Prima Secundae
136. Principles vs. Conclusions, Why Opinion Is Not a Virtue, and Art vs. Foresight (Prudence)
Class of 2013-10-17
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/136-principles-vs-conclusions-why-opinion-is-not-a-virtue-and/

[0:00] To the second, it should be said that when the what notion of the object under one act is referred to a what power or to a habit, right? Then the habits or the powers are not distinguished according to the what notion of the object and of the material object, huh? Just as to the same power seeing pertains to see what color, color and light, light being the ratio, right, seeing the color, right, and it's seen together with that, right?

[0:37] So you don't, as we're distinguishing them, but one is like the reason which you see the other, right? Other things insofar as they partake of light, huh? Okay. In Thomasine,

[0:51] when he talks about God, there, when God knows other things or wills other things, he does so under what knowing and loving himself. So that's the formal object of his intellect and will, right?

[1:07] Okay. Okay, I didn't read. Explain the text very well there. I think he says according to the notion of the object. I think he's talking about the formal object, okay? And the material object. You don't distinguish between the two. It's not like one thing is is hearing the what seeing the color and the other thing is seeing the color, right? But the color is visible insofar as it partakes of light or something of that sort, right?

[1:41] Just as to the same power of sight pertains to see color and light, which is the reason of seeing color and simul together is seeing what with it, huh? Okay.

[1:57] So when I when I see the shape of this table there, I I see what the shape and the color at the same time, simul, right? But in the case of principles and conclusions, are not what simul, right? Huh? Okay.

[2:15] So, man who sees the principles doesn't always see right away, and so you're not right away the conclusions that follow from them, right? But the principles of demonstration are able to be considered what? seorsum by themselves, apart from that. Without this, that one considers the what? Conclusions. They are able also to be considered simul, together with the conclusions, right? Insofar as the what beginnings are deduced into the what conclusions, huh?

[2:55] So, to consider them in the second way, the beginnings pertains to science, right? To see the conclusion in the beginnings, right? Which considers also conclusions. But to consider the beginnings by themselves without seeing the conclusions in them pertains to what? Understanding, right? So, this understanding is presupposed to science, right? But it's one thing to see the beginnings by themselves, right? Another thing to see the conclusion in them, right?

[3:27] Now, if you go back to the likeness there to mathematics, right? Can't you see the length and width of the table without seeing the area? Without having multiplied them?

[3:43] You know, it's like you know when a woman goes into the supermarket there, and she knows the price everything she puts into her basket. Then she wonders if she's got enough money to cover that thing, right? Well, she could know what's going to cost her by adding up the price everything she put in there, which price she what knew, right? But she can't maybe do this in her head and so on.

[4:07] And so she she knows the what prices these things. seorsum, as she says, apart from right or by itself, apart from the total one, right? And sometimes she's what surprised to what it it comes to, right? We had a little bit on this. Also, you got it's amazing how women can do these too. Yeah.

[4:34] So it's a different, right? It's a really different habit, right? To know them by themselves and to know the conclusions by them, right? It's but they're connected habits, right? And since you have to know them in themselves before you can you know reason out from them, right? This is an example I think of comparison or analogy Saint Thomas uses when he speaks about the angels who see God still being purified in some way, and he uses this example of between the angels, all see God, but they don't see as were all the same things.

[5:14] So he compared, I think, to like seeing a view in the distance, and then somebody pointing out some detail to you. Oh, you know, did you not see more? Well, yeah, it's not the whole thing, but I didn't see that particular. Yes, he uses that, and maybe there's a something like that here. Well, I don't know if that's exactly the same thing, but there's something like it in the sense that some people would see more in God than others would, you know.

[5:43] But it's not like there's there's two two sides there, you know. Or maybe it's like, yeah, okay, never mind. I mean, there might be a private revelation of something that that God sees in Himself that we don't see in Him, right? And that being another manifestation, right? But then you're not seeing it through seeing Him, right? Something outside of your seeing. him but here it's through seeing the beginnings in themselves, and then later on you deduce something from them, right?

[6:17] You reason out the conclusion, right? The conclusion is in the what power of the premises, but you have to reason it out and see that what follows from it. Just like you say, the area of the table here is in the knowledge of the length and the width, right? In the power of that, right? So if I know the length and the width, I'm able to know the what area, but not until I multiply to actually know it, right?

[6:47] So I can know the length and the width by themselves without knowing the area. It's a kind of unlikely to say, you know, because you know, the length and the width, you know, the area, But you know, there's no soap necessarily, right? You know.

[7:06] So it's amazing, you know, the beginnings that Euclid has, and then he starts to draw conclusions out of them. Goodness, it's really beautiful what he does.

