Prima Secundae
141. Aquinas on Virtue II (ST I-II q.58 a.5 – q.59 a.2): Prudence Needs Moral Virtue; Virtue and the Passions, Stoics vs. Peripatetics
Class of 2013-10-31
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/141-aquinas-on-virtue-ii-st-i-ii-q-58-a-5-q-59-a-2-prudence-needs/

[0:00] You probably meant to turn around, right? To the fifth, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that intellectual virtue is able to be without moral virtue, right? Now this is a good question for me now.

[0:19] For the perfection of the before does not depend upon the perfection of the after. Yeah, there it is. Before and after, there, right? But we reason is before the sense desiring power, right? And moves it, right? Therefore, the intellectual virtue, which is a perfection of reason, does not depend upon moral virtue, which is a perfection, the appetitive part. Therefore, it is able to be what? Without. it right Moreover, moral things, are the matter of prudence, right?

[0:55] We saw it before in another article. Just as makeable things are the matter of what? Art. Art. But art is able to be without its own matter, right? Just as the metal worker without iron, right? Yes, it's iron, isn't it, Therefore? Therefore, also foresight can be without the moral virtues, which foresight is nevertheless among the intellectual virtues, which among the intellectual virtues most of all would seem to be joined with the moral virtues, right?

[1:34] More foresight is a virtue bene conciliativa, right? Taking counsel well, as is said in the sixth book of the ethics. But many there are who take counsel well, who nevertheless what lack the moral virtues, huh?

[1:54] Therefore, foresight not able to be without moral virtue, huh? Is able to be. Is able to be, yeah. But against this is that to will the bad, to to will to do the bad, right, is opposed directly to moral virtue.

[2:19] But is not opposed to what? To what is able to be without moral virtue? But opposed to what prudence, huh? That someone what? Should sin willingly. Yeah, as is said in the sixth of the ethics, huh?

[2:38] Therefore, prudence is not able to be without what? Moral virtue. Yeah. It's a famous thing that the artist who knowingly what? Makes a bad work. Yeah. It doesn't make art, right? The cook who knowingly ruins the meat? Get even with him now.

[3:10] But the man who knowingly does something immoral, right? He's worse. than The man who unknowingly does. Saint Paul excuses himself a bit, huh? For persecuting the church, huh? He did so unknowingly.

[3:27] Well, Thomas distinguishes, huh? I am sure it should be said that the other moral virtues of reason, rather, are able to be without what? Moral virtue. Yeah. But prudence or foresight is not able to be without what? Moral Virtue. Yeah. And what's the reason for this? Well, the reason for this is that foresight is right reason about things to be done, right? But it's right reason about things to be done not only in universal, because that'd be, you know, that'd be the science of ethics or something, right?

[4:08] But also in the particular, the individual, in which are actions, right? But right reason presupposes the beginnings from which reason what goes forward. But it's necessary for reason to proceed, right, about particulars, not only from universal beginnings, but also from what? Particular beginnings.

[4:39] Yeah. Now, about the universal beginnings of things to be done, a man has himself rightly through the natural what understanding of beginnings, through which a man knows that nothing bad should be done, right?

[4:56] Or also through what some practical science, right? You study the Nicomachean ethics, right? But this does not suffice to reasoning rightly about what? Particular particulars, huh?

[5:15] For it happens sometimes that the universal beginning of this sort, known by what understanding or by science, right, is corrupted in the particular, right, by some what? Passion huh? What's the expression? An offer I couldn't resist. Can't resist. Just as to the one who is what has concupiscence right? For when concupiscence conquers, right, it seems that this is good what one desires, even though it be against the universal judgment of reason, right?

[6:04] And therefore, just as a man is disposed to have himself rightly about the universal beginnings, either through natural understanding, right, or through the habit of science, so also that he have himself rightly about the particular beginnings of things to be done, which are the ends, because it is necessary that he be perfected by some habits by which it becomes, in a way, to man a natural right to rightly judge about the what end.

[6:41] And this comes about through moral virtue. For the virtuous man rightly judges about the end of virtue, because such as a man is, so does the end seem to him.

[6:55] Thomas will go back there. He's talking about damnation, right? Can't change your habits there. Once you're out of time, we're not out of time.

[7:11] And therefore, for right reason about things to be done, which is foresight, it's required that man have what moral virtue. So Socrates didn't quite see that.

