Prima Secundae
134. Aquinas on the Subject of Virtue (ST I-II q.56, aa.4–6): The Emotions, the Interior Senses, and the Will
Class of 2013-10-03
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/134-aquinas-on-the-subject-of-virtue-st-i-ii-q-56-aa-4-6-the/

[0:00] With the irascible and the concupiscible are the subject of virtue, right? To the fourth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the irascible and the concupiscible are not able to be the subject of virtue.

[0:18] First of all, because these powers are common to us and the beasts, right, the brutes. But now we speak about virtue according as it is proper to man. For thus it is said to be human virtue.

[0:36] Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are not able to be the subject of what? Human virtue. Human virtue, which are parts of the sense-desiring power, huh? Greek, as I mentioned, they called them the thumos and epithymia in Plato and Aristotle, right? And Plato says courage is in thumos, temperances in

[1:05] epithymia. Moreover, the sense-desiring power is a power using a bodily organ, right? But the good of virtue cannot be in the body of man, for the Apostle says in Romans seven, "I know that it does not dwell in my flesh." Good.

[1:31] Therefore, the sense-desiring power cannot be the what subject of virtue. These are all probable arguments, aren't they? Right. Moreover, Augustine proves in the book on the morals of the Church that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, in that through the soul the body is what ruled, huh?

[1:57] So Socrates is that to argue that the soul is what immortal, right? Even the body survives death; at least the bones, right? So a fortiori, yeah, the soul rules the body, because it's more like God, who's definitely immortal, right? God is the ruler of the whole universe. If the soul rules the body, it's more divine-like than the body. Therefore, if the body survives, right, at least the bones, and they say down Egypt, you know, even the mummies there they preserve the flesh.

[2:27] But a fortiori, the soul is preserved, right? Interesting Socrates' arguments. Okay. Whence that someone uses the body well, the whole should be referred to the what? Soul. Yeah. What's the word? Are we going to be in Latin now? auriga Chariot. Okay. Just as what that if one makes temperate the chariot for oneself, he what? He governs the horses. Yeah. Right that he rules. Oh, by which he governs the horses, yeah.

[3:06] Yeah. This whole is what. Ode to me. Ode to me. Yeah. Yeah. Now Plato uses that example of the horse being ruled by the man, right? The chariot too. Yeah. So it's easier to see that the then that the reason rules the emotions, right? But something like ruling the the horse, huh?

[3:29] But just as the soul rules the body, so also reason rules the sense appetite. Therefore, the whole ought to be attributed to the rational part, that the irascible and the concupiscible are rightly ruled, right? But virtue is that by which one lives rightly. Therefore, virtue is not in irascible and concupiscible. But only in the rational part, right? You can see how Article Two is kind of ordered before, right?

[3:57] Can virtue be in more than one power, right? Well, does this an order among those powers, right? By the way, the auriga also can mean the charioteer, the one that drives the chariot. Oh, okay, okay.

[4:12] Well, they always remind me Shakespeare. The word "battle" means you know the the army itself, right? It's a true battle and order, you know. It means it means army and battle before the battle begins. Yeah. Moreover, the chief act of moral virtue is what choice, huh? So Aristotle defines moral virtue. It's a habit with choice, right? Existing in the middle towards. That's right. Determined by right reason.

[4:42] But choice is not an act of the irascible or the concupiscible. But of what reason, huh? The cat doesn't choose to eat the mouse, right? Therefore, moral virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible, but in what reason, huh?

[5:03] But against all this is that fortitude, or courage, I guess, is the Latin English word, are are laid down to be in the irascible, right? Temperance, moderation, and concupiscible. Whence the philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics, as we accept those two virtues, courage and temperance, that these virtues are of the irrational parts, right? But they can partake of reason in some way.

[5:32] I answer Thomas says that the irascible and concupiscible are able to be considered in two ways. In one way, by themselves, right? In so far as they are parts of the sense-desiring power. And in this way, it does not belong to them that they be the subject of what virtue.