[7:19] But notice he he goes on now at the end of it to to point out though this connection here. Whence the one rightly considers these three virtues are not ex aequo equally, right? Distinguished from each other, right? But in a certain what order, right? Just as happens in potential what powers, right? This is something we'll meet more later on, right?

[7:57] Of which one part is more perfect than another, right? Just as the reasonable soul is more perfect than the sensible, and the sensible than the what living soul, right? Huh? Okay. That's a little bit like you know three, two, and one, right? Huh? Two includes one, but something more, and three includes two, but something more, right? Okay. And in this way, he says, scientia depends upon understanding as from something more what?

[8:34] More from the beginning. Yeah, more principle. And both depend upon wisdom as from what principle, right? Which contains under itself both understanding and science, Aristotle. says this, right? I was giving an example of that when I was doing the whole and part, right? Huh? The students there couldn't, in a sense, what defend their acceptance of the whole being more than the part, right? In fact, they're denying it, right?

[9:01] In words, right? Because of this what? Yeah, yeah. By the wise man who distinguishes the senses of the whole, right? Huh? He can what defend? And judge better, right? The truth, the axioms, and everybody can, you know, could be misled, right?

[9:26] Potential holes. I mean, you use this notion of potential holes in the virtues, right? The potential, speaking potential parts of the virtue, right? Yeah, this will come up a lot in the second, second day, right? He'll distinguish the the subjective parts, which are the species, right? But then he distinguishes the potential parts, right? Which are? Well, wait till we get there, you know. I have a hard time.

[9:50] I've been through this like a number of times, but I just can't seem to get it in my. But like in in in foresight, we were talking about it a little earlier. Okay. counsel and then judgment, right? But then command, which is kind of the principal thing, right? Has the full power of it. Are those potential parts of the virtue? Well, the the the consul of the judgment would be, yeah.

[10:12] Would be potential. parts. Yeah, yeah, part of the power, right? Let me see. Potential parts. When I talk about the four tools of dialectic, you know, I think that they are what four abilities or four powers, right? In a sense, but they all make up the power of the.

[10:32] They're really potential. Yeah, I don't know if that's that's best way of saying it, but it's one way. They're part of the powers of the dialectic. So, is other your example of a number is two potential part of three?

[10:47] Well, no, more so. Yeah, yeah, three contains two in a sense, right? But more, right? The kind of example there's the soul, right? That that the rational soul contains what the sense soul does, but something more, right? The sense soul contains what the living soul has, but something more, right? But Kierkegaard used to compare blood with sap, right? And blood's even more marvelous than sap, right? But something like sap in the tree, right?

[11:18] Yeah, that's that's a hard thing to get a hold of, in a sense, potential hole, you know. Yeah. But Aristotle in the chapter on whole and part doesn't mean talk about potential hole, but he seems to know what it means, you know. I mean, he talks about he talks about the soul and so on, right? Because he speaks of the powers of the soul as being the parts of the soul, right?

[11:42] Oh, so those would be like potential parts. Yeah, he doesn't mean. Powers of the soul. Yeah, he didn't. He doesn't mean quantitative parts, obviously, right? Or species, right? Or even integral parts of an integral whole, anything like that, either. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Interesting. Oh, interesting. Yeah, that's a little good. Yeah. Which I've been to. No, but it's it's a very difficult thing to get order first, you know.

[12:08] It's funny how you go through these things and they don't stick. But, Thomas, when he explains the whole doctrine of the whole and part. He speaks the potential whole in its parts as in between the other two kinds of whole, right? It's a little bit like what both of them, right? But it's not quite like the genus and the species because you can't say the whole of one part, right?

[12:34] But it's not exactly like the composed whole either, right? It's something hard to understand, right? And it's interesting that Aristotle doesn't speak of explicitly in the fifth book of *wisdom, high as it may be, right? But he obviously talks about this and he talks about the parts of the soul.

[12:53] Okay. That's a very interesting thing he says there. He puts natural understanding ahead of science, which always stuff is kind of funny, you know.

[13:17] To the third, now what about this idea? Why isn't there one for opinion, right, in dialectic, right? To the third, it should be said that as has been said above, the habit of virtue determinately has itself to the good in no way to the what bad. Bad, huh? That's why Thomas would argue, you know, when God has virtue that the virtue because God is all of a simple is God, right?

[13:41] Therefore, he can't do anything bad. He necessarily works according to his what his virtue, right? But even if I have virtue, you know, some virtues, um, I'm not the same as my virtue, and so I might not use it.

