Prima Secundae
127. Summa I-II Q52 A1: How Habits Grow – The Form Itself vs. How Fully the Subject Shares in It
Class of 2013-05-30
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/127-summa-i-ii-q52-a1-how-habits-grow-the-form-itself-vs-how/

[0:00] Father, the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, ordain and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. And help us to understand what is written.

[0:32] Let's look again at question fifty-two, which some of you saw last time. It's tied up with what's going to be in Article Two again. Go at least to the the body of the article. I don't do everything again, but it's really really a very important article here for many reasons, in addition to

[0:56] a particular thing here about habits, huh? So Thomas says in the body of the article, question fifty-two, there, Article One, I answer that it should be said that augmentum, which I suppose you could translate as what growth, right?

[1:13] Just as other things pertaining to quantity are carried over, transferred, right, from bodily quantities to understandable spiritual what things, okay? And why is that? On account of the connaturality, right, the coincidence of their nature, of our understanding to bodily things, which fall under the what imagination. I've seen Thomas, you know, give that beginning there many times, you know, and he'll say all our kind of thoughts that we have, the words that we have applied to these immaterial things are taken from the continuous and and time.

[2:05] And you stop and think about that. Take the words like beginning and end, right? What's the first meaning of beginning and end? Those two words.

[2:19] Yeah, the first meaning of beginning. It's the beginning of the magnitude, right? Okay. To which is similar the beginning of the motion or the magnitude. If it begins, the beginning the magnitude and the time it takes. But the first meaning is what you got something continuous here, right? So the point is the beginning of the line, right? Mm-hmm. That's a good what

[2:43] example, right? Okay. And you know when we talk about God, you've heard me talk about God, and sometimes I compare God to the point that is the center of the circle. And when Thomas is talking about how the eternal now is. Opposite every now in time, right? He compares the nows in time to the points on the what? So it comes to circle. So one point is before after another one, right?

[3:08] But compared to the what center of the circle, they're right opposite, right? Huh? See, but you're kind of you know helping your thinking, right? But starting from the imagination, right, to to talk about these things, huh? The word end, the first meaning of end is well the end of the table, right? Okay, the end of the road, right? The point is also at the end of the line, right?

[3:33] Huh? That's the first meaning, and then you gradually carry it over, right? Um, we saw that you know with Shakespeare there, right? When he talks about reason is the ability for large what discourse, right? What discourse is taken from something continuous which is running, and large is obviously taken from what quantity, right? Huh? And then you say, well, okay, doesn't have exactly the same meaning, but you carry those words over.

[4:10] Now that is said in bodily quantities, something to be great when it has arrived at the suitable what perfection of quantity, right? Huh? Okay, so a midget is not, right? Huh? Okay. Whence some quantity is regarded as great in man, does not regard as great in elephant, right? The sort of size you want. huh Aristotle talks about that in in fiction there, right? Huh? Why a play, say is is more beautiful than a sonnet, right?

[4:45] huh? It doesn't have a certain magnitude, right? Huh? Okay. And what's that in Midsummer Night's Dream? Then one girl is kind of short, you know, and the other girl thinks she's making fun of her because she's short, right? She doesn't have the full, you know, size and you know.

[5:06] I suppose a short man, you know, is kind of looked down upon by women too, you know. Okay. Whence in forms we call something great from this that it is what perfect, huh? But no, it's other reasons there, right? When I was talking about large discourse and what it means, right? I said you can have a discourse about what the universal, right? And then going back to the imagination, it's kind of like universal covers a large what area, so to speak, right?

[5:37] Huh? Because it's said of what many, right? Huh? But it's not really covering them in the way the blanket is, huh? Like Socrates thinks when he's a young man, right? He compares universal to a blanket, you know, spread over things. The Parmenides, uh? He's running into contradictions, like he gets other people into later on.