[5:57] In another way, they are able to be considered in so far as they partake of reason, right? Through this, that they are apt to what obey reason. And in that way, the irascible or the concupiscible is able to be the subject of human virtue. For thus it is a beginning of human action, in so far as it partakes of what reason, right?

[6:29] So in the music of Mozart and the Baroque, right, you have the movement of the emotions, right, in harmony with reason, right. Right? Even Harry Truman, you know, complained about the music of his time, right? Rock and roll, you know, there's no reason. And in these powers, it is necessary to lay down that there are what virtues, huh?

[6:59] Now that in the irascible and concupiscible there are some virtues is clear. For the act which go forth from one power, according as it is moved by another, right, is not able to be perfect unless both power powers is well disposed for the what act. For just as the act of the artist is not able to be what suitable unless the artist is well disposed for acting, and also his what his instrument, yeah.

[7:37] In these therefore, in those therefore which are the irascible and the concupiscible do right, according as they are moved by reason, right. It is necessary that there be some habit perfecting one to act well, not only in reason but also in the what irascible and concupiscible, that they are what habituated to listen to reason or to follow reason, right. And because the good disposition of the moving power,

[8:13] excuse me, the power that's a move mover, right, should be noted according to its conformity to the moving power. Therefore, the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible is nothing other than a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason, right. So Plato compares it to the the man taming the horse, right, huh? If you go to Washington Irving's Tour of the West, there you know he goes out west.

[8:40] He describes really to the you know the the disciplining of these horses, right? You know they get these wild horses and how they tame them, you know, and then the horse, you know, is obedient now, right? And but notice, huh? First time you get on such a horse, he's going to try to throw you off, right? You've got to keep on coming back, upon him, right? And that's what your emotions tell you—they kind of throw reason off, you know.

[9:05] But it's it's more clear, right, huh? I know if you ever read the the Republic of Plato, you know. But in in the first book, Socrates kind of overpowers him with his reasoning and so on. And then at the beginning of the second book, you know, someone says to Socrates, "Do you want to just seem to have convinced us, or do you want to really have convinced us?"

[9:27] And that's when Socrates blows up the soul big, right, huh? And he compares it to the parts of the city, right. And you can see more the order of the parts to each other than the order of the parts of the city, right, than you put in in the man himself, right, huh? So Aristotle when he talks about the reason ruling the emotions, you know, he raises the question: Should reason rule the emotions like?

[9:57] A master. Rules the slave, right? Or like the father rules the son, right? Of course, the father and the son are two different people, right? And the master and the slave are two different people, right? Now, you can see, you know, better the relation of the two, right? And you can see the relation of reason and the emotions, right? Aristotle, you know, eventually concludes they should rule the emotions like the father rules the what?

[10:24] Son, right? Huh? And it's because the emotions have something to say about what they do, right? Huh? And they—it's not kind of a tyrannical rule, right? But you'll speak of reason as ruling my hand, right this. There's no resistance apart of my hand, right? My emotions is sometimes resistance to go one way or another, right? You know. So,

[10:58] we'll mention that later on here, and then reply to objections. So, what is moral virtue? Right? It's a habitual decision to listen to, right, and to follow the reason, huh? But in that horse there's a kind of something like a habit, there, you know, by the ways, you know, so bad about it. And and the same way with the child, right? Um, Thomas is, I think he's talking about temperance there, you know, intemperance Because of the childish vice, right?

[11:32] Huh? And he's comparing it, you know, to the rule of the father of the child. If the father doesn't discipline the child, well, that goes his own way. Eventually, get to a point where the father can't control the what? Child. right? Okay. The mother used to say to me, you know, it's time when the please have to stand in. You know, parents can't any more control the the kids, right?

[11:54] Huh? Well, it's like with the emotions, right? Huh? You give in to them all the time, then eventually they become too powerful for you, right? And you can't really control them. Yeah.

[12:08] So he applies to the first objection, huh? Distinguishing the element of truth in it from the element of truth not in it. The irascible and incubusable considered secundum se, huh, by themselves, right? Huh? Insofar as they are parts of these sense-desiring powers, huh? Are common to us and to the what beast, right? But according as they are rational by participation, as obeying reason, in that way they are what?

