Prima Secundae
132. Summa I-II Q.55 aa.3-4 and the Start of Q.56: Virtue as a Good Habit, Augustine's Definition of Virtue, and the Subject of Virtue
Class of 2013-09-26
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/132-summa-i-ii-q-55-aa-3-4-and-the-start-of-q-56-virtue-as-a/

[0:00] To third one goes forward thus. It seems that it's not of the meaning of virtue that it be a good habit, right? Huh? For sin is always taken in after something bad, right? But even of sin there is somewhat virtue, according to that of Saint Paul in the Epistle to Corinthians. The what virtue of sin is what?

[0:33] Therefore, virtue is not always a good habit, right? Huh? Of course, you know. I mean, Saint Paul calls what Concupiscence there too is called a law, right? The law of my flesh, right? That's kind of a extended use of the word, right? Quasi metaphorice, metaphorically said, huh? Okay, we'll see what Thomas says. Moreover, virtus corresponds to what power, right? But power is not only in regard to the good, but also in regard to the bad, right?

[1:12] According to that of Isaiah chapter five, woe to you who are potent in drinking wine! That's. It's directed towards me, I guess. And strong men to what? Mixing. Mixing what? Drunkenness. Yeah. Therefore, virtue has itself to good and to bad. What did you say? You're no more powerful than the devil, right? Huh?

[1:42] Moreover, according to the Apostle Second Corinthians, virtue is made perfect in infirmity. Ah. What a contradiction, right? Yeah. But infirmity is a certain evil, right? Therefore, virtue not only has itself to the good, but also to the bad. See, wonder how long he had to think up to think up these objections. But against

[2:13] this is what Augustine says in the book on the morals of the church. No one would doubt that what the virtue makes the soul best, right? And the philosopher says in the seventh of the ethics. This is equating now the whole text. Virtue is quae bonum facit habentem makes its haver good, right? And his what. His work. Good, yeah. So I used to talk about my two eyes, you know, and if I look at you, you know, my right eye is kind of blurry over there, you know, and my left eye is much more clear, right?

[2:49] So my left eye is my virtuous eye, and my right eye, I'd say, is my what vicious eye. I don't mean I look at the girls with my right eye, he said. But you know, what's the eyes what own act, right? To see. Yeah, yeah. So if you have twenty twenty version, then you what? It makes the eye that has that twenty twenty version good, right? And it sees good, right?

[3:13] Huh? Okay. So my left eye is more virtuous than my right eye, right? I say, by the virtue of the eye. And I think you kind of you know do that because it kind of makes people realize what virtue is, right? Why would you want a knife that isn't sharp, right? Why would you want a knife that you know can't see, you know?

[3:37] It's like Cain and Abel. I was remembering just a brief comment pointing out how how the text of Genesis is phrased. Yeah. It says that God looked upon Cain and his offering. Yeah. And Abel and his offering. So he looks first at the man. Yeah. And then looks at his work. Yeah. So if the one if the first thing is good, then the second one you can't have the second one making the first one

[4:07] So. article Yeah. I answered it should be said as has been said above virtue implies the perfection of a power Whence the virtue of each thing is determined towards the last thing that the thing is what capable should be said, as has been said above, virtue implies the perfection of a power. Whence the virtue of each thing is determined towards the last thing that the thing is what capable, right?

[4:35] As is said in the first book de Caelo. But the ultimate thing that each power is able to achieve is necessarily something that is what good, right? For everything bad implies somewhat defect, right? So my ability to be mistaken, you know, that cannot be the perfection of my the virtue of my what reason, right? But that whereby I know the truth, then. Whence Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names that everything bad is weak, is infirmum right?

[5:15] huh? There was Thomas in his prayer there for communion there beforehand, right? What does he mean by infirm? You know, he's praying to God the Father. He said infirmus habemus ego. Yeah. Medico vitae. Yeah.

[5:43] And on account of this is necessary that the virtue of each thing be set in order to something what good, right? Huh? Continue. The farthest I can do is an error. That's pretty. That's pretty bad, right?

[6:02] Whence human virtue, which is a doing habit, right? He said, "in Article 2, is a good habit and doing of something good, right? Opportunity of something good.

[6:17] Now, to the first, it should be said that just as perfect, so also good is said metaphorically in bad things. Okay. For there is said to be a perfect thief or robber and a good thief or thing, right? As is clear through the philosophy Aristotle says, it's like a metaphorical sense, right?