[14:01] Now, the good of the understanding is the true, and the evil of it is the what false. false. Whence only those virtues, those habits, are called intellectual virtues, which semper always the true is said, right, and never the false. And therefore, opinion, which is the result of dialectical reasoning, right, and suspicion, which is a kind of reasoning you have in rhetoric is an argumentative part of rhetoric uses the enthymeme in the what example, right?

[14:35] They can be of both the true and the what false, and therefore they might what not produce something good, right? And therefore, they are not intellectual virtues, as is said in the sixth book of the *Ethics*, right? Now, stop and think a bit about that, huh? As Aristotle shows, and he takes up the natural road, what is more known to us is less known by nature, right?

[15:02] So he's talking about how we know things what imperfectly, right? The imperfectly known, in a sense, even the defectively known, you might say. As before, the perfectly known for us, right? So there's two interesting befores and afters in our thinking, and one is that we guess before we know.

[15:27] The simplest example of this is when a murder has been committed, right? Huh? They don't know who done it. They don't know done it, but you know who's the who's we suspect, right? And if a wife has been murdered, right away it's the husband. I was joking about that last night with my my students, you know. I said, you know, something happened to Rosie, and I hate to have the police and all there first.

[15:52] What were you doing? Suspect number one. You know, they suspect you for some reason. Prime suspect. Yeah, he's the husband himself, or he hired someone to do it, you know. And so they don't go to everybody in the town when somebody's been murdered, right? Huh? But they they try to guess who who might have done it. Right, and sometimes you know they go to that man, they question him, and he didn't know what he was doing at that time.

[16:14] And eventually they they get closer to knowing that he did it, right? But you obviously guess before you what? No, right? And in in logic, right, we have the dialectic and rhetoric, both of which are arts of what? Guessing, right? But as I used to point out to students, you know, the the the weatherman has got a what? Art of guessing, right? There's a 60 percent chance of rain tomorrow.

[16:43] Well, he doesn't know. Or the economist says, you know, barring unforeseen circumstances, the economy should you know do this. Doesn't know, right? Even the doctor, you know, he thinks he guesses that you might have this. I think we ran a couple tests on you, you know. I know people always, you know, it's all these old folks who are in the daily mass that hear about these tests and so on.

[17:05] People I know, you know, friends, you know, the doctor's gonna know. So he's guessing, right? Doesn't know what's wrong with you. And you know, I hate to you know have a jury there decide my fate. You know, I hate to be on a jury myself. You know, a life or death. You know, they have to guess that he did it. Yeah. But I mean, a lot of times it's it's guessing, and people have been wrongly, you know, put in jail.

[17:31] You know, DNA and this guy's terrible. But anyway, but we guess before we what? No, no, and that's where Aristotle proceeds dialectically before he tries to determine the what truth. We guess before we know. Now the other thing is that we think about something before we what? Understand it, right?

[17:58] And what comes after thinking about something, but before understanding it? Reason out. No, thinking out. thinking out. Yeah. And you can distinguish a number of senses of thinking out by the eight senses of in in the fourth book of the physics, right? So to think out the parts of some what whole, right? That's one sense of thinking out, right? To think out the definition of something, right?

[18:33] What's a Shakespearean sonnet? Why thought out that it's a likeness of thought and feeling in 14 lines of iambic pentameter, divided into three quatrains of alternate rhyming and completed by a rhyming couplet. That's my definition that I thought out.

[18:52] And I thought out a definition of what comedy, right? I'm an writer of comedy. Okay. The seventh sense of in, where something is in the efficient cause, right, and the power of efficient cause. That's a sense of thinking out. Do you think out a conclusion, right? Which also can be called reasoning out, right? So by the syllogism, you think out a conclusion, right?

[19:20] In a sense, if you think out the the cost of what you've got in your grocery basket, right? Okay. So these are two ways in which imperfect knowledge, or not knowledge in the strict sense at all, right, comes before knowledge or perfect knowledge, right? Okay. We guess before we know, right? And many times you don't get beyond the guess, right? And we think about something before we understand it, and many times you know we think about something without understanding it.

[19:53] Do you think about what I told you? Yeah, But, I still don't understand it. We say it a lot. Okay. So Thomas, you know, when he's talking about opinion and suspicion there in the sixth book of the Ethics, he calls them a what? A guess, right? And I guess it's a good word to use, guess, right? But we do guess before we know, right? Many times, you know.

[20:30] Einstein says, you know, a scientific hypothesis is what freely imagined. Well, what is freely imagined? Is that known? No, it's a guess, right? And even maybe after they confirm it, it's you know confirmed guess, but still guess. Yeah. You know, Einstein actually says scientific theories a system of guesses, right? You know, maybe it's not knowledge in the strict strict sense, right? You know, but you know the Pythagorean theorem, you know, I think has been shown that it must be so, right?