[7:39] Now, what about this before and after this case of look before and after? To the first, therefore, it should be said that reason, according as it is grasping the end, comes before the what desire of the end. You can't desire the end unless you know it in some way, right? But the desire of the end goes before reason reasoning about choosing those things that are what for the end, which pertains to prudence.

[8:17] So Thomas is seeing distinction, distinction there, right? The way in which reason is before the appetite there, and the way in which the appetite is before reason.

[8:31] Just as also in speculative matters, the understanding of beginnings is the beginning of reason syllogizing huh Well what about the second objection? To the second, it should be said that the beginnings of artificial things are not judged by us well or badly according to the disposition of our appetite. As the ends, which are the beginnings of what moral matters, but only by the consideration of reason, and therefore art does not require a virtue perfecting appetite, just as prudence requires.

[9:17] Is Thomas contradicting himself what he said earlier? I was going to say, yeah. Yeah. But is that you know that desire of the end is proper to the the virtue, right? I mean, to the art, you know, is not a virtue perfecting what maybe the sense appetite, right? There's got to be some intention of that end, right? One intends to to make right.

[9:49] Sort of like the cook didn't intend to make the the food tasty, let's say, right? She would be a cook Yeah. that's what I I was thinking of that. just some years ago when we were talking about marriage, and some people think that marriage is something other than what it actually is. Are they actually getting married? They're intending something that isn't marriage. Is that marriage? It happens all the time.

[10:13] That's no problem. That's what happens. Moral excuse me mental breakdown. I remember when my brother Richard was getting married. he was getting married, and the priest, you know, you know, he was happy to marry them, you know, because he thought they'd stay together, you know, These married people he thought, you know, they're going to stay together, you know, they just they don't. Yeah, yeah. It's kind of discouraging that way.

[10:39] That's right. I know Father Abbott said that once about priests. I don't know Boston, some big archdiocese, and I think they took a survey and had the clergy all meeting together, big whole bunch of them, and lots of experience, many years have been around. And what did they find the least, or they might say the most difficult? What's the word I'm looking for? The distasteful, the most disagreeable part of their priestly ministry.

[11:02] they all said wedding preparations. The marriage prep. he said it's like they're on another planet. Just another. They don't have any idea what they're doing, and they don't care. Yeah. So it's like the most uncomfortable and distasteful part of their priestly ministry.

[11:21] They're more concerned about the flowers and their hair and their whatever the reception. Where do you start? Yeah. Yeah. I'd be real tempted if I were a parish priest to say, "Just go to a JP, and we'll talk later. Finish the ceremony, and then come back to me. Walk through instructionally. " That'd be a real temptation.

[11:58] Yeah, because if there isn't the moral virtue there, you're not going to be disposed to make a good, good choice. And the old shotgun weddings are more stable than the ones they have now. You think you think a shotgun wedding would not be? You know.

[12:41] I remember seeing a woman say, "You know, shouldn't I just this term illegitimate child? " Right? You know, in my day we called it love child. Yeah. Yeah.

[12:55] Yeah, there was a song by the Supremes, Dan, Dan Carroll, or whatever he was. The Supremes had a song like "Love Child." That's what

[13:07] I heard somebody say. I just read an article about it was a comment about Donald DeMarco who writes articles in Wanderer, and he was commenting on a comment from Peggy Noonan, who writes for the Wall Street Journal. She was at some play production. I don't know what the play was, but it was something from the fifties or sixties. And t here is this moral dilemma in a scene, and this young woman is she talks about her.

[13:35] She's pregnant and she wants to have an abortion. She mentions this in the play. When the play was produced, that's meant to be a dramatic moment, and everybody's supposed to be like horrified. She said she was at the play. Everybody cheered when she said that. It's like, what? And what? We have no judgment about these things at all. We don't get it. That's what she he calls it.

[13:55] inculturation not enculturation but inculturation When in culture, you're closed in on yourself, and this is our complete system, and nothing else fits into it, so t here is no option for life anymore. That's not that's off the radar screen. The only good thing is wow, they're just closed in on their own universe.

[14:22] I was first in Worcester, there you know. I was still a bachelor, you know, I was living in a place that was rented out, kind of rooms, you know, kitchen privileges and so. We got to know a young man, and he'd gotten married, right? And they'd been married for a while, and they found out that his wife was, you know, taking, you know, at. Contraception pill.

