Prima Secundae
133. Aquinas on the Subject of Virtue (ST I-II q.56, aa.1–3): Virtue in the Powers of the Soul, and Why Faith and Foresight Are Virtues Simply
Class of 2013-10-03
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/133-aquinas-on-the-subject-of-virtue-st-i-ii-q-56-aa-1-3-virtue/

[0:00] Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray for us and help us to understand all that you have written. Name of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. So we'll look at the premium here again from the subject of virtue.

[0:38] Then we ought to consider about the subject of virtue, and about this six things are asked. First, whether virtue is in the powers of the soul, right, as in a subject.

[0:54] Secondly, whether one virtue is able to be in many powers. Then it gets down to individual powers, huh? And third, whether the understanding can be the subject of virtue. Now, why should there be a question about that? We'll see. It's most interesting article in some ways. Fourth, whether the irascible and the concupiscible, right? huh Thumos and epithumia in Greek, huh? As the sense, desiring powers, huh? Fifth, whether the sensitive, grasping powers, huh?

[1:31] The aversions them. And fourth, with I mean six rather, whether the will itself, right? Okay. No, so the first one proceeds thus: It seems that virtue is not in the power of the soul, as in a subject. For Augustine says in the second book on free judgment that virtue is that by which one lives rightly. But to live is through a power of the what? Is not through a power of the soul, but through its what?

[2:08] Essence. There's an equivocation here in the word "to live," right? And therefore, virtue is not in the power of the soul, but in its very essence. Moreover, the philosopher says in the second book of the Nicomachean Ethics that virtue is what makes its haver what good, and his work or operation renders it good.

[2:36] But just as the opus is what constituted through the power, so the one having the virtue is constituted through the essence of the soul. Therefore, virtue does not more pertain to the power of the soul than to its what essence, huh? We got to know those categories, you know. Moreover, potency is in the second species of quality, huh?

[3:03] Virtue is a certain quality. It's the first species and the first species of quality, habit or disposition. But of quality, there is not a quality, right? Therefore, virtue is not in a power of the soul, as in a subject, right?

[3:21] But against this, he says is what Aristotle says in the book on the universe that virtue is the ultimum of what, the power. But the ultimate of something is in that which it is the ultimate. Therefore, virtue is in the power of the soul. You repeat that as the first argument in the body of the what article, right? So Thomas says, I answer it should be said that virtue pertains to a power of the soul can be made manifest from three things.

[3:52] He's got the reading a chapter in Summa Contra Gentiles. There's eleven arguments, right? Usually the Suma, you know, he he cuts it off at three, right? So doesn't stretch here. memorative powers. First, from the very definition of virtue, which implies a perfection of what, power, right? But a perfection is in that of which it is the perfection. That's going back to the ultimum potentia, right?

[4:27] Secondly, from something else we showed before that it is a operative habit, right? Huh? But every operation is from the soul through some what, power, right? So when we study the soul, we point out that the powers are not the same thing as the soul, right? They're like properties of it.

[4:48] And third, from this, that it disposes toward the what best. But the best is the end, which is either the operation of the thing, or in the case of making something achieved through the operation, proceeding from a what power. So if it's the ultimate of, it's going to have to be in the what power of the soul as in a what subject, right?

[5:14] Now he replies to the first objection by pointing out the two senses in which to live is what used, right? Now to to live is said in two ways. It's taken in two ways. Sometimes to live is taken to mean the existence, the being, the to be of the one living, right? Okay, that's what sense of life when you say you died, right? Okay, body is dead, right?

[5:45] And thus it pertains to the essence of the soul, which is the beginning of being for the one what living. In another way, to live is said to be the operation of the one living, right? And thus, by virtue, one is said to live rightly. Insofar as through the virtue, someone operates rightly. I was reading Thomas there in the Summa Contra Gentiles, where he's talking about God being, what, life itself, right?

[6:16] Of course, he uses both, huh? Because God's being, right, is God, I am who I am, right? And God's operation of understanding and so on is what God is doing, right? It's not something added unto the substance, right? So he argues from both senses of to live that he has here to God being what, life itself, right? His substance is his being, and his substance is his operation, right?

[6:44] So his substance is life itself. Those distinctions are made by Aristotle too in the books on the soul. Okay, that's the most common mistake, right? I was asking the students last night. I said, "Can you think without words? "

[7:09] Well, if you can, in some way, it's kind of imperfect, you know. Do you know what you you think? Not only do other people not know what you think if you can't say it in words, but do you know yourself what you think if you can't say what you think? And but notice, most common kind of mistake is the mistake from equivocation, right?