[12:40] Proper. Proper to man, right? Huh? And in this way, they're able to be the subject of human virtue, right? Remember when I was in high school, there, you know, one of these dance things, you know, where they Talking, he pays actually the words of the song. You don't think I can make a monkey out of you? I will,

[13:03] without taking a reason, right? huh? You know, therefore, it's like a beast, right? There's no human virtue there, right? Not properly human, right? So, Gus, I mean, what is it I guess, You know, talks about how different vices are compared to some animals, right? Now, and so if I'm irascible, I'm like a dog or something, you know, huh? As Heraclitus says, and the dogs bark at one they don't know.

[13:40] Other vices like pigs and so on, you know, can be compared to some irrational animal. Now, what about the body? There, right? To the second, it should be said that the flesh of man, from itself, does not have the good of virtue, right? But it comes to be, nevertheless, a tool, right? A virtuous act, insofar as reason moving, right? Our members, which is speaking to our body members, right?

[14:11] We what? Go to serving justice, right? Exhibite What is that? Exhibite. You could say we show them, or maybe you could say try. I'm not sure. So also he says the irascible and the concupiscible, from themselves, do not have the good of virtue, but more the infection of the foams, right? From original sin. But in so far as what they conform to reason, thus in them is what generated the good of what moral virtue, right?

[14:46] Yeah. Exhibits can mean to present them. Yeah. You put them forth for that. Yeah. Now, in the third one, you get this famous distinction of Aristotle. To the third, it should be said in another way, right? Is the body ruled by the soul, and the emotions or the irascible and the concupiscible by what reason, right? For the body, immediately you might say, obeys the soul without what contradiction.

[15:23] In those things in which it is apt to be moved by the soul, right? Whence the philosopher says in the first book of the Politics that the soul rules the body by a what despotic, huh? Like a slave, right? That is, as a lord rules his what servant, huh? And therefore, the whole motion of the body is referred to the what soul, right? And in count of this in the body there is not any virtue but only in the what soul right.

[15:58] But the irascible and incubusable, and. How do they translate "nudem" there anyway? Not at once. They use I know it's either the nod or the. Yeah. Motion. There's a sense of all at once, right? It's kind of like nod. But how do they translate that in your English text? I'm missing it. Oopsa. It's the middle of the third reply. But the irascible do not obey reason ad nutum.

[16:28] Do not obey reason blindly. Yeah, you know, it's not something they do. I didn't think you know, nod. Yeah, I think the nod. Yeah. They use that in church law when somebody's made a bishop at least temporarily. Ad nudem sanctus sedis. Yeah. I mean, as long as we give you the nod, you're in charge. That's how I would translate that. You get the nod for now. Yeah.

[16:54] Well, wait. Let's see what happens next. But they have their own motions, right? Which, to some extent, right, or sometimes, are repugnant to reason, right? Once in the same book, the philosopher says that reason rules the irascible and concupiscible by a political principle, right? By which the what free are ruled, right? We, which have in themselves their own what will, right? And in count of this is necessary in the irascible and concupiscible for there to be some virtues by which they are well disposed to their what act.

[17:40] Now, what about the fourth objection? About from choice. To the fourth, it should be said that in choice there are two things, to wit, the intention of the end, which pertains to the moral virtue, right? And the foretaking of what is for the end, which pertains to what prudence. As is said in the sixth book of the ethics.

[18:09] Now that one have a right intention of the end regarding the passions of the soul, this takes place from the good disposition of the irascible and the what Conchipisable. And therefore, the moral virtues are about about the passions, are in the irascible and concupiscible. right I'm disposed to drink or eat moderately, right? Huh? But then reason says how much I should have, right? Huh? Okay. So if I'm going to operate on somebody today, maybe I shouldn't have any cocktail if I go in there, right?

[18:49] But maybe after I operate, I should maybe relax the cocktail or something, right? But reason only consider those circumstances, right? Huh? And say, well, is appropriate this time, right? Huh?