[6:42] Perfect sense. Yeah. According to this, therefore, also virtue is said metaphorically in evil things. It's a little bit like you know when they say you know

[6:56] when your whole house is consumed in fire, right? It's a complete what? Complete wreck, right? You know why use the word complete there? Because the house now is as far away from being complete as it could be about, right? But that's being said, what? Very metaphorically, right? Okay. Can't go any further towards non-being, right? You're a complete ass. You know, you know that. You know that that's what was said to the curate of ours when he was in the seminary.

[7:29] He couldn't figure out the Latin. Yeah. His textbook. Complete dunce. Well, that's the professor said to the priest who was teaching him. Said, "You're a complete ass." And he said, "Well, if Samson could take just the jawbone of an ass and kill a whole Philistine army, just think what God could do with a complete ass." Very good.

[8:03] Is my glass completely empty? Not now. I mean, you say complete there, right? That's kind of the metaphorical use, right? It's perfectly dull. Okay.

[8:22] And thus the virtue of sin is said to be law, in so far as what through the law occasionally that means an accidental causality is a what sin magnified, right? And as we're arriving at its what maximum, right?

[8:42] Yeah, we just had that reading of Romans chapter seven. That's what he said. Yeah. But sometimes, doesn't it speak? You know, that God is allowing the sinner to go to his full,

[8:52] you know, evil, right? Didn't St. Paul say that too about the? Oh, oh, is it fill up the quota of your sins? Is how it's translated sometimes. Yeah, it's almost like yeah, go ahead. Yeah, yeah. So take Hitler, you know, really in the last part of the war, the Holocaust really got going, you know, and they's kind of you know going to the, you know, complete complete what did you say, complete.

[9:26] Tolkien didn't like Hitler at all, you know, in terms of his understanding of German myth and so on. They just got all wrong. Really? Yeah, yeah. I think that's a piercing one he talks about. Tolkien, yeah. That's interesting. Edelbach had a chip on his shoulder against the Germans because he just didn't ever get over Aryanism. That explains German idealism and everything. Explains it.

[9:56] Huh. That story that he tells about the Saint somebody as the devil, and he's got the devil by the nose, and he's taking him around and around. And the devil breaks down and starts cursing, starts cursing in German, which is his native tongue.

[10:21] Wait, you're gonna show me that one. I don't remember that. one. Oh, that's good. Well, that's what um, former Cardinal Ratzinger once talked about. It's was it is it? It's some novel or something where the devil, who is it? The Antichrist shows up. Yeah. He's a scripture scholar, a Chippingham.

[10:53] Yeah, Mark Twain. He makes fun of the German language, you know. Madmen invented, you know. I guess the German language has got this kind of word order, you know. It's kind of thing. Well, Warren tells me a funny story. One of these, you know, national things. There, they had somebody's translating. The guy goes along, right? The guy's trying to say in French, right? And you know, it's not until the end that you find out this thing is supposed to be, you know, I just you know, stand down and stop translating and walk out of his booth, you know, Kind of funny, you know.

[11:23] Ridiculous language, yeah. To second, it should be said something like the first one, right? That the evil of what drunkenness, right, or too much drinking. Drinking. Nimie potationis. What's time I say supposed to drink. musgradularitatum, right? Yeah, Yeah. Consists in the defect of the order of reason, right? Now it happens that with the defect of reason, that there is some what inferior power, perfect, perfect, right, to what is of its own what kind, right?

[12:01] Even with repugnance or with the defect of what reason, right? The perfection of such a power, since it is with the defect of reason, cannot be called a human virtue, right? Okay. So that's, yeah. Yeah.

[12:22] So these guys would go out now and kill ten, fifteen people, you know, kind of what? Some sort of imperfection there, right? The lower powers, right? Yeah.

[12:37] Now the text from what Saint Paul is not too hard to see, huh? To the third, it should be said. To that extent, reason is shown to be more perfect; the more what the infirmities of the body and of the lower parts are, is more able to what conquer them or tolerate them, right? And therefore, human virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be perfected in infirmity, not of reason, but in the infirmity of the body and inferior parts.

[13:11] Right? Well, they could say, you know, that you turn to God too, right? And you're strengthened by God rather than by your natural powers. Okay. Well, let's get to that answer today. Want to take a little break or? Sure. Take a little... To the fourth one goes forward. Thus, it seems that is not a suitable definition of virtue which is accustomed to be assigned. That virtue is the good quality of the mind by which it lives rightly, which no one uses badly, which God works in us without us.