[7:34] To the second, it should be said that the good is either the end, right? That's the fundamental meaning. That's why Aristotle says, "If you do away with the cause called end, you do away with the good." No little thing, he says. Or, in secondary way, it is said in order to the end. Okay. So in the Our father, the first two petitions ask for the what, end, and the second one, the means, which one is ordered to the end, right?

[8:08] And then you have the ones that deal with impediments to the end. And therefore, since the good of the one doing consists in his doing, right? The good of the one operating consists in his operation. This also is what what. Makes him do what? It is the virtue makes him do a good. Yeah. It refers to the operation and consequent to the power from which the operation what proceeds, huh?

[8:44] So even though it goes back, and you say the man is is good, it's because of his what, virtue and his operating powers. Now the last one, this is a question that comes up a lot. Can one accident be the subject of another accident? And the distinction Thomas always makes is this one here. To the third, it should be said: the one accident is said to be in another, as in a subject, not because an accident, through itself or by itself, can sustain another accident, right?

[9:17] But because one accident exists in substance by means of what? Another accident. As color belongs to the body by the surface, yeah. Whence the surface is said to be the subject of what? Color.

[9:38] And in this way, the power of the soul is said to be the subject of virtue. The second article gets more interesting. Go along here. No, the third article is really important.

[9:51] Got to see the first and two. To the second, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that one virtue is able to be in two powers. Of course, Thomas in the body of the article is going to say, in some way, this is possible, but not simply, right? For a habit is known. For habits, they're known through their what acts, right? But one acts goes forward in diverse ways from diverse powers, as walking proceeds from reason, as what directs us, right?

[10:27] From the will, as what moves us, and by the motive power, as what carries out the thing. Therefore, one habit of virtue is able to be in many powers. That seems to be so, but distinction you're not seeing there. Moreover, the philosopher says in the second book of the ethics, it's Nicomachean Ethics. There's actually three books come down in ethics from Aristotle, but Thomas comment on the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, and then they call it the Magna Moralia.

[11:02] And there, you know, Nicomachean Ethics is probably the most basic, but there are some things in the other ones too, especially about the influence of God upon your will. Michael Aristotle saw that.

[11:21] What book is that? What book is that in The Eudemian Ethics. Okay. Thomas would refer to that too. Moreover, the philosopher says in the second book of the ethics, but they're referring to Nicomachean Ethics in all these cases right now, that for virtue three things are required: to know, to will, and to act immobiliter, right?

[11:49] But to know pertains to the understanding, to will to the to the will. Therefore, a virtue can be in many what powers. There's some element of truth in these things, right? But there's distinction that should be seen. Moreover, prudence, and what's the English word for prudence? Foresight. Yeah, Winston Churchill uses, and Berquist uses, right? Foresight.

[12:23] But you know, Thomas, you know, says that prudencia comes from providencia in Latin, right? So providencia is given as what integral part of prudence, right? Because the principal part gives its name to the whole thing. But you can see there with with providencia that foresight is the English word for it.

[12:47] Moreover, prudence or foresight is in reason, since it is right reason about things to be done, huh? As is said in the sixth book of the ethics, huh? Why art is right reason about things to be made, huh?

[13:05] But is also in the will, because it is not able to be when with a what perverse will, right? As is said in the same book. Therefore, one virtue is able to be in two what powers.

[13:20] But against this, virtue is in the what powers of the soul is in a subject. But the same accident is not able to be in many what subjects. Subjects. Therefore, one virtue is not able to be in many powers of the soul, right?

[13:41] Well, Thomas has to see distinction here, right? That's the first thing the mind has to see is distinction, right? So Thomas quotes Anaxagoras, right? huh? the first guy like the sober man? Aristotle said, talked about the mind, right? With the mind to what distinguish things, right? So that's characteristic of the mind, right? We've spoken of how distinction is presupposed to what order, right?

[14:17] So something can be in two things in two ways. In one way, thus that ex equo, equally, you might say, right? It is in both, huh? And in this way, it is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers. That's the reason he gives now, right? Because the diversity of powers is to be what noted according to general or more universal conditions of the objects, right?

[14:55] But the diversity of habits according to what special or less universal, right? Okay. So you might say, you know, the object of reason maybe is truth. Let's say in general, right? But of geometry, it's the truth about lines and angles and figures, right? Arithmetic, it's the truth about numbers, right? Natural philosophy, truth, right? So the object of the different habits come under the more general object of the whole what power, right?

[15:26] Okay. Whence, wherever there is a diversity of powers, there is a diversity of habits, right? But not reverse, right? Okay. A little bit like the genus and species, therefore, right? Huh? You don't have dog and what two different genera unless one genera is above the other one, right? Huh? Okay. But that's why you know the word predicamenta there that they use in Latin, huh? Derived as word predicament, huh?