[19:12] Yeah, the man's going to be going to bed shortly afterwards, right? He's got to go out and drive or something, you know. He has to consider these things, right? Huh? Usually, the doctor has coffee, I think, before he operates. Unless it makes me nervous, man. He's got a shaky hand.

[19:32] Yeah, I say, you know, you would eat more on Thanksgiving, you know, especially if Grandma's gone to a lot of work to make some special pie or something, you know. Have a little bit more. Yeah, yeah, you got to, you know, which maybe you might not eat that much every day, right? What's called feast for reason. Yeah, I was reading in Mass today. You know, it's from Jeremiah, I think it was.

[19:57] Huh? He's talking about You know, they read the whole book, kind of. You know, and they were weeping and so on. And they said, "No, no, go home and and drink sweet wines and eat this and and rejoice, you know, in the Lord, right? Today is a day for rejoicing, not for.

[20:17] That's tomorrow. tomorrow we have St. Francis, which he's one of our patrons. So we go on a hike tomorrow, but we won't bring any wine. Hot dogs, just hot dogs. Okay.

[20:33] Well, actually, when you have hot dogs, you should put it with beer than with wine, you know. Especially if you have mustard, you mean, didn't? Yeah. Or hot pastrami sandwich, something like that, you know. Mustard, you want a beer? You don't. You want pizza? You want beer?

[20:48] Yeah. That's the only time I feel like eating drinking beer. Not with the meal. Just to the fifth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that in the

[21:03] interior sensitive powers, right, there can be some virtue, right? Four, and this is going to be very interesting. Distinction that Thomas will make: the sense desiring power can be the subject of virtue insofar as it obeys reason. We just said that, right? But the sensitive powers, apprehensive powers, the interior ones, they obey what reason, right? For to the command of reason, the imaginative power and the cogitative power and the memory power, right, operate, right.

[21:36] Therefore, in these powers, there can be some what virtue, right? Remember the arguments that Thomas has. Eleven arguments today, you know. They remember them. Got them

[21:48] in order, right? I suppose the Middle Ages there, where you didn't have access to books too much, you know, you had to really memorize what you. Here's a chance to read this book. You know, I better try to remember what I read. Apparently, that's what St. Thomas was especially famous for: his memorization skill.

[22:18] That's why some of them are wrong, though. Too. Some of his quotes are not exactly correct. From memory. Shaky. Well, Brother Bernard can produce new and improved versions. We're working on it. I remember going to see De Kite one time. You know, I had my my Leonine edition of this, but some other book, you know, and and I was asking about something, you know. He's going to look at my text so much, and then I don't want that.

[22:46] I'm looking at his Leonine notes. You know, he's so used to, you know, remembering the pages on and the thing there. You know, I do that all the time. I remember the position on a page, but then I have to look through the book to find which page that was. Yeah, yeah. That's often occurs to me.

[23:04] It was on this page down near here. Yeah. See, you have none of that with those computer things, you know. They just, you know, it's it's gone, you know. But then you could do a word search real fast.

[23:21] So that's a that's a nice interesting argument, right? Mm-hmm. And it's based upon what seeing a likeness of ratios, right now. Moreover, just as the rational desiring power, which is the will, is impeded in its act, right? Or is also aided through the sense appetite, right? So also the understanding or the reason is able to be impeded or to be aided through the foresaid what powers, right?

[23:55] So when you're doing geometry, you got to be able to picture these things, right? Each time I was doing the thing with the solid figures, I had a little you know cardboard thingy, yeah. Or the dining table, the kitchen table, or something, you know, help you to picture these these things.

[24:17] Um. Thus, therefore, in the what? Just therefore, as in the sensitive desiring powers, there can be virtues. So also in the apprehensive ones, right? Yeah, I just obtained the other day the first six books of Euclid, that somebody had done somewhere in the 19th century, that instead of referring to lines or angles or whatever by you know A B or A B C or something, it doesn't with little colored diagrams.

[24:51] So in the course of the proposition, instead of saying angle A B C, it shows a little picture from the. It's curious, isn't it? But it helps your your visual memory. Yeah.

