Prima Secundae
138. Counsel, Judgment and Command: Eubulia, Synesis and Gnome as Parts of Prudence (Q57 A6)
Class of 2013-10-24
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/138-counsel-judgment-and-command-eubulia-synesis-and-gnome-as/

[0:00] Okay, now we get these funny words here. I guess they. They come from the Greeks, right? Article six, huh? With the eubulia, synesis, and gnome right? Our virtues, what, joined to what, foresight, huh?

[0:21] To the sixth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems unsuitably are joined to foresight, eubulia, which means good counsel, right? E is what good, right? Eubulia counsel. Synesis, right? And gnome which refer to kinds of what? Judgment, right? But one in more ordinary areas and one in special difficulties, right? For eubulia is a habit by which we take counsel well, right? As is said in the sixth book of the Ethics, right?

[0:56] But to counsel well pertains to foresight, as is said in the same book, right? Therefore, good counsel eubulia is not a virtue joined to foresight, but more is prudence itself, right?

[1:16] More to the higher pertains to judge about the lower, right? But that virtue would seem to be supreme, whose act is judgment, huh? But synesis is bene iudicativa, taking what? Judging well, right? Therefore, synesis, judgment, is not a virtue joined to foresight, but more it is the what? Seems like it's a high thing, huh? In logic now they would distinguish between iudicative logic, right? Which would be the Posterior Analytics, right?

[1:59] That's kind of the high point of logic, right? But of course that's not about action, right? It's about perfection of knowledge, which is judgment, right? So what is a superior thing? It's not counsel. It's not even judgment. It's something even higher than that, foresight.

[2:25] Moreover, just as are diverse those things about which one ought to judge, so also are diverse those things about which one ought to take what? Counsel. But about all things that one takes counsel, there is laid down one virtue, to wit, eubulia. Therefore, for judging well about things we've done, one ought not to lay down apart from synesis another virtue called gnome. What the heck? Why do you have two here?

[2:55] Judgment, right? And only one for counsel, right? That's his thing. Moreover, Tullius, and that's Cicero, lays down in his what rhetoric three other parts of foresight, to which, to it, the memory of past things, right? The understanding of what's situation now, and the foresight of what future things, huh? And Macrobius also lays down in his work on the Dream of Scipio, right, the great general, certain other parts of prudence, to which what caution, right?

[3:39] Huh? That's about the impediments that might arise, huh? And docility, right? Huh? Because you have to be docile because no man is sufficient to see all the circumstances by himself, right? So docility. Thomas will have you know he articles there in the integral parts of foresight and the secunda secunda, but we're not into those details. Yeah. Therefore, it does not seem that these virtues alone should be what joined foresight, huh?

[4:11] But against this is the authority of some guy called the philosopher in the sixth book of the Ethics, right? Huh? Who what lays down these three virtues to be joined to what foresight? Foresight. Okay. I answer. It should be said that in all powers that are ordered, that is the chiefest, which is ordered to the chiefest. What act? The principal act, most principal.

[4:46] But about things to be done, human things to be done, three acts of reason are what found, of which the first is to take counsel, the second is to judge, and the third is to what command, right? Huh? I told you that about my brother Mark, right? His joke there about he and his two friends in Quebec, there, right? One guy was good at what thinking of all kinds of things to do.

[5:15] He was very imaginative. He proposed all kinds of things they could do, but he had no idea which one they should do. But brother Mark was the man of judgment, you know. This is the one to do, right? But he's kind of you know more sluggish fellow than the book. The other guy was yeah, go, you know. So he said we had divided the three acts among the three of us.

[5:39] That's good though. See. Now he says the first two correspond to acts that you have even in the what looking understanding, right? Which are to inquire, right? Which is like taking counsel, right? It's like dialectical investigation, and then to judge, huh?

[6:03] For consul is a certain what, inquiry. But the third act is proper to the what, practical understanding, insofar as it does something. Right, it's operativus, right?