[13:54] For virtue is the goodness of man. That definition comes from Augustine, by the way. Okay. Virtue is the goodness of man, right? Huh? For it is virtue that makes the one having it good, right? That's part of Aristotle's notion there.

[14:14] But goodness does not seem to be what. Good. The good. To be good, yeah. Just as neither is whiteness white, right? Okay. Therefore, unsuitably is it said that virtue is a what? Good quality, right? Not goodness itself, but that by which you are good, right?

[14:41] It's a little hard to get it first. But is health healthy? Sounds unhealthy. See, but you see, it'll probably mean you say is is health that by which the body is healthy, right? Health is not that by which health is healthy, right? But it's that by which the body is healthy, right? The same thing as virtue, right? Huh? Okay. And

[15:12] well, anyway. Moreover, Augustine says in the. Excuse me. Moreover, no difference is more common than its what genus, right? Since it is divisa of a genus, right? Divides a genus. But good is more what common than quality, right? For good is convertible with being, which is said of all, right?

[15:44] Therefore, good ought not to be placed in the definition of virtue as a difference of quality, huh? Now put that in your pipe and smoke it, huh?

[15:58] Moreover, as Augustine says in the twelfth book of the Trinity, where first there occurs something that is not common to us in the. mente. That pertains to the mentum, right? Huh? The mind. And mentum, you know, kind of as part of meaning just the reason, right? Includes the will, usually. And I mean.

[16:24] But there are some virtues also of the irrational parts, right? They can use more irrationality in them, as the philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics. Therefore, not every virtue is a good quality of the mind.

[16:41] But maybe they partake of reason, right? Of course, it's a question of how you exactly use the word "mensura the idea of measurement. However,

[16:56] rectitude seems to pertain to what justice, right? Because he's considering now this part of the definition: recte vivitur, right? By which one lives rightly. For the same are said to be. Right and just. Yeah. But justice is a species of virtue, right? Therefore, you don't define the genus by the species, right? Therefore, unsuitably is right put in the definition of virtue when it's said by which one lives rightly.

[17:33] I think he took pleasure in coming up with these objections. Moreover, whoever takes pride about something uses that thing badly, right? But many superbiunt virtute. Many are proud of their virtue, right?

[17:56] Augustine say about the the chaste virgins at this time they were proud, and then they fell into sin, right? Then they they had this pride, right?

[18:09] So, for Augustine says in the rule that pride enters even into good works, right? That they might perish, right? That's the thing, horrible thing about pride that it can rise even from something what good, huh? Yeah, that's a famous passage from a letter. It says down here that where he says the three most important things in spiritual life are first humility, second humility, third humility. The reason is because pride can insinuate itself in every good work we do except humility.

[18:38] Yeah. That's the reason why. Yeah, but see, Dion said that he always had to watch for pride because he understood Thomas better than anybody else, so that there's an occasion of pride for him, right? Huh? So, it's false, therefore, that no one uses virtue badly, right? The pride uses virtue badly. That's a subtle one, right? Yeah. Moreover, man is justified through virtue. But Augustine says, upon those words of John, "You would do greater things than these, right?

[19:17] " Who created you? Without you, will not justify you. Without you. Therefore, Unde sic it said that virtue is worked by God in us without us.

[19:30] There's a large number of objections for the Summa. Right, usually about three objections. Huh? He's getting carried away. Too much fun. Yeah. His wrestling was more fun than a human being is allowed to have.

[19:48] But against this is the authority of Augustine, right? From whose words the virtus definition is collected, and especially in the second book on free judgment.

[20:03] Who is Thomas quoted in these things? You know, besides Aristotle and Augustine, mainly. You know, Cicero comes in a little bit. You know, but but this mainly Augustine and Aristotle.

[20:20] These guys. I answer it should be said that this definition perfectly gives us the whole meaning of virtue, right? For the perfect meaning of anything is gathered or brought together from all its causes.

[20:45] Now the foresaid definition comprehends all the causes of virtue. Now the formal cause of virtue, just as of anything, is taken from its genus and from its difference.

[21:06] And so he gets the formal cause when he says "qualitas what bona." For the genus of virtue is quality, and the difference what good.