[25:07] Moreover, prudence is a certain virtue, a part of which, as Tullius lays down, is memory, right? In his book on the rhetoric. Therefore, also in the memorative part, there can be some what virtue, right? And for the same reason, in the other interior apprehensive powers, right now. So I find myself you know if I memorize a a sonnet, say Shakespeare or a poem, I come to know that poem much better, right?

[25:32] Think about it, right? Or I memorize a psalm, you know. Start to notice things after a while, you know. So. And as your imagination memory starts to decline, right now. Albert the Great, there, he had a real feel of memory there towards the end of his life, you know. So he had a tremendous, you know, scholar, so. But against this is that all virtues are either intellectual or moral, as is said in the second book of the Ethics, right?

[26:06] But the moral virtues are in the appetitive part, right? The intellectual virtues in the understanding of reason. Therefore, there's no virtue in the what?

[26:17] Yeah. So Aristotle divides human virtue into the virtues of reason itself, and then the moral virtues, which are in the appetitive powers that we share in reason, right? So divides into two, right?

[26:36] This guy wants to divide it to three, right? Now Thomas does admit that there are habits in this, right? I answer: It should be said that in the sense powers, right, the apprehensive ones, right. So I use that word grasping, right?

[26:58] The thing known as yeah. Just giving one of the students last night there, you know, something he he said. I said, what is a square? He teaches geometry, right? So square is a equilateral right-angled quadrilateral. Equilateral right-angled quadrilateral is a definition. Therefore, a square is a definition. What's wrong with that? No, next time you tell me, I said.

[27:32] But in some sense, you know, in the definition you have contained what a square is, right? Without the mind becoming a square. So that's really a beautiful thing, apprehensive, right? The grasp.

[27:52] Because with discourse, you you you borrow the what act name of the act of the legs, right? Don't you use the hand so much or the or the feet to name the act of the will, do you? Obscure thing that will.

[28:13] Okay, so he says in the grasping, the interior grasping powers, there are laid down some habits, right? Didn't say the exterior senses, right? But the interior ones, right? Which is clear from that, expression that Aristotle says in the book on what memory, right? And memory, right? That in memory, one thing after another, right, custom what works, right? Which is like as a word, a certain nature, right?

[28:41] It's called second nature, right? Because it has a similar effect. For it is nothing other, right? For nothing other is a habit that is what. Consuetudinalis huh It's kind of hard to make an adjective out of that in English. huh Custom and habit. Yeah. Then a certain what. Habit acquired through custom, right? Which is in the mode of what? Nature. Whence about virtue, Tully says that Cicero, in his rhetoric, that's a habit in modum naturae, right?

[29:18] In agreement with what? Reason, right? But in the mode of nature. In man, nevertheless, that which is acquired from custom and memory, and in the other sensitive grasping powers,

[29:35] is not a what? Habit. Per se, but something annexed to the habits of the intellectual part, right? Not a complete habit in that part, right? Something annexed to it.

[29:52] But nevertheless, if there are these habits in these powers, they are not able to be called what? Virtues. Because virtue is a perfect habit, by which it does not happen except to do the good, right? Hence, it is necessary that the virtue be in that power which is consummating, right? The good work, right? But the knowledge of the true is not consummated or completed in the grasping sense powers, right?

[30:24] But these powers are, as it were, preparatory, right, to the knowledge of the, and therefore in these powers there are not what virtues by which the true is known, but that's more in the understanding or the reason, right? Okay, now if you look at this first objection, the reply to this objection, you see him kind of elaborating upon this, right? Because the first one is saying, well, don't the sense powers interior obey reason, like the emotions, right?

[30:58] motional powers obey reason. Well, they make a distinction here, right? He's looking before and after, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the sense desiring power has itself to the will, which is the desiring power of reason, as moved by it, right? And therefore, the work of the appetitive power is completed in the sense what appetite, right?

[31:28] And account of this, the sense appetite is a subject of virtue, right? So I was giving an example. There was that last time of my driving up to Quebec on the route to President Kennedy, right, with a new car, right? And these crazy Frenchmen, you know, didn't like the fact that I was slowing down for all the potholes, so he roared by me and wham, they picked up one of those stones that's on this terrible road, right?

