Prima Secundae
137. Is Foresight (Prudence) Necessary for Living Well? Art, Right Appetite and Practical Truth (Summa I-II, Q57 A5)
Class of 2013-10-24
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/137-is-foresight-prudence-necessary-for-living-well-art-right/

[0:00] With the Father and the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deus gratias. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, And help us to understand what you've written. With the Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Now we're going to find out whether foresight is a virtue necessary for man.

[0:41] To the fifth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that foresight or prudence is not a virtue necessary for living well. For just as art has itself to makeable things of which it is the right reason about them, so also foresight is to things doable, according to which the or by which or in which the life of man is considered. For it is foresight is a what right reason about things to be done.

[1:21] But art is not necessary in things to be made, except nor that they might come to be, not over after they have been what made. Therefore, neither is foresight necessary to man for living well after he has become what virtuous.

[1:42] But only as regards this, that he become what virtuous. That's such a subtle, subtle thing. I never noticed. Moreover, foresight is that to which we rightly take counsel, as is said in the sixth book of the Ethics. But a man is able to act by good counsel not only his own, but also of someone else. Therefore, it is not necessary for living well that man himself have foresight, but suffices that he follows what the counsels of those who are in fact prudent.

[2:27] I know what this says about the Obama administration, but We've heard the blind lead the blind. apparently, Well, it depends. It depends on where his goals lie.

[2:42] You're interviewing some of the people you know who worked on the thing, you know. And this guy worked on this section, and this guy worked on this section, but no one was seeing if they worked together. You know the two things. Why not? Vaccination. Just just

[2:58] like when they catch a child doing something wrong, why did you do this? They have no clue. They don't know why they did it.

[3:14] Moreover, a virtue of reason is that by which it happens that one always says what is what, true, and never the false. But this does not seem to happen by prudence, huh? For what? It is not human that in counsel about things to be done, one never errs. Huh? To err is human, huh? To forgive, divine.

[3:41] Since human things to be done are things that are what contingent, as distinguished from necessary, right? Able to have themselves in different ways, huh? Whence it is said in the Book of Wisdom, chapter nine, and the fourteenth verse, the thoughts of mortals are what fearful, and uncertain are our what providences or foresight.

[4:09] Therefore, it seems that foresight ought not to be laid down as a what virtue of what reason, right? But against this is what is said in the eighth chapter of the Book of Wisdom, huh? It's a very wise book, apparently. It is numbered with the other virtues necessary for what human life. Since it is said about divine wisdom that it teaches foresight and sobriety, right? Justice and maybe virtutem there means courage, right?

[4:45] Huh? It's kind of virtus is named from vira, right? Viral. So the virtue of the man is what courage, right? And that's the first virtue that Aristotle takes up in the what ethics? Yeah, it's courage, huh? And because the Greek word is arete, right? huh, For virtue, which is tied up with Ares, the god of of war, right? Huh? So since that's more known, huh? And so as I always said to students, I say you know you can get the medal of honor for one glorious afternoon on the battlefield, but you can be sober all your life and it won't give you a medal of honor.

[5:21] Or you can be just all your life and it won't give you a Medal of honor. But you know, I guess it's more clear that courage is a virtue and so necessary for the protection of the what? Yeah, city. Yeah, yeah. As Douglas MacArthur used to say in his speeches, so

[5:43] then which nothing is more useful in the life for what men than these things, right? Huh? Now what does the master say? Huh? The magister. huh I answer. It should be said that prudence, sir. Foresight in English is a virtue maxima, right? Most of all, most of all, necessary for human life, huh? Why? Because to live well consists in doing well, right? That's nicely said, huh?

[6:22] You need foresight to live well. I should tell the students, you know, of course, I'm doing philosophy, I'm living it up. They kind of you know, that's probably that bad.

[6:43] You're getting drunk you're living it down. You're going downhill. You know, but for this, that someone do well, right? That only is required what he does, right? But also in what way he what does it, right? And that, to wit, he works or does it according to right choice, right? And not only from impetus or from passion, right?

[7:17] Now, since choice is of those things which are toward the end or for the sake of the end, the rightness of choice requires two things: to wit, a suitable what end, debitum finem, and that which is suitably ordered to a what? Right end. Yeah. Proper end. Yeah. How would you say that? Appropriately ordered to.

