Prima Secundae
139. What Makes a Virtue Moral? Moral vs. Intellectual Virtue, Socrates and Augustine (Q58 A1-2)
Class of 2013-10-24
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/139-what-makes-a-virtue-moral-moral-vs-intellectual-virtue-socrates/

[0:00] eight. Then one ought to consider about the moral virtues. We talked before about the order here, right? Huh? Seems to be what reverse of the order in the what? Nicomachean Ethics, right? Or in books three through what five? He talks about the moral virtues, right? And then in book six about the virtues of reason, right? Well, here he has the reverse, right? And perhaps part of that reason is that the virtues of reason are more what shared by God, right?

[0:39] So we have God has understanding. He has knowledge of things by their causes. He has wisdom, right? He has foresight of the whole universe, right? He has, in a spirit way, even has art, right? Huh? Is making the universe, right? But most of the moral virtues God doesn't what have, right? Temperance or mildness, because he doesn't have the emotions, the ones that concern the emotions and so on, right?

[1:02] And does he have courage? No, in strict sense, right? Metaphorically said to be. It's only justice, maybe, that he has, right, or something like that. Maybe the morality too, of course, that's what that great Avicenna said, right? But maybe that's part of reason, right? The ones that are more like God, right? Huh? But leave it at that. And first about the distinction of them from the virtues of reason, right?

[1:31] Huh? Secondly, about the distinction of them from each other according to their what? Right. Yeah, their own matter. Yeah. And that's question fifty-nine, I guess. Okay. Next question. Third, about the what distinction of the chief ones or the cardinal ones, as we call them, from the others, right? Huh? And of course, that's presupposed to the order there of the what second Secundae second part of the second, Because he he does the three theological virtues and then the four cardinal virtues, and the other virtues are you know attached by some likeness to the what?

[2:15] Chief one. Yeah, yeah. So if temperance is a chief one, you get humility comes in there, right? And and eutrapelia and so on, right? That are some similar one mode of proceeding, right? Huh? Mildness is put there, right? See. Okay.

[2:39] Okay. And that's going to be in the what? Not till question sixty-one, I guess. There must be two ones for the distinction among them themselves. About the first five things are asked, right? Now the first thing you should ask is whether every virtue is a moral virtue, and it's going to go back to that idea that moral virtue is, but for the most part, more fully virtue, right?

[3:06] Because it inclines you to to do well as well as giving you the ability to do well. Secondly, whether moral virtue is distinguished from intellectual virtue, right?

[3:20] Third, whether sufficiently virtue is divided to the intellectual and the moral, huh? Something in between. Not till this point that he does that actually, especially. Four, whether moral virtue can be without the intellectual virtue.

[3:39] Five, whether a converso intellectual virtue can be without what moral, Moral, right? What a thorough mind this guy had. Shouldn't we envy him? One should be thankful for him. Thank God for him.

[4:00] Read the studies of modern philosophers, especially you read what's his name English philosopher there. Russell. One of those guys, yeah. But you get kind of an envy for Aristotle, you know, that he should have been so great and had so many. They called me philosopher, you know. I mean, how dare he be called? Yeah. We're all equal, you know. Yeah, we're all equal in stupidity. Yeah. He's fighting Hume too, you know.

[4:30] Aristotle's fame is all gone now. He says, you know, don't worry about him anymore. Took care of that I guess. Yeah, yeah, yeah. He's kind of rejoicing the fact, you know, that he's declined in his.

[4:53] You know, Warren Warren very sainted me, you know, and you can see after De Koninck died, all these guys coming out of the woodwork, you know, you know they envy the man. it's greatness. Because I really admire the humility of De Koninck he would defer to Monsignor Dionne you know, and there was no no envy no no false humility you know.

[5:22] I mean Warren came to De Koninck later than me, you know. he's going to work with De Koninck because he's in science and so on, and De Koninck, you know, made perfectly clear to him that Dionne is the greatest mind up here, you know. And I told him when I was writing my doctoral thesis. Monsignor is my director, you know, and I want to ask De Koninck about the things that he's thinking Why do you bother with me, you know?