[6:00] And because the good has the yeah now now notice I see interesting text in Thomas of the way he uses the word ratio and we don't use the word reason in English exactly that way right but sometimes we speak of the reason why something is so and is that reason more on the side of our mind or is it on the side of the thing itself the reason why something is so

[6:36] what's the reason why we had a civil war here right does reason does reason mean thought or does it mean more on the side of the thing itself

[6:47] yeah yeah yeah so there we use the word ratio in the way Thomas sometimes uses in these texts right but so I rarely speak in English the reason why I say that right I don't usually say the reason what okay but maybe you could start to start this new custom right the reason of what something is right would be on the side of the thing right because what a thing is is more in the thing obviously than it is in our mind right or in the definition right okay You heard my sophistical syllogism there right huh

[7:26] a triangle is a I mean a square is equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral but equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral is a definition therefore a square is a definition that's the fallacy of accent right is it is it yeah yeah just like you explained yeah that would be the example right or maybe also though the fallacy of simply and not simply right huh because in a way the definition is what is the thing yeah yeah but in a way but it means the mind right yeah yeah it's the definition of square is square as understood so it's not square simply but square is understood right huh so is it both fallacies could be both involved yeah yeah that's why sometimes you see the definition of truth as the

[8:18] adequatio intellectus et rei intellecta Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Not just the thing itself yeah but the thing as understood that's what the truth is yeah then he quotes a statement from Augustine which you have to read in the Latin to get the alliteration right of Augustine because he's a rhetorician you got to realize he alliterates beautifully right in his quae non mole magna sunt right idem est esse meum quod magnum so he's got four M's there right huh okay it's like it all gets lost when you get into English there right I don't know how we even translate with moldy exactly.

[8:58] It's a little pile. That's I think it's yeah, yeah. That's its first, I guess, first yeah. Okay. Well, as the great Augustine says in the sixth book about the Trinity, right? Okay. Now he comes to a very important distinction. The perfection, however, of a form can be considered in two ways, huh? And you could say there, two ways that a form can be what perfect, right? Huh?

[9:30] In one way, according to the form itself. Now we'll have to see that that means exactly. In another way, according as the subject partakes of the what form? Okay.

[9:49] Now, the Iranian is going to talk about you know I think in the next article in fact It takes the example of what geometry, right? Okay. And the more theorems I know in geometry, right? The more what perfect you could say is geometry. But there, it's the form itself is being perfected, right? Huh? Because it extends now to more theorems, right? More conclusions, right? Okay. But as I go over a theorem again and again, I start to understand that same theorem better, and that means that my reason, right, absorbs it better.

[10:32] It it partakes of that theorem more, right? Huh? Okay. So I like to go back and read the same thing over again, right? And

[10:46] read it twice and read it thrice, you know. As Pericles says, what is worth saying can be said more than once. And what is worth thinking about can be what? Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[11:02] I just got marvelous! This great mind of Boethius, there, you know, the definition of trinity and the diminution of eternity, right? And Thomas's use of that, you know, and what what Boethius says, he's a great mind that Boethius, you know.

[11:20] But the teacher, you know, he likes to teach us through Boethius or teach us through Thomas, right? Because he wants to what us to share the dignity of what being a teacher, right? When Thomas says, "Why does God cause things sometimes not immediately, right? But through other things, right? " He wants them to share the dignity of being a cause, right? And that's very generous of him.

[11:49] Yeah. Yeah. And so he teaches us through Thomas or to Euclid or somebody else, right? Huh? Because he wants Thomas and Euclid to what share the dignity of being a what? A teacher. Teacher. In particular, right? Huh? So if he asked me to say a few words tomorrow or Saturday for the trivium, you know, graduation, I think I'll stick something in here about very elegant the teacher, right?

[12:18] And the ability of it, though, right? Huh? It's really kind of a you know marvelous thing, right? My teacher Kasurik, he'd say you can't be a teacher too much." He says, "He'd help himself to my candy. if I had some candy." What do you ask. if you tell himself.

[12:38] That's right. Pericles says that in the play. That's one of the lines I remember. Is truth can never be confirmed enough, though doubts can never sleep. Even if you don't have any doubts, you can never confirm enough. Yeah. Yeah. Now, in so far, therefore, as the perfection of a form is according to the form itself, thus it is said to be what small or what great, great or large.

[13:09] I guess right. Okay. Now, what did Samuel not Samuel Johnson? Did Ben Johnson say about Shakespeare? I don't know. Is it small Latin or less Greek, something like that?

[13:24] Okay. But you might say, if a person doesn't know too many words, he has a small vocabulary, right? Okay. Shakespeare probably had an extremely large vocabulary, right? You know these people do these word studies, but they, you know, the Harvard other places they find that he's got he's got tremendous vocabulary. I mean, how do you know anybody who's got such a vocabulary? What man? Yeah. Put a great or little health or science, huh?

