Prima Secundae
130. Aquinas on Habits: How They Are Distinguished — by Power, Object, Good and Bad, and Unity (Summa I-II, Q. 54)
Class of 2013-09-19
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/130-aquinas-on-habits-how-they-are-distinguished-by-power-object/

[0:00] Okay. Now you heard me talk about distinction, division, definition. So distinction is kind of the basic thing for the mind, right? I was just reading, you know, where Thomas is talking about God as being the cause of what the distinction of things, right? The first cause. He's distinct from all the things, and the cause of their distinction, right? And then then he refers to Anaxagoras, right? Anaxagoras had introduced the mind, right, for the distinction of material things.

[0:35] The mind begins to distinguish things, separate them. So a nice thing there for him, you know. But follows some Shakespeare's definition, right? That you know, looking before and after presupposes what the ability to see distinction, huh?

[0:56] Okay. Then we're not to consider about the distinction of habits, huh? And about this four things are asked. First, whether many habits are able to be in one power.

[1:22] It's going to be a very interesting question. Theological virtues you have faith, is in reason. There's two theological virtues in the will, right? Of course, you mean the natural habits. I mean, I mean the philosophical ones are discussed. You have many. at least five at least five in reason, right? Because some of them can be subdivided. So there's many. Art of carpentry, art of cooking.

[1:59] Second, whether habits are distinguished according to their what objects? Third, whether habits are distinguished according to good and bad. A very strange one. Whether one habit can be considered for many habits? That sounds crazy. Why does he even ask that? You know about this Thomas and I. I was ahead of me somewhere. To the first then one goes forward thus. It seems that there are not able to be many habits in one what power?

[2:36] Power, huh? For those things which are distinguished by the same, when one is multiplied, the other is what multiplied, right? But according to the very same thing, powers and habits are distinguished according to acts and what objects. Likewise, therefore, they are what multiplied, right? Therefore, there cannot be many habits in one power. Are you convinced temporarily by that argument? I am. It doesn't take much. I'm a pushover.

[3:18] Moreover, a power is a simple power. What are you saying? Virtus is used for power, yeah. But in one simple subject, there cannot be diversity of accidents, because the subject is the cause of the accident.

[3:39] From one simple thing, there does not seem to proceed except one thing, right? Therefore, in one power, ability, there cannot be many what habits.

[3:53] Moreover, just as a body is formed by figures, this is the easy one to see. So a power is formed by its what habit, but one body cannot be at the same time formed by diverse figures. Therefore, neither one power is able to be formed at the same time, huh? Simul by diverse habits. Therefore, there are not many habits. There cannot be many habits in one power.

[4:21] But against this is that the understanding is one power in which there, however, habits of diverse sciences. I said you don't have this computer habit, wherever it is. Hance,

[4:48] it should be said that it has been said above. Habits are certain dispositions of something existing in what potency to something, either to nature or to operation or the end of the nature.

[5:15] And about those habits which are dispositions for the nature, it is manifest that there are able to be many in one subject. In that of one subject, there can be what taken in diverse ways the parts, according to which, according to the decision of which the habits are set. Just as we take the parts of the human body, the what? Humors, huh? Insofar as they are disposed according to human nature, there is a habit or disposition of what health.

[5:57] If one takes it according to similar parts as the nerves and the bones, flesh. There are dispositions in origin. There is what strength, or I guess you'd say weakness. I guess. Yeah. Leanness or meagreness. Yeah. Strength, I guess.

[6:23] Yeah, strength, or if somebody's skinny or weak, I guess you could say. If one takes the members as the hand and the foot and of this sort, the super disposition of them is what beauty, beauty. And thus there are many habits or dispositions in the same. So you're talking about health, strength, and what beauty, beauty, right?

[6:55] Men men wonder more whether they're strong women more whether they're beautiful or what. Friend Jim's the ex golden glove boxer. He goes, "I'm strong, man," he says, "but not healthy."