[5:42] you got Dionne he said well I don't see what you think too, you know. So he told me what he thought, but you know, I mean, you know, just just amazing. I'd see Monsignor De Koninck's house was not far from where I was, you know. and I'd come out and see Monsignor, walking back and forth there, you know. Before he goes in to see De Koninck, you know, he's probably thinking, "something out that they want to talk about?"

[6:02] you know. and all I'd say is hello and move on quickly. I want to disturb him with this train of thought, But it's kind of remarkable those two guys. Father Boulay was the third guy, you know. he was good too, But De Koninck and Dionne were really great. Um, I was telling the students last night, doing doing the natural philosophy there, you know. But when De Koninck was doing, I don't know, of course, in place or time right you know.

[6:29] I remember, him coming down the hall, and I was kind of standing in the hall, and he stood in front of me and looked up and said, "Isn't this wonderful?" You know, He's just more wonderful than anybody in the whole class. I said, "You know, just he's been teaching this thing you know since the 1930s." He said, "I still see something new when I go through there," you know.

[6:49] Of course, in there in Rome, Monsignor Dionne pointed out something De Koninck had not seen, And De Koninck said, "How is it possible that I had taught this all these years and not seen it?" You know, it's amazing. Those guys, they're marvelous guys. Okay.

[7:03] To the first, then one goes forward thus. It seems that every virtue is moral. For moral virtue is said from mos moris. That is from custom, right? So we call them customary virtues That could be misunderstood today. Of course.

[7:23] Why are they called customary virtues? Because they're produced by what custom, right? Repeated acts. But of all virtues, we are able to be what accustomed to the acts of all what virtues, huh? I'm accustomed to doing geometry now. Let's say, right. Hence, every virtue is moral.

[7:43] What a wonderful gentleman! It's just what what a super kind of guy he is. Like teacher Kasurik said, you know, compared to Aristotle, he says, "I got the brain of an angor."

[8:00] He meant it too. He's a marvelous guy. He was always the best philosopher in the in the graduate school by by far. There's nobody else comparing to to him. None of those guys would ever say that, you know. But he just, you know, compared to Thomas, I got the brain of an angor. However,

[8:25] the philosopher says in the second book of the ethics that moral virtue is a habit with choice, electivus, existing in the middle, of reason towards us. Actually, it's a habit with choice existing in the middle towards us, as determined by right reason, right? To get the whole thing. But every virtue seems to be a habitus electivus, with choice, because the act of any virtue we are able to what do from what choice, right?

[9:03] So I choose to pick up the book from time to time, right? Do a couple marvelous theorems, right? My master there. And every virtue, in some way, consists in the middle of what reason, as will be clear below. So, what did Shakespeare say, right? All my reports go with the modest truth, nor more nor clipped, but so. Or as Falstaff says, they say more or less than the truth.

[9:37] They are what villains and the sons of darkness. Something like that. So you know the truth about the Trinity, right? You know you have, or the Incarnation, the Trinity. You have those who say there are three persons and three what natures, and then there are those who say there's one person. Really, and one nature, and the truth is in between those two, right? Then with Christ, you know, you have the reverse, right?

[10:06] And some say because you have one person, you have one nature there. Some say because you got two natures, you got two persons there. The truth is you have one person with two natures. So the truth is in between, you know. Thomas will explain that, right? Go to the meat, and you can see that about art too, right? Now, if you cook the meat too much, you're going to get criticized.

[10:31] Cook it not enough, it is raw. Still quivering. Yeah, cook it, or you cook the meat too long. So I get these criticisms from time to time. Better to undercook it, you can just put it on again, for a little bit more, but. you know. Yeah, But say we you put soda or seasoning on, and you put too much or too little, right? I put too much pepper in the soup one time, and I was criticized for that.

[10:59] Everybody remembers the time that Daddy put too much pepper in the soup. Everybody remembers. Maybe because it was a memorable occasion, never happened again.

[11:12] And now this beautiful statement of Tully, of Cicero. For Tully says, more of it. Tully says in his rhetoric, right, that virtue is a habit, right? In the manner of nature, right? It's like a second nature, we say, huh? Okay, in what agreement with what reason? That's beautiful.