[16:03] It kind of used to be fond of that English thing, right? It wasn't meant to be in a predicament. It's a situation you can't really get out of, right? What you do? There's no way to get out of this damn situation. And this is the way: if you're in the genus of substance, like a man or a dog or a tree, you can't get out and go into the genus of quality, let's say, right?

[16:26] Huh? And if you're, you know, the number seven, you're in the genus of quantity. You're stuck. You just can't get out and wander around and be a quality or be a relation, right? You know. If you're double, you're stuck in relation, right? Towards another, right?

[16:48] In another way, and this is the way in which there's an element of truth, right? Of course, as Aristotle says and Thomas says, you know, in probable opinions, you know, in probable arguments, there's always some element of the truth, right? And this is the element of truth now. In another way, is able for something to be in two or even more, none ex equal, right? not as we're equally, but in a certain order, right?

[17:18] And thus one virtue pertains or is able to pertain to many powers. Thus that it be in one, chiefly, right? This is the English word, principally, huh? And it extends itself to others, either through the what, by way of diffusion, right?

[17:40] Or by way of what, disposition, huh? According as one power is moved by another, and that's the idea of diffusion, right? And according to what, disposition? According as one power takes from another, right? Okay. So my memory takes from my senses, right? Okay. And we'll see as we go on. It gets very interesting now. How one takes from another, right? But also how one diffuses or pours itself over the others, right?

[18:15] And so he applies then to the first objection that it should be said that the same act cannot what equally and in the same order pertain to diverse powers, right? But according to what? Different reasons. Yeah. And in a diverse what order, right? Huh? You got to look before and after, right? Okay. Not looking before and after, you're not using your reason, right?

[18:47] To the second, it should be said that to know is presupposed to what moral virtue, right? Insofar as moral virtue operates according to right reason, huh? But essentially in desiring. Moral virtue, what consists, right? Okay. So when you have a good desire, right, or or good love, right, it's got to be a reasonable what love, right? But it's still essentially a love, right, or desire.

[19:25] Now, to the third, it should be said, and this will come out more in the next article. Foresight or prudence really is in reason as in a what subject, but it presupposes the rectitude of the will as a what beginning. And Aristotle's going to say this about you know, the moral virtues are presupposed to prudence because they give them the kind of the foundation for it, right?

[19:52] Unless I want to eat moderately, my reason is not going to figure out how much is too much, right? And I see this with people who drink too much, right? Right, huh? You know, and the wife is trying to get the husband not to you know drink so much, right, huh? Oh, I only had a couple of lousy beers, right? Well, he's not denying he's not denying the principle, right, that you shouldn't drink too much, right?

[20:15] But he just can't judge how much is too much, right? And because his his desire to drink is what, yeah, unreasonable. Yeah. Guy worked within the package store there, you know. He was saying you know trouble with drinking, he says, is that once you start to drink, you lose your ability to judge how much is too much, right? Because he told a funny story about this guy.

[20:39] You know, he went to the the banquet that they have for the package stores, you know, and knows the old days. He had a lot of drinking, you know. There was people, you know, giving free drinks and so on. And he went to the bathroom, I guess, and he couldn't figure out how to unlock the bathroom thing, right? So his his fellow workers found that he's in there, and so they pushed the guy over the top, he don't down to lock the door because he was too drunk.

[21:06] I mean, was it was it Noah? You know, got you know got used to it, right? No. Yeah, and you know, I was quoting Augustine there, you know, about the perverse and immature love of reason, right? Well, you could say that Noah didn't have a perverse love of wine, but he had an immature love. He wasn't experienced, right? He didn't realize, you know, the you know how it didn't hitch you all at once, and maybe else he doesn't hit you too much, you know.

[21:42] And he was a little embarrassed there. I mean, his kids had to cover him up and so on. And trying to, he's a good man, Noah. You know, so we're not gonna see his perverse love of wine, but

[21:57] okay. Now, Article Three, right? Now, this is really a very important article. To the third, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the understanding is not the subject of virtue, right? This presupposes the understanding now of what we said in the second article, right? He's going to spell it out in terms of reason. For Augustine says in the book on the morals of the church that every virtue is love, but a narrow-minded mind.

[22:37] But the subject of love is not the understanding, right? But only the desiring what power. Therefore, no virtue is in the understanding, right? Yeah. Here Augustine's saying that, and Aristotle says, you know, that human virtues divide into moral virtues and the virtues of reason, right? Intellectual virtues, well, these great minds, you know. Disagree? What can you say, right? It's like my brother Mark was maintaining, you know, that you know, noir is the greatest grape in the world, and Warren Murray was maintaining Cabernet Sauvignon.