[21:20] It would be nevertheless more suitable a definition if, in place of quality, took what habit. Have a number one of Augustine get away with that? Very, very relevant. A modest suggestion. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. When Thomas disagrees sometimes with Albert the Great, you know, he says someone said this, you know, but doesn't mention that it's Albert who said it, right?

[21:47] If, in place of quality, habit replaced, which is the genus propinquo, right then. Okay. In fact, defining square as a plain figure or a rectilineal figure, not defining it by quadrilateral, which is its genus, right? That's its proximate proximate genus, huh?

[22:09] Okay, we'll get to Augustine get away with that law. Defect. Virtue does not have a material ex qua from which, right? Just as neither other what accidents, huh? But it has a matter about which, and a matter in which, to wit, its subject. Right. Now, the matter about which is is the object of virtue. Right.

[22:44] And this could not have been placed in the force of definition, in that by the object is determined the species of the virtue. Right.

[22:53] Here, however, is assigned the definition of virtue in general. Whence there is placed the subject in place of the what material cause, when it is said that it is a good quality of the what mind. Right.

[23:14] Now, the end of virtue, since it is a operative habit, will be the operation itself. Now, it should be known that. Of operative habits, some are always for the bad, as vicious habits, right? Others are sometimes toward the good and sometimes towards the bad, as opinion has itself to what true and false, huh?

[23:44] Thomas, in his commentary on the sixth book of the Ethics, here he says, "Opinion and suspicion are not virtues, right? Because sometimes opinion is what false, and even more so, it's in suspicion nothing false, right? "

[24:01] But virtue is a habit semper, always having itself to the what good, huh? That's of being understood per se, right? Huh? Okay. So my wisdom, as such, is always what for the good, right? Pride in wisdom, I could be proud of my wisdom or something like that, right? Okay.

[24:27] And therefore, that one might discern virtue or distinguish virtue from those things which always have themselves to the bad, he says, qua recte vivitur, by which one lives what rightly. That, or one might discern it from those things which have themselves sometimes to the good, sometimes the bad. He says, which no one uses what badly, right? When this to separate virtue from the power too, right? Because you can use your power badly, or you know, as well as well.

[25:03] Now, the efficient cause of the infused virtue, about which the definition is given, that's what he says there, virtus infusa, right? So he's not talking about the virtues that Aristotle talked about in the Ethics, right? Huh? Because they're not infused virtues, right? Huh? The English philosophers, you know, objected to the word infused, right?

[25:26] Being too sensible, right? You know, poured in, you know, you know, yeah, this is an infused virtue, right? You know. If it was wine, it would be a real infused. Yeah, I had a little bit of virtue in. And the kind which is said, which God in us, without us, works, right? Huh?

[25:46] Which part of the definition is be taken away? The rest of the definition would be common to all virtues, right? To both acquired and infused, right? Okay.

[26:01] Now, let's go back to the first objection. Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that that which first falls into the understanding is what being, right? Huh?

[26:21] Whence to each thing grasped by us. we attribute that it is being, right? That something, right? And consequently, that it be one and good, which are convertible with what being.

[26:42] Aristotle, in the what fourth book of wisdom, right, shows the convertibility of being and one, right. But then, you know, in the ninth book, he brings out thing about the good, right.

[26:58] Once we say that the essence is both being and one and good, right, and that unity is both being and one and what good, and similarly about goodness itself.

[27:16] But this does not have place in special forms as what Whiteness and health, like an example I was giving there, right? Huh? So we don't say that health is healthy, right? But that the body is healthy by health, right?

[27:36] For not everything that we grasp do we grasp under the notion of white and and healthy, right? Huh? But nevertheless, it ought to be considered that accidents and forms that do not exist by themselves, right, are not subsistent, are said to be beings, not because they have being, but because by them something is, right? So also they are said to be good or one, not by some other goodness or unity, but because by them something is good or what one, right?

[28:20] So wisdom is good because by wisdom I am wise. If I wasn't wise, the wisdom wouldn't be really good. Thus, therefore, a virtue is said to be good because by it something is what good, right?

[28:44] Now, to the second, should be said that good that is placed in the definition of virtue. This is the objection that said, "Hey, that's too common. The difference can't be more common than the what genus, right? " Well, Thomas solves it by saying that it's not the same good we're talking about there. The good that is placed in the definition of virtue is not bonum commune, right?