[11:36] But since every human virtue is ordered to the good of man, is necessary that it be what In agreement, right? Reason. Consent to reason, right? Since the good of man is to be according to reason, as Dionysius says,

[11:52] and therefore every virtue is moral, right? Wow. Wasn't it Gregory the Great that brought Dionysius back to the Western world? I think it was Gregory the Great. I think he'd been out, you know, Monsieur or something out there, you know, and he got to know Dionysius so he developed a unique.

[12:14] But against this is what the philosopher says in the first book of the Ethics, that speaking about what Moribus, right? We do not say conio sapiens, nor intelligens right? He's wise or understands, but that he is what mild or what sober, right? Thus, therefore, wisdom and understanding are not what moral, moral. Understand that, obviously. Today, you would.

[12:47] Which nevertheless are virtues, as has been said above, right? Therefore, not every virtue is what moral, right? Now, somebody, a fellow, was in seminary, and he told his grandmother, "He was studying moral theology," and she said. Is it immoral? theology?

[13:06] Oh I never thought of that. Actually, moral would mean originated without custom, right? I answer. It should be said for the evidence of this to consider is necessary to consider quid sit mos What is mos? For thus we will be able to know what is moral virtue. It sounds like a reasonable proposal when you say.

[13:39] But moss signifies two things. I didn't know that. Sometimes it signifies consuetudinem, which means I guess custom, right? Just as is said in the Acts of Apostles, I guess chapter fifteen, verse one. Unless you be what? Circumcised. Circumcised according to the custom of Moses, you are not able to be saved. That was rejected, wasn't it? Thank God. But he's just quoting it to what they were saying, right?

[14:16] To indicate an example of that one meaning of the word mos. Sometimes it signifies an inclination, right? A certain natural or inclination, right? Or quasi natural, right? Like a second nature, right?

[14:38] To doing something, right? Whence also of brute animals there are said to be somewhat. Yeah. You see this, and I've seen this in natural scientists sometimes.

[14:54] Okay. Whence it is said in the second book of Maccabees, in the eleventh chapter, that the what? The lions. Roaring in the way of the lions, I guess you would say. Yeah. The enemies roaring at their enemies, and the custom of them they prostrated and they killed them. Yeah. So the war that the lions are accustomed to war, right? And this is taken moss in Psalm sixty-seven, where it said, "Who makes them to dwell in the what house in one what?

[15:32] " One custom, one way. Yeah. They have a common inclination, you might say, right? Okay. And these two meanings, in in nullo distinguuntur, nowhere distinguished among the Latins, as regards what? The word. Yeah, the vocal sound, right? But in Greek, they are what distinguished, huh?

[16:00] For ethos, which, with us, signifies what morum, sometimes has the first e long, and it's written per eta. Alpha beta gamma delta epsilon. Eta. Sometimes it has the first what short, and it's written there epsilon, right? Mm hmm Yeah See, You're fighting out every day. This is Thomas, right? And I forget these things. It's interesting.

[16:43] Now, vir, moral virtue is said from mos according as mos signifies a certain what? Natural inclination. Not that he said according to custom, because it's acquired by custom, right? Here he says more inclination, right? A natural inclination or quasi-natural, right? Like second nature, I guess. To what doing something, right?

[17:11] And he says to this meaning of moris, propinqua near is the other signification, by which it signifies what custom. For custom, in a certain way, is turned into what nature. So he called it second nature. It's second nature to me now, like breathing out and breathing in in the musical, right? So he's got a custom of this woman, right? But breathing out, breathing in is custom and nature in the first sense, right?

[17:44] See, it's a second nature to me now. Now it is manifest that the inclination to an act properly belongs to the what desiring power, of whom it is to move all the powers to what? Doing. Yeah.

[18:12] And therefore, not every virtue is said to be moral, but only that which is in the what desiring power. So he answers the first objection then by saying, to the first, therefore it should be said that that objection proceeds from the word mos, according as it signifies what custom, right? It's kind of

[18:45] funny he says that because you might say, you know, that in order to acquire a moral virtue, you have to repeat these acts, right? And then you get this kind of second nature, right? So you just don't think of, you know, let's get drunk this weekend, huh?

[19:06] I remember the kids in high school. You know, hear them talking. You know, let's get drunk this week. You know something like that. You know.

[19:19] You know. I remember. I remember. High school there, Mister Schmidt there. You know, talking about this growing up. You know, and you're brought up right, You know, and so on. You get exposed to these bad things, and say, "Well, Schmidt just doesn't do that." You know, get drunk the weekend. Where would I be? You know, what stupid thing.