[31:51] And I could hear it banging just side of the car, and I knew it was going to leave a good mark, you know. But I'm a philosopher. What do I care, you know? So, you know, you know, but you kind of talk to your emotions, right? You know, it's like like a child, right? And you say, no, no, take it easy, you know.

[32:14] And account of this, the sense appetite is a subject of virtue, right? Because it's consummated, right? This mildness, right? But the sensitive grasping powers, right? More have themselves, right? Magis habent, right? Don't be too precise here. But magis habent have themselves more as moving with respect to the understanding, right? So the images are what moving the reason, right? The images is enlightened by the acting upon understanding, right?

[32:53] They're really moving the understanding or undergoing understanding, right? So they're not completing the act, right? And therefore, they don't have the holistic character. Yeah. In that, the images is a famous proportion of Aristotle. The images have themselves to the understanding soul as colors to the what sight, as is said in the third book about the soul. It's a beautiful proportion Aristotle has. And therefore, the work of knowing is ended or completed in the understanding.

[33:30] And in account of this, the knowing virtues are in the understanding or reason itself, right? So Thomas is looking before and after here, and Aristotle did before him, right? That, in a sense, the will comes before the emotions, as far as what courage and temperance is concerned, right? Okay. And so, you know, if

[33:56] I'm walking down the hall and you bump into me, right? I get angry. Or reason, you know, these things can consider, right? That wasn't intentional on your part, right? If one of these high school kids who doesn't knock through everybody, that's different, right? It may call for a little bit of anger, right? But the you know, if you're using my kids for target practice or something, you know, if it calls for zeal, it could be a good deal of anger, right?

[34:29] You know, maybe not to kill you, but enough to stop the damn practice of these kids. Yeah. So it's kind of completely right, you know. My anger is what obeying my reason, right? According to the circumstances, right?

[34:53] These guys I work with there in the accounting houses I call the place where you count the churches' funds there and something, you know. But. A couple of them, they're really always kidding each other, you know. Kind of insult each other, but this guy says, "Oh, it's all good, good nature, " you know. You had to get stitches sometimes, the way you know. You know, when somebody does the thing, I said, "You've come a long way."

[35:18] Yeah. I took. I tell you that the guy says that. What did you learn since coming here? You have to count yards, and I said, "Count this." You know what else to say? Some people get the funniest things, you know. People

[35:44] get. But I mean, it's a question of before and after, right? That the images are before the reason more, right? Okay. By the you know the courage and emotions and so on, there. Temperance of them is after the well, right? So it's more the completing of the act, right? Is there right now? Calm down, calm down. So the completion of this act of calming down is in your irascible, right?

[36:15] Kim? You've had enough. you know, since you're a little kid, right? Had enough. Had enough, ice cream. Kim, yeah, We're going to this friend's house and it was in high school first time, you know. So he takes some ice cream, and I said, "Yeah." He picks out a like a celery. I like that, you know.

[36:41] Well, he he was underweight, and they're trying to fatten him up, you know. I never got a piece of ice cream that big, man. So sisters were telling me yesterday, Mr. Catherine, they get a lot of food donated to the school, and they went someplace, and the guy gave them a big, huge box of something that was frozen. They didn't know what it was, but it was expired by like two years ago, and they didn't know what it was.

[37:05] Should we eat this? What is it? They didn't know what it was. But it turned out some big, huge, like ice cream treat. They said, "Oh, we devoured it, chocolate all over our face."

[37:19] So the experience didn't matter at that point. But anyways, a little temperance. So is this advice is for the second objection too, right now? Okay. I think

[37:35] Father Boulay was making a point about this. You know, the reason is kind of almost you know at the mercy of the interior senses, right? You can't imagine these things properly, right? You can't really do geometry and other things, right? Can't picture these things, right? I know that happened to me when they got to the higher algebra. I did final algebra one, geometry, and then I got the algebra two and like precalculus stuff, and I just there was a total disconnect.