[7:49] Now, to the right end, a man is suitably disposed through the virtue which perfects the what? Desiring part of the what? Soul, right? Whose object is the good and the end? So we saw before he's talking about how you need the what moral virtues to be well disposed towards the end, right? And so, unless I want to eat and drink moderately, right? In a reasonable way, huh?

[8:22] I'm not going to find what the right amount. Yes, right. Okay. And I'll be saying to a couple of Aussie beers or something, you know, something like this. It's probably more than that.

[8:44] Now, to that which is suitably ordered to what, or appropriately ordered to a right end, is necessary that man be directly disposed through a habit of what reason, right?

[9:00] For to take counsel and to choose those things which are what? Yeah, it's an act of reason, huh? Well, it's reason to look before an act, right? to see the order of things. And therefore, is necessary reason for there to be some virtue of reason, some intellectual virtue, by which reason is perfected. To this, that it suitably has itself to those things which are towards the end, and this virtue is what foresight.

[9:33] Whence foresight is a virtue necessary for what living well, right? huh? On the First objection, kind of a strange objection there, right? Huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the good of art is considered as not in the artist himself, right? But more in the thing made by the art, huh? The artifact. Since art is right reason of things to be what made, huh? For making, going out or transit, you know, passing over to an exterior matter is not a perfection of the one making, but of the thing what Made.

[10:26] made, huh? So cooking is not a perfection of the cook, but of the dinner. Thank God. Yeah. Thank God. Just as motion is the act of the mobile and not of the mover, right? For art, however, is about things to be what made, huh?

[10:52] That's one of the criticisms we used to give of Karl Marx, right, huh? Because he sees man reaching his fulfillment by making, huh? Well, making is perfecting something other than man, right? So how can you say that this is the fulfillment, the perfection of man that consists in activity of making? You got the wrong genus of activity there, right, huh? You need an activity that is a perfection of the doer and not of the what something else.

[11:21] Something done, yeah. But the good of foresight is to be noted in the agent himself, right, in the one acting, of whose perfection whose perfection is the the doing, huh?

[11:39] For foresight is right reason about things to be done. So Aristotle distinguishes between these two activities, right, huh? Now, in English, sometimes we we like to point out the word doing and the word making, right? And

[12:02] sometimes, you know, we say making is is doing something. Other times, we divide doing against what Making. making, right? And therefore, we can divide doing into making and doing, right, huh? But why does making there get the what? Yeah, not because it's better, but because it has something in addition to the doing, right? Namely, some kind of a what product, right, huh? Okay.

[12:31] So Aristotle distinguishes between those two, but the making is a perfection of the thing what made, while the doing is a perfection of the doer himself, right? Okay. It's interesting at the beginning of the second book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, where Thomas is going to consider God now not in himself, but God is the beginning of other things. God is the the maker, right? The creator, right?

[12:57] Then he begins by recalling this distinction between these two kinds of operations, and he's saying, to understand, you know, a thing fully, you have to know what it does, right? But then there's these two kinds of doing, right? The doing that remains in the doer. We talked about that in the first book when we talked about God understanding Himself and loving Himself and rejoicing in Himself and so on.

[13:17] And now we're going to talk about what His making of things, His creating things, and so on, right? And you need to see both of these things to fully appreciate, you know, what we can know about God through what He does, right? But God's

[13:36] making my immortal soul is a perfection of me, right? But not a perfection of what? Of God, right? He gets nothing out of this, right? And so Thomas always quotes Avicenna, right? Saying God alone is what liberal in the full sense, right?

[13:59] And I was just reading his critique there of one thing that Avicenna says there in the second book here, you know, where he disagrees with Avicenna and he he spent some time there showing that he's mistaken, you know. But he acknowledges other places, right? He does quote in many places, like in the beginning of the of the very topic, right? It's going to deal about the so-called transcendentals right De Veritate right?

[14:26] Then he quotes the text of of him of Avicenna and follows him, right? Of course, he spends a lot of time too criticizing and very much of his ideas about the possible intellect and so on. But other times he'll quote him with some kind of approval, right? So he he distinguishes, huh?