[6:22] For reason does not have to command those things which cannot come to be what by man. So we don't command the Pythagorean theorem. We don't command that the triangles and have three angles equal to right angles.

[6:40] Don't do any commanding there, right? We just try to find and judge it. Not as manifest in those things which come to be by man, that the chief act is to command, to which the others are what? Ordered. Yeah, this guy's always looking before and after, Thomas, isn't he?

[7:02] We have to see the order of these three acts to understand why one is principal and so on. And therefore, to the virtue which is bene preceptiva, right, well commanding, to what prudence, as it were, to the what, more chief, more chief, are joined as secondary eubulia which takes counsel well, and synesis and gnome which are judicative parts, huh? Okay. About whose distinction we'll speak later in reply to one of the objections, right?

[7:40] Okay. So makes clear, right? You look before and after there, and you see it all. I imagine prudence is also used in a more general sense too, not only for this particular act, particular virtue, which, in other words, don't mean commonly use prudence to include all this. Well, you could, yeah, but these ones are really kind of ordered to this act, right? There's something kind of different to these things, right?

[8:16] So he's saying that the principal act is really the act that, the highest virtue which is foresight here, right, is responsible for, right? Then, but kind of a lesser virtue responsible for judgment, and then being these two, whatever their difference will be, as we'll see, and then for consul, even lesser one, right? If you didn't have consul and judge well, if you didn't have those, you obviously wouldn't be able to command well.

[8:53] Yeah, yeah, yeah. So this sometimes isn't just a So you wouldn't be a prudent man, right? You can just Take that thing we were talking before about Augustine, right? Huh? You decided to give up a sinful life, maybe, right? And that was a good judgment, right? That was, but not today, You know. It's not prudent, yeah. you know. And you know, when people talk about these things, they're not so profound, like like I got to lose weight, right?

[9:22] Huh? You know, and and so on, but even once you make that judgment, they're not there yet, right? You got to really what take the last step, right? Which is command, right? The book on prayer about the heart, and he talks about that in one of the chapters. He said there's three things you got about prayer, and so forth. Is learn what God wants to do, and then figure out how He wants you to do it, and then do it.

[9:52] So that's seems to me that's what that foresight's gonna do. No, I mean sometimes you know a man who who drinks too much, he he smashes up the car or something, you know. He realizes he's got a problem, right? And and he judges he should give it up, but I mean that's that's a long way from be curing himself, right? Huh? Yeah. You know, just got to go down and join double A or triple A or whatever it is.

[10:16] Double what this. I just I read an article. someone somebody was kinda lamenting something I call analysis paralysis. Mm-hmm. It's people who never make up. They they can analyze. They know all the options. They know them well. They know which one's best. Mm-hmm. They never stop analyzing. Make sure. Do. Make sure they go over and over and over and over. Yeah. Yeah. They should have done that, John.

[10:38] The others should have done it. They didn't do it, you know. They didn't do it. They never quite got around it. Yeah. Yeah. They never

[10:46] command. You kind of see that in higher kinds of foresight, like military foresight or political foresight. You know, where a man has the ability to what command others, right, and so on, right? Especially when I know there's a particular. I think it's one of the parts of prudence or something. It calls for a judgment about commanding something quickly. Right. You have to make a yeah a quick judgment about something and evaluate to do it because sometimes you you as they say the window of opportunity to do something is very small and you could miss a big chance or something.

[11:28] You see that in a man like Lincoln, you know, or a man like General Patton or somebody, or MacArthur or something, you know. You see that that command is what kind of perfects them, right? Huh? Okay. So this first objection here is kind of really touching on what you said. To the first, therefore, it should be said that prudence is bene conciliativa, like you were saying,

[11:59] but not as as if bene conciliari to take counsel well is immediately an act of it's of what foresight. But because this act, huh? It perfects this act by as a medium or by by yeah by you know a virtue subject to it, which is eubulia, right? Yeah. So that eubulia, if it's not really foresight, it's subordinated to it, right? Huh? It's um. That's as it belongs to it, right?