[14:01] Okay. So Shakespeare had small Greek or small Latin, or something like that. But Ben Johnson said, right? I got small French or something. Um. But in

[14:15] so far as the perfection is to be noted according to the partaking of the form by the subject, right? Huh? It is said to be more and less. Okay.

[14:28] So when I, you know, read the same text over another time, I start to understand it. What more, right? Huh? First time I read the text, maybe I barely understood it, you know. And then second time, more, you know, I see more in it, right? Huh? And it's like you know, DeConic said, you know, he'd been teaching the physics since the 1930s, and I had him in 5860 first, you know, and he said he still saw something new.

[14:57] He went through it, right? Once again, Dion pointed something out to him. How could I miss that? DeConic says. After all these years of teaching it, right? Okay, I'm not seeing that, you know.

[15:14] Now, this should not. This distinction should not be brought forward according to this that the form has some being apart from the matter or the subject that exists out there in the world by itself, right? But because other is a consideration of it according to the reason of what it is, the reason of its species, right? And the other, according it is, as is partaken in the what subject, right?

[15:42] Okay. I don't know if you can see that going to the reason of its reason of what it is. But I don't see why you can't do it. You speak of the reason why, right? I can just speak of the reason what. But I'm stretching a little bit in this language there. When I asked Monsignor Dionne, was it good to speak of thinking out something, right? And he said, yeah, but you can't say that in French.

[16:09] huh? He and Boulet thought that French was inferior to English, right? Both for poetry and for philosophy, both of them. Just as Latin they thought was inferior to Greek, Greek for both poetry and for what philosophy, huh?

[16:31] That's why you talk about how when the church defined things, you know, and the clarity that came from Rome, right, huh? But it was in the Latin language, right? That shows the divine what? Mirabile dictum. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I think it's so clear. Mirabile dictu and then you know, he praised Thomas that he could think so well in Latin, right? And then I praised Dion for thinking so well in French.

[16:57] I'm sure he accepted that compliment. Okay. Now, according to this, therefore, about the intensity, right, and the remission, right, of habits and of forms, right, huh? So habit is like a form, right? There were four opinions among the philosophers, as Simplicius narrates, right, in his commentary on the what categories and the predicaments.

[17:38] For Plotinus and other Platonists, lay down that these qualities and habits receive more or less on account of this that they are what Material material. And from this they have a certain indetermination, how much or how little there, on account of the infinity of what of matter, right, huh?

[18:03] Others, huh? In contrary, lay down that these qualities and habits, in themselves, do not receive more or less, right? But qualia, which means that's the concrete thing, are said more or less according to a diverse what partaking, right? So that's one way that it can be more, right?

[18:38] But they would deny that the thing itself can be more or less, right? As example, that justice is not said more or less, right? But just is said more or less, right?

[18:51] And this opinion is touched upon by Aristotle in the predicaments so in the categories, huh? Third was the opinion of the Stoics. In the middle between these,

[19:08] for they laid down that some habits receive in themselves more and less as the arts, right? But some not as the what? Virtues, right? So you see, yeah, some in themselves can, some not.

[19:27] A fourth opinion was of some saying that immaterial qualities and forms do not receive more or less; material ones do receive. Huh? Was the man say to Christ, you know, I believe, help my unbelief, right? It's as if there's what? More or less. Yeah, yeah. And some people can love God more and some less, right? Now, what a mess, huh?

[20:07] Thus, therefore, that the truth of this thing may be made known, right? It should be considered that that by which something obtains, it's what species, huh? It's kind. Okay, is necessary to be something fixed and what standing, right, huh? And as it were indivisible, right, huh?

[20:38] Because whatever things attain to that are contained under that what species, and whichever things proceed from it either in more or less pertain to another species, either a more perfect one or a more imperfect one, huh? Whence the philosopher, and that means Aristotle, by antonomasia the philosopher, right? That Christ is teacher by antonomasia. He says in the eighth book of the metaphysics, and this kind of influenced by Plato, that the species of things are as what numbers, in which the addition or diminution varies the specifically.