[29:08] The one that is convertible with being, and is in more, et ultra more, right? It's the common way of saying et in plus, right? It's in more, right? ultra more than quality, but it's the good of what reason, right? Huh? According as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names. That the good of the soul is to be in accordance with reason. That's a very solid thing, huh?

[29:35] Dionysius says that, huh? Okay. Now, and I used to say to students, you know, what's a good human act? How does that mean? Caring. He cares. A good human act is a reasonable human act, right? That's what it is. You want to say the one word, right?

[30:02] What's a good love? It's a reasonable love, right? Okay. What's a good fear? A reasonable fear, right? Some things you should be afraid of. You afraid of a suicide bomber? Yeah. And it can be a good anger, right? A reasonable anger, right?

[30:25] But it can be an unreasonable anger, right? This is what Dionysius is teaching us. But. Aristotle teaches us that too, right? That's what you come across in the first reading. The Nicomachean Ethics is a boy, you know, was convinced, right? So impressed, I remember memorizing a passage there from the Nicomachean Ethics there, about living in accordance with reason. My father said, "What are you doing?" My father came by.

[31:04] That's very serious. I'm saying, okay. Sound okay here, man? My my cousin and my, who was a philosophy major too, you know, taught philosophy. But he and my brother got Uncle Jim, you know, there in the college, you know, to reading the Nicomachean Ethics, you know, you thought it made sense, you know, you know, just not the, you know, inaccessible to the, you know, good minders.

[31:32] If you went to college, you probably have impediment to reading a journal. Too much common sense, right? Stuff about you know, you know, homosexual marriage and so on. It's supposed to common sense, right? But they care about each other. They care. Jesus, Mary, Joseph. That's my my somebody wrote an email the other day about that. We shouldn't try to make the gay people straight, you know. And I said, well, we should try to make them Christian first.

[32:09] I agree with you. We should try to make them Christian first. The rest will take care of itself. Now, what about the third objection there?

[32:23] That's in terms of now, what being in those powers that are common, right? Now, some virtues are of the irrational parts, right? But the famous distinction there between. The part of the soul that is essentially reasonable, right, and the part of the soul that is not essentially reasonable but can partake of of reason, right? Okay.

[32:47] I was driving up to Quebec one time and had a new car, you know. And I said, I think I'll take a little different route this way, and go up the the main, you know, and so on, and get to the thing there. The route to President Kennedy, right? The route to President Kennedy. So I'm running boot. Well, it's a very bad road, and there were potholes, you know.

[33:10] So I was going kind of, but slowly, right? So you get one of these crazy French drivers behind you, you know, who didn't like the fact I was going slow, you know. So finally, gets so disgusted, roars by me, you know, and of course he kicks up a stone. I could hear it hit the side of the car, and I knew that it's going to leave a nice little mark there. You know, but uh, I could ask, I'm a philosopher, what do I care.

[33:29] you know? Yeah, don't let it disturb your tranquility. Yeah, yeah. The time I was going into assumption, you know, and and the guy had stopped at the stop thing there, and I came up behind him, and I could see this car coming down there. So lady driver, young and thing, I just braced myself. Everyone's got to hit you know, and wham, she hit my car so hard it went into the car in front of me, you know.

[33:56] And neither of their cars could move afterwards, right? My car was still able to to move, you know, so I had to kind of move down to where they could call, you know. And I go, I might proceed to school, you know, and give my lectures, you know, without any problem. I don't care about this dumb dumb car. You saw in your rearview mirror what she was doing there.

[34:15] You know, I go certain route to to church in the you know the morning, wasn't I go to the 8: 30 mass, and these women they come down the middle of the road, they seem like they own the road, you know. And so I always stay well to the right, you know, because I know it's going to be a woman, and it's not a man; it's always a woman.

[34:39] That's only inductive reasoning, Doctor. It's inductive, and you haven't proven anything. Just happens that way in your neighborhood. So virtue is not able to be in the irrational part of the soul, except insofar as it partakes of what reason, right?

[35:05] And therefore, reason or what mens, right, is the proper subject of human virtue, right? When he when he gets to temperance and fortitude, he'll argue that the virtue, the habit, is in like if you give us the habit. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, insofar as it partakes reason, but if that's where it is, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's not in the mind. Yeah, yeah. When he he quote I used a quote the other day, the brothers were talking about chastity.