[7:13] So I was more healthy than Jim, but he's not as strong as anything to knock me flat. Not even thinking about it. Used to think if I had wealth, I hired Jim as my bodyguard. Chauffeur and bodyguard. Yeah,

[7:40] yeah. We worked in the back of the store there, you know, especially on those you know holidays when a lot of money coming in the store. He wanted to go over to the bank around the corner and deposit it, but he'd always ask, you know, this ex football player, you know, that worked for us to accompany him, you know, because protect him, right? That was more healthy than football player, but he was he was much stronger than me, you know.

[8:01] He always asked him to accompany me coming into the bank. It's kind of funny to see them walk out the door. If, however, we speak of habits which are dispositions for works, which property pertain to powers, right? Because they're the ability to do something, right? Thus, also it happens that of one power there can be many habits. The reason for this is because the subject of habit is a power that in some way is undergoing, right?

[8:42] Passive. For an active power only is not the subject of somewhat habit. This has been made clear before. Now, a passive power is compared to a determined act of one species as matter to what form. In that just as matter is determined to one form to one agent, so also the undergoing power, by what reason of one active object, is determined to one act in species.

[9:24] Whence just as many objects are able to move one passive power, so also one passive power can be the subject of diverse acts or perfections in species.

[9:41] Habits are certain what qualities or forms inhering, existing in powers, right, by which a power is inclined to determine acts and species. Determine acts according to some species. Mhm Once one power. can

[10:01] have what? Once to one power they are able to pertain many habits, just as many acts differing in what species. So because you can have many different

[10:19] acts from the same power, you can have different habits. It's not as clear as it could be. To the first, therefore, it should be said, just as in natural things a diversity of species is according to what form, right? A diversity of genera is according to matter, as is said in the fifth book of metaphysics. For those things are diverse in genera, of which the matter is diverse, right?

[11:02] So also the diversity of objects in genus makes for a distinction of what powers. Whence the philosopher says in the sixth book of the ethics that to those things which are other in genus, right, there are also what different particular what animals, huh? But the diversity of objects in species makes for a diversity of acts in species, and consequently of what habits, huh? Whatever things are diverse in genus are also diverse in species, but the reverse of this is not so.

[11:47] And therefore, diverse powers there are diverse acts in species and diverse habits. However, it is not necessary that there be diverse habits; that diverse habits be of diverse powers, but there can be many of one power. And just as there are genera, genera, so there are species of species, and thus it happens that there are diverse species of habits and powers.

[12:25] Why saying that there's a difference between distinction according to genus and distinction according to what species? Yeah. To second, it should be said that although that a power, although it be simple in its essence, is multiple in its what potency or power, right? According as it extends itself to many acts differing in what species, and therefore nothing prevents in one power. There being many habits differing in what species, huh?

[13:06] To the third, it should be said that a body is formed by figure as to its proper termination. But habit is not the termination of a power, but it's a disposition to an act as to its ultimate term. And therefore, there cannot be of one power at the same time many acts, except perhaps as one is comprehended under the other. Just as neither of one body can there be many figures, except according as one is in what another, as the triangle is in the what quadrilateral, right?

[13:46] Notice the Latin the trigona, huh? The quadraton, the quadrangle. It's interesting. that. He's using the Greek words there. Yeah. For the intellect is not able to understand at the same time many things, right? But is able at the same time to know many things habitually, right? Like God knows all things actually, huh? Yeah. Amazing. Okay, whether habits are distinguished according to objects. To the second one proceeds thus: it seems that habits are not distinguished according to objects, for contraries are differing in what species, but the same habit of science is the contraries, as medicine of health and what sickness.

[14:55] They're different objects, right? Therefore, they are not differing in species according to object, and therefore habits are not distinguished, according to objects differing in species. That's better translation.

[15:31] Aristotle's one book in the politics on the preservation of governments and the corruption of governments. Same, same knowledge. Plato and Aristotle both of them emphasize the same knowledge, the opposite, right?