[14:59] But interesting thing there, huh? Avicenna didn't think that that the understandable forms remain in understanding but are not understanding. But then that we turn towards this separate substance, and these forms flow into us again when we think about these things. Well, then, what's the role of the phantasms and the images, right? Well, they're to what dispose us to turn properly to the separate substance, right? And Thomas is saying, you know, well, this doesn't differ too much from what Plato says, where he had the forms, you know, where he get these things.

[15:44] But then he says Plato does better than Avicenna because Plato, what is the role of the senses, right, in the imagination, so on, huh? Well, to kind of wake up the reason to recall what it already knows. See, but he says, you know, by using images and fantasies, you are not disposed to turn towards this immaterial substance, right? You know how in Saint Paul was pulled up to the third heaven.

[16:10] You know, whether in the body or not, you know, it's like he's he's withdrawn from his senses right now. So you have to always be withdrawn from your senses to to to go up to God, right? Huh? Fully, huh? Yeah. And so Plato is better, right? Huh? He doesn't see the senses as disposing you to to go towards those exterior things. You already got them in you, right?

[16:32] You know, you are doing is recalling these things, and something the sense will make you what start to recall something, right? That you that you already know. So he praises Plato, you know, better in that respect than that you are being disposed to turn towards altogether immaterial substance, right? By your by your images, sort of things. But he's a great mind, Emerson, you know. But Emerson and Plato, you know, they they both get mixed up.

[17:03] They can't quite distinguish the the one that is the beginning of number and the one that is convertible with being. And sometimes they attribute what belongs to one of them to the other, and vice versa. So even those two great minds

[17:22] can fail, right? About those difficult things. Okay. So, but the good of foresight, prudence is noted in the agent itself, whose perfection it is to act, right? For foresight is right reason about things to be done. And therefore, for art it is not required that the artist operates well, but that he makes a good what work, huh? Okay.

[17:59] So the what cook can be sipping, you know, and drinking it, or drunk is out the cooking, you know, and that doesn't make any difference as long as he he makes the right things, right? Huh? It always tastes good. Yeah. Yeah. Okay.

[18:19] For it is required more that the artifact, right, be well done, right? Just as if the what a hammer, I guess, huh? Strike well, yeah. What's that? Or the saw cut well. Yeah. And what's more, property to these things, ah, is not so much what if property of these things it is to act, but it's not more to what to be acted, right? Huh? To be moved, right?

[18:51] Because they don't have any lordship over their own acts, and therefore art is not necessary for living well. For the what artist, right? But temperance is necessary for eating well, right?

[19:08] And foresight, huh? How much do I need, right? But foresight is necessary for man for living well, and not only for this that he become what good, right? Because even after you acquire virtue, you still need what foresight. Because how much should I eat? Not right. Okay. Do I have a big lunch or do I have a? You know, is it Thanksgiving or what is it? You can consider these things.

[19:43] You've got to consider the circumstances, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. Now you see some truth in the second objection, right? But if you can only act on the counsel of others, you have some imperfection there in yourself, right? You really want somebody not. Or maybe many people Should I have should I should I have another bite.

[20:04] Should I have another drink. Have I had enough yet? A little kid, you got to tell them you've had enough candy, you know. And you get a box of candy from your aunt or something, you know, and you stuff yourself. We'll put it away now.

[20:21] It's embarrassing when you have to tell that to the monks. We've had enough. So when man does the good not by his own what reason, right? But moved from the counsel of another, huh? He is not yet right altogether perfect in his operation, right? So the kid eats moderate amount of candy, but under the counsel of his mother or father, he doesn't quite get perfect, right? As far as the reason, what directing, right?

[20:59] And as regards his moving the appetite, now the appetite moving. Whence, if he does the good, not nevertheless what? Simpliciter does he do it well, right? But secundum quid, right? Which is to live well, right?

[21:21] Now the third objection has got some very subtle things here. Because he's going to distinguish between the truth of the practical intellect and the speculative intellect, right? Of course, when we first heard this when I was in philosophy. You know, we're always around telling everybody, you know, what does truth consist of? Practical reason, right? Compared to truth in geometry, right?