[35:37] He quotes from Augustine, Saint Thomas. He says chastity is not a virtue of the body, but of the soul. That's what he said. It would be in the appetite. Yeah. Perfecting. But I think mens there means I don't think it's limited to reason, meaning reason, the intellectual. power. it just really means the soul in general because it partakes of reason. It includes there. You know, I always say if you listen to music of Mozart, right, which is representation of the emotions, right?

[36:09] That's the best example of how the emotions can partake of reason, right? But like that thing, you know, asked this article, did you know the one? Yeah. And since the thing that's good about Mozart's music and the music of the Baroque too, right, is it represents the emotions. In harmony with what reason, right? And and you get to romantic period, you get a little bit of revolt there, right?

[36:34] You know, and as Arceli says, you know, the one thing Romantic will not admit is that the reason, the emotions should be subject to the reason. it seems to them, Got to indulge the emotions and so on. And you get the later people; they're really crazy, right?

[36:52] We were driving the car the other day, my wife and I, and and Prokofiev's classical symphony came on. You know, of course, the story I heard was when they were saying, "to him, "Why don't you write more like these other guys?" So he wrote the classical symphony, which is a little bit satirical, you know, but it's kind of a nice little piece of it nevertheless. you know, but so you know what an immensely talented man Prokofiev was.

[37:12] You know, but just born the wrong century. You know, I told you the story. You know, where I was kind of interested in music of Prokofiev, and I was going to listen to one of his quartets. You know, the music room of the Saint Paul Public Library. And you know, you make you write. You know, if you open, you just sign your name, and then you go in there, right?

[37:34] You can hear whatever you want. It's in the collection of the library. So I was in there, and the girls at the desk and so on. and It's a sound fu fum, but you can hear the kind of thing. I hadn't been there very long listening to Prokofiev, and the girl comes in and she thought I had it on the wrong speed. I just laughed. I said, "I said, you're doing some Prokofiev in here."

[37:57] It didn't sound right to her, you know. That's common sense, right? You know. I first heard in that room though, you know, Mozart's thirty-six symphony, right? It was one of these beautiful days with the blue skies, puffy, powerful clouds, you know, and so. And someone said, you know, if all that survived, Mozart was the was the introduction there to the thirty-six symphony. You know, would be enough to establish his greatness.

[38:28] You know, it's such an impressive thing, you know. And you realize he's representing, you know, magnanimity, you know, like he does later on in the Jupiter, which is also in C major, right? He uses that key for for representing magnanimity, magnanimity.

[38:46] But then you realize that the emotions can partake of reason, right? If you listen to this crazy, you know, rock and roll stuff, you might wonder, you know, and something could be without reason, you know. But Mozart,

[39:01] beautiful, beautiful. Okay. Now he says, "Is proper justice is proper the rectitude, right, which is constituted about exterior things which come into the use of man, right, which are the proper matter of what justice, right?" But the rectitude which implies an order to a suitable end and to the divine law, which is the rule of the human will, is common to every virtue. Right. So the idea of rectus is broader than just justice, right?

[39:44] Right and wrong, right? You would speak of right lines, right? I think it's we call a straight line. they call rectus. Now, to the fifth, it should be said that someone can use virtue badly as a what? Object, right? Huh? As when he senses badly about virtue, as as when he what? Hates it. That's one way, right? Okay. Or when he is what? Proud about it, right?

[40:28] Huh? Okay. Not, however, in the beginning of its use. That what? The act of virtue itself. Yeah, yeah. To give alms. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But for the wrong reason or something. Yeah, yeah. But you could say it's accidental in a sense, right? Huh? Okay.

[41:00] Woman's beauty, huh? Or woman's modesty can be an object of what? Lust, right? Huh? That's per accidens, right? Huh? The beauty itself, as such, is not bad, right?

[41:21] God made it beautiful to catch a man, anyway, right? Let's do it last night. You know, he's going to get married on New Year's Eve, right? Huh? And so that's a proper quote from Shakespeare. you know. How can my sides hold to think that man, that knows by history, report his own proof what woman is. Yea what she cannot choose but must be, right? Wills free hours languish for shared bondage.

[41:47] So, so Iachimo says in in Cymbeline, right? And later on in Cymbeline of course, when Cymbeline realizes how evil is his wife, right? He says, and he's surprised to realize, "Who ist can read a woman, right? Yeah, yeah. " A magnificent uh Yeah. Great play. You know they explain intus legere in Latin about to read within, right? Intelligere, right? So I mean, Shakespeare has that kind of a connection to, where you speak in the Latin, right?