[15:52] You know what ugliness is. You know what beauty is. You know what ignorance is or error is. You don't know what knowledge is. Moreover, diverse sciences are diverse habits, but the same what knowable pertains to diverse sciences as the earth to be round is demonstrated both by the naturalist and by the what astronomer, right? And therefore, habits are not distinguished according to their what. See, astrologers are not in a negative sense, right?

[16:30] That's to say, you know, can the same can philosophy and theology know the same thing? Okay. But it's like you know, let's just compare it

[16:58] to the senses, right? Can the sense of sight, right, know the shape of this, which is rectangular, right? And the sense of touch know the shape of it too.

[17:10] They don't know it the same way, right? The one knows it by where how far the color extends, right? Yeah. The other one knows about that. Yeah. But they they can know the same thing, but not in the same way. It seems. If they know the same thing the same way, I don't know if they have different powers. The sense of touch and the sense of what sight, you know.

[17:31] I recognize your voice, right? But my ear, right? That's what they say. I just learned that recently. That people who are blind and they want to know who you are, they feel your face. That's how they get to know you. It's kind of curious. I mean, besides your voice or something, but they want to know your face. They feel the features of your face. They have a sensitivity to those kinds of senses that we don't.

[17:59] I'm kind of dull to those things. Yeah. They're much more focused in the senses that they have. However, on the same act, there is the same object, but the same act can pertain to diverse habits of virtues, if they're referred to diverse ends, right? For to give money to someone, if it be an account of God, pertains to charity, huh? But if it is an account of solving a what?

[18:40] outstanding debt pertains to justice, right? There you go. Therefore, also the same object can pertain to diverse habits. Therefore, there is not a diversity of habits according to diversity of what? Objects.

[19:00] But against this, it is that acts different species according to diversity of objects. And habits, their dispositions, their dispositions to acts. Therefore, also habits are distinguished according to diverse objects. We see in the angle what does Aristotle say, right? He's going to talk about the powers of the soul, right? The abilities of the soul, and then he says that the abilities are going to be distinguished by their what?

[19:30] Acts, right? And the acts by their what? Object, yeah. So the ability sight, the sense of sight, and sense of hearing are distinguished by seeing and hearing, right? But they're both forms of sensing, but the one is sensing color, the other is sensing sound. So they're ultimately distinguished by their what? Object, right? Well, that carry over into habits, right? Huh? Except it's a more what particular distinction, right?

[20:01] Huh? Okay. So seeing red and seeing green is not the same thing, but red and green are more particular differences than color and sound, right?

[20:24] And it should be said that habit is both a what? Certain form, yeah. And is a habit, right? Huh? Curiosity, say that now. Now a distinction of habits in species can be noted either according to the common way in which forms are distinguished in species, or according to the way that is what property to habits, right? So form is something more general than habit, right? Huh? I mean the soul is a form too, right?

[21:02] So it's more general. Now forms are distinguished from each other according to diverse what active principles, in that every agent makes something like itself in species.

[21:24] But habits imply an order to something. Now all things which are said according to an order to something are distinguished according to the distinction of those things to which they are said, right?

[21:43] Now habit is a what? Habit is a disposition which is ordered to what to things. We said before, to wit, to nature and to the operation following upon the nature, right?

[22:01] Thus, therefore, according to three things, habits are distinguished in species. In one way, according to the active causes of such dispositions; in another way, according to nature; in a third way, right, according to objects differing in species, as will be unfolded in the things that what will follow. To the next three answered replies and the next article. To the first, therefore, it should be said

[22:42] that in the distinction of powers or also of habits, one ought to consider the object materially, right, but the ratio of the object differing in species or also in genus.

