line more ten feet long than another line? But if we're talking quantity, isn't that all more or lesses? Yeah, but if you take your quantity, ten inches, let's say, right? Okay. What is one line ten inches long? Longer or shorter than another line ten inches long? Or is one line more ten inches long than the other?

[19:25] You either are ten inches long or not, right? You can't be more or less ten inches, right? You might say that, right? But if you say you're more or less ten inches, you mean you're you're reading something what? A little longer than ten inches or less. You're not reading ten inches, right? Okay. So one line can't be more ten inches long than another line can.

[19:49] I mean, if we get up and they they say, oh, we're the same height, you and I am, but I'm more that height than you are. Isn't that so? Okay. And how about figure, right? Huh? You know, can one circle be more circular than another circle, right? And sometimes we speak loosely and we say, you know, this is more circular than that, right? Huh? So you might say, for example, that the

[20:18] the Earth is more a sphere than than a box in the store, right? But strictly speaking, is the Earth a sphere? You know. No. And can one sphere be more a sphere than another sphere? Yeah. I mean, someone said, "You know, a rubber ball is more a sphere than the Earth, " but then strictly speaking, the Earth is not a sphere, right? Because you know, it's up and down the mountains and the valleys and so on, right?

[20:54] Yeah, yeah, yeah. It makes you think of animal farming. Yeah. All animals are equal, but some are more equal than others. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's good that he says that, right? Huh? That that's tied up with quantity equal, right? Huh? In the original sense, right? Okay. So you know the famous saying, you know, quantities equal do the same to each other, right? But someone comes back and says, yeah, but one is more equal to it than the other, so they're not the same.

[21:30] Yeah, I mean, you know, then you'd be denying that axiom, right? Huh? You know, in other words, if if I'm equal to you and he's equal to you, right? Then he and I are equal according to what the axiom says, right? Quantities equal do the same, right? Are equal to each other, right? But if he could be more equal to you than I am,

[21:57] then he and I might not be equal, right? Even though we're both equal to you, but because he's more equal to you than I am, then he and I are not equal. But then we're not really understanding what equal means, right? Okay. So if two lines are equal to a third line, then they must be equal to what each other. And the first theorem in Euclid is that, right?

[22:22] Huh? It's on a straight line to construct a what equilateral triangle, right? Huh? What he does is take the straight line and using one end point he makes a circle, right? And then using the other end point he makes another circle, right? And then where they meet he draws what lines to the end points, right? Well, these two lines are radii of the same circle, so this line is equal to this line.

[22:50] And these two, right, are equal. Are really the same circle. So this is equal to that. Well, since these two equal that one, then since they must be equal to each other, that assumes that one cannot be more equal to the to the original line, right, than the other, right.

[23:17] So figure is an interesting thing, there, right? One circle cannot be more circular than the other, right? But he points out this because the proximity to substance, right. Hence, the philosopher says in the seventh book of the physics that when something takes on a form or a figure, it is not said to be altered, right, but more to come to be, right.

[23:59] But other qualities, which are more distant from substance, and are joined to passions and actions, they receive more and less according to the participation of the subject. So I can be more or less what hot or the water that put on the stove, right? Can be more or less hot, right?

[24:28] Now Thomas says he seems to accept what what the Commentator is is saying, right? Huh. But one says he goes on says but it is possible also to more explain the reason for this what diversity, right? Huh.

[24:48] For as has been said, that from which something has its what species is necessary to remain fixed and standing in something what indivisible like numbers.

[25:07] In two ways then it can happen that a form does not partake is not partaken of according to more and less. In one way, because the thing partaking has a species by itself, and hence it is that no substantial form is partaken of according to more and less. An account of this, the philosopher says in the eighth book of the metaphysics that just as a number does not have more nor less.

[25:46] So my daughter has how many children? Ten. Ten, yeah. Ten. Okay. I heard other people, you know, they're talking. Some people have ten too, you know. Can one have more ten than the other?