[23:09] They say when these two experts are in disagreement, it was a poor man like me, you know. So, in fact, my brother Mark's early position, you know, they needed for a perpetual seminar on this question. Generation, generation. I keep on testing both of them, you know, and so he was in favor of perpetual seminars. Never arrived at a final conclusion, but he accepted this case. Exception that proves the rule.

[23:36] But there is some element of truth in what Augustine is saying, right? You know, didn't he see these other things? Augustine, the guy, really wants to understand what he believes, even right. So, level on other things.

[23:57] I guess one of the reasons why Augustine began to be suspicious of the Manicheans was that they were what? Didn't know the liberal arts, right? So how could they know it? These higher things didn't know lower things, right? Moreover, virtue is ordered to the good, as is clear from the things said above. But the good is not an object of the understanding, but of the desiring power.

[24:22] Therefore, the subject of virtue is not the understanding, but the desiring what power, right? Moreover, virtue is what makes its habet good. That's part of the definition, right? As the philosopher says, but the habit perfecting the understanding does not make the one what having it good, and does not make good the one having it. Ah, for an account of science or art, a man is not said to be what good, right?

[24:58] Therefore, the understanding is not the what subject of what virtue. So we're thoroughly confused now, right? You know, teacher, because I could say it's a business of the teacher to confuse the issue, but he meant that in a sense you know even that sense, you know, see, there is some difficulty here, right?

[25:22] But against this is that men, the mind, most of all, is said to be the what understanding, right? But the subject of virtue is the mind, is is clear from the definition of virtue, induced above. That was a definition of Augustine, I think, one of qualitas mentis, right? Or the mind, everything else is reason, right? The understanding. Therefore, the under so Augustine is in contradiction with himself, right?

[25:51] Therefore, and the understanding is the subject of what virtue, yeah. We're going to meet that formidable kind of distinction called the distinction of simpliciter and secundum quid in this article, right? You've already seen that kind of distinction many times. I answer: It should be said that it has been said above. Virtue is a habit by which someone operates well, right?

[26:26] But in two ways, huh? Is some habit ordered to a what good act? In one way, in so far as through a habit of this sort, a man acquires the ability, the faculty, for a good act, right? Just as through the habit of grammar, a man has the faculty of what Speaking rightly.

[26:54] But grammar does not, however, make that a man will always what speak rightly, huh? So I can say you, you is my students, and I are your teacher. Okay.

[27:14] For a grammarian can what speak like a barbarian, yeah, or make a Solicism, which is a a grammatical mistake, right? And the same reason is in the other sciences and arts, right? So the cook knows when he can what ruin the steak by cooking it too much, right? And putting too much seasoning on something, right? You know, you can, you know, they always talk about one time when Daddy put too much pepper in the soup, you know, and I did so ignorantly, right?

[27:50] Not through art, right? In another way, a habit not only gives one the what faculty of acting, but also makes that one uses that faculty rightly, huh? Just as justness not only makes that a man be of prompt will to doing just things, but also it makes that he in fact operates what justly, right? Okay.

[28:23] So notice the difference between justice then and what and the art of grammar, right, huh? The art of grammar enables me to speak correctly, but it doesn't necessarily incline me to speak correctly, right? But the virtue of justice not only incline it makes me able to do what is just, but it inclines me to actually do it, right, huh?

[28:52] Now, and because good, just as being, is not said simply something according to that which is in. Potency or an ability, but according to what act? What does that mean, right? Well, if I, you know, say to you, "Are there chairs and tables and doors and the trees out here in the campus?" Would you say so? Without qualification, simply. No qualification. You'd say that they are what out there?

[29:32] Maybe an ability, right now. There's something in the tree that is able to be a chair or a table or a door, right? But you wouldn't say simply, would you?

[29:45] And in a sense, you know, the early Greek philosophers couldn't quite explain this, right now, because they said, you know, that everything that comes out of matter must already be in there, right? Is that so?

[29:59] And Socrates kind of makes this mistake in the Meno there, right? When he says that the slave boy already knew how to square, how to double rather, the size of a square. As a matter of fact, when he was first asked, he said you double the side, right? You get a square twice as big, sounds good, doesn't it?" And Socrates has a conversation where he shows him that if you double the side, you actually get a square four times as big, right?

[30:25] And then he asks him, you know, questions, and the slave boy gradually comes to understand that the diagonal would be the side of a square twice as big. He puts together four squares, you know, and the diagonal is going to be half of each of those, right? So it's going to be twice as big, right? The square on top of the diagonal. And Socrates says, "I didn't teach him, you know.