[21:22] species, right, huh? Okay. Now, go back to Shakespeare's exhortation there to use reason, huh? What is the man if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed? At least no more, See, in this idea, no more, right? So it's like saying that a body is one, and a living body is two, and an animal is three, and a man is what four, right, huh?

[21:57] So you add life to a body, and you got a plant. You add sense to a living body, and you got an animal. And you add what reason, and you have a man, right, huh? Okay. Now, my mother didn't like me calling man an animal, right? I told you that, but I said, well, Mama, he's not just an animal. He's an animal that has what Something more.

[22:29] reason? Something more. Yeah, that's admission to be a man, right, huh? So that Aristotle can say reason more than anything else is man in the ethics, huh? Just like you can say that in a way there's a two and three, right? But three is not just two, right? It's two plus one, right? And that third one more than anything else that makes it to be what three, right?

[23:00] So they're like the what numbers, right? And you add or subtract, and you have a different kind of thing, a plant or an animal or a man, right? Or just a stone or something, right?

[23:21] And of this sort are hot and what white, huh? And other qualities of this sort, which are not said. This is very important. In order to another, right? Because that's going to be important in talking about those qualities that do admit of what more and what less, huh?

[23:47] And these things don't admit of more or less, much more so substance, right? Which is being, per se, right. So substance cannot be more or less, right?

[24:04] So is one dog more a dog than another dog? Or is one cat more a cat than another, right? Or is one square more a square than another square? You're either a square. You're not a square, right?

[24:23] Now, those things which receive species from something to which they are ordered That's not true now about whiteness or what heat. They are able, according to themselves, to be diversified in more and less, huh? And nevertheless, they are the same in species on account of the unity of that to which they are ordered, which they receive their species, huh? So geometry is ordered to knowing what lines and angles and figures and so on, right, huh?

[25:02] And but you can know them more or what less, right? So geometry can be more or less, right? And not only understood more or less, but the science itself can be more or less, right?

[25:24] Just as motion by itself can be what more intense or or remiss, and nevertheless remains the same in species on account of the unity of the term from which it is what specified, huh? And the same can be considered in health, for the body arises at the reason of what of health, according as it has a disposition suitable to the nature of the animal, to which diverse dispositions there can be what suitable, whence the decision can be varied in more or less.

[26:04] Nevertheless, there remains always the reason of what. Health. Whence the philosopher says in the tenth book of the Ethics that health itself receives more and less, for there is not the same what measurement in all, nor in one and the same always. But even being remiss, there remains health up to some point. I suppose that's kind of ontology, right?

[26:36] Now these diverse dispositions or commensurations of health have themselves, according to exceeding and exceeding. Whence, if the name of health were imposed only to the most what? Perfect. Perfect. Then health would not be said more or less. Okay. So are all beautiful women equally beautiful?

[27:01] But if one woman is more beautiful than another, right? And that one is not beautiful. No, no, I can say tonight, Which of my grandgirls is the most beautiful, you know, And I think they're all many of them, they're all beautiful, you know, but some are more beautiful than others, right? Okay. When

[27:25] growing up, you know, you'd see sisters, you know, and one is clearly more beautiful than the other, right? And Valkenberg girls when I was in grade school, they were twins, you know, and we get into new grade, the teacher couldn't tell them apart, and they would switch seats, you know, and the teacher would know it, you know, but I could always tell them apart. In fact, that one was much better looking than the other.

[27:43] one. But still, you might call them both beautiful, right? And thus, therefore, it is clear in what way some quality or form can be according to itself what increased or diminished, right? And what way not?

[28:06] Now the other way in which it can be more or less according to the participation of the subject, if however one considers the quality or form according to the partaking of the of it by the subject. Thus, also there are found some qualities and forms that can receive more and less, and some not, right? Okay. So, unless you make a distinction, right? Some qualities or some forms can, in themselves, be more or less, right?

[28:38] And some cannot, right? Some can be what? Participation. More or less, right? And some not, right? Okay. Now a very interesting thing, but Saint Thomas is going to go beyond that. Because of this diversity, some features assigns from this that substance by itself cannot receive more or less. Because it is being what per se it is not received in the subject, right? And therefore, every form which is substantially partaken of in a subject lacks intensity and what Remission, huh?

[29:21] My soul is not more or less a soul, right? So, whence in the genus of substance nothing is said according to more or less. And because quantity is next to substance, it's the second species, and that's how Aristotle treats the things. quantity second quantity second.