[23:04] Now, although contrary species differ by diversity of things, right. Nevertheless, there is the same way of knowing each, right? Because one is known through what the other, and therefore, in so far as they come together for one reason of being knowable,

[23:31] they pertain to one knowing habit, huh? That's a very subtle thing in the sense of stuff. Think about it, right? Okay. That's one way they distinguish between reason and the body, right? The reason, not the body, because in the body, one contrary excludes the other contrary, right? So health excludes sickness, and sickness excludes health, right? But in my mind, the knowledge of one isn't the other, right?

[24:02] So normal blood pressure, high blood pressure, you know, has normal blood pressure in its understanding, right? You can't really know that blood pressure is high unless you know what normal blood pressure should be, right? Okay. This is a famous example because Thomas Aquinas said, "To the second should be said that the Earth, to be round, through one medial middle term, the natural philosopher demonstrates, right? And through another, the astronomer who has the mathematical science of nature, right?

[24:55] Okay. As to the what shapes of eclipses or something of this sort, right? Okay. So when the Earth comes between the Sun and the Moon, it casts a circular shadow upon the thing. That's kind of mathematical middle term, right? But the natural one demonstrates this through a natural medium as to the motion of heavy things to the middle, or through something of this sort, right?

[25:26] Now the whole power of a demonstration, which is a syllogism, making us to know, depends upon the what middle term, right? And therefore diverse middle terms are as diverse what? Active principles. Yeah. According to which the habits of the sciences are what diversified, right? Which is something like to the senses, right? Where they have what they call the common sensible, right? So that more than one sense knows it, right?

[25:56] But it knows it to its own what proper sensible, right? So I know the shape of this here is being rectangular through the color. I know what it is, red, kind of. And I can also know through what hardness, right?

[26:14] So the touch is knowing in a different way than sight is, right? And the eye is only going to be distinguished by color rather than by what shape, right?

[26:28] But it's knowing shape in a different way. What about this idea about ends? To the third, it should be said that as the philosopher says in the second book of Natural Hearing, Physics, and the seventh book of the Ethics,

[26:51] an end has itself in doings as the beginning, a principle or premise in what demonstrations. And therefore the diversity of ends diversifies virtues, just as the diversity of active principles, the different premises for showing something.

[27:15] For the ends are the objects of the acts of the interior acts, which interior acts most of all pertain to what virtues, right? So that's interesting. That's a very important portion there, right? So,

[27:35] just as we reason from the premises to conclusions, so we reason from the end to the means that are suitable to it, right? So the end is like the act of principle whereby you know a conclusion, right?

[27:52] So say, why is this conclusion so? We go back to the premises, right? Why are you doing this? Well, for this this end. So that's since you reason both, you might call it. You might use the word reason in both cases, right? The reason why I did that, right, and then you get the end, right?

[28:13] The reason for thinking this theorem in Euclid is because of these what premises, right? It's the reason he he gave, right. Whether habits are distinguished according to good and bad, to the third one proceeds thus: It seems that habits are not distinguished according to good and bad, because good and bad are contraries. But there's the same habit of contraries as has been had above. Therefore, habits are not distinguished according to good and bad.

[29:08] Moreover, good is convertible with being, right? It's one of these transcendental, some most common things. And thus, since it is common to all things, it is not able to be taken as a difference of some species, as is clear through the philosopher in the fourth book of the places.

[29:29] Likewise, since bad, since it's a privation and non-being, cannot be the difference of some being. Therefore, one cannot distinguish habits and species according to good and bad. That's pretty good. Vindicates me.

[29:46] Yeah. Vindicates me. Moreover, concerning the same object, there can be diverse bad habits, huh? Just as concerning concupiscences, there can be intemperance as opposed to excess, right? And insensibility, right?

[30:07] Aristotle says, you know, in the ethics there's no name for this defective one, right? Because it's so rare, right? So I said, you know, what do we call it? What's called puritanism or something, you know.