[26:05] No. Okay. Numbers, neither more nor less, right? So as the philosopher says, just as number does not have more or less, so neither does substance, which is according to the species, right? That is, as regards partaking of the specific what form.

[26:26] But if they are with matter, right? That is, according to material dispositions, there is found more or less in substance, right? My body can be more or less disposed, right? To keep it. In another way, it can happen from this that the indivisibility itself is of the what Reason of the form itself. Whence it is necessary that if something partakes of that form, that partakes of it according to the reason of indivisibility, and this is the reason why the species of number are not said by more or less, because each species in them is constituted by what?

[27:16] Yeah. Yeah. So three is two plus one, right? So it's that third one that makes it to be three, right? And that third one is as indivisible as a point is, right? So you can't have more or less, right?

[27:35] The very indivisibility is of the notion of the form, right? And the same is is true. Same reason is found in the species of continuous quantity, which are taken according to numbers as what? Two cubits, three cubits, right? And about relations as double and what? Triple, right?

[28:09] So can one number be more double another number than another number? Is five more double of two than fours? Five is not even double of two, is it? Just four is double of two, right? And figures like

[28:36] triangle and quadrilateral, we'd say, right? But notice the word there? Triangle is named from angle, right? And quadrilateral is named from the side, right? But in Greek, sometimes named from the angle, tetragonum, right?

[28:52] You know, we call triangle. It's kind of funny, huh? Triangle is named from three angles, right? Rather than three sides, although sometimes they do call it trilateral, right? And quadrilateral is named from four sides, but it could be called quadrangle, right? Right. And we sometimes speak of quadrangle on campus and all that. Quadrangle, right? Rather than quadrilateral, huh? Then go on and the quadrangle.

[29:19] Yeah. It's kind of funny. I don't know why it's probably custom there, right? And this reason Aristotle lays down in the Predicaments, right? Where assigning the reason wherefore figures do not receive more or less, does huh?

[29:48] But things receive the what reason of triangle or circle are in a like manner what? Triangles and circles, right? But not more or less. I guess is what he means, right?

[30:04] Because to wit, indivisibilities of their reason, right? Whence whatever partake of their reason is necessary that in an undivided way they partake of it. Through

[30:21] a mouth, we're giving us the Italian something. Have you seen a nest there? You know the birds are the mother coming back with the worm. You know, we're like a tongs, but it's just too much for us. Okay.

[30:39] Now the grand conclusion. Thus, therefore, it is clear that since habits and dispositions are said by an order to something, right? As is said in the seventh book of physics. In two ways, one is able to consider intensity and remission and habits and dispositions. In one way, by themselves,

[31:11] in so far as that is said to be more or less health or more or less science, which extends to more or what few. Now I have heard said that if you wanted to go study theology at the University of Paris in the Middle Ages, right, you had to know the first book of what Euclid, right? Those forty-eight theorems, right? But there are thirteen books of Euclid, right?

[31:43] So the man who I just got to reading the seventh book and the eighth book, you know, okay. So my I have more geometry than you have if you only made that minor requirement of the University of Paris, right? You just know the first book of Euclid, right? You extend to forty-eight theorems. I extend to what a couple hundred theorems, right?

[32:12] But that's in the habit itself, right? To what does it extend? Okay. Another way, according to partaking of the subject, right? Huh? In so far as equal science, air, or what health is more received in one than another, according to diverse aptitude, either from nature or from what custom, right? Huh? Okay.

[32:46] For habit and disposition do not give the species to the subject. Neither in their reason is included what indivisibility, right? Now later on, we'll talk about this about fridges in particular, right? Where they can grow, right?

[33:07] But now, what's the difference there, Rena? You know, I sometimes say, you know, I go through these theorems in Euclid there, and I think I follow, you know, Euclid's arguments, right? I kind of know the theorems, I guess, right? But if they had a big blackboard here, which unfortunately we don't have today, we'll get up now and demonstrate that before the class, right? Well, maybe I, you know, you know.