[30:50] But did the slave boy in the beginning know? Actually, no. In fact, he was mistaken. He's so far from knowing, you know. He didn't say, 'I don't know. ' He said, 'You double the side. '

[31:03] And so he's mistaken, right? So Socrates is making the mistake of simply knowing. simply. And it's a secundum quid right? Simply and not simply, or simply and in some way, but a diminished way, right?

[31:28] That's a very common mistake, right? And of course Meno himself makes that mistake before, right? Because he says, "How can you direct yourself to what you don't know?" I told you the simple example I give in class sometimes is: I don't know how many students are in class today, right? But I'm awfully smart, and I can direct myself with the greatest ease to knowing that, right? And I count them.

[31:53] Let's say I get twenty-four, right? How did I direct myself with so much ease to twenty-four when I didn't know I was looking for twenty-four?

[32:04] Well, I knew I was looking for the number of students in class, and twenty-four is the number of students in class, right? Though I didn't know that, but it is in fact the number of students in class. So in some way, I knew what

[32:20] I knew what I was looking for, right? In some way, is that to know simply? I told you I used to always pick on a girl, and I'd say, you know, she's going to contradict herself? but I'll see. I said, "Do you know my brother Mark?" And she'd always say, "No." And I'd say, "You know, you know what a brother is. You know what a man is.

[32:38] Yeah, Well, that's it? My brother Mark is. So you do know him, don't you?" Well, in some sense, knowing what a man is or what a brother is, you know every man and every what brother in some way, right? Okay. And if you give me a wine to drink, you say, "Now, what is this?" I said, "Well, it's a wine. Do you know what I'm drinking?"

[32:59] In general or a certain way Yeah, in some way, yeah, yeah, but but I don't know perfectly, right? And to know something in a generic way, in a sense, is to know in potency, right? Okay.

[33:13] If you know the difference between something and nothing, I say in some way you know everything. One of my students said, "I'm going to go home and tell my dad that he'll like that." He's not the Hells Professor, did he? But if you know what something is, right, in some sense you know everything, don't you? Because everything is something, right? Yeah, but that's not to know simply, but in some imperfect way, right?

[33:38] In some diminished way, right? I told you about how we tend to, you know, if you add, you know, onto a name, you know, you kind of babyfy it a little bit, you know. So you know, I know somebody's daughter was called Annette, right? Huh? And she got older; she didn't like that Annette, because it means little Anne, right? Well, now she's not little anymore, right? So she wanted to be called Anne.

[34:06] So we all started calling her Anne instead of Annette, right? Huh? But that's the way it is, right? See, it's good. Child tends to say that, right? Not dad, but daddy or something, you know.

[34:28] So, just go for the end of the paragraph again. And because good, just as being, is not said something simply according to that which is in potency, right, or in ability, but according to that which is an act. Therefore, from habits of this sort, a man is simply said to operate good and to be good, because he is what just or temperate, huh? The same reason about similar things, and because virtue is what makes its haver good and what he does good, right?

[35:02] Habits of this sort, simpliciter, right? Simply are said to be what virtues, right? Because they render the good work in act, right? And then simply they make the haver what good, right? Huh? The first habits, huh? Like the grammar, do not are not simply called virtues, right? Huh? Because they do not render the work good except in a certain what ability, right? Okay. Nor do they simply make the one having it what good, good, right?

[35:39] Huh? For one is not said simply to be good from this that he is knowing or an artist, right? But he's said only good secundum quid that he's a good grammarian or a good what. A carpenter or something, right? See. So from studying geometry, I'm now a good man because I I know some geometry. See, no, might be a good geometry though, right? Huh? See, but I'm not said to be good simply, but you have to qualify, right?

[36:13] I'm a good geometry, right? In an account of this, he says, right. Plurum plurimum, right? Many times, right. Science and art, huh? It doesn't say it's about foresight. He says science and art, right?

[36:34] Are divided against virtue, right? But sometimes they are called virtues. This is clear again in the sixth book, the Nicomachean Ethics, right? Now let's go back to that. This kind of a general thing about how names becoming equivocal by reason, right? Sometimes you have a name that is said of what two things, right? Huh? And then one of those two keeps that name that is said of both of them as its own name, right?

[37:05] Huh? And the other maybe will be given a what a new name, right? Huh? Okay. And there's two ways that takes place, right? Huh? Sometimes one of them adds something very noteworthy that stands out in addition to right the common meaning of the of the name common to both, and then that gets a new name, right? Huh? And the other one keeps the other name, right? Okay.