[19:46] But you know, I don't think of you know. You see a demonstration, say in Euclid. You know, it's one act, and you kind of what are formed there. You know already. You know, it's not doesn't be repeated like. like This other thing has to, you know.

[20:08] What Hamlet is telling his mother there, you know, about that second husband, right? You know, don't go to bed with him tonight, you know, to make things easier, and you know. But you have to repeat the acts, right? Now, in the intellectual virtues, it seems like you kind of one act you can see something, you know. But but anyway, Thomas says chiefly for for the other meaning of loss, right?

[20:36] The inclination, right, that he argues from, right. Okay, here he says, excuse me, just both of them come by custom, right? So that's not the way he distinguished them, right?

[20:51] To the second should be said that every act of virtue can be done from what choice, huh? But right choice only that virtue which is in the desiring part of the soul makes for a what right choice, huh? The phrase has been said above that to choose is an act of the what desiring desiring part, huh? Okay.

[21:20] Notice that word too that Thomas uses when he talks about love, you know, dilectio, right? You know, where can I translate that chosen love, right? Huh? But obviously love is in the appetite, huh?

[21:37] Whence the habit of choice, which is a what beginning of choice, is only that which perfects the desiring power, although also the acts of other habits are able to come under what choice, huh? So I can choose to think about the triangle, choose to think about motion, think about God, and so on.

[22:08] Now, to the third, it should be said, huh? That nature is a beginning of what motion. The full definition of nature there in the second book of Natural Hearing, Physics, is nature is the beginning and cause of motion and of rest, huh? In that which it is first as such cannot be happened. But he's emphasizing that is a source of motion, right? Huh? But to move things, huh?

[22:41] To doing seems to be proper to the desiring power, right? Okay. And therefore, to be assimilated in nature in agreement with reason is proper to what the virtues which are in the desiring power, right? huh? Article 2. Article 2. Article 2. To second one goes forward. Thus, it seems that moral virtue is not distinguished from what intellectual. I think he'd already saw this thing, but he's been very what precise, right?

[23:27] Very penetrating, right? Very, very thoughtful about these basic things. For Augustine says in the book on the City of God that virtue is the art of living well. I know he'd get in trouble, Augustine, for saying it's an art.

[23:50] But art is an intellectual virtue. There you go. Now Augustine, I don't know about that. Augustine. Therefore, moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue. He's like Pope Francis. He says things that people can twist all around.

[24:06] And how am I going to get him out of this? Get him out of this. Moreover, many times the definition of the virtue of moral virtues is laid down. What Scientia, knowledge, or, science? As some define that perseverance, which is moral virtue, right, is the science or the what habit of those things in which one ought to what remain or what should not remain, right? Stubborn be a vice, right?

[24:37] But virtue is persevering in those things you should persevere in, right? And sanctitas I guess, huh Sanctitas is a science making us what faithful

[24:52] and observing just things that are just according to God, right? But science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore, moral virtue ought not to be distinguished from intellectual.

[25:07] Moreover, Augustine says in the first book of the soliloquies that virtue is recta et perfecta ratio, right, right, in perfect reason. He is in trouble, is Augustine? But this pertains to intellectual virtue, as is clear in the sixth book of the Ethics. Therefore, moral virtue is not distinct from intellectual.

[25:33] Moreover, in the fourth objection, nothing is distinguished from that which is placed in its what definition. But intellectual virtue is placed in the definition of moral virtue, for the philosopher says in the second book of Ethics that moral virtue is a habit with choice existing in the middle. Determined by reason, towards us, he left it out.

[25:59] Determined by reason, right? And insofar as the what Prudent man, huh, Sapiens, would determine, right? Okay. What would Christ do? That didn't say right. Did somebody say? Okay.

[26:19] This right reason of this sort determines the middle of moral virtue. Okay. Or excuse me, this right reason determining the middle of moral virtue pertains to an intellectual virtue, as is said in the sixth book, right? So I should say this too. Does does anger know how much anger you should get, right? My standard argument was, if I bump you coming down the hall, there you bump me down the hall.