[12:36] Huh? And MacArthur would call together his leading officers, you know, and discuss what they should do, you know, and what they have to say, right? And he'd probably do the judgment and the command.

[12:55] Yeah. Okay. Now the second one is saying how judgment is the highest thing, right? Well, in looking reason, it is, right? Let's see Dionysius in this marvelous judgment, right? Huh?

[13:19] If you didn't think what you said was, or he's hesitant to to say it is correct, he thought twice about it, that's for sure. So he says judgment in things to be done is or to something what? Further, right? Huh? For it could happen as you are saying for someone to judge well about doing something right, and nevertheless not do what? Coming about right. Yeah, yeah.

[13:50] Checking some of those leaves up, you know. Can't command myself to get up there. Tomorrow, tomorrow. Yeah, yeah. What do you say? Never do today what you can put off for tomorrow.

[14:09] But the ultimate compliment, right? Huh? Is when reason already what? Commands well about things to be done, right? A lot of understanding here, human nature, isn't it? You know, fallen human nature. As actually in that part, I think it's in that book on prayer. That's what Brother Harding says. That's the big downfall of most people. They know what God wants, and they know how to do it.

[14:33] Yeah. Get around it. Yeah. Yeah. Now, the third objection is about why are there two virtues about judgment and only one about counsel, right? Knows

[14:58] the rule of two or three is being observed here, right? You have these three acts, right? Now, and one of them is going to be divided into what? Two, right? Huh? You don't, you don't. We're divided into four at first, do you? No, divided into three, and then one of them is seen. And then why is it so? Huh? Well, you can see the reply to this is longer than the first two together, right?

[15:23] And this is why why it is so. To the third, therefore, it should be said that judgment about each thing comes about through. And now, how should translate "propria"? You know, I don't think proper principles is the way to translate, right? Its own. Its own, huh? Its own private principles, right? Huh? What inquisition is not yet through what things own principles, huh? So that's interesting, huh? Even looking reason, right?

[15:52] Huh? There is many what forms of reasoned out knowledge because that's judgment, right? You have to judge about what is its own beginnings, right? But there is one kind of dialectic that used everywhere, right? And so you find Plato in the dialogues, the Socrates' dialogues, talking about just about anything, right? In doing so, from probable opinions, right? When you get down to judging, then you got to get down to what's what private to this subject, right?

[16:23] What is its own beginnings? My son-in-law there is getting interested in making wine out there in California. It's going to be something, so yeah. So, but you read about these winemakers, you know, and they get to know the different what grapes, right? But what is good for one grape is not good for what another grape, right? And what is good for one wine is not good for the making of another wine, right?

[16:56] And so that's why some places are more appropriate, right, for drinking, for making Chardonnay, right? I'd say rather another one is more suitable make Cabernet Sauvignon, right? And they experiment around; they find this is the right terroir, you know, for this particular grape, you know, and the right temperature and so on. And

[17:16] so you got to know what is private to right this particular grape, right? And in soil and in climate and in the way you and the barrel, yeah, yeah, the wood in the barrel and how the wood is seasoned and all that's all part of it. Yeah, all chemicals.

[17:42] So he says, inquiry, investigation is not yet to its own what beginnings, huh? Because these, when these are had, there is no need for further what inquisition. But the thing has already been what found, huh? And therefore, there is only one virtue ordered to what taking counsel well.

[18:07] But two virtues to judging what well, because the distinction is not what in the general principles, yeah, but is not in the common principles, but in the what private ones, okay? And then it makes a beautiful comparison to to looking reason When's in looking matters and speculative matters, huh? One is dialectica inquisitiva de omnibus, dialectic, which is investigating about what all things, right? But the demonstrative sciences, which are judging, right, are diverse about what diverse things, yeah, yeah.