[38:08] I couldn't I couldn't understand it at all. I couldn't imagine. I couldn't make an image of it. Yeah. Terrible. Mostly, has something you're supposed to do in your computer there. You know, the instructions are just not clear at all. You know, you can't figure out what you're asked to do. You know, just don't let the push. You know, that's all I want to know. It's translated from the Chinese.

[38:39] Yeah, especially when it's translated from Chinese. Now the memory that's in prudence, right? We'll come to that eventually. To the third, should be said that the memory is not laid down to be a part of prudence in the sense of a what subject part. As a species, as a part of the genus, right? As if the memory be itself a virtue, what per se, right? But it's because it's one of those things which are required for foresight.

[39:10] Is the goodness of what memory, right? And thus, in some way, it has itself by way of what Internal. part, yeah. So you don't consider it being a virtue all by itself.

[39:24] It gets more complicated. That's like remember the Alamo. That's that's part of military groups. You get times two, they finish the other week. So, Article Six here: Whether the will is able to be a subject of virtue? To the sixth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the will is not a subject of any virtue. For that which belongs to a power from the very what notion of the power, that doesn't require any habit, right?

[40:02] But about what it is, the very notion you might say of the will that it be in reason, the rational part of the soul, according to the philosopher in the third book about the soul. So it is that it tends into that which is good according to what reason, right? Just as the sense appetite tends towards agreeable to the senses, right? To which is ordered every what?

[40:28] To which every virtue is ordered, right? Because each thing naturally desires its own what? good. For virtue is a habit in the way of nature, agreement with reason, as Tully says, as rhetoric. Therefore, the will is not a subject of virtue. It's like something natural for it to be, right? This is the reasonable, desiring power, right?

[40:54] Moreover, every virtue is either intellectual or moral, as said in the first and the second book of the Ethics. But intellectual virtue is is is in a subject in the understanding and reason, not over in the will. And the moral virtue is in the subject, is in a subject in the irascible and concupiscible, which are rational by participation. Therefore, no virtue is in the will as in a subject, right?

[41:23] Well, if you remind you of Plato, right? Because in the Republic, right? He has those three what parts of the soul, right? And in reason, there's wisdom or something like that, and in the irascible, there's courage, and in the epithumia or the concupiscible, there is what?

[41:44] Temperance. Yeah. There's no place for what? Prudence. For for justice, right? Okay. Kind of got the cardinal virtues there, right? So, you know, wisdom's up here, courage is here, and down here is temperance. There's no place for that, right? And so that's why you blow up the city, you see, right? And so you've got wisdom in the rulers of the city, courage in the what soldiers, and then temperance in the hoi polloi, right?

[42:18] There's no place for the justice, right? So he's got to consider justice to be kind of what the ordering of these three together, right? But it's not like a separate part of the soul with a separate what virtue, right? So you see that kind of back in that platonic understanding of these things.

[42:37] So no less a mind than Plato, right? Completely. Moreover, all human acts to which what virtues are what Ordered. ordered are voluntary. If, therefore, with respect to some human acts there is some virtue in the will, so for like reason with respect to all what human acts there would be a virtue in the will. Either, therefore, in no other power would there be any virtue, or to the same act would be ordered two virtues, which seems something rejected before, right?

[43:17] Therefore, the will cannot be the subject of virtue. But against all this is that greater perfection is required in the mover than in the moved. But the will moves the irascible and the concubiscible. Much more, therefore, are there to be virtue in the will than in the irascible and the concupiscible, right?

[43:42] I answer: It should be said that through a habit the power is perfected to acting, right? Therefore, there is what a power needs a habit perfecting it for what acting well, which habit is a virtue, right? In those cases where there does not suffice the what proper motion of the power, right? Now, the proper ratio of every power is to be noted in order to its what object.

[44:18] Whence, since as has been said, the object of the will is the good of what reason proportion to the will. As regards this, the will does not need a virtue what perfecting it, right? But if that good that is eminent for man to will

[44:42] that exceeds the proportion of one willing, either in regard to the whole what human species as the divine good, right, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as regards the individual man has the good of one's what neighbor, then the will needs what virtue. And therefore, virtues of this sort, which order the affections of man either towards God or towards his neighbor, are in the will as in a subject, as charity and justice it's kind of interesting you're saying that, right?