[21:41] Because true is is the good of the what intellect, right? To the third, therefore, it should be said that the truth of the what, or the true of the practical understanding, right, is taken a different way than the true of the what looking understanding, right? Spectative intellect,

[22:06] As is said in the sixth book of the ethics, huh? For the truth of the looking understanding, right, the speculative understanding, is taken by conformity of the understanding to the thing.

[22:24] So if I say that man is a two-legged animal and a dog is a four-legged animal, then this is what true, yeah, conformity to the thing, huh? And because the understanding is not able to be infallibly right conform to things in contingent things because they can be otherwise, right? But only in necessary right things. Therefore, no speculative habit, no virtue in that sense of the speculative understanding, which are what.

[22:59] Natural understanding, reason out understanding, or scientia, and wisdom itself, right? And therefore, no habit, no speculative habit of contingent things, is a intellectual virtue, but only that which is about what, Necessary. Yeah. And I still talk about this in the posterior analytics, right?

[23:28] But now this is the thing that we're repeating. You know, the truth, over, the practical understanding is taken by conformity to rectified what appetite, right? To right desire, right? So it's not to the thing, right?

[23:49] Which conformity in necessary things has no place, right? Because they do not come to be by the human what will, right? So I don't make the triangle to have its interior angles be two right angles, right? That's necessary, and I can't do nothing about it. Okay. But only in contingent things, which are able to come to be by us, right? Okay. Whether they are what inward things doable, or outside things makable, right?

[24:29] And therefore, only about what contingent things is laid down to be a virtue of the practical understanding, which virtue about things to be made is called art, right? And about things to be done is called what foresight, Um prudence is the Latin word for it. Foresight. is the English word. I'm a Latinist at heart.

[24:56] Can you illustrate how, in art, the truth of the practical act is conforming to right appetite? Right appetite is involved in truth of art.

[25:14] Well, you have to desire the the the good of that art, right? No, Aristotle talks about, for example, those who want to what they want a happy ending in tragedy, right? Okay. And if you read, you know, if you read these little history of the plays of Shakespeare, you know, the performance of them in England in the 17th and 18th and 19th centuries, they would take, you know, some liberties, right?

[25:56] Now, so with King Lear, you know, Cordelia does not die, and she ends up marrying. Somebody and so on, right? And Aristotle says, you know, one should not aim for just any what pleasure, you know, in tragedy, but that which is what proper to what tragedy, right? Then, and they're seeking the pleasure of what? Yeah. In that right. So that would be a false plan. Yeah, you're designing the wrong end, right?

[26:30] Okay. Now you know these things, you know the horrible things, you know they sell even something liquor stores, right? You know they have kind of a candified wine, you know, kind of a soda pop wine, you know, for people who haven't quite made the transition from the soda pop to wine, childhood, you know. Now I know from experience, you know, when people first start to drink wine, you know, they they want a sweet wine first, right?

[27:02] This horrible thing called it's kind of pink zinfandel, you know, kind of, but sweet, you know, sickeningly sweet, you know, just just disgusting, you know. But the person is seeking on the pleasure of of dessert, yeah, soda pop in in in a wine, right? And but even after a person gets to like maybe a dry wine, maybe they drink a dry white wine maybe first, you know, and then only you know a red wine.

[27:26] I remember my cousin Michael there saying to me, you you like that? Like you know the dry red wines, you know, and and I remember I worked in the package store, you know. Of course, I used to talk about wine a little bit and how Cabernet Sauvignon was the greatest, you know, one of the greatest of grapes. And so one of the one of the guys didn't know nothing about wine.

[27:45] Some woman comes in, she wants a bottle wine. It's really good, you know. And so so my friend said, "Carney, so he sits himself, friend said, 'Carney, so well when when a person come in the store and asks you know for advice on a wine, I'd say, well, now who are you buying for? This person drink wine regularly with their meals, or you know, and I would say something quite different, you know, from what they would tell me, right?

[28:09] " But because of course after she got the Carney, said, "Oh, that's an awful one. " Well, the first time, you know, huh? Yeah. I remember, you know, when I first came on, thinking like deep frowny or something, you know, kind of sickeningly sweeted out, you know, and and so

[28:32] that's kind of a universal principle, right? Huh? You know, if someone you know puts vanilla ice cream on on his filet mignon. Whipped cream. Yeah, yeah, yeah. See, you're seeking the the pleasure of dessert in filet mignon That's that's wrong. That's mistake, right? Wrong, wrong answer. Yeah, so you've got to know what pleasure is appropriate, right, to this, right? And.