[37:35] But then since you have the reverse, right? Sometimes one of them has perfectly or completely what is in the common name and the meaning of common name, and the other has in some imperfect way, right? Incompletely, in potency, somewhat, as he says, what's common, right? And then it kind of loses that name and is called just a habit or something, right? Huh? Okay. So sometimes he says it's what divided against, and sometimes it's what not.

[38:09] You know, and there's all kinds of examples there. I mean, runs through philosophy, right? Huh? And and he always say, you know, priests always say, you know, now the guy treats the lady like a you know person, not as like a thing, right? So you're dividing person against thing, but yet as a person, nothing, right? No, no, see. But the word thing is being kept by these things that don't have much to say beyond their being a thing, and a person who has something very noteworthy, reason and will and so on, right?

[38:41] Huh? They get the name person, right? Huh? So this is people constantly getting confused about these things, right? Huh? So you can divide person against thing if you want to, but you can also say a person is the thing, you know. So that's that's a very common kind of equivocation. Her style of devise habit, disposition against habit, right? But sometimes we say that habit is a disposition, right?

[39:07] But because it's a disposition that is stable and and not easily moved, right? It gets a new name, habit, right? And then your mood, it could change, you know, with a cup of coffee or or a good meal or something, or that is keeps the name disposition, right? Huh? Okay. Does man have reason or understanding, right? That's a good example, right? And sometimes we say well, reason is in man is the same thing as understanding, right?

[39:37] But then sometimes we say the angels have understanding, and man has not understanding, but yeah, which they call in Latin sometimes, intellectus obumbratus right? Overshadowed, you know, reason. So when when Shakespeare defines reason, right, he defines it by looking rather than by what seeing. Right, because looking doesn't imply that you what are understanding very much, right? And he says first you have to have discourse, right? It's by discourse that you come to what understand, right?

[40:15] For the most part, huh? We understand very little, something very little, and very general, right? Without discourse, huh? But most of it is a, you know, I translate the Greek word episteme, right? Which means in Greek, you know, coming to a halt or a stop, right? But if you go back to the great Boethius there, where he says that understanding is to reasoning as rest is to what motion, right?

[40:44] So episteme, by its etymology, right, names an understanding that comes after emotion, right? So I translate episteme, which is usually translated Latin scientia, right? I translate it into a reasoned-out understanding, right? So my good teacher there, Euclid of

[41:10] Athens and Alexandria, right? He is a reasoned-out understanding of lines and angles and figures, right? And a reasoned-out understanding of numbers, right? In Book Seven, Eight, and Nine, right? So I think we're well into translating episteme, right? You don't see that all in the Latin word scientia, right? But I don't see the one word you can use to really get the sense. But both Plato and Aristotle point out that episteme, you know, comes from the word to to come to a halt or a stop, right?

[41:42] So it signifies rest or an understanding that comes after, right? But the English word understanding is really a marvelous word, right? And the word standing comes from the word standing, right? So it's like Boethius says, right? It's a kind of rest, right? But there could be understanding that's kind of in the beginning, kind of a natural understanding, right? But episteme is reasoned-out understanding. It's understanding that comes after what motion, right?

[42:16] So that's what what he emphasizes there in the definition of reason as reason, right? The ability for larger discourse, looking before and after, right? Trying to understand, right? We do understand a few things, right?

[42:40] So he says the first habits, though, right, do not simply are not called simpliciter virtues, right, huh? Because they do not render the what work good except in a certain what ability, right? Nor do they make simply the man what good, right? But he's a good geometer, or he's a good cook, right?

[43:09] For one is not said, for man is not said to be simply good, from this that he is knowing, or that he is an artist, right?

[43:20] But he's said to be good only secundum quid, as a good grammarian or a good. artist. Okay, we read that already before. Okay. So he says, the subject, therefore, of a habit, which is called a virtue secundum quid, right, is able to be the understanding, not only the practical understanding, right, but also the speculative understanding, right, without any order to the will, right, as the philosopher says in the sixth book of the Ethics.

[43:59] That's the book that's about the virtues of reason, right? So science, wisdom, and natural understanding, right, and also art, right, isn't the practical reason, are laid down to intellectual virtues, but in this what, secundum quid, right? But he's going to say something different about what prudence, and also about faith, right?

[44:32] Now the subject, however, of a habit which simpliciter is said to be virtue, right, is not able to be except the will, or some power, according as it is moved by the what will, right?

[44:52] And the reason for this is because the will moves all the other powers which are in some way what rational, right? It's going to involve even the emotions, right? He moves them to their acts. This has been had above,

[45:09] and therefore that a man in act and not just in ability, right, bene agit, acts well, happens from this that a man has a good what will, right?