[14:44] Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, known to him, right? She had no intention of having children at all. She just wanted to get married for social reasons, you know. And he wanted children very much, you know. And so, this seemed to me, you know, to be, you know, a reason, yeah, yeah, and so. I guess the she was willing to you know testify that she had no intention of having children, right?

[15:13] She wasn't hiding the fact, right? Yeah, I guess the priest who married them was convinced that she was, you know, in this situation. I went. I went and talked to Canon Lord, and I said, "We got to have some witnesses beforehand, you know. " Well, she's going to tell some witnesses beforehand, you know. Here, she's willing to testify that she had no intention, you know, children, and the priest who married them was, you know, talking to her and him, you know, was convinced that this is what the situation is, you know.

[15:39] And the Canon Lord is saying you've got to have witnesses beforehand. You are like she's supposed to told you and you. I am getting married, so I have no intention of having children. Well, I mean, that seems like you know. I mean, they're lying, which I don't think they were at all. Either one of them, you know, you know, she won't admit. There's, there's a call of judgment there.

[15:59] Yeah, yeah. It seems I don't know. I don't know. Yeah. That to me seemed to be, you know, reasonable. You know. I know it was. I've heard from a fellow who said that way back when, who was somebody. I don't know if it was his own wife or somebody else that he had talked to, but I guess back in the day, maybe in the fifties and sixties.

[16:29] Since then, I can't imagine anybody does this anymore. But if a married woman wanted to have some kind of contraceptive implant in her body, they had to get the husband to sign agreement. Otherwise, the doctor wouldn't do it because it has to be agreed. Today, who cares? Who cares? It's a woman's right to determine what she wants. At least they had some sense of what the purpose of marriage is, and it's a consensual marriage

[17:07] So we finish the article quicker The last objection. Okay. To the third, should be said then that foresight not only is bene conciliativa, right, but also bene educativa and bene praeceptiva, right? And especially that last thing cannot be, unless that removed is removed, the impediment of passions corrupting the judgment, right? And the command of prudence, right? So he says it's it's what affecting the judgment and the command of prudence, not so much the what, not so much the consul, right?

[17:56] The consul. What's the name of that diplomat that worked for Napoleon there? What's the Italian man? Yeah, he was good in consul, right? But he was kind of a scoundrel in personal life, as far as I know. You know.

[18:12] I mean, he was pretty good for getting friends, you know, off, you know, with these deliberations with the victorious powers and Napoleon fell, you know, and so on. He's a pretty smart guy, you know, but he was not. Rascal. Yeah.

[18:35] So. Take a little break now before you look at. So we have a proemium here, question fifty nine. Then we're not to consider about the distinction of the moral virtues, right? To each other, right?

[18:58] And because the moral virtues, which are about passions, are distinguished according to the diversity of the passions, it is necessary first to consider the comparison of virtue to passion, and then secondly the distinction of the moral virtues according to the passions. And that's going to be the next question, right?

[19:23] This is presupposed that. So about the first five things are asked: whether moral virtue is a passion, it's an emotion, right? Just to ask kids, what is love? What's a feeling? Yeah.

[19:43] I said, well, there's a love, and there's a feeling, but there's the the end all, where you start. Secondly, whether moral virtue is able to be with passion, right? Well, that's a attack upon the Stoics, right? You know, the Stoics just seem to speak that way. And of course, Shakespeare has that pun on the Stoics. Don't be such stocks you know, like he said No. Third, whether it can be with sadness, huh?

[20:16] That's very interesting. Four, whether every moral virtue is about passion, right, or emotions? And whether there can be some moral virtue without passion? Very, very thoughtful guy, this guy Thomas. You know, never met anybody so thoughtful.

[20:39] Okay. To the first, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that moral virtue is a passion, huh? For the middle is of the same genus with the extremes,

[20:52] but moral virtue is a middle among the passions. Therefore, moral virtue is a passion, right? What is it? A middle in the passions, or does it establish a middle in the passions? What? I have to see. Moral virtue and vice, since they are contraries, are in the same what genus? But some passions are said to be what vices, such as envy and what anger, right? I used to give us in the great school there, you know, the catechism: anger is a vice, right, or something.

[21:38] Then we find out that Christ was angry, right? The one time there, the exe says so. Therefore, also some passions are virtues, right? See, so some vices are passions, and some virtues must be passions, right? Because they're the same genus contraries. That's an interesting thing. Moreover, mercy is a certain what? Passion, huh? For it is sadness about the what? Evils of others, right? Has it been said above, huh?