[33:39] So my geometry extends to those theorems in some way, but I don't partake of them fully, right? This is the second kind of thing, right? Okay. Now you know I'm I'm kind of tied up with the Summa Contra Gentiles of Thomas, right? Huh? So I've been through the every chapter in the four books many times, right? Huh? But when I go through it again, I seem to understand the same things, but even better, right?

[34:13] Huh? You know, De Koninck had been teaching the physics since 1930s when I had him at under 58, you know, 50. Yeah, I can say 58. Yeah, yeah, 58, 59.

[34:30] Yeah. He said he still saw something new in them every time I went through them, right? So does his knowledge extend to more things now? Maybe not, right? But he understands the same things better, right? There seems to be a difference there, right? Okay. How's this to Mozart's symphonies again? Huh? And starting from the first ones all the way up to the last ones, gee, that is really that is really something that that symphony, you know.

[35:12] So I've heard all Mozart symphonies many times, right? But gee, appreciating a symphony in a way I've never appreciated before, right? I just just so much symphony. So does my knowledge of Mozart symphonies extend to more symphonies now? No, there's only

[35:39] well, a few questions about whether this is a symphony or not It is because the second and third ones I think are kind of by his father, rather than by Mozart, right? But there's other ones that aren't in the numbers, right? And then there's there's no 37, but there is a 36th and a 38th 37th is really Michael Haydn's symphony, Mozart wrote an introduction to it, you know.

[36:02] But anyway, I have heard heard all the Mozart symphonies rather than say discovered someone, right? So my knowledge of Mozart symphonies can't extend to any more symphonies than he wrote, apparently, right? Right. But I keep on hearing more in them, right? So I what? I partake of these symphonies more and more, right now. So that's a little different, right? I'm hearing them more and more, right? Deepening rather than broadening.

[36:33] Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But you know, I remember I was first learning these things, and I say, oh, these are wonderful. I'm looking for the next, you know, for another symphony Mozart and see what he does in some other symphony, right now. I remember looking for the thirty-seven symphony, saying, you know, you know, I wonder what that is like, you know. I found out there is no 37th. symphony Although I heard the 36th and 38th I wonder what the 37th is like you know,

[37:03] But um you know, But it's the Great is supposed to have done? You know, because no more worlds to conquer, right? I guess there were, but he didn't know of any other worlds to go out and conquer, right? I suppose he could have, you know, stabilized his kingdom more, right?

[37:26] Huh? Yet, there kept on what seeking other things. I mean, he he ran over Poland without much trouble, right? And then he overran France rather quickly, right? Huh? Something, right? Huh? Things are really going pretty good, you know. He had taken over Czechoslovakia, you know, after he had taken over the Sudeten there, and then and then he made the mistake of going into Russia, and then started to turn around, you know.

[37:57] So he should have maybe, you know, dug in more deeply in the things he had, right? Set aside Russia for the future time, right? When he developed the A-bomb and so on, right? But he didn't realize. I mean, because he's kind of a difference between a man, you know, increasing the empire, right, and then stabilizing the what territory he does have, right, and bringing it more firmly under his what control, right, huh?

[38:35] Yeah, of course program of Hellenizing, trying to create a synergy between the Persian and the uh Yeah, yeah, yeah. He had his men marrying Persian girls and so on, and trying to mix the races there, you know. But t here is a difference between

[38:54] stabilizing your what which you have and and making it more firm and. One time I we drive across country, my brother Mark and I. I wanted to memorize Shakespeare's sonnets, but I only have the first twenty memorized. Now I kind of forgotten them, right? You know, but unless you kind of repeat these things, you kind of forget them, right? Huh.

[39:25] But it's one thing to extend your memory to other sonnets, and then to just understand things better, right? Huh. I know. I memorize, you know, a few of the psalms, you know, and then I tend to use see them, you know, and I tend to think about them, you know, and I come to understand those psalms better, right? Huh. And but so.