[21:06] Or that the interior angles of a triangle could be two right angles, right? Those things have really been shown. So we don't have too much knowledge. We have a lot of guesses, huh? A lot of wild guesses, right? Especially on TV, you know, they they have something. They're always having a you know asking people to write in and say yes or no. You know, if they think this is true or not.

[21:27] They get a sized idea, people, you know, just a wild guess, you know. I told you they're they're interviewing people, you know, about the the health bill, and they say, "Yeah, which you think is better, huh? The on the Affordable Care Act or or the Obamacare?"

[21:48] They say, "Well, what is you know saying? The Affordable Care Act is obviously better, you know. The name tells you it's better. This is the name of the act, right? The Affordable Care Act, It's just nicknamed Obama. They only have to say, you know, What's going on, the average citizens, right? I told you I talked to a guy who was helping a guy who was running for governor of the state here, you know.

[22:08] And he's traveling all over the state, you know. You're meeting people all the time, you know. And he says, people. Don't know what the candidate stands for, right? And sometimes the candidate they're supporting is supporting the thing that they're opposed to, right? They don't even know this, right? We just saw the ignorance, you know, the people, you know, I mean, the underinformed, as they call them. Not even the subtle things, you know, just what man stands for.

[22:39] So, should we take a little break here? Look at the third article here now. He's going towards the practical virtues right now. Now, why does he take up art before prudence? Maybe because it's more like the first ones, right? At least doesn't have that rectification of the appetite, right? I can be a good cook, you know, and be a glutton, you know, or something, right? Okay. To the third one goes for thus.

[23:13] It seems that art is not an intellectual virtue. For Augustine says in the book on free judgment, right, that no one badly uses a what virtue, right? But someone uses an art what badly, right? Huh? For a man or some artist, according to the knowledge of his art, can do bad things, right? So, see, the doctors these days abortion, so on, right? And therefore, art is not a what virtue, right?

[23:46] Huh? So, always see, no one knows how to kill you better than a doctor, huh? Make it look accidental, too. Okay. This may go back again to the distinction of the what two senses of virtue, right? Huh? Moreover, of virtue there is not a virtue, right? But of art there is some what virtue. What the hell is that? As is said in the sixth book of the Ethics.

[24:17] Therefore, art is not a virtue. That's unusual objection, right? Huh? Moreover, the liberal arts are more excellent than the mechanical arts, right? So Thomas talks about that in his commentary in Boethius, right, the distinction between the liberal arts and the mechanical arts, right?

[24:41] But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are speculative. So the liberal arts are what grammar, rhetoric, logic, and then you got the what geometry, arithmetic, and

[25:00] yeah, there's a kind of making in all the liberal arts, right? But it's kind of a liberal making, right? None. Therefore, if art were intellectual virtue, it ought to be what numbered with the speculative virtues, right? Huh?

[25:19] But against this is what the philosopher in the sixth book of the Ethics, as he lays down art to be a virtue, right? Huh? But nevertheless, he does not number it with the speculative virtues, whose subject he makes to be the necessary part, the scientific part of the soul, right? Okay. So.

[25:41] So usually they say art is what right reason about making right prudence is right reason about doing right so Aristotle when they define usually the way they state the definition of moral virtue it's a habit with choice right existing in the middle towards us as what determined by right reason and then right reason about doing right that's foresight right

[26:12] thus therefore huh okay answer should be said that art is nothing other than right reason about some things to be made right the good of which does not consist in this that the human what desiring power has itself in some way right now but in that which what makes the work that is made right be in itself what good huh can make a good wine right or good dinner or a good book or whatever it is um

[26:55] it does not pertain to the praise of the artist insofar as he's an artist by what will he makes the work right but how is the work that he's made okay so whether he gets hate making dinner for you right has he made a dinner that tastes good right He's reading about what's his name the German I mean, the English painter there but he seems to like music better than painting you know but he did very nice paints jobs

[27:42] thus therefore art properly speaking is a what habit habit of doing but nevertheless in some way it comes together with the speculative habits there's an unlikeness there right That's why he takes it up before prudence foresight is much more different you know so we pass from the less unlike to the more unlike okay in the principle Thomas goes there in ordering the books on life

[28:11] right after the De Anima he puts the books on what sense and sensible and memory and imagination because in the De Anima you're considering the soul and kind of separation from the body and these things are closer to the the mental and so on then you go to the books like the parts of animals and all sorts of stuff you know we're getting very down into matter right so we go from things that are less unlike to things that are more

[28:41] Because also regards to those speculative habits, it pertains in what way the things which they consider are right qualiter se habeant right. What way they have themselves right? Somebody used that phrase: "How they have themselves." You know, he's he's being a Latin text, right? That's the way that's the way they say it.