[29:42] And because quantity is next to substance, and figure follows upon quantity, right? That's the quality. of figures follows upon quantity. Hence, it is that neither in these is something said more or less. Okay. Now, sometimes you speak kind of loosely and say this is more circular than that, right? But either you're really what circular, or you're not, right? We did that them all. Did Lucy say that in one of the Charlie Brown cartoons, somebody drew a circle and said, "Suppose it's a perfect circle.

[30:13] " She says, "Every circle is a perfect circle. " Something like that. But think about, you know, we're all created equal, but some are more equal than others, right? But equal is tied up with quantity too, right? So strictly speaking, you can't be more equal. than others, right? Whence the philosopher says in the seventh book of Natural Hearing that when something takes its form and figure, it is not said to be what altered, but more to what come to be, right?

[30:51] So you don't, you know, come to be more a circle, but you come to be a circle. But other qualities which are more distant from substance and are joined to passions and actions receive more and less according to partaking of the subject. So you get the sense qualities, right? Hot and white and so on. One thing can be hotter than another. One can be whiter than another, right?

[31:17] Or the blackness, right? Some are blacker than others, right? Some are darker. Okay. Now Thomas sees some truth in what Simplicius says, right? But one can also more unfold this, the reason for this diversity, right? For as has been said, that from which something has its species is necessary to remain fixed in what standing in something indivisible. Now, in two ways it can happen that a form does not Is not partaken of according to more and less.

[32:01] In one way, because the thing partaking of it has its species or the kind of thing it is by according to it itself, right? And hence it is that no substantial form is partaken according to more or what less, huh?

[32:21] And in kind of this, the philosopher says in the eighth book after the books of the Metaphysics that just as number does not have more nor less, so neither does substance which is according to what species. That is according to the partaking of the specific form. But if with matter that is according to material dispositions, it's found more and less than what substance, huh? In another way, this can happen from this that the indivisibility itself is of the reason of the form.

[33:02] Whence it is necessary that if something partakes of that form, there partakes of it according to the reason of what indivisibility. And thus it is that the species of number are not set according to more and less, because each species in them is constituted by an indivisible what unity, right? So the one is even more what indivisible than the than the point. Contrary to modern mathematicians, right?

[33:34] Who go around dividing one, right? Pretty scandalous. It's not continuous with it. Discrete. And for the same reason, it is true about the species of continuous quantity, which are taken according to numbers, as bicubitum and tricubitum, right? Indivisible gradations like double and what triple, right?

[34:02] So is five more double of two than four? No, it's not really double at all, right? Only four is double of two. And about figures as triangle and what Quadrilateral, right? There's no word there, Tetragona, right? I've often wondered about that because you know we call triangle, we name it from angles, right? Three angles, and then quadrilateral, four sided, right? But sometimes you see in the books the term trilateral, right?

[34:39] Yeah. So why not call trilateral and quadrilateral? Why tr triangle and quadrilateral? They just where the language grew up, right? Yeah. Here you got trigonum and tetragonum, and they got the same. Why not say triangle and quadrangle? Quadrangle. Which we use sometimes. Well, quadrangle was you know in the in the Christian that's what they. Yeah, yeah. In German we don't say quadrangle, we say quadrilateral.

[35:07] We say pentagon. As my French teacher used to say, "Don't fight it, accept it. That's the way. That's what you see in French. " Yeah. Just don't fight it. You see, so a lot of a lot of a lot of a lot of frustration. Yeah, we just accept it. Yeah. Don't waste your time.

[35:29] And this reason, the Aristotle lays down in the predicaments, the categories, We're assigning the reason wherefore figures do not receive more and less, right?

[35:46] That what things receive the ratio of what triangle or trigon, and circle similarly are what trigona and circulata One is more, or less, right? So one circle is not more circular than another.

[36:05] Because indivisibility is of their very what reason, what they are. Whence whatever partake of the reason of them, yeah, I got that thing still after reading. I'm getting used to speaking that way. Is necessary that they partake of it in an undivided way, huh? More or less. Thus, therefore, it is clear that since habits and dispositions are said by order to now that's a clear phrase I was talking about, as is said in the sense of the physics, in two ways there can be intention and remission in habits and dispositions.