[26:47] Should I get angry? That was a pure accident, not at all, right? If you one of these kids that got high school boys down knocking your boys goes down, it's a double of anger, right? Or for being careless, you know, huh? You know. But only reason can consider what circumstances are, right? Using my kids for target practice, right? That golf for. Firm anger, right? Firmly upon response.

[27:15] Yeah. So if your congressman is supporting abortion, you know, maybe you should get all. Most effective thing to get angry with him, but. But against this is what is said. Okay. Therefore, virtue, moral virtue, does not distinguish intellectual. But again, this is what is said in the first book of the Ethics. That virtue is determined according to this difference, right? For we say of these, some are intellectual and some are what moral.

[28:04] Aristotle gives at the end of the first book a division of the two, right? And then books two through what? Five. He takes up the moral virtues in book six, the intellectual virtues, huh? So in. Taming of the Shrew, right? You have a description of the Ethics, right? He's going to apply that part of philosophy that treats of happiness by virtue, especially to be achieved. Shakespeare knew exactly what the Ethics was doing, right?

[28:35] Says it better than most. He would say, philosophy says about what's that book about? Happiness by virtue, to especially to be achieved by mind. Nobody knows why Shakespeare is so wise, but just to read a little bit about things.

[28:57] Now he says the first beginning of all human what? Works. Works is reason, right? Huh. And whatever other beginnings of human works are found, in some way, what obey reason, but in diverse ways, however, huh? For some obey reason altogether, automatic, you might say, right? Without any contradiction, just as the members of the body, right? If they are in their natural state, consistent, right? For immediately, for the Ethic Commander, reason, the hand reaches out, right?

[29:41] Huh? Wow. Especially if there's popcorn at the end of it. Or the foot, right? Okay. Whence the philosopher says in the first book of the Politics that the soul rules the body by despotic principality. That is, as a lord or master rules his what servant, right? Huh? Who has no right of what contradicting him, right?

[30:14] Now some lay down that all active principles which are in man have themselves in this way to reason, huh? Which, if it were true, it would suffice that reason was perfect for acting well, right? Whence, since virtue is a habit by which we are perfected in acting well, it would follow that it was in reason alone, right? Unless there would be no virtue except the intellectual one.

[30:43] And this was the opinion of Socrates of all people, right? Who said that all virtues are what prudences, right? As is said in the sixth book of the Ethics, right?

[30:58] Like if you know the reason why you ever do anything bad is because you don't know what's going on. Yeah. I read an article the other day about somebody talking about vocations, religious life, and I think he's a young Dominican. I was writing this. It was really good. Yeah. Well, well, very good. Except that he says that everybody has a call. God wants what's best for you, and religious life is best.

[31:20] Therefore, everybody is called to religious life. Oh, I said that's a little premature. Yeah, yeah, I thought that's a little premature, and he says so. So therefore, everybody's called, but then not everybody can really live it. So you have to go and try it to see if you really can live it. If you can't, then you can go get married. And I decided that doesn't work. I didn't mean to offend you.

[31:40] Yeah. Yeah. Well, what he's lamenting is that this indecision. They want to discern forever and never get to do anything. So he's trying to get people to do something, but I think he's going about it the wrong way. This. It sounds like this is what he's saying. You can just see this, then do it. It seems to be a very modern problem. I mean, modern world, the problem is ignorance, rather than just.

[32:09] Oh yeah, yeah. When Socrates laid down that man, right, knowledge existing in him was not able to what sin, right? But to every sin, sins an account of ignorance, right? I see. There's some truth to this, right? And Thomas says, quote, even Aristotle saying, you know, every man who sins is mistaken. Then some we think that what is bad is what good, right? And Scripture says the same thing, right?

[32:35] I'll quote Scripture saying the same thing. Okay. But this proceeds from the supposition of something false. For the desiring part, right, obeys reason, not omnino ad nutum, not automatically. I don't know how to translate ad nutum

[32:58] Because the fact that it plays the reason, not blindly. Yeah, Newton said more the idea, of what just you know, Give a gesture, or nod or something but it. Cum obi qua contradiczione right? Mm hmm Some resistance Okay. Whence the philosopher says in the first book of the Politics that reason commands the appetitive, right? By a political rule, by which one rules the what? Free, right? We have some work or some right in what?