[22:14] But this Cicero, right, huh? A what? A marvelous speaker, right? Does not doubt to be called a what? Virtue, right? When I was talking about that kind of romance, and the mercy and forgiveness romances, I call them, right? There being six of them in Shakespeare. Please, as Augustine says in the ninth book of what, the City of God, huh? Therefore, passion can be a moral virtue, huh?

[22:49] But against this is what is said in the second book of Ethics that passions are neither virtues nor what vices, I suppose, right? Now, what does the master say? See,

[23:09] I think Thomas should be called the Magister, not Lombard, but anyway, Thomas should be called the commentator, not a verbalist, right? I answer: It should be said that moral virtue is not able to be a what? Passion. Passion, and this is clear for a threefold what reason, right?

[23:34] First, because passion is a certain motion, right? Of course, we use the word in English. We use the word emotion, right? Which comes in the word motion, right? Of course, when Aristotle takes up motion in the third book of the Physics, it's when he talks about actio and passio, right, huh? Okay. So, my kicking you is you're being kicked at kind of the same thing, right, huh?

[24:04] Part of part of the whole part of the whole thing. Yeah. But moral virtue is not some motion, right, huh? But more a beginning of some what? Appetitive motion existing as a certain what habit, right? It's more a habit than a what?

[24:29] Yeah. And it's a source of some appetitive motion, right? Secondly, because passions from themselves do not have the what character of good or bad, right, huh? Why? Because the good or the bad of man is to be in accordance with reason. That's what Dionysius says too, right?

[25:01] Whence passions, considered as such yeah, considered by themselves, right, have themselves to good and to bad according as they're able to agree with reason or not agree Yeah, Convenire, come together with reason. That's kind of interesting, isn't it? That's kind of concrete, huh?

[25:31] When Shakespeare says you know something about love and reason don't keep much company nowadays, right? And that's you know pity certainly doesn't make them better quaintly says you know you know but that kind of fits the word convenire, right? Come together etymologically, huh? Means come together with, right? Come with, yeah, yeah.

[25:55] But nothing such is able to be a virtue, since virtue has itself only to the what good, huh? As has been said above, right, now.

[26:11] Third, because it being given that some passion has itself only to the good, right, or only to the bad, right, so we tend to speak of pity as what passion that's good, right, and envy is a passion that's bad, right, huh? Okay.

[26:34] So, given that this is so in some way, secundum aliquem modum, right, in some way. Nevertheless, the motion of a passion, in so far as it is a passion, has a beginning in the what appetite or desire, and a term in what reason, yeah, in the conformity to which the appetite what tends, right?

[27:06] But the motion of virtue is the reverse, for it has a beginning in reason and an end in the what desire, in the desire part, according as it is moved what by reason, by reason, right? Whence, in the definition of moral virtue, it is said in the second book of the Ethics that it is a habit, right, electivus, meaning a choosing habit or a habit with choice, in the middle, right, consisting in the middle, determined by what reason, as the wise would what to you, yeah, as the wise man is to measure these things, right.

[27:52] To get yourself a good vehicle, not many men are wise. Yeah. Okay. So, like I was saying, to the first, therefore, it should be said that virtue, according to its essence, is not a middle among passions, but it's a middle according to its effect, because it constitutes, say, what middle among the passions, right? Okay. So that comes up in virtue and is two right there. Sick that surfeits too much is in star with nothing, right?

[28:32] There's no mean happiness, therefore, to be constituted in the mean. The second should be said. If vice is said to be a habit by which someone acts badly, right? It is manifest that no passion is a what vice. If, however,

[29:09] a sin is called a what vice, which is a vicious act, right? That's nothing prevents a passion to be a what vice, and contrary to run together to the act of virtue, according as a passion is either contrary to reason or follows the act of what reason.

[29:39] What's he saying? here huh? Why are envy and anger those the ones he takes here, right? Why are they what Some would call it vices because incline us, I suppose, right, to do something what bad, right? Every time you pick up the daily newspaper, which I am glad you don't do, but there's always somebody who got angry with somebody and shot him or knifed him or something.