[39:58] My knowledge of the Psalms is growing in one way, right? When I penetrate the ones that I memorized more and understand them better, right?

[40:11] But then you know they go on to other Psalms. So I should try to go through all the Psalms. I mean, I got through them in a superficial way, I guess. You know, there's two ways of what growing, right? Huh? Two ways of growing.

[40:32] Okay. So let's look at the reply to objections huh To the first, it should be said, therefore, that just as the name of magnitudo, right, is derived from bodily quantities to the understandable perfections of forms, so also, right, the name of growth, right, whose what

[41:08] is the great, right? Okay. Now going back to take take Shakespeare's definition, there it is. It's a serious thing. Large discourse, right? Well, large and small, for that matter. Large belongs first of all to what quantity, right? Okay. He's a large man, you know. Okay, or a large house, you know. I mean, you know, you know. And we drive around Shrewsbury there. We come back this one street there.

[41:48] We come back from church there. And you say, "Gee, what little houses was? " You know, boxes, you know. And then this new area there. What kind of house? You know how much that house would cost? It wasn't expensive. So it's a large house, you know. I mean, you know. So this is the first meaning of large and small, isn't it? When Shakespeare speaks of large discourse, he's carried the word large over from quantity to something else, right?

[42:16] But maybe more closely, you might say, what what is a large discourse, right? Well, sometimes I say it's a discourse. One meaning of it is a discourse that covers a large area, right? And there I'm kind of already kind of what staying close to the quantitative origin of the word, right? Okay. But then more precisely, what I mean is that reason has a discourse about the universal, and universal is said of.

[42:51] Many things, in fact, some universals are said of an infinity of things, right? So a discourse about universal is a large discourse; it covers many things, right? You know, but in one of the dialogues there, you know, with Socrates, his

[43:10] young man, right, and he's Parmenides, he's trying to understand universal, right? And it's like a big a blanket you're placing over all these things, right? We're kind of stuck in that first meaning, you know, the quantity of one, right? And so Socrates, you know, when you have a blanket, you know, if we lay down it, the one thing could over us, only part of the blanket could be over you, another part over me, another part over you, right?

[43:37] But when this is said, when when animal is said of dog and cat and horse, the whole of animal is said of dog, the whole of animal is said of cat, you know, it's quite different from quantity, right? Yet there's a certain likeness there, isn't it though, right? You know, so that's one example of large, where large is what very close to, yeah, yeah, but seeing a difference between the way in which a blanket would cover, you know, these furniture or something here, right?

[44:10] And the way that universal covers many things, right? Okay, and then I say, you know, the discourse of the wise man is the largest of all in this sense, right? Because it's a discourse about being and one, and these are said of everything, right? So this is the largest discourse that there is, right? Okay, but then there's another meaning of large, which is more close to the one here in the text here, where large means what?

[44:40] Great, in a sense, means something perfect, right? Okay, and I contrast large discourse there with the with small talk, right? Where small talk means talking about what unimportant and significant things, right? See, why large discourse in this sense would be discourse about great things, right? And but great here doesn't mean in a quantitative sense, right? But discourse about let's say about the soul, right? Discourse about human happiness, and the largest discourse of all in this sense would be a discourse about God Himself, right?

[45:23] But a discourse about the universe, right? You know, Einstein, after in 1905 he had the special theory of relativity, right? And then in 1915 he had the general theory of relativity, right? Which led to an explosion of the development of cosmology, right? So Einstein says he primarily wanted to understand the cosmos as as a whole, right? Well, the cosmos is the greatest thing there is, you know, in the world around us, own because it includes everything in some way, right?

[46:02] So cosmology is a a large discourse, right? The discourse of the cosmology is very large. but the cosmos is ordered to God, right? So discourse about God is even greater, but nevertheless, cosmology is a large discourse, right? You see why Einstein was moved to it, right? And Galileo gives us reasons why he's doing this too, right?