[30:34] Likewise, there can be what many good habits, huh? Just as Aristotle distinguishes in the Ethics, there in the seventh book, human virtue, right? And what heroic or divine virtue? Yeah. Thomas comes back there and he talks about the gifts of the Holy Spirit, right? And they're like heroic virtue, right? Different thing from. This is clear through the philosopher in the seventh book of the Ethics. Therefore, habits are not distinguished according to good and what bad.

[31:10] But against this is that a good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to what vice. But contraries are diverse according to species. Therefore, habits do differ in species, huh? According to difference of good and bad, huh? Different kind of opposites, then. What does he say, son?

[31:36] I answer: It should be said, and it has been said, habits and species are distinguished not only according to objects and active principles, but also in order to nature, right?

[31:54] Which happens in two ways: in one way, according to agreement to nature, or also what? Disagreement. Yeah. And in this way, distinguished in species, good and bad habits, huh? For by a good habit, one is said to be disposed to an act suitable to the nature of the one acting, right? But a bad habit, one is said is said or by one is disposed to an act that is not suitable to what?

[32:27] Nature, huh? Homosexual acts. Yeah, so. Yeah, I think this frustration of nature as such, and what it is. But the acts of what? Virtues. That are suitable to human nature are those which are according to reason, huh? Acts of vices, since they are against reason, are discordant from the clash of human nature, right? And thus it is manifest that according to the difference of good and bad habits can be what distinguished in species, huh?

[33:06] That's what Shakespeare said, "the revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse." There you go. That's why I'm thinking about about how we use the word taken from the feet, right? We talk about discord, but also the word stumble, right? Now, and in *Hamlet* and *Juliet*, right, you have two things said, right? Wisely and slow they stumble and run fast. And then later on, you know, are not so vile that on the earth doth live, but to the earth some special good doth give.

[33:48] Nor not so good but strained from that fair use. Revolt from true birth, stumbling on abuse, right? Just those words, I think, really shows excellence of Shakespeare's mind, right? Revolt from true birth, because that's where we get the rejection, right? Stumbling on abuse, right? That's where you really what go against your nature, right? It's a stumble. We had the other day the gospel. Looking at which gospel currently reading Luke, I forget.

[34:18] Remember which one it is, but it's repeated in more than one. But they often will say they translate it not accurately, as far as I'm concerned. Our Lord says, "If your hand causes you to sin, cut it off." He didn't say that. He said, "If your hand causes you to stumble." That's the word. That's from the Greek. If your eye causes you to stumble, or and he says, "Woe to those who cause one of these little ones to stumble."

[34:41] That's the word he uses. Yeah. So it's kind of interesting that. Yeah. Interesting. Other words, stumble. You know, Shakespeare became a master of words in the English language. I always call him the master English language because he uses words so well. Yeah, yeah.

[35:03] Oftentimes, that's what I do when we have a passage of scripture. I don't change the words that are in the scripture, but if it provide even on the page it provides us, or in the Greek it says this, I'll put the more, I think, more accurate. Yeah. More tempted to say, you know, Obama revolts from true birth, stumbling on a piece. If I be stuck with stop go, click the wrong one.

[35:28] You know what he, he says it like that. We just keep praying for him to change. That's what I think. That I just saw an article inside the Vatican there. Some gal was just made the head of the March for Life. Yeah, it's just Irish name. I can't remember her name now. And she said, "You know, that's one thing she keeps praying for Obama's conversion. That's what she's doing.

[36:05] " What else can you do? In another way, according to nature, habits are distinguished, right? In that they have one habit disposes for an act suitable to the what? Lower nature. Yeah. Another habit disposes for an act suitable to a what? Higher nature. Yeah. And thus the human virtue, which disposes for an act suitable to human nature, is distinguished from the divine virtue, right? Or the heroic virtue, right?

[36:54] Which disposes for an act suitable to a what? Period. Period nature, right? Now, to the first, it should be said that of contraries, there is able to be one habit, right? According as contraries come together in one what? Notion or definition.