[29:01] But not in what way has itself human what desire towards them right now? For so long as a geometer demonstrates the true, right, the triangle has interior angles, interior angles. It makes no difference how it has itself according to the appetitive part, right? whether he rejoices in the fact that it has three angles, or is iratus. he's angry about it darn it! it's still right. yeah. and

[29:36] you know, in the time of the development of modern physics, there you know the physics of the 20th century, and they were trying to carry out the program of the 20th physics, and it just didn't work, you know, and they got kind of irritated, you know, and but they're kind of forced by the truth itself, you know, to go the way they did, right? So it makes no difference whether they rejoiced or hated it.

[29:55] I agree about it. Yeah, I guess Plankton liked the idea at all what he discovered, right? But he was forced to go, right, by the truth itself, huh?

[30:17] And thus neither does it differ in the artist, right now. You know, this has been said, right? So he makes the the soup so it tastes good, right? That's all. I don't care whether you hate soup or not, right? Okay.

[30:40] Get somewhere at the house there, you know, and try to offer them a drink, you know, and they want some kind of vodka. I got a vodka bottle. Why? Finding a bottle of vodka that we gave it some for the other, you know, I'm making the drink, you know, but you know, just long as I make it with the right proportions, you know, they, you know, I'm a sufficient.

[30:58] Mixologist. Mixologist. Mixologist. Yeah, that's what they call him, you know. So you don't have to to like the the drink to make it make it properly, right?

[31:11] Yes, a friend of mine, the woodworker, makes a beautiful walnut table and walnut chair. I hate walnut. Okay. And therefore, in that way, art has the notion of virtue, just as the speculative habits, right? In so far, to wit, as neither art nor the speculative habit make a good work as regards its what use, huh? Which is what. Proper to a virtue that perfects the appetite, but only as far as the ability to act.

[31:49] What? Well, huh? So you can see why he takes up art before prudence you know See. He proceeds in an orderly way, this Thomas Aquinas. I think he is. He doesn't just wander like a modern guy would wander. huh Okay. Monsignor Dionne used to say say in class, you know, when Thomas gives or Aristotle gives examples, you know, he always asks, "Why does he use this example?"

[32:15] Right? So I wouldn't bother with a modern philosopher, he says, Why does he use this example? You know, just the person who thought that had Yeah. My old teacher Kasurik said you can tell the guy is you know mined by the examples he chooses. right? He knows what he's doing. Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that when someone having the art does a what? Okay, now we get prudence, which is going to be distinguished from art.

[32:49] Why? Why does he distinguish it from art and not from the speculative virtues? Well, what does the dialectician say? Distinguish things closer. Yeah, yeah, that's where the difficulty is, right? Huh? You know, things are farther apart, but that was not the same thing, right? Huh?

[33:15] So is the politician and the carpenter closer? You know, politician and the philosopher. To the fourth, one proceeds thus. It seems that foresight is not a different virtue from art.

[33:33] For art is right reason of what? Some works, but diverse genera of works do not what make that something lose the notion of what art, since there are diverse arts about works that are valde diversa, right? Huh? Since therefore also prudence is a certain right reason of works, it seems that also it ought to be called what? Art. Art, huh? Our art seems caught up on your mind.

[34:10] That's from Saint Gregory. This is just the art of living. Yeah, and he still said, yeah, yeah. Moreover, foresight more comes together with art than speculative habits, for both of them are about what can happen otherwise, right? As is said in the sixth book of the Ethics. But some speculative habits are called arts; therefore, much more prudence ought to be called an art.

[34:43] Moreover, to prudence pertains to take counsel well, as is said in the sixth book of the Ethics. But also in certain arts, it happens that one takes what counsel, as is said in the third book of the Ethics, as in the military art, right? Huh? So MacArthur would call together a staff there, you know, discuss what should we do now, right? Even what Washington used to do that too, right?

[35:14] So MacArthur got to the American embassy there in Japan. He said, "We are here, General." The picture of that Washington there, you know, we are here, General. You made it. Yeah. I think MacArthur kind of thought of Washington as the greatest American, you know, not not Lincoln but Washington.

[35:42] That's like when my dad, when he first moved to South Carolina, they moved down in January. This back in the seventies, and and in February is Washington's birthday and Lincoln's birthday, and they were both holidays. So we get down to South Carolina. My dad just started his job, and he he asked one of his coworkers, "Do we get Lincoln's birthday off?" And they said, "Lincoln, who?" That's interesting you speak of the military art, because Thomas, and he devised later on the species of foresight, I guess in the second day, you have military foresight, right?