[18:49] So you can see that you read, you know, when Albert the Great there divides, and Thomas Aquinas when they divide the logic of reasoning, right, the third act, the logic of arguments, right. They divide in two parts: the iudicativa part, which Aristotle treats of in the prior and posterior analytics, and then the what? Inquisitiva part, huh? Yes, part. Yeah, the which Aristotle treats in the book of places, right?

[19:21] In the book on its permutations, huh? And you can use the what? The the eight books of places in philosophy, right? Huh? See, you can't use the posterior analytics. They don't give you the private principles of each one, right? They tell you you got to go find the part. Once you find those, then you can, you know, demonstrate, right? Huh? That's a very subtle thing, right? So there are many forms of reasoned-out understanding, reasoned-out knowledge, right?

[20:00] Where you judge. uh who's. necessity of these things, right? There only one dialectic, right? That rules over them all. So it's kind of interesting, right? The same way dialectic, I mean, sophistic is like that too. It's not tied to any one thing. So you know, the first kind of mistake that you take up in the book of Sophistical Refutations is the mistake of mixing up the senses of a word.

[20:28] Well, what what sides is that tied to? You could do it in any one. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And so I could, you know, give you, you know, examples of this kind of mistake, right? From any science, right? It's kind of a common thing, right? And then in dialectic, you have the second tool, as the tool of distinguishing the senses of a word, right? Well, that's not really prior to some science, right?

[20:54] That's you know, if you know a little bit of that, you can see kind of comparison Thomas is making here, right? When she says in speculative matters, one is the dialectic, which is inquisitive about all things, right? That's why Aristotle in the

[21:12] fourth book of Wisdom says that dialectic is like wisdom, because it's about everything. But wisdom is about all things in a demonstrative way, and dialectic with what probability. And sophistic, he says, is also about all things, but in apparent way, apparent way, apparent apparent apparent of wisdom, right?

[21:35] Makes you a wise guy, right? To make wise. Okay. But the demonstrative sciences that you're judging, right, are diverse about what diverse things, right?

[21:49] And if we talk about the the what the private road of each science, right? I was kidding the guy last night there, the one student who teaches. He teaches Euclid there at the at the not Trivium, no, up at the college there. The what's that been? Oh, Schumachlin. Yeah, I guess one of those colleges up there, you know. And so I talked a little bit about it.

[22:14] I says, now, what is the philosophy of the continuous? You know. Well, of course, when you divide quantity, divide into continuous quantity and discrete quantity, which involves number, right? So arithmetic is about, discrete quantity, numbers, and geometry is about continuous quantities like lines and angles and figures and so on. I says, so what is the philosophy of the continuous? We might, in class, say it's geometry, right?

[22:45] Because it's about continuous quantity, right? But there's no consideration of the continuous in general in what Euclid. Where do you find a consideration of the continuous in general? And more lengthy than what you do in logic, right? Where you distinguish continuous and discrete.

[23:12] No, it's in the sixth book of natural hearing, the sixth book of the physics, right? So I used to call it sometimes the philosophy of the continuous. And Aristotle shows, for example, that the continuous is divisible forever; is continuous as such, and that nothing continuous is composed of what indivisibles, right? And this is true about any continuous, whether it be a line or the motion over the line or the time it takes to go down the line and so on, right?

[23:43] I said, now, why is there no, why is there no philosophy of the continuous there in geometry when you study continuous quantity at some at some length, right?

[23:57] Well, it goes back to the very order, right, of these sciences, huh? In geometry, you go from the simple to the what composed, right? So you go from plane geometry to solid geometry, from the circle to the what sphere, from the square to the cube, right? They're not related to the general to the particular, but it's the simple to the what composed, right? And Euclid starts the sphere.