[37:33] Yeah. Noble in the same way, you might say. But never does it happen that contrary habits are one species, right? This is a very subtle distinction, right? For the contrariety of habits is according to what? Contrary. And as you can see, I was really troubled, how to translate "rationes is the best way, right?

[38:01] How would you translate that? Say characteristics. I don't know what you'd say. That's not. That's not adequate. Did you say reasons? Common aspect. Common aspect. Yeah, it's in the fifth. Isn't that word aspect? Yeah. Well, the translator who did those questions likes.

[38:25] Somebody else translating. In this, according to good and bad habits. are. Distinguished, insofar as one habit is good and the other bad, not, however, from this that one is of the good and the other of the bad, right? See, so Nicomachean Ethics is both of the good and of the bad, right? It's about virtue and vice.

[38:58] But in the other case, it's the virtue, it's the habit itself that is good or bad, right? So there can be a good habit about the good and the bad, right? I suppose there could be a bad habit about the good and the bad too, right? But

[39:24] the same habit cannot be both good and bad. But the same habit can be about the good and the bad. That's kind of a interesting thing, right? I'm gonna get a, get a, you know how I like to to ask students, you know, what sense of before it is one sense of before come before another sense of before. Yeah. Can you do something about good and bad again?

[39:47] Yeah. But something a little bit like that, right? A good habit, the same habit cannot be both good and bad, right? But the same habit can be about the good and the bad, about the good and the bad that's opposed to that good.

[40:11] But the same habit cannot be in harmony with nature and and in disharmony with nature, right? You know, logic is about correct reasoning, incorrect reasoning, right? I used to get the kids up on the board, you know, and I'd say if A is so, B is so, and then I'd write that four times across, and then I'd say A is so, and then A is not so, B is so, B is not so, right?

[40:45] And I'd get four victims up on the board. And I'd say, anything follows necessarily, right? But I mean, what what follows, right? And usually, you know, sometimes you get them at all. Sometimes I mix that. Yeah, I think so. Again, when they get everyone mixed up, and the one where something does follow, they think nothing follows. You know, something doesn't follow, they say something does follow. So I say this shows the need for logic.

[41:09] I made your point because it's written on the board. It justified your job. Yeah, yeah. Right, you see what I'm doing there, right? You see the ones where something follows, something doesn't follow, right? Where the argument would be good, and where the argument would be what? Bad, right? Because at least it's the argument: if A is so, B is so, and then saying A is not so, therefore B is not so, right?

[41:37] Aristotle says, "Well, that doesn't what." Foul, right? It is true that if being came to be, it had a beginning, but does it follow that if it didn't? You know. Yeah.

[41:55] Yeah, that's the example I use. If if it's raining out, the sidewalk's wet. Yeah. It's not raining out. The sidewalk's wet. Oh, they got it all wet.

[42:08] So you see, logic is about good and bad reasoning, right? Ethics about virtue and vice, and medicine is about health and sickness, right? I did the pork chops last night, pork loin last night real good, you know, nice and juicy. Now didn't make it all dry, you know. So, work better. Come on, by the way, you did it last night. Did you thank Rosalie for that? No, I didn't.

[42:39] Oh, you did. Really? Ooh, tasty! That's not easy. Yeah. And you got to carry just to get the right amount. You don't have it, you know. Want to eat pork too pink? You know, bad pink. You know, but you want to have it, you want to have it tender and moist, right? But I know how to do both, right? You say a woman was upset. with a man, you know, she'd overcook the meat or something like that.

[43:08] So it's by the same art of cooking that she knows how to do it right and how to do it what wrong. If you know how much salt or pepper to put on, you know how much would be too much and make it too. See, there there are they're making food tasty and and untasty, right? Yeah. Then

[43:32] it's interesting to say, right? Not not too hard to see that distinction, right? Is it that the same habit cannot be both good and bad, but the same habit can be about the good and the bad? Is that true?