[36:30] And distinguishes that from political foresight. MacArthur had something of both, right? Because he, was really in Japan after the war, there he was showed a lot of political foresight. In the gubernativa, right, the government takes counsel, right, in medicine. Therefore, prudence is not distinguished from art, but against all this is that the philosopher distinguishes prudence from art, right? That solves it, right? I answer: It should be said that where there is found a diverse notion of virtue, there is necessary for virtues to be what distinguished, right?

[37:17] Now, as we said above, that some habit has the notion of virtue from this only that it makes the ability of a good work, right? Another from this that it makes not only the ability of a good work, but also that one actually uses it for a good thing. Art, however, makes only, huh, solum, the facultatum, right, the ability for a what good work. Good art. How do we get the word facultatum to our word faculty, huh?

[37:52] Because it does not regard what Appetite. appetite. Art does not, right? But foresight not only makes for the ability of a good work, but also for what use of this?

[38:08] For it regards the appetite not because it's in the appetitive power, right, but as presupposing the rectitude of the what appetite. Now this is something that Aristotle saw, and Thomas follows his master Aristotle here.

[38:27] Now the reason of this difference is because art is right reason about things to be made, right? By foresight is right reason about things to be done, right? Now, to make and to do differ because, as is said in the ninth book of the metaphysics, right? That's the book on act and ability, right? And in the second part, there Aristotle will go on to different senses of act, right?

[38:52] And there he distinguishes between making and and doing. That facio or making is an act passing over, right? Into exterior matter, right? Just as to build and to what cut and other things of this sort, huh? Why to act is an act remaining in the one acting, as to see or to will and so on, right? Thus, therefore, in this way, foresight has itself to these human acts, which are the use of what powers and habits, just as art has itself to the outside makings, right?

[39:40] Because both is a perfect reason with respect to those things to which it is compared, right? Now, the perfection and the rectitude of reason in speculative matters depends upon the beginnings, from which reason what syllogizes, right? Just as has been said, Notice Thomas a lot of times he'll say instead of reasoning from premises, he'll say reasoning from principiis, right? Yeah. From which reason syllogizes, right? Just as has been said that science depends upon the what understanding, right?

[40:19] This natural understanding of the beginnings, which is the habit of what beginnings, and it presupposes it, right? So in human acts, the ends have themselves like the beginnings in what? Yeah. Yeah. This is the famous proportion of Aristotle in the seventh book of the Ethics, right? Thomas mentions a lot in theology, right?

[40:46] And therefore, for foresight, which is right reason about things to be done, it's required that man be well disposed about the ends, which happens through right desire, to rectify appetite.

[41:06] And therefore, for prudence is required what moral virtue, through which the appetite becomes what rectified, huh? So when Thomas is talking in the Ethics there, why does Aristotle take up the moral virtues? He says for the virtues of reason, right? And he's taking up foresight especially there. He says, well, for two reasons: one, because by the moral virtues we are disposed for the virtues of reason, and also because they are what more known, More known, right?

[41:36] But you can see how they're disposing. In a sense, you you need you rectify towards the end, right? If I don't want to eat moderately, I'm not going to find what's a moderate amount to eat.

[41:52] If I don't want to be just in my dealings with you, you know, I'm not going to find what is the right price to charge and the right, you know. So you've got to have the rectitude of the will, that's the starting point, right? And

[42:11] going to treat my wife right, I'm not going to find the right way to treat her, right? Okay. Incidentally, because you're making an exterior matter, right? This is why the arts are distinguished by what, basically, by the matter in which they make something, right? Because I bear a bad work of art. This is not a work of art, nay, rather is against art, right? Just as when someone who knows the truth lies, right?

[42:54] This is not said according to science, but against science, right? Whence, just as science has itself always to the good, right? So also what art? Okay. So if I change the proportion in the cocktail there, right? So it's too sweet or something, right? The uh Manhattan should be two to one, right? The other would be too sweet, right? Only one part of sweet, sweet vermouth, right? So, okay.

[43:29] What's the one you made with two parts brandy and one part crème de menthe? If you did the reverse, it'd be just too sickeningly sweet, right? Otherwise, it helps your digestion after dinner, right? Okay. So it's not according to art, right?

[43:45] Whence, just as science always has itself to the good, so in a sense art always does, right? In fact, according to art, right? You give the right proportion. And according to this, it is said to be a what virtue, right? But in this, nevertheless, it falls short from the perfect or complete notion of virtue, right? Because it does not make the use what good, good, right? But for this, something else is what required, right?