[30:11] So many vicious things going on out there, you know. And envy, you know, my goodness, the evil envy does, right? You know, that's well at the end of Julius Caesar, there, right? You know, and he kind of praises

[30:35] Brutus, right? Others did what they did out of envy of great Caesar. He did out of concern for the common good, right? He thought he was going to make himself a tyrant. The others, you know, did out of envy, right? And that's true about, in it to some extent, about Christ too, isn't it? Probably Pilate knew it. Yeah, yeah Says in the gospel, yeah, yeah. So envy is quite a thing, you know.

[30:58] One of the previous translations that Father Elias made of one of our hymns is a supplication on Friday, I think, or no, it's for Sunday. It gives a little overview of the history of salvation and the incarnation, verse by verse, and the old way he had it translated. They changed it probably to be more diplomatic or something. But he said the envious crucified. That's what he translated.

[31:22] I think that's probably a more literal translation. Was the same name? I don't remember. I have to look at it, but they dropped the envious part. They changed it into a I don't know That's for midday prayer.

[31:45] Yeah, you see that in the academic world, you know, envy, you know. So when they kind of. say, "Well, that's half the faculty gone now." How many they like me saying that? Until it survives. Let me show you And so yeah the. the uh la I guess uh virtue of Pope John Paul II before he became pope, and he was. He was in Poland. There were only two cardinals in Poland at that time: him and Wyszynski.

[32:19] And he was commenting on something about. What was it? Maybe it was the other way around. Maybe somebody else was commenting on him. Whatever it was, I think he was commenting about the cardinals of Poland. Yeah, And he's referred to Wyszynski as two thirds of the cardinals, of Poland. Even though there's only two. He's more than half the cardinals of Poland. something like that.

[33:05] So there's a likeness here between the passion and the vice, right? The virtue for that matter? right? It inclines you, right? So pity, probably. would incline you to do something good, right? And envy, you know, something bad, right? You know. See, women being envious of each other, you know, sometimes. What was I reading? Talking about all the all the.

[33:44] All the evils, all the hardships and misery we bring on ourselves by by this kind of envy and all. What was I reading? Tell me about it. It was describing a woman going out, and she does all these awful things to herself, and she makes herself miserable so she can have a moment to look good in front of other people. or something like that And and then and she's she's always miserable because she's worried about what everybody else is doing.

[34:06] Whatever. See how can this be happiness? How can this be? What was I reading? I can't remember. what it was reading. It was describing this kind. of thing. They told the story of the woman coming in, you know, to the meeting at the White House. There, you know, with the president's wife, not the president, but. And I guess the president's wife had on the same hat. This woman coming in, had.

[34:26] So this woman, when she saw that she had the same hat on, she quickly took her hat and turned it upside down. So I'm like, what the heck? I don't care if I came out and some guy had the same hat I have, You know. I said, "Hey, I like your hat." I went up to Thomas Moore there one time to talk, you know, and and the president of the college was there, Chris, and he had the same suit on that I had on, you know.

[34:51] So We're both conservatives. We had the same style suit. But it didn't bother me, and I tried to turn my suit inside out. Well, a woman do. For a woman, no, can't be done. Intolerable. Yeah.

[35:21] The third one now. Mm-hmm. The third should be said that mercy is said to be a virtue. That is the act of a virtue, right? Huh? Because we sometimes say that, right? That's justice, right? Yeah. Justice will be done. That means it'll be just, act. Same way here. Secundum quod, huh? the motion, that motion, right? Of the soul serves what reason, right? Huh? When thus what mercy is bestowed, the justice is conserved, right?

[35:55] Huh? Whether it given to something in need, right? Or when one what forgives the one who's penitent, right? As Augustine says, there, right? If, however, mercy is said to be some habit by which man is perfected to reasonably taking mercy, right? Nothing prevents mercy to be said to be a what? Yeah, yeah. And the same reason is about similar passions, right? Now I was telling you about that case in the in the parish there, you know, where some woman was complaining to somebody about criticizing abortion, right?

[36:40] Now because it makes some woman feel bad, right? Well, that's kind of a false what? Compassion. Yeah, yeah, false mercy, you know. And so, see if I went to the pastor to complain about it, and he says, "Well, they should feel sorry about it." He says, "It's a serious sin," you know. Yeah. So put her in her place, so she's gonna, you know, get the. That's the kind of thing Charles Bonnell refers to, he refers to some kind of pastoral practices where they refer to it as a kind of pious way, a loving way of dealing with a certain kind of penitence because their sins are sort of understandable.