[24:27] Says, imagine a circle and the diameter of the circle, and now rotate it around, and now you've got a sphere, right? And the cube has got what six sides there, which are all squares and so on, right? You learn how to construct a cube there in solid geometry. While natural philosophy goes from what the general to the particular, right? This is a striking example of it because the general consideration of the continuous is divisible forever, where you show that, and where you show there's not composed of indivisibles and so on, right?

[25:04] That general thing is in the what sixth book of natural hearing and not in geometry. That's an awful subtle thing, right? That you should find that distinction, right? It goes back to what's the private to geometry way of proceeding and what's private to natural philosophy.

[25:36] So you can't get you can't judge well if you don't know what road to follow in each science. Each science has its own what road, right? Kind of the classical text there is the Boethius and the De Trinitate of Boethius right? Where he distinguishes, you know, the road of natural philosophy and the road of what of geometry or mathematics and the road of wisdom, right? Here's like a word you know to describe it, Thomas pulls out all article, you know.

[26:09] But absolutely, you know, you know. I remember Monsignor Dionne gave me a course, when I first stopped at the ball. he was talking about that. You know, that that kind of inspired me. You know, to to go and eventually write my doctoral thesis, right, on the on the comparison of Descartes and Aristotle on the three roads, right? Huh? Well, Descartes was talking about the the road of the natural road in the beginning of the physics.

[26:33] There, Aristotle talks about it, right? And you know, he reasons from the natural road to the road to follow natural philosophy. How can he do that? See, well that's what Boethius says, right? When he says that natural philosophy proceeds rationabiliter right? And Thomas explained different senses of rationabiliter but, most of all, observes the common road of what of reason, right? Proceeding from senses and so on, huh?

[27:01] That's why he can Aristotle do that, right? Huh? But if you don't know the road to follow, you know, you are going to make mistakes in what in judging, right? Huh? You know, so like the great Boethius says, you get in talking about divine things, you have to give up the imagination, right? You can't picture the the Trinity, right? Huh? Making the painter, you know, you know, for the you know dove and so on, but you can't really picture the Trinity.

[27:34] You've got to understand it, right? Huh? Otherwise, you know, Shakespeare says, "Wandering illusions." What's his name there? What's the name of that guy there?

[27:55] Heidegger, you know, Warren is saying to this Heideggerian there. Well, that stuff's poetry. I guess the Haidingerian said, "Yeah, but it's beautiful poetry." Does

[28:12] Descartes want to proceed like methods of mathematics and other sciences? Everywhere, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. This is continued by Spinoza, right? Huh? Because Spinoza says that the order in our thoughts and the order in things is the same. See, now what's unusual about geometry? It's kind of it's kind of an exception to what characterizes our mind. Our mind naturally tends to know the effect before the what cause.

[28:43] And so, every time we ask why, we know the effect but not the cause in some way. Why in geometry you go from what the cause to the effect, right? So you know you have you know straight lines intersecting; these opposite angles are what equal, right? And you prove that through the fact that those lines are intersecting are what straight because they're intersecting, they make what two right make you know angles, right?

[29:09] But because the lines intersecting are what straight and not one bend, that's why you're going to prove that those what opposite angles are equal, right? So in a way, you're going from the cause to the what effect, right? Yeah. And Spinoza and Descartes starts it, you know, but Spinoza makes it a principle, right? The order in our yeah, and and basically the order in our thought and the order in things is just the reverse, right?

[29:40] Because the effect is before the cause in our knowledge, for the most part, right? But in things, the cause is before the what effect, right? Okay. So the

[29:56] imagine the kind of mistakes he gets into, right? And then Hegel, right? Then Hegel, you know. he's. Influenced by what Spinoza, right? And Hegel deduces the whole universe from the most what general thought we have, being, which passes over into non-being because it says nothing, about what a thing is, and then you get becoming and so on. So he's trying to generate the whole reality from what the most confused idea in our mind.

[30:29] Now the most confused idea in our mind is what comes first in our mind, and our mind knows things in a confused way, right? So he's saying the order in things is the order in our mind, right?