[42:21] Who ist can read a woman? Yeah Well, we see that sometimes, you know, you can read somebody. Well, we see that sometimes you can read somebody's character. Or even when we say like Padre Pio. he could read hearts. He could read hearts. Oh yeah, yeah. I read stories about someone in confession? you know, he's not telling, telling the thing you know that he did, and yeah, he he'd be very severe with the man.

[42:46] You know, he's he's just read a book about how many guys he kicked out of the confession. Yeah, yeah. One after the other, get out of here. I'd first heard, you know, that after the war there's some of the American soldiers who try and go to confession to him, you know, because, you know, I suppose like you might go to the the Curé of Ars right? You know, you know you're getting yeah cleansed.

[43:10] Yeah, yeah, yeah. Must we stop there rather than begin the question 50? Can we do the 6 objections Oh, oh, excuse me. You're not used to doing. that many Oh yeah I'm tired of the week

[43:32] To the sixth, it should be said that infused virtue is caused in us by God, without us doing something right, but not, however, without us. Consent. Consent. It's interesting. He says that, right?

[43:48] Aristotle talks, you know, about virtues that are gotten by repeated what acts, right? And this is to be understood that when it said that God in us, without us, works, right?

[44:03] Because those things which are what done by us, God caused in us, not without us acting, right? For He operates in every will, in every what nature.

[44:20] We're getting closer to virtue. So we get to the subject of virtue. For the premium, let's look at the proemium here Then we have to consider about the subject of virtue, and about this six things asked.

[44:36] First, whether virtue is in the power of the soul as in a what subject, right? See, where is that geometry just floating around my head or somewhere? Now my geometry is in power of my soul, right? My reason. Second, whether one virtue can be in many powers. I wouldn't think it could be, would you?

[45:05] But there might be a connection, right, between like foresight and temperance and right. Memory and temperance What they call the foolhardy man, you know, shows there's some connection there between the vice and opposition to reason, right? The particular particular reason, but you probably see you make distinctions on this. Third, whether the understanding is able to be the subject of virtue, right? I got logic up there, and I got geometry up there.

[45:34] I got arithmetic up there. I've got some natural philosophy, or the wisdom of nature, as Shakespeare calls it. Even some wisdom up there, right? Some theology, right? All kinds of virtues up in my reason, right? Maybe a little bit of foresight. I don't know much too much of that. I was reading about MacArthur there. You know, he really had foresight there when he, you know, was head of Japan there after the war.

[46:01] kept the Russians out. You know, they're trying to get in all the time. It would have made a mess. Like Germany, you know, they would have divided it up like that, you know, and they would have. But like Korea, you know, they would have made a mess of the whole thing. Of course, you know, sometimes they were even threatening to invade, you know, and MacArthur says, I'll take the Russian embassy here and lock them all up.

[46:21] The guy says. I believe you would. He said, "That's the way to handle the Russians, you know, huh? You know, It's like you know, with Patton in Europe. there, you know, the Russians were complaining about something about the use of the boats or something like that, you know, and and and he just got you know into a fit. He simply got fit, and then Russian, you know, ran out, you know, and he turned to his things.

[46:46] How was that for performance? He said, 'He was perfect. ' Then he scared the wits out of the guy, you know, huh? You know, he gets his gun out. You know, he's like, 'It's

[46:58] the guy turned around and said, 'I believe you would. ' He didn't pursue the matter anymore. Whether the what irascible and concupiscible can be the subject of virtue, right? Third, whether the sense apprehending powers, the eye, ear, can they be? And then last of all, the will. right, Interesting, he puts the will last, right? Because when Plato talked about these, what did he talk about?

[47:35] He had he had reason up here, and he had what the irascible here, and then he had temperance down here, right? Now, and then he had no place left for justice, right? Now, so justice was kind of the ordering of all this, right? But actually, justice belongs in the what the will, right? Now, so in a sense, he didn't see the will as a distinct subject there, a distinct virtue, right?

[48:01] They did see the irascible as being the subject of what courage, right? Now, and temperance, of the concupiscible, right? Now, of course, Aristotle begins. He begins in the third book. The first two virtues he talks about are fortitude and what temperance, right? And then justice doesn't come in until the fifth book, right? So Thomas is still following his master Aristotle here. Interestingly, he takes the will last, huh?

[48:31] You might think he put that first, right? Yeah. So I'm going to stop there.