[37:16] Like young couples are constantly fornicating or something. It's just well, you should you treat them easily because you know they're just in love, and he calls it an impious kind of piety. Yeah. You're not helping them. Okay. The little one, yeah. The kids come tonight. Up and down. You do. Up and down the stairs. Up and down the stairs. They don't come in here. No, they won't dare to come in.

[37:51] I was telling you earlier about the little kid next door, right? Did I tell you that story about the little one? Last, last, he's in the kindergarten now, but last one he came there, and of course his mother was going around thinking it's a little kid, and and he'd taken off his mask, you know, and his mother said, "They took off his mask. They don't want to scare you."

[38:12] Yeah, concerned about me, you know, to stir me too much. Don't talk about her there. That's so cute. So, the second one go forward. Thus, it seems that moral virtue is not able to be with passion, right? Huh?

[38:36] For the philosopher says in the fourth book of the Ethics huh, that the mild one is the one who does not what. Suffer. Yeah, but the patient one is the one who suffers and is not what led astray by it, right? Okay, and the same reason can be given about all the moral virtues. Therefore, every what. Moral virtue is without passion, right?

[39:11] You won't find anything like this in Descartes, by the way. They never bothered to object to their own thinking. Moreover, virtue is a certain right habitudo, right? Relation or I don't know what you mean No Habitudo yeah. Sometimes it has a sense of relation but disposition, right, In the soul, just as health of the body, as is said in the seventh book of natural hearing, whence virtue seems to be a certain health of the soul, right?

[39:49] Huh. Okay. And vice is the sickness of the soul, right? You sick? We say it. This one people. Okay. As Tully says in the fourth book of the Tusculan Questions,

[40:03] but the passions of the soul are called certain what sicknesses, right? There you go. Of the soul, as Tully says, Cicero says in the same book.

[40:16] But health does not what suffer with itself, sickness, right? Therefore, virtue does not suffer with itself. Okay. Not compatible with it, right? We'd say that comes the same root there. The passion of the soul, right? Huh. Okay. Moreover, number three here. moral, virtue requires a perfect use of reason, even in the particular, right? But this is impeded by passions, as the philosopher says in the sixth book of the Ethics, that pleasure is corrupt.

[40:57] The estimate of foresight and prudence. watch out for pleasure. Aristotle warns us about that. And Sallust says in his thing on what? Catiline conspiracy. That the soul does not what easily see the true, where what those things are active, right? The passions of the soul. Therefore, moral virtue is not able to be with what action.

[41:36] But against this is what the great Augustine says in the fourteenth book about the City of God. If the will is perverse, right? It also has what perverse motions, right? Of passions, that's to say. If, however, the will is right, not only are the passions, what? Inculpable. Not guilty. Praiseworthy. But even praiseworthy, right? But nothing praiseworthy is excluded through moral virtue. Therefore, moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but can be with them.

[42:11] That's interesting. It's nice to take some of this stuff. I know Mother Teresa used to say that too about that. I think she used the example of Rome with the emotions. If you see someone in need and you have the emotion of compassion for them, you feel pity for them, then that actually can make your good deed more virtuous because it moves you more and somebody to be more generous or whatever.

[42:38] So shame, good shame. There's a shame that's praiseworthy and a shame that's shameful. Yeah. I answer. It should be said that about this there was discord between the Stoics and the Peripatetics, which are the Aristotelians, right? As Augustine says in the ninth book of the City of God. For the Stoics laid down that the passions of the soul cannot be found in the wise man or in the virtuous man, right?

[43:12] So there are stocks, of Shakespeare Stuck is it stocks. But the Peripatetics, I guess they're named because they walked around when he lectured, right?

[43:25] Whose sect Aristotle? What instituted, right? As Augustine says in the ninth book of the City of God. Laid down that the passions could be together, right? Simultaneously, at the same time, with moral virtue, right? Mm-hmm. Um but the passion says, reduced to what? The middle, right? So Aristotle's more human, right? Mm hmm So they start to think of the Peripatetics as being between the Stoics and the, you know, Epicureans, right?

[43:53] And the Epicureans go in one direction, you know, and the other. Yeah, yeah. The one won't eliminate the passions altogether. The other ones they're gonna kind of give into the passions, you know. Oscar Wilde said, "I can resist anything except temptation." Yeah.