[30:41] So you go from Descartes to Spinoza to to Hegel. That's a very big mistake, isn't it? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But you know, he was saying to Descartes, you know, that natural science resembles pure math. That's a compliment, you know, to me. You know, he's saying, right? He he he wants it to resemble it, right? What was it in that in that second interview? I think it was with the Pope.

[31:05] That's kind of spurious now that they question its authenticity. But the guy said something to him about Descartes. To the Pope? Yeah, Descartes. Yeah, but he never lost his faith, or something like that. The Pope sort of put that qualifier. Whatever, whatever else mistakes he made, he didn't lose his faith. Yeah, yeah. He didn't. He wasn't faithful to his. Yeah, he took the pilgrimage there, you know, to one of the shrines there, you know.

[31:28] I think it's kind of a sign that he. Unlike Unlike Emmanuel Kant, who refused the ministration of his minister at death, he's sent away. Yeah. Yeah, kind of whatever the person's well, shadowy character. Well, whatever.

[31:47] So you can't judge in the same way, right? You know, it used to distinguish, you know, the the way of judging, for example, in the three sciences, huh? Because natural philosophy, natural science, you judge by going back to the what senses, right? So both Aristotle and Einstein said that natural philosophy begins with the senses and it ends with the senses, right? See, everything we say about the natural world goes back to what we learn through our senses, and we judge it by going back to our senses, right?

[32:27] Huh? Okay. Now, is that the way you judge in geometry? See, you have to find a flat surface out here to construct these things that are on a flat surface. Because is this surface really as flat as the geometry needs? No, no, no. But he separates right surface and things of this sort from what sensible matter, right? And he makes them perfectly flat, right? Okay. He imagines them to be that way, right?

[33:01] So his judgment goes back to the what imagination, not to the senses, huh? Okay. But then you get into say science like logic, right? And as my teacher Albert the Great says, you know, the first thing to be considered in logic is the universal, right? Well, where do you go to judge that? Understanding, yeah. Yeah, goes back to the reason, right? So in one case the judges go back to senses, though, and to imagination; other to the reason, right?

[33:35] Huh? And I remember, you know, when you get these people who want to do these Venn diagrams, and so I've got to say that you know some men are, some women are beautiful, right? We got the circle there, and you you call a part of it right, so then you're saying that some are and some are not, right? But you can't really say that, right? Some means some, and to say about the rest.

[34:00] And you can say some women are beautiful, and not all women are beautiful. Some women are beautiful too, you know. Or you can say some are beautiful, if some are and some are not, you know. And so the but they try to replace the universal with the class, right? Well, the class is a multitude, right? It can be imagined, right? So you got a class here, right?

[34:21] Okay. And is a student, you know, the collection of you four guys. Yeah. See, or a student is something that is said of each one of you, which is a true universal, right? But they're confusing the universal, which cannot be imagined, right? Universal whole with the what? Integral. Integral whole, right? Which can imagine it, the multitude, you know, people, right? And so they're kind of trying to resolve to the imagination, and they they misjudge things, right?

[34:55] Randall, yeah, correct. Yeah. But that way, logic is closer to wisdom, right? Because in wisdom you have to judge about the separated substances like the angels or even God Himself by going back to reason. You can't go back and try to imagine the way God is, right? And then you're not able with God's kind of compacted Father, Son, Holy Spirit, just like three three things rolled into one big ball, and you know, judgment's completely off, you know.

[35:30] So you can see why this required a multiplicity of ways of judging, right? Again, theology, right? And you have to what? What does, Article 13 say? He's first going to say that it's the soul. What's the soul of theology? It's the? Scripture, right? So you have to go back to the Word of God, right? Revelation. So when you talk about the Trinity, right? Well, there are three persons in God.

[36:03] Well. Find this in Scripture. You find this in tradition of the Church and the councils and so on. You know God judges by imagination. Your. Senses, right?