[45:25] So my knowledge of the art of deception, there, these physical imitations, right, huh? I can come into class and I can what deceive the students, right, huh? And if I did that, you know, and left them in this deceived, right, then I'll be making a bad use of my what? Yeah, my knowledge, right, huh? Okay. So I'd come in and show them, you know, that the whole is not always more than the part.

[45:57] Oh, yeah. But it's by the equivocation of the word whole and part, right? I told you how I do that, right? Okay. And thus, that man in act acts well. Happens from this that man has a good will, whence the virtue which makes one act well in act, right? Not only ability is necessary that it either be in the will itself, right, or in some power, according as it is moved by the will, right?

[46:42] Now, it happens that the understanding is moved by the will, just as the other what powers. For one considers something in act in that he wants to, right? Huh? So I want to do some geometry now, right? I've been at it for a while, but.

[47:03] And therefore, the understanding, according as it has an order to the will, is able to be the subject of virtue, simpliciter dicta, right? Said simply.

[47:16] And in this way, huh, the speculative understanding or reason is the subject of what faith, huh? For the understanding is moved to assenting to those things which are faith from the command of the what will. And then he quotes the great Augustine, right? For no one believes unless he wills to do so, right?

[47:50] I suppose you have to do that to see if the pulpit is is somewhat off of the cuff remarks, right? Huh? Okay. He's just because if you know the idea of proselytizing or converting was kind of nonsense, right? Huh? Yeah. Well, the way in which there's an element of truth in that is that no one believes unless he wills, right? And so you have to. I was listening to Junior Holmes yesterday, right?

[48:17] And he was talking to a guy from Northern Ireland, there, you know, and and he had become a Catholic, right? Huh? So on, huh? But he was trying to use his reason all the time, right? Get this in, and God finally said to him, you know, you know, can't you be a fool for me, you know?

[48:37] So this is this what what he's saying, right? Huh? Okay. That's kind of a strong way of putting it, right? It is. That's the benefit of rhetoric, sometimes. I think that's what the Pope does. Somebody was explaining some of his comments not only about the proselytizing, but some of that other. Yeah, but it's a little bit like when Christ says, you know, you know, if your eye is a source, you know, if you look at pornography or something, you know, pull your eye, pull your eye out, right?

[49:08] Throw away, right? And if your hand is, you know, striking people, so cut it off, you know. As he says, doesn't he? Does he really mean that? I don't think so. You got to overcome your pornography desires, or your desire to hit somebody. I'll cut off your hand, or cut your eye. But I mean, it's kind of a kind of a shocking way, you know, in a sense, or kind of an abrupt way, you know.

[49:36] Eyebrows, but no. See, he says that the the what faith is in the speculative, looking reason, right? Because primarily its object is is God, right? God is you can't really know Him, just to know Him, right? Okay. But the practical intellect is the subject of what foresight,

[50:09] since foresight is right reason about things to be done. It is required for foresight that man has himself well towards the beginnings of the world. of the reason of what things to be done, and these are the ends to which a man has himself well through the rectitude of his will, just as to the beginnings of speculative things, the natural light of the agent intellect the things that are naturally understood, like the whole is more than a part, right?

[50:48] That's that's underlying geometry and so on, right? But underlying foresight is rectitude of the will, right, with regard to the end. So I don't want to be just to other men. I'm not going to reason. I'm going to figure out what to what to do, right? Unless I want to eat and drink moderately, I'm not going to know when I've had enough. If

[51:16] I have excessive desire to drink, right, I'm going to easily go beyond and see. I'm not. you know might even argue the policeman about it, right?

[51:39] That's what he says. A beautiful, beautiful proportion and comparison here, and therefore just as the subject of reasoned out knowledge, right, which is right reason about things to be looked at. That's how Shakespeare defines it by looking, right? Is the what speculative, the looking understanding, in order to the agent, what intellect, right, which the things that we naturally understand we naturally understand. So the subject of prudence is the practical understanding, but in order to what the right will, right?

[52:12] You see why he had the article two before this, right? Because that was kind of laying the foundation, right? That a virtue can be to some extent, in some way, in what, yeah, but not in the same way, right? And in some order between them, right? It's an order here of what the beginning of foresight is the end, right? So if your will is not, you've got to be, you got to the end, not just in a speculative way, so to speak, right?

[52:40] But you have to be inclined to be in a concrete way with the will. That's interesting. It's a beautiful text, huh? So in your final exam you're going to have a question of. What does foresight and faith have in common, right? Or why are these? Although in reason, right, why the virtues simpliciter loquendo, right? Why art and scientia and so on are not simpliciter right? Virtues, huh, it's a beautiful text, interesting.