[36:49] In one way, according as there is a greater or lesser what Health. Health. or a greater or lesser science which extends to more or fewer things.

[37:04] So, if you know any first book of Euclid, right, which you had to do to get into theology in the Middle Ages, right, you might not know as much as I know, right. Who knows the second book as well, the third book. In another way, according to the partaking of the subject, in so far as an equal science or health is more received in one than in the other, right, according to the diverse aptitude, either from nature or from what custom, right, huh?

[37:37] For habit and disposition do not give the species to their subject, right, not the substantial form, right. Nor again do they include indivisibility in their what reason. Okay.

[37:59] So, the last time I just didn't go to the body of this together. I'll go through the objections again, but unless you demand, they do so. Why not? Well, won't hurt. Okay. Okay. Truth can never be confirmed enough, but I'll sleep. I have to punish those who gave him last class. You can always, you can always do that. Okay, notice the first argument. Augmentum is about quantity, right?

[38:37] Growth, huh? It's about quantity, huh? As is said in the fifth book of the physics, it's in the fifth book of the physics that Aristotle talks about the species of motion, right? And growth is one of them, right? He tries to find in what genus they are, right? So alteration is in the genus of quality, right, In the third species, and growth is in the category of quantity, right, huh?

[39:02] So, but habit is not in the genus of quantity, it's in the genus of what? Quality. Therefore, about these there cannot be any what? Growth, right? Okay, that's something dealing with the word there, right?

[39:20] Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that as the name of magnitude is what derived from bodily quantities to the understandable perfections of forms, so also the name of growth, right? Whose limit is the what? The great.

[39:46] So John Paul the Great, Albert the Great, big man, Gertrude the Great. Yeah, yeah. It reaches to perfection right? But it's, The word has been what carried. Over right. So Monsignor Dionne said that man objecting here cannot move the word right. He's stuck on the what first meaning of the word, huh?

[40:13] There's all kinds of people who are stuck on the first meaning of the word. Who can't carry the word over? It's too heavy for them to carry it over.

[40:23] Hobbes there, you know, complains about these theologians talking about virtues poured in by God. Infused virtue means poured in, right? How can a man be born again? Yeah, yeah. Same objection. He's stuck on the first meaning of birth, right?

[40:43] Okay. Well, the time starts out that because the first problem there is with the in the word, right? Huh? I was reading in the sentences there yesterday. I was trying to read about the will of God, right? Huh? And the first objection is, well, the will is an appetitive power, right? Huh? But Augustine says there's no appetitus in God because it's a something you lack. Yeah.

[41:12] Well, gotta point out how these. There's a problem with the word, though, right? Huh? Our mind, you know, is very much tied up with words and thinking.

[41:26] I was like the objection about God being perfect. Perfect is something that's completely made, but God is not made, so not perfect. That's it. Moreover, a habit is a certain what perfection, right? As is said in the seventh book of Natural Hearing. But the perfection, since it implies an end in a what limit, does not seem to receive more or less. Therefore, habits are not able to what grow, right?

[42:00] Huh? The second should be said that habit, to be sure, is a perfection, right? Huh? But not such a perfection that is the limit of its subject as giving to it what its specific being, right? Nor does it include in its reason or in its definition limit, right? Just as the species of numbers do, huh? Whence nothing prevents but that it receive more and what less, huh?

[42:41] Moreover, in those things which receive more and less, there can be what alteration? What that is said to be altered, which goes from less hot to more hot. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in the seventh book of the physics. Therefore, habits cannot be what increased, huh?

[43:11] To the third, it should be said that alteration is first in the qualities of the third what species, right? Which are the sense qualities.

[43:27] But in qualities of the first species, which is habit or disposition, right? There can be alteration what per posterius, right, huh? For an alteration made according to hot and cold, it follows that the animal might be altered according to what health and what sickness, huh? So you heat a man too much or cool him down too much, you're going to affect his health, right? But it's first a change in what the third species of quality, right?

[43:59] That is effects afterwards, huh, on the health. And likewise, there being an alteration according to the passions of the sense what desiring power, or according to the grasping sense powers, right? There follows a alteration according to the sciences and the what virtues, huh? As is said in the seventh book.

[44:29] Okay, watch out for those passiones, appetitus sensitivi, right? Especially young men.