[43:56] Moral virtues and the intellectual virtues, or just intellectual? I see it more in the case of intellectual virtues, you know, but maybe there's something like that. I mean, if if I have virtue of justice, then I'm inclined to pay my debts, right? But I also, you know, aroused so to speak by by some injustice somebody's doing, right? Yeah. You know, it's by the same moral virtue I'm inclined to a good act, right, and away from a bad act, right.

[44:35] You know, if the act is contrary to the virtue. Even even in the opposite way, in terms of if you got a vice. That's what they talk about honor among thieves, you know. They know what's they know what's right, money. They just don't think. Maybe the thief knows very well about the seventh commandment. Wants everybody to observe it except himself. He's got the exception. don't take my stuff.

[44:56] Yeah, it's like the IRS. Okay. Did you finish the implied objection? Did the first one or just the one? Okay. Wait a minute. Yeah, yeah, the first one we. No, we did the second one. We just we just finished the third one, didn't we? Third article, but we haven't answered all the objections. I don't think. Yeah. Okay. Okay. Wow, I lost my place. Oh yes, yeah, yeah.

[45:36] We have done the objection. And the first one is yeah. Yes. Okay, we did it. Yeah. See, the last sentence is what I was kind of taking off at. Yeah. And ita secundum bonum et malum habitus distinguuntur. Yeah. Insofar as one habit is good and the other habit is bad, right? Not, however, from this that one is of the good and the other of the bad, right?

[45:56] Okay. The second should be said that the good common to all being right, the good that is convertible with being, is not a difference constituting the species of any habit, right? But it's always a certain determined good, right? Huh. Which is according to its suitability to a determined nature, to wit, the what human nature, right? Huh.

[46:28] Likewise, bad is not a difference constituting a habit. The that does do so is not a pure privation, right? But something determined that is repugnant to a determined what nature, right? Okay.

[46:46] So it's something that is some some some thing, right? But it has attached to it, you might say, a privation, right? Huh. It's not just a pure privation, right? Okay. So intemperance is not simply, you know, the lack of reason, but real inclination to eat too much or drink too much or something, right? So.

[47:10] So that excessive desire for food and drink involves deprivation of reason, right? Okay. Desire not modified by reason or not in accordance with reason.

[47:35] Now this. Okay, the third objection. To the third, it should be said that many good habits are about the same in species. Are distinguished. Many habits, many good habits, about the same in species are distinguished according to their suitability to diverse natures. Many bad habits are distinguished according to the same thing, according to diverse repugnancies to that which is according to nature. Just as to one virtue are contrary diverse vices about the same matter. So The Puritan is contrary to reason in a different way than the intemperate man, right?

[48:45] And the coward is what opposed to reason in a different way than the foolhardy man. To the fourth, one proceeds thus: it seems that one habit is constituted from many habits, right? Who's going to take the opposite side? I guess.

[49:19] For that whose generation is not perfected at once but successively seems to be constituted from what various parts? Build a house, right? Lay the foundation first, right? If you're fool, you don't have anything to finish the rest of the house. Let's get the foundation. But the generation of the habit is not what all at once, but successively through many acts. Therefore, one habit is constituted from many what habits.

[49:51] Moreover, from parts is constituted the whole. But to one habit are assigned many parts, as Tullius lays down what many parts of fortitude, temperance, and other virtues.

[50:11] Therefore, one habit is constituted from what many. Moreover, about one conclusion alone, there can be a what science can be had both in act and habit. But many conclusions pertain to one whole science, as to geometry, arithmetic. Okay, I can buy that now.

[50:37] And therefore, one habit is constituted from what many. But against this, a habit, since it is a certain quality, is a simple form. But nothing simple is constituted from many. Therefore, one habit is not constituted from many habits.

[50:59] I answer: it should be said that a habit ordered to operation, about which now we chiefly intend, right, is a certain perfection of a power, right. But every perfection is proportional to its perfectible. Whence, as the power sense is one, extends to many things according as they come together in something one. That is in some general notion of object, right? So also habits extend to many things according as they have the order to something one.