[44:14] You know, he said, "What the best way to handle temptation is to give into it." Finishes right off. That's very funny, but it's very wicked too. He's saying.

[44:28] Looking down the house, he said, "The serious." Now, notice this caution here now. This diversity, as Augustine says, there is more secundum verba, right? Than according to their very what positions, right?

[44:53] For the Stoics did not distinguish between the what intellectual appetitive power, which is the will, right? And what? Sense. And between yeah, the sense, desiring power, which is divided by the irascible and the what? Concupiscible Or epithumia and thumas in Greek, right? They did not distinguish in what? In this. passions of the soul. Soul from the other affection of human affections, right? That the passions of the soul are motions of the sensitive what desiring power.

[45:36] The other affections, which are not passions of the soul, are motions of the intellectual desiring power, which is called the will, right? Just as the what? Peripatetics distinguish them, right? Huh? But only as regards this, that the passions they called some affections that were repugnant to what reason, right? Well, that would be a disagreement in words, right? But not in thing. But if they arise from deliberation, in the wise men or in the what?

[46:10] Virtuous. Virtuous men. They cannot be right. If, however, they arise suddenly, this can happen in the virtuous man, right? Huh? For the things seen of the soul, which are called what? Fantasms, are not in our power, but they will sometimes happen to the soul, right? Huh? And when they come from what? Terrible things, right? Huh? Is necessary that they move the soul of the what? Wise men, huh?

[46:44] That he be what? A little bitter against the time, yeah. Or the yeah, by fear, or be contracted in some way by sadness, right? Huh? Nevertheless, these passions come before the what? Work of reason, right? Huh? Nevertheless, they what? Prove these And they consent? Yeah, as Augustine narrates in the ninth, of the City of God, said by what? Somebody called Aulus Gellius. Thus, therefore, if passions are called disordered affections, they cannot be in the virtuous man, right?

[47:28] Huh? Thus, that after deliberation he consents to them, as the Stoics lay down. If, however, the passions are said to be whatever. Emotions of the sense of appetite; thus, they can be in the virtuous man, according as they are ordered by what reason. Reason, right? When Aristotle says in the second book of the Ethics that what? Some, excuse me. Yeah, they do not well determine the virtues to be what impassibilitatis, huh?

[48:02] Without passions, right? Mm-hmm. And rest, because they say what? They speak simply. Yeah, but they ought to say that they are what at rest from passions, which are as ought not to be, right? Mm-hmm. And when they ought not to be, right? Huh? Okay. They can have your children, I guess, right?

[48:32] How about this text from Aristotle. Well, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the philosopher induces that example just as many other ones in the logical books, not according to his own opinion, but according to the opinion of others, right? This is a point that Thomas makes more than once about Aristotle, right? Huh? For this was the opinion of the Stoics, right? That virtues were without the passions of soul, which opinion the philosopher excludes in the second book of the Ethics, huh?

[49:04] Saying that virtues are not what impassibilitatis. Yeah. How would you translate that, right? But not being able to be moved, right? Emotional event or something. Yeah. By passion.

[49:20] But it can never, however, it can be said that when it is said that the mild man does not undergo, it should be understood does not undergo a what disordered passion, right? Huh? Okay.

[49:38] That's the way he solves the objection from Tullius, right? Huh? That it proceeds about passions according as they signify what disordered affections, right? Now maybe he's being too kind to the Stoics, right? Because sometimes they seem to you know deceive you. And you think that all right, your wife and children are being killed, and you just you know I can't do anything about it, so I won't feel anything about it, you know.

[50:03] Sorry, I always tell people who are pacifists to say, "Do you think a man whose wife is being beaten and his children are being killed, and he should he should say, offer it up, dear, turn the other cheek?" No. No.

[50:22] So he says, a passion coming before the judgment of reason, if it overcomes, right, it prevails in the soul that one consent to it, right? Then it impedes the counsel and the judgment of reason, right? If, however, it follows as it were, commanded by reason, right? It aids, or what, to carrying out the command. What reason, right? So if you're shooting, using my kids as target practice, right?

[50:51] An anger that comes from my considered judgment about this matter will help me to, you know. Or if you're stepping on my toe and I say you're on top of my toe, and you say so what? None. That's your problem, buddy. A little bit of anger would be help me to carry out the pulse of this attack upon my toes.

[51:17] I better stop now so I can get home for the.