[46:27] So you can see, you know, in the use of the word "large," there, Thomas is saying here, where you're taking words that name something, you know, in imagination something in quantity, and you're carrying them over, right? Okay.

[46:43] Well, I usually when I talk about large discourse, I usually give us the first meaning is that it's a discourse about the what universal, and that's closer to quantity, isn't it? Than the discourse about great things, right? Right. And so I kind of you know smooth over that first transition by saying you know I'm gonna cover a large area right now, you know. And when when you say for example that no odd number is an even number, right?

[47:13] Huh? How many how many numbers are you covering there? Okay. Yeah. Wow. Wow. And when you say no prime number is a composite number, right? And no perfect number is a prime number, right? Wow. You're covering. Oh my goodness. You know. You know, in a kind of a qualitative sense, right? Huh? You know. That's first studying astronomy, you know, and study some of the stars and Betelgeuse there in Orion, right?

[47:42] And you could fit the whole solar system inside Betelgeuse, right? Oh my God. And I just learned, you know, the sun is 93 million miles away from the Earth, right? And the size of the solar system, you know. Wow. you know. I mean, if all this inside, you know. Betelgeuse. Wow. Wow. You know these old stars expanding you know, so. Oh my God. You know. But I was talking to my kids, you know, and I said, Daddy, can you count to 100?

[48:15] And I said, Yes. And they're like, can you count to 1, 000? Yes. After a while, they stopped to admire me, But. why? Oh, Daddy, can you count to 1, 000? Oh, Daddy. I mean, you know, it's great to be able to talk about God, you know, or talk about the cosmos, you know.

[48:38] Sure. Second thing. To the second should be said, huh? I think we did the first. Yeah, the first one you just talked about, right? Huh? Okay. Or just as the name of magnitude is derived from corporeal quantities to understandable perfections of form, so also the name of what greatness right Whose term is the magnum, right? the second should be said that a habit is a certain what perfection, but not such a perfection that is what a terminus of its subject as giving its specific being, right?

[49:14] Huh? Nor in its ratio does it include what limit as to the species of what number, right? Whence nothing prevents, but that it receives more or less, huh? So I can see, you know, I come back over these theorems and Euclid once in a while. I say, Yeah, I understand a little bit better, you know. I see see it better now, you know. I see how the way these things fit together, right?

[49:39] And I can see that I'm going to what. I can understand it better and better right now. In the same way, you know, sometimes I get to reading my favorite book, the Summa Contra Gentiles. They say, Well, I'm gonna go read what he says. About the same things in the Summa, what he says about in the sentences, right? And he approaches a little bit differently in a different context.

[50:00] You start to see it a little bit better than you did before, right? You know, the second professor will sometimes say the same thing and explain a little bit differently, you know, and you see a little bit better, right? You know, you've had that experience, you know. And so, when I go from one summa to the other summa, or to the disputed questions, you know, where it's discussed or the sentences, it's a little different, you know, You're starting to understand this even better now, you know.

[50:30] Okay. To the third objection, huh? It should be said that alteration is first found in the qualities of the third species. That's the sensible qualities, like hot and cold, right?

[50:45] White and black. But in the qualities of the first species, right, there can be an alteration per posterius, right? For when there's an alteration according to hot and cold, the animal can be altered according to health and what sickness, right? So heat a man up too much, cool him down too much, you can affect his health, right?

[51:14] And likewise, an alteration made according to the passions of the sense-desiring power, or according to the sensitive powers, there follows an alteration according to sciences and the what virtues. And I imagine these things in Euclid more clearly, right? To understand how, When my passions cool down, you know, I get a little more virtue in me, you know, and so on. Okay. But also, you know, the the word alteration, if you talk about it as undergoing, you know, well then the word undergoing is carried over too, right?

[51:54] Understanding is an undergoing. In fact, it's named from under, isn't it? We have to stop here now. So this is quite a particle there, right now.