[44:18] Although the good use of what without the art is not possible. I don't know how to make the food, right? Okay. That clear enough there? That you get that same distinction, right, between the but the art itself doesn't make you use it right, huh? Okay. Lady's doing a little arsenic there to get rid of her husband gradually, right, or something like that. You know, arsenic's an old lady's story, yes.

[44:49] It's not according to art. That's not the way it's supposed to make the drink. Now to the second, it should be said, because for this that a man use well his the art which he has, there is required a what good will, right? Which is perfected by a moral virtue. And therefore the philosopher says that there is a virtue of art, right? To wit, a moral one, in so far as the good use of it requires somewhat moral virtue, right?

[45:25] Okay. For it is manifest that the artist, do justice which makes his will right, inclines that he do a what faithful work, right? Doesn't put in some cheap stuff material in there, right? Okay.

[45:48] That's what Aristotle again is the mechanical arts. We got a desk. This is a while back. Got a desk for ninety nine dollars. Big desk, like the ones that I think people are using. Ninety nine dollars. Friend of mine is a carpenter. He looked at the desk and I said, "How much did we pay for it?" It's obviously it's made in China, and he said, "I don't know."

[46:11] I said ninety nine bucks, and he looked at it. He said, "You know, you couldn't even get the material on this kind for ninety nine bucks. They can get the material, make it, and ship it, and sell it for a profit at 99.

[46:33] So that's what Aristotle means right that there's some virtue of art, right now. Now, to the third, it should be said. This is talking about the liberal arts, right? To the third, it should be said that also in those what speculative matters, right, there is something by way of being a certain what work, huh? For example, the construction of a what syllogism, right, or of a suitable what speech, huh?

[47:07] Or the work of numbering and what measuring, right, huh? And therefore, whatever what This kind of work of a reason habits speculative habits are ordered, right, are said to a certain similitude or likeness to be arts, but what liberal to the difference of those arts which are ordered to works that are done through the yeah, which are in some way servile because you're a slave, your body, right?

[47:41] Right. In so far as a slave, the body is in a slave-like way under the soul, right? And man, according to his soul, is free, right?

[47:58] Okay. Those sciences which are ordered to no work of this sort are called simpliciter scientia, right? In no way arts, right? Nor is it necessary, if liberal arts are more noble, that there belongs to them more the notion of what art, huh? So once Indiana's do it a lot on what the liberal arts are, but you got to be clear that they're not arts in the same sense, exactly, right?

[48:29] But there's some likeness of them to the arts, right? When the arts in strict sense is as a kind of matter exteriority that you're acting on in a manual way, right? I can add up numbers in my head a little bit. I worked at the package store, you know. Guy would come over three, four balls, you know, and so I just kind of add them up in my head.

[48:50] You know, I get kind of clever at how to do it in your head. You know, he said, "How'd you do that?" They trusted me after a while.

[49:04] But in the making of the syllogism, right, making the definition, it's logic is sometimes called an art, right? The art of making definitions, syllogisms, statements, and so on.

[49:23] It's not a making in the full sense of the word, huh? We can see how there's an ambiguity there with the word art, right? Is geometry to be put under scientia here in the Latin word episteme, right, or should we put under arts, right?

[49:46] Simply put under scientia, right? But there's some likeness there, right? Of course, Euclid is is making things as he goes along, right? Make an equilateral triangle, in, the first theorem.

[50:05] It's kind of a mental making, right? And especially when when the difference in matter requires different tools and a different way of being worked, right? So my wife there sometimes makes a dress or something, right? And my brother-in-law makes houses and tables and chairs sometimes, and uses a hammer and saw. My wife doesn't need to; she makes a dress, uses the scissors and needle and so on, right?

[50:45] She'd not work at all with my brother-in-law's matter, which is wood, sewing together the table, sewing together the house. And she does it with my mother, not my mother, but my wife, you know, hammering ones on it, I take the piece of the dress, the cloth, and you know, join them by by by nails, right? Nailing the things. So different matters require different what tools and a different way of working, right?

[51:13] Huh? Actually, the glassblower, you know, doesn't use the hammer and so on to do what to do, right? Because you got to work the matter a different way, right? And you notice that Aristotle in the book on the Poetics art when he distinguishes the imitative arts, right? He distinguishes them first by that in which they what make, right?

[51:36] Huh? So the the painter and the and the poet don't make in the same matter, right? Huh? And so even though later on when he defines, you know, tragedy and things of those sort, he puts down first of all what it's an imitation of, right? Before he puts down that in which they imitate, right? When he distinguishes the arts, he does first of all by that in which they imitate, because you have a different matter that requires a different what?