[29:03] So I know, like with Shakespeare's plays, you know, you got the tragedies and then the other extreme, the comedies, and then you have these two kinds of romances in between, right? And the pleasure of, each one of these is what different, and you got to know what the pleasure is, and you got to desire that, right? I used to take this example. I think I've told it to you before.

[29:24] Kind of, I used to have an advice column in the St. Paul newspaper for teenage kids. You know, kind of like what you have for adults, you know, or so-called adults. And the this one was the

[29:40] high school girl writing in that her boyfriend wants her to wear candy flavored lipstick, right? It certainly is candy flavored lipstick for little girls, right? And she wants to to to wear, you know, real real real adult lipstick. That was her problem. Well, the advice is very short, you know. uh, buy him a lollipop.

[30:06] He's thinking in a kiss the pleasure of what candy, right now, you know. It's a very obvious example, though. of a person not knowing, what, you know. What's the purpose? Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And so, in that sense, you got a right desire, there, right? I'm thinking about, you know, building a house, or how. I'm starting to see how the truth of the practical intellect and, you know, building a house isn't in right appetite.

[30:36] It seems it's more in conformity to the planning he has in mind, or something. Yeah, but since you've got to kind of know, I'm trying to get more, more on example with these things of tragedy, comedy, and so on, right? You know, I remember talking to a high school girl, and I said, "You're doing Shakespeare." Yeah, yeah. I said, "You like the Shakespeare?" Well, she likes the ones.

[30:56] that they have in. But the pleasure of tragedy is something you have to get used to, you know, and accustomed to, right? And desire that, right? Huh? Um. There can be horrendous things in uh, in architecture too, right? Huh? Remember my friend Roy Monroe there? You know, had this beautiful Minnesota State Capitol. That was a beautiful building, right? Huh? The main building, and then the first buildings they built, you know, for bureaucrats and so on, were beautiful buildings too, you know.

[31:36] And then during Governor Freeman, huh? Uh, he put in one of these what? Space age something. Yeah, one of these awful things, you know. And my politician friend was calling it Freeman's bordello or something. Just, you know, out of place, you know, huh? And you know how they how they have sometimes in these very nice places they they have a a building code too. if you can't just put up just any kind of a house, you know.

[32:03] And so, even there, there's something to be said, right? About that. Yeah, and you know, I know when they make the chapels out of Thomas Aquinas College, you know, that was very well planned, you know, and very well, very suitable for for prayer, right? Huh? Yeah. Um, I'd like to say my parish church there, you know, the the windows are all just kind of abstract, you know, you know, from Tullery's studio in Florence.

[32:33] There's nothing representational there, right? Huh? And that's not good for children, right? Or even for adults, right? And I always tell that story of you know one time my wife was seeing a doctor there across from Blessed Sacrament Church there. I don't know if you know that in Worcester there. It's a very nice little church, and outside this kind and so I walked over there at the church with the kids, you know, but she was in the doctor's office, you know.

[32:57] And outside they have kind of a representation of Fatima, Fatima. Sure. Yeah. With the little. This is Bangor Main Street. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Okay. And Ryan Pleasant Street, I guess. Well. But you know, the little thing. I had to say something about, but it was, yeah, we were just walking around, kind of to kill time there when she was over there. I noticed my children were like, this, you know, because they're imitating the This depiction, yeah.

[33:22] You see? And what is it? This what's this church in Clinton? There, that that parish has more candidates for priesthood than any other parish, I guess. Oh really? It's a beautiful church. I've been there for you know masses sometimes and for funerals and so on. Beautiful, the windows. Same thing. St. John's, you know. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, St. John's. Yeah. And it you know, so by chance that you have more, you know, you want to be a priest, you know, in this beautiful church.

[33:49] And so, so maybe part of what you're talking about related to like church, it would be wrong desire for building a church to make it look like a Frank Lloyd Wright house. Yeah, That would be a wrong desire. Or sometimes the church is made, you know, the idea you know the meeting place, you know, you know, you know. They describe these ones, and or is it in in in

[34:18] Holland or someplace you know. Another world. Or alongside the wall, you know, inside the church, and they've got these automatic machines that are going to make coffee. This is true. It starts up, you know, you know, like they give you at you know at the communion time it starts up, so that as soon as the mass is over, you can walk over and have a coffee. Get donuts, fresh donuts, come out or something.