[53:19] Aristotle saw that, you know. Aristotle insists upon that, right? If you don't have the moral virtues, you can't really have foresight, now. You can have worldly wisdom, we'd say, you know, but you can't have really the virtue of foresight, now. Isn't that in? It's either in Aristotle and/or in the commentary where the word for

[53:41] moderation of temperance refers to saving your reason or having. Yeah, so sophrosyne yeah, yeah. But you can't have the virtues without without foresight in some measure. Yeah, yeah, there concerns of the means, right? But it's kind of interesting. I used to talk to students a bit, and I'd say it's kind of subtle, you know, because you know, as as Dionysius says, the good of man is to be in accordance with reason, right?

[54:09] I'd say to them sometimes, which is better, knowledge or love, right? And in the proemium to the three books on the soul, right? Aristotle wants to talk about how this is a very good knowledge, it. And but he begins by saying, holding as we do that all knowledge is good, but that one knowledge is better than another because it's about a better thing, right, or because it's more certain, right?

[54:42] In both ways, we could say the knowledge of the soul is very good knowledge, right? You know, okay. But notice Aristotle is pointing out that all knowledge is what good. All knowledge is such as good, right?

[54:57] Now, one time there in that question period afterwards, a father was asking about you know sex education, right? But is to know these some of these details about this is that as such bad? See, no, it's because of the you know the sake of the passions and so on, right? That it's not suitable, right? Okay, so it's because of something other than the knowledge itself that it's not suitable to give this, right?

[55:25] I I told you how when when we were doing the commandments, the my children are little. when it came to the sixth commandment, right? It is little kids, you know. So what's adultery, daddy? Right. I said it's stealing somebody's mother or father. Oh, yeah, that sounds pretty bad, right? And it's not a really false thing I said, right? But I thought it was appropriate, you know, for a little one, right?

[55:50] You know, and so there's some things that's not appropriate for them to know, right? Huh? But because of something else in them, right? Huh? It's not the knowledge itself that is bad, right? But it's all love. As such, good. See, and so you know we're talking about the famous text in the De Trinitate of Augustine there, right? Huh? He speaks of a perverse and immature love of reason, right?

[56:17] Huh? That gets people. And this, you know, if you ever been in academic world, you know what I'm talking about. Or you pick up reason magazines like that, right? You know, you know these kind of atheistic things, you know. But they have a perverse and immature love of what reason, right? But is it possible? You were saying before that Noah had a not a perverse love of wife, but an immature love of them And I was saying to my students.

[56:47] And I said, can a man have a perverse love of a woman, right? Sure. And and an immature, you know, love, and they're not exactly the same thing, right? But but they're both not good, right? Huh? And so not all love is what good, huh? So only a love that is ordered, right, as opposed to perverse, right? Huh? A love that is mature in some way, right?

[57:14] Huh? Now there was an expression used to use in Aristotelian times as a kid. Puppy love, isn't that the word? Yeah. What is puppy love? Is that a good love? No. Immature. Yeah, but I think you call immature rather than perverse, right? Yeah. You know. No, I love my neighbor's wife, then I got perverse love of woman, right? So there it seems, you know, that it's it's reason, right, or knowledge, right, that orders things, right, and therefore it seems that that the the knowing powers, right, I mean the love and so on, depends upon knowledge, right, to be good, right?

[57:53] Huh? But here it seems to kind of be reversed, you know, because you have to. Right order to the end. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, eventually this will come out, maybe later on, huh? Because you see a problem which comes first, right? Chicken or the egg, right? Huh? Which comes first, reason or the what? The rectitude of reason or the rectitude of the the will? Because seeing the rectitude of the will depends upon it being ordered, right?

[58:27] And its reason looks before and after, and therefore knows order, right? And you know, that's why Dionysius says, you know, for a man to be good is to be what reasonable. Yeah, to be in accordance with reason, he says very clearly, Dionysius right? And Aristotle would say something like that, right, and so on. Thomas himself would say something like that, huh? But then you have Augustine talking about virtue as love, right?

[58:49] Huh? You know, and but of course he actually says the order of love, right? So. There's some knowledge that comes before the rectification of the will, right? But then there must be the rectification of the will before he can have foresight, right? So

[59:15] that's a very subtle thing, right? And Aristotle saw that, right? Thomas says, "This is a very interesting article." So foresight really depends a lot on experience. Yeah, but I mean, it depends upon the rectitude of the will and even of the what the irascible and concupiscible appetites, right?

[59:35] Okay. Shall we take a little break?