[52:07] Yeah, yeah. I was reading in Shakespeare today. There is it in the was in the Taming of the Shrew, you know, where he says is a Vulcan a good carpenter? Well, Vulcan, Vulcan works with you know fire and so on, right? That's what he worked with wood, you know. My father's factory there, you know, so I worked in

[52:31] the wagon place there, where they're making not wagon but these drums, you know. And you heat the metal and you bend the metal, right? Huh? So that's the way you work with wood, you know. You heat it and then you bend it. That would wreck it, right? You see, so the wood and the and the metal have to be worked with differently, right? They're really different arts, right?

[52:53] Okay. So it's very important that he says that it's facere as actus transiens. It's an act going out to exterior matter, right? Okay. Okay.

[53:20] But the good of artificial things is not the good of the what human desire, right? But the good of the what artificial things themselves, right? And therefore, art does not presuppose what right appetite, right? And then it is this goes back to Plato that more is praised the artist who willingly sins, right? Than the one who unwillingly sins, right? Huh? Because it's not ignorance, right? In his part, right?

[53:55] If he knowingly sins, right? Huh? Okay. So, so Mozart wrote a work, you know, it's called the musical joke, right? Where he's showing out the mistakes that musicians make. Well, he's knowingly, right, making mistakes, right? Okay. And when I, you know, use these fallacies, I'm knowingly making mistakes.

[54:18] Um. But in the moral matters, right, if I knowingly, you know, kill you, right, that's worse than if I, you know, unknowingly, you know, happen to kill you, right? When the artist is to be worse, right?

[54:35] Yeah. If I ruin the meat on the grill, right, it's knowingly. Plato's, you know, developed that, right? Because the rectitude of the will is of the notion of foresight, right? But not of the notion of what art, right? Thus, therefore, it is clear that foresight is a virtue distinct from art, eh? It's a marvelous distinction of the two.

[55:28] To the first, therefore, it should be said that the diverse genera of artificial things all are what outside of man, and therefore they are not what the common notion of virtue here, right, of art, right? But foresight is right reason about what human acts themselves, right? Whence the virtue, the ratio, or notion of virtue is diversified, right? So doing is an act that remains within the doer, right?

[55:59] Making is one that passes out into exterior matter. To the second, it should be said that foresight more comes together with art than the speculative habits as regards its subject and matter, right? Huh? For both are in the what. Opinionative part of man, of the soul, right, and about the contingent that can have itself otherwise, right.

[56:29] But art more belongs with the speculative habits in the notion of what virtue, because it doesn't have the rectitude of the appetite, huh? Then prudence, which is closer to the moral virtues, right? So it's interesting how the so-called cardinal virtues. What are they? They're three moral virtues: justice, fortitude, and temperance, and what's put with them? Foresight, huh? See, it's kind of strange, right? Some may say, "Why is foresight a virtue of reason, and the other virtues of appetite of the appetites, right?

[57:04] The will and the irascible and the concupiscible right? " Why they put together, right? Because foresight presupposes the what? Rectitude of the appetite, right? So it makes sense to put it with them, you know, among the cardinal virtues. You don't have art in there, or geometry, and and justice, and so on.

[57:31] It's interesting enumeration, though the the cardinal virtues, right? But you can't understand unless you understand how foresight differs from both the the speculative virtues and from the from art, right? And why it's put there with those moral virtues, not them.

[57:54] Plato and the Protagoras there. He has the four cardinal virtues plus piety. He has five five virtues. Interesting, his piety raised more piers than we are. If

[58:20] people go over our house in a balloon, you know, and I was just hear the sound blowing there again. We hear it sometimes in the morning, you know, you know, and actually out there, as that last Saturday, you know, coming over and hi, hi, they're sitting down to us down the ground, you know, they're coming down so low, I think they're hitting the nearest trees almost, and they're almost touching the nearest trees.

[58:43] I don't know. The lady got killed there. They came down into a tree. She was stuck on a branch. Okay. We saw that's a secundum, right, huh? Okay, the third one. To third should be said. That foresight is bene consiliativa right? taking counsel well about those things which pertain to the whole life of man, right? And therefore to the last end of human life.

[59:30] But in some arts there is counsel about those things which pertain to the what? Private ends of those arts, right? Whence some, in so far as they take counsel well in

[59:47] warlike things, right, or in sailing, right, are said to be prudent what? Leaders or governors. Not, however, prudent what? synetice, right? But only those who take counsel well about those things which confer to the whole of what life? Leaders or sailors or captains, gubernators. Gubernator is this degree for a helmsman.

[1:00:21] That's what the Phi Beta Kappa. That's what it means. Theosophia Philosophy is the helmsman of life. That's what the fraternity. Helmsman of life. Helmsman of life.