[34:40] Just, just. uh, I mean, this you know, these churches, you know, like like my daughter Maria's going to get married, right? Huh. And she wanted to get married in in the cathedral downtown, right? Rather than our

[34:56] parish, we actually put she wanted to get married in a real church. Yeah. No blame. And so maybe there are churches you go into them and they dispose you to prayer, right? Huh. And what does Christ say? This my father's house is a house of prayer, right? Well, if you're not disposed to to pray when you go into these churches, right? You want to linger there and say prayers, right?

[35:19] Well, then you don't really know what what kind of a building you should have been making. You should have been making a building that would make us what want to praise God and pray and so on, right? Rather than just coffee and. do this Yeah, you wouldn't, for example, the house architecture. You wouldn't want a house that was, which some people do nowadays, it's all glass. You want you want some privacy, you know.

[35:45] You don't want the whole world to be looking when you're taking a shower. Yeah. I'd say the TAC, you know, was very impressive. Yeah, yeah. Who's that famous actor? I guess that's coming up along the aisle. Oh, I heard about that. Yeah. Yeah. And he saw that beautiful building today. An Irish, he saw the tower. Yeah, so he came in. So who's that? Yeah. What was his name?

[36:07] Yeah, I know it was an Irishman. He ended up giving a talk there, you know. Yeah. On Shakespeare, he did some Shakespeare. Yeah. Yeah. And struck me that he was a pretty pious man, but just struck by the beautiful building there. I don't think

[36:27] didn't like the church there, the new one down there. Padre Pio. I don't like it at all. I mean, it's kind of a public one, you know, for the crowd. San Giovanni. yes, it's typical modern Italian. Yeah, kind of Barney thing, you know.

[36:41] Oh yeah, God, that's the worst. The one in Los Angeles. God, where is it? Yeah. Because when you are thinking of art in general, whatever form of art, you just you don't normally you don't normally think about judging it in terms of conforming to right appetite. You know, this is not this is not the the appetite for the whole life, right? Like having force imprudence, you know.

[37:06] We spoke with that before in the previous one. There is a kind of counsel, you know, an artist says, "I'll make the thing," you know, but it's about a particular end, right? So.

[37:20] I see. Yeah, even yeah, but see what I am saying. It seems to me it's not it's not the criteria that comes to mind for most people that you know you are judging, you know. Yeah. The you know the good meal. Yeah. Or or the good house or the good chair by right appetite, right? You know. is that a real criteria We had words of Mozart there talking about the golden mean, you know, and how it's not being observed, you know.

[37:46] It should be, you know. So unless you have that that desire for that golden mean, right, you are not going to succeed, right. Even even in art. Yeah. Yeah.

[38:06] It's not necessarily in. I guess. No, well, I would say yes. Say people put ketchup on everything, you know. Everything tastes like ketchup. In. Well, certainly they like ketchup. Yeah. And and there is a way of preparing a meat that kind of complements the meat, you know, brings out the flavor of the meat, and you can enjoy that. Flavor the other things kind of, you know, kidneys help.

[38:33] Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Slop the stuff on you. You can't taste it. That's what that's what some kids they did one of those. I always ketchup or mustard or one of the other, and they let some kids make suggestions what to put on the label, and they started printing and selling them. And I forget whether it's ketchup or mustard, but one of them said for hamburgers or hot dogs.

[38:56] That need a little help. Well, that's for somebody who isn't too good at cooking. What about that green ketchup that they made? Hamburgers with problems.

[39:11] So that's a very interesting distinction in between the looking reason and and doing reason, as I call them sometimes, right? It's speculative and practical, let me see, and I think, you know. Aristotle saw that, didn't he? Saw that Those cases one has to be conformed to? Aristotle says that Homer taught the other Greeks how to make a good plot. You know, a good plot is not about what happened to one man, but a course of action has a really a beginning, middle, and end, right?

[39:44] If a man is not aiming at that, he's not going to succeed, and it's going to be kind of a episodic sort of thing.