[45:19] It's like you kind of naturally will your own good, right? What you don't know is we're naturally will the good that is God, right? You have to be what perfected, right? By charity, I guess, right? You don't necessarily will the good of another, right? You see, even little children, right? They certainly want their own good, right? But they don't sometimes take into account the other person, right?

[45:42] And sometimes, you know. You see the kid come home and he's got a little toy there, right? It's not his own. I said, "Oh, whose toy is this, huh?"

[45:58] Johnny's. Did Johnny say he could take it? He had that look. Yeah, yeah, you can't look that way here. Well, don't you think you ought to be turned? You know, so so. You kind of see that they have to be what educated to be what just right towards others, right? I used to play you know ball with the kid down the block there. He's kind of a spoiled brat, you know, and the game wasn't going the way he liked it.

[46:32] Right? He'd take the ball and go in the house. Right? His mother said, "Well, none of that, you know. She'd take the ball, throws the balls to us, and make him come in the house. Right? So now he's got to do the ball nor the game, right? But he's got little lessons. Mother was was giving him, you know, in case he was a little bit selfish. to say the least.

[46:54] But a child's something like that, right? Huh? Or or if the child has candy, right, you kind of encourage them, you know, to share a piece of the candy with their brother or sister, whatever it is, and maybe share a piece with daddy, you know. But just you know to get them in that spirit of thinking of their right, but you realize it right away as a parent.

[47:18] I think you know the child has to be. Have to be taught. Yeah, yeah. As if you know, know how how we have the the commandment too of charity. You know, it's kind of explicit about loving God and your neighbor, right? But it's not explicit there about loving yourself, as if that's kind of is kind of natural to love yourself, you know, which is Richard, right? That is how am I?

[47:45] Well, that's what I was thinking too. That's not just education, but it's discipline too. I mean, it's not just learning something, but it's it's educating. Or put it, is this a moral moral dimension? That's like like Nino was wondering if you could be taught virtue like mathematics, geometry, or something. No, no. no. Yeah, no. Discipline or what you're teaching in a certain way by directing other powers to the world.

[48:20] I remember that this is one we classed a professor there, some you know talking about as a kid. You come from a big family, right? You're coming home, you get some candy, but you get you know six or eight other won't be you won't even taste it, you know. So you you stuff it in your mouth before you go in the house. You can't eat it, right?

[48:39] It's all gone, you know. I used to do as a kid. My my mother used to pack my lunches for school. Unlike other kids whose mother would put. You know, carrot sticks and all kinds of things like that. My mother gave me Twinkies and all kinds of good stuff. All my buddies just went, "Wow!" Like I had some of that, and I licked the whole thing. I said, "Want some now?"

[49:08] Is he still that way? That's one of the reasons why I'm in the monastery. So we've got a primum now, right? So the first therefore it should be said that that reason has place of the virtue about the virtue which orders one to one's private good, right? That bonum proprium, right? Of the one willing, right? Just as temperance and fortitude, which are about the human passions and others of this sort, right?

[49:44] If it's kind of natural there. Now, to the second, it should be said, huh? This is contrary to my friend there, Plato, that the rational by participation is not only the irascible and concupiscible, but omnino, entirely right, that is universally the appetitive powers, right? As is said in the first book of the Ethics.

[50:09] Under the desiring power, however, is comprehended the what will, the rational appetite, as we call it, and therefore, if there is some virtue in the will, it will be what a moral virtue, except if it is a what theological virtue, right, huh?

[50:33] To the third, it should be said that some virtues are ordered to the good of the what Moderate passion. moderate passion, which is proper to this or that man, and in such it is not necessary that there be some virtue in the will, since for this suffices the nature of the power. But this is only necessary in those virtues which are ordered to some what simply good, like the god or or like the neighbor, right?

[51:10] Well, that's the end of that. Now we can go on to the distinction, huh? Distinction on the brains. So no class next week.