[36:19] What is you know the the what's the missing of sensum defectu? Right, you know the faith is supplying for the defect of the senses. The Eucharist, right? You don't judge what the Eucharist is by chemical analysis of host or something, right? You know, that's not the way to judge those things. You know, so

[36:47] there are many ways of judging, right? Many terms to which you go. Got to go back, judge. But dialectic, you see, can proceed from probable opinions anywhere, right? Huh? I can pick up Einstein. Say this guy had had one one year, he had what three hypotheses, all which were worth a Nobel Prize, right? They gave him one for the one they could understand first. It feels a long thing.

[37:18] Since he's never been, you know, a fruitful guy. What does Einstein say? A scientific hypothesis is freely imagined. Well, that's probable if Einstein said so, right? Huh? You know, Mozart does in those operas the most beautiful operas in the world. Mozart says in an opera the words must be altogether the obedient servant of the music. That's highly probable. if Einstein said so, right? Pythagoras said what Pythagorean theorem, right?

[37:52] It's highly probable, right? You know, face it because Pythagoras said so, right? Huh? My God, I know he's got the theorem in geometry. I mean, this got a guy's name attached to it. Everybody's heard the term Pythagorean theorem, right? Yeah, yeah. What a guy he was.

[38:11] But I can use this, you know, David Gomad anywhere, right? I can't judge, you know, certainty of these things by probable opinion, huh? So that's a beautiful comparison Thomas is making, right? Because he sees all these things.

[38:34] Okay, now he's going to come down and say so. He shouldn't be shocked or scandalized or unexpected, right? That there could be a distinction, right? More in judging, right? Now, synesis and gnome are what, according to what are distinguished according to the diverse rules by which they what judge, right? For synesis.

[39:03] Is judging of things to be done according to a common what law, right? But gnome according to what natural reason in those things in which the common law lacking, as we'll be more later on, right? So there's times and you should what?

[39:31] Yeah, you see, maybe times when I should go over the speed limit, right? I get some to the hospital and so on, right? Watching this ambulance coming down, roaring with the lights on blinking and that roaring going on. And of course we're all filled up here. Just as that's coming today, you know, and coming down there in Main Street, there in Shrewsbury, there on Route Nine, there.

[39:55] And I said, "What are you going to do? He's going to go in the left turn aisle I think. That's when he could get biased." I said, "I thought the other people were going to start up."Almost, you know, because they, think they stopped in time he shot on, like that. But he was going on the speed limit, right? But there may be times when you should do something, right?

[40:13] Huh? Could there be a bomb about to be thrown off? Such a thing, well, maybe I should slow down, huh? Yeah. Okay. What about all these other little things that we touched upon? To the fourth, then it should be said that memory, understanding of what, the present, and foresight, similarly caution, docility, and others of this sort, are not virtues diverse from prudence, but in a certain way are compared to it as what integral parts, in so far as all of them are required for the perfection of foresight.

[41:02] There are also certain what subject parts to foresight, or another name for subject parts. There are what species of prudence, right? The household, right—that's the prudence of the father, let's say, or mother. Regnativa, that of the king, right? And actually, in the later on in the Summa Theologiae the second, second day, he distinguishes four species, right? One is the foresight of the individual man, right? So I can take counsel well and so on, and command for myself, right?

[41:40] Then I can what command as a father, I can, yeah. And then there is the what military foresight, and then the what, yeah, yeah. It's interesting, right? So what you see in MacArthur there, you know, in Japan after the war was great, what political foresight, right? But during the war you saw military foresight, right? But they're in proximity there, right? Huh? You see that in in Washington, George Washington, right?

[42:08] You know, he has both military foresight and political foresight, right? You know, they're kind of connected, yeah, yeah. Close together, then. Household foresight, or the father's foresight. Take our own break now. It's three thirty-three. Three thirty-three. Fifty-