[51:39] To wit, to some special. Object of or aspect of a yeah. One nature or one nature or one beginning, as has been said above, right.

[51:59] If therefore we consider habit according as it extends itself, thus we find in it a certain multiplicity, right? But because that multiplicity is ordered to something one, to which the habit chiefly regards, hence it is that the habit is a simple quality, not constituted from many habits, even if it extends to many, right? For one habit does not extend to many things except in order to something one, from which it has its what unity, right?

[52:41] Now to the first, it should be said that succession in the generation of habit is not constituted from this that part of it is generated after part, but from this that the subject does not at once or immediately right achieve the disposition that is firm and difficult to remove, right? And from this that at first it imperfectly comes to be or begins to be in the subject and is paulatim is perfected, right?

[53:10] Wisely and slow, right? They stumble and run fast, right? If you go too fast, you're not going to stumble, which is not to acquire the virtue, right? And thus also about other qualities, huh? So he's talking about that and right the subject is partaking of the virtue, right?

[53:32] Now to the second, it should be said that the parts which are assigned to individual cardinal virtues are not integral parts, right? From which is constituted the whole, but subject parts or what? Potential. parts. Yeah. Well. This is going to be the main distinction there that you follows all the way through the Secunda Secundae, right? The different ways in which a thing can have parts. So we have to.

[54:03] Not integral parts. Yeah. That's what you said there Yeah. But subject parts are what species, right? Okay. So if you say temperance, then you may have a species. One might be concerned with food or drink or something. The one with sex, something like that, right? And so, and then potential ones are ones that don't have the full what power of the of the virtue, right? And something of it, huh?

[54:35] But those distinctions will come out more later on. Don't worry about that too much right now. The one who, in some science, Third, it should be said, the one who, in some science, acquires by demonstration the knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit, but imperfectly, huh? But when he acquires through some demonstration science of another conclusion, there is not generated in him another habit, but the habit which first was becomes more what perfect, as extending to what more things, right?

[55:18] In that the conclusions and demonstrations of one science are ordered, and one is derived from the other, right, huh? So I go through all these thirteen books that you did there, I mean I just didn't want to have it.

[55:42] fifteen books of uh of uh Saint Augustine, or the fifteen books, of St. Augustine, or the 12 books, of St. Augustine, or the 15 books of Ambrose.

[55:55] It's just what happened. What gives unity to theology, right? Is it because it's one object? It's all about God and other things in comparison to God, right? Huh? That's part of unity, isn't it? And you know, when Thomas says, you know, his theology, you know, way way back in the first question, right? His theology, one science, right? How can it be? You know, they talked about all these different things.

[56:28] You know, talks even about human virtue and so on, but it's all in comparison to what to God, right? Huh? We talk about God in himself, other things, because God is the Alpha and the Omega, the first and last, the beginning, the end of things, right? This is very clear in the Summa Theologiae right? Huh? Where the first book is about God in himself, and then the second book about God is the beginning of things, right?

[56:54] Huh? And then the third book about God is the end of all things, right? So you need to have divine providence, you know, and so on. But it's they're all ordered to one thing, right? Huh? But if you say that that all this is in the light of what faith, right? That's another way of seeing unity, isn't it, of the science?

[57:16] Even though I suppose it comes to what faith is, you're going to have to bring in God, I think. But in a sense, you know, God's God's knowledge, in a sense, is the active principle of our thinking, right? Yeah. So, or in the other case, you're you're emphasizing, you know, that God is the subject or the object that you're knowing, right? Huh? Do you know in the light of faith, right?

[57:46] They speak of the light of faith. Yeah, yeah. And it's one of my favorite titles of Christ that's given in the Apocalypse. It's called the faithful witness because he's testifying to the to that one light. Basically, he's testifying because we don't see that light directly. We only see it through the witness

[58:20] It's a good time to stop I guess Mm hmm.