[33:35] In a contradicting, right? We call it dialogue today. Whence Augustine says upon the Psalm that sometimes the understanding precedes and there follows a slow or no affection at all, right? Huh? Okay.

[33:56] In so far as it sometimes, huh, by the passions or habits, the appetitive part, this is done, so that the use of reason in the particular is what Impeded. impeded, right? Huh? And according to this, to some extent, it is true what Socrates says, right? Huh? That science being present, one does not what sin, huh?

[34:26] If, however, this is extended usque all down to the use of reason, any particular what? Choosable things. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So one shouldn't commit adultery, but but this woman here now, this is the thing to do, right? You know, it's not applied to that thing, right? Huh? You know, it's like saying, you know, this is adultery. If I shouldn't do this is pleasant, I will do it.

[34:52] You know, the mind is going back and forth like that. Could stop and do either one, right? Thus, therefore, for this that man act well, there is required not only that reason be well disposed to the habit of a what intellectual virtue, right? But also that the desiring power should be well disposed to the habit of what moral virtue, right? So, therefore, just as the desiring power is distinguished from reason, so moral virtue is distinguished from the intellectual.

[35:34] Whence, just as the appetite is a beginning of human action, according as it partakes in some way of reason, so also moral habit has the notion of a human virtue, in so far as it's conformed to what reason, huh? So you have reasonable habits, right?

[36:01] Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said. Now we're going to do the poor Augustine here, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that Augustine communiter right? Generally. Takes art, right? For any right, what reason, right? And thus under art includes also prudence, huh? Not a sloppy right, huh? Which is also right reason of things to be done, right? Huh? Just as art is right reason of things to be done.

[36:34] That's what you're doing there, right? That's one of the forms of what ways that a word becomes equivocal by what reason, right? By dropping out part of its what meaning, right? Okay.

[36:49] So you know when Aristotle takes the word suffering or undergoing, you know, and says that sensing is undergoing, right? Huh? You keep the idea of receiving something, right? But you drop out the idea that it is what that is painful or destructive of you, right? Huh? And then when you go and apply it to understanding, is undergoing too, right? Even drop out the idea of a body, right?

[37:17] huh? You're still kind of receiving there. And so that's one way that a word becomes what equivocal by reason. So it becomes generalized, you might say, right? Huh? Okay. So that's the way. So Augustine off the hook here, right? Okay. But if someone didn't realize that and thought that art was being used,

[37:44] and so it's a little bit, you know, a little bit not the best choice of words, right? But we can put them up this way, huh?

[37:56] And according to this, when it is said that virtue is the art of right living, essentially it belongs to foresight, right? But nevertheless, participative, right? Now, so you got to make these distinctions, Augustine, right? To the other virtues, according as they are what directed according to prudence. I don't know if Shakespeare. I don't know if Augustine knew much of Aristotle. He speaks about the categories, you know, a little bit, but doesn't seem to talk about the Nicomachean Ethics, do you?

[38:26] I don't think he's seen it, you know, and or even knowing physics that well, you know. So it's kind of remarkable how far you go without having. Thomas had the advantage of both Augustine and Aristotle, you know, had that great help of the Greek too, so. But then it's a little, a little, you know. Augustine can be more misleading. Thomas is a little careful there, you know, the way he speaks about those things, right?

[39:01] Okay. Now, those things in the second ones, he says, such definitions, by whomever they are found given, proceed from the Socratic what opinion, right? And they should be. Expounded in the same way as we said about art, right? So he's not exactly saying you should continue that way of speaking, right? It might be misleading, right? And the same thing should be said towards the what third one we said virtue is the right and recta perfecta ratio right?

[39:34] Okay, it's essentially that, but participatively, that, right? That's kind of funny because you know you quoted the definition of virtue before of Augustine, you know, you know, which no one uses badly, which seems to fit just moral virtue, right? And now he's saying virtue is recta perfecta ratio, right? You know, so there's no freedom there in Augustine. Okay, now to the fourth reason, it should be said that right reason, which is according to foresight, is placed in the definition of moral virtue not as a part of its essence, but as something partaken of in all the moral virtues, insofar as foresight directs all the moral virtues, right?

[40:24] You know, partaker reason, right? Now should we stop or what is it? That's good.