Prima Secundae
144. Summa I-II Q.60 Aa.2–4: Virtues of Operations and Passions, Justice and Its Kinds, Padre Pio on Suffering, and Being True to Oneself
Class of 2013-12-05
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/144-summa-i-ii-q-60-aa-2-4-virtues-of-operations-and-passions/

[0:00] Name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas, Deo gratias God, our enlightenment. Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand all that you have written. Before we begin here at the second article, I guess, question sixty, I was reading a biography here, of Padre Pio, right?

[0:36] I picked up when I was out there, and a little passage here that kind of touches upon this suffering, right? She suffer like a like a stoic, or she suffered like a more human way, right? Okay.

[0:54] He's describing the last part of Padre Pio's life. Padre Pio is now making his way towards eternal life, and every day he is afflicted by ills which no mortal can escape. But he carries them; he doesn't simply bear them with submission to divine will, to the point that he makes even those who are suffering and who see his example become resigned to God's will. He does not deny his sufferings when he truly suffers.

[1:27] My son, I feel completely shattered. He would reply to our questions, and then he would quickly add, "May God's will be done." Agony is a familiar visitor to his soul, his tears are to his eyes. Even if others don't notice this much, as he always appears to be jovial. Father Agostino, who is one of his spiritual directors and like that, tells us in his diary, "I found Padre Pio very disheartened.

[1:58] As soon as we were alone together in his cell, he started to cry. I was upset, but I was able to control this. I let him cry for a few minutes. Afterwards, we talked. The dear Padre told me that he felt this unexpected trial deeply. But then, having allowed his humanity to show through, he quickly takes a grip on himself and begins to joke, even about his own problems, and he blesses and thanks the Lord.

[2:26] And quoting again from the diary, I found him very much relieved. Thank God. How do you spend your days now? I asked him. He replied, "I pray and study as best I can, and I annoy my brothers. "

[2:45] In what way? I said. I joke as before, and even better than before. He's his own best audience. Then he clearly said, during the first days of the terrible trial, I felt very bad, but then the Lord sustained me, and so I adapted myself to my new surroundings. May Jesus be thanked. But you must come to see me. I need a friendly, brotherly, fatherly word. So the guy commented, "How comforting it is to find common elements in exceptional men.

[3:22] Marble and bronze heroism arouse astonishment, but they do not warm the heart. Christian heroism, on the other hand, dwells in hearts of flesh, without destroying the innocent weakness of human nature, and in this sanctity finds strength and beauty. The fact that the saints suffer and are happy to suffer does not mean that they do not feel the pain. They can crucify their flesh, but by doing so they do not change it into stone nor render it insensitive.

[3:57] They are not made of stone, and they haven't got any of the qualities of the Stoics, whose ambition it was to quote make all feelings die.

[4:08] It cost the Holy Curé d'Ars a great deal, for example, to get up before dawn every morning, and many times would enter the confessional with a great with a great sense of reluctance.

[4:21] Padre Pio suffered, he says, humanly, right, and not stoically. He desired to suffer always more and without any comfort, and this constituted all his joy, because those souls who suffer without any comfort lighten the sufferings of Jesus more. Padre Pio would say, quote, "I am an egoist where suffering is concerned. I want to suffer alone. I should reproach myself if I were to seek to be deprived of the cross, even for a single hour, or worse still, if others were to step in and rob me of it.

[4:59] And in order to alleviate the sufferings of the Good Jesus, he remained faithful to his daily program till the end: choir, altar, confessional, getting there in latter times with the help of a wheelchair. Thus realizing the words he had said to his spiritual director on the twelfth of November, back in nineteen fifty four, I would prefer to be brought to the confessional on a chair rather than not hear confessions any more.

[5:26] So that's interesting. Who is the author of that? This is a noted Capuchin, and his name is Alessandro of Ripabottoni, a Capuchin friar, religious province San Angelo and Padre Pio. He's considered one of the best of the Capuchin religious, best historian, Capuchin religious province. Does not mark that page. Mark that page so I can. copy that Do you have a stick Pope in here Something else Or you can put this yeah It's the Eucharistic Miracle, Lanciano.

[6:03] Oh, did you go there too? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Beautiful. See, you look pampered if I look at you. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Put the book in there now. You can put this in if you want. Put this. Oh.

[6:17] It's on the chair. Yeah, on the chair. Yeah. Okay. That's my son. That's the way that that picture is with a phone. Totally. That's phenomenal. It's a great picture. Certainly one page for the next page. Thank you.

[6:35] Yeah. Oh, I didn't see that. You love Charles. So what's that? You were here just last few weeks ago. Yeah. You went gone to

[6:56] where's the house? Loretto. Went to Loretto. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Went to place to see Matthew's buried too. Well, I didn't know that. Yeah, Salerno. Didn't these churches see Matthew? I didn't know that. So, that was interesting.

[7:14] Went to Saint Francis of Assisi again then. Yeah. Okay. So we're up to Article Two here in Question Sixty, huh? Think so. To the second one goes forward. Thus, it seems that moral virtues are not distinguished from each other by this that some of them are about operations, right? Others about passions or emotions, right?

[7:40] First objection: for the philosopher says in the second book of the Ethics that moral virtue is what pleasures. It's operative of the best things about what pleasures and what sadness, right? But pleasures and sadnesses are certain passions. Therefore, the same virtue, which is about passions, is also about the operations as existing as something operative or doing.

[8:12] Moreover, second objection: passions are the beginnings of exterior operations. If therefore some virtues rectify passions, is necessary that also consequently they rectify operations. Therefore, the same moral virtues are about passions and operations.

[8:34] Moreover, to every exterior operation, the sensitive appetite is moved either well or badly. But the motions of the sensitive appetite are passions. Therefore, the same virtues which are about operations are also about what passions, right? So you discover something. Intellectually, that you were looking for, right? You feel good. Yeah. So the emotions, right? Even those things. But against this is that the philosopher lays down that justice is about what operations, but temperance and fortitude and mildness, right, gentleness, are about certain what passions.

[9:19] So he sees as a distinction, right? See a text there in Thomas there where he's talking about the moral virtues not the end of life, right? Because moral virtues are over to something else than themselves, right? You can see says in the greatest of them. Guess what virtues he takes up? Fortitude and justice. Fortitude is about passions, and justice is about actions. Now Thomas is going to solve the objections, right, and not even take them up individually by this distinction he points. Out here, I answer.

[10:03] it should be said that both operation and passion can be considered or compared to virtue in two ways. In one way, as what effects, and in this way, every moral virtue has some good but operations, which is productive, right?

[10:31] And also some pleasure or sadness, right, which are passions, right? But in another way, they can be compared. What operation can be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which it is? And in this way, is necessary to be other than moral virtues that are about operations as a matter, and those that are about what?

[11:07] And the reason for this is because good and bad in some operations is to be attended according to themselves, in whatever way a man is affected towards them, right? So if I pay my debts happily or sadly, right, I'm a just man.

[11:33] In so far as the good in them, right, and the bad in them, is taken according to the reason of the what commensuration, huh? To another, right?

[11:48] You agree to paint my house. I agree to pay you Yeah. Yeah. And in such things, there is some virtue directive of the operations in themselves or by themselves, right? Just as buying and what? Selling.

[12:09] And in all doings of this sort, in which there is to be noted the aspect of debt or not of a debt to another, right? In account of this, justice and its parts are properly about operations as about its own what matter, right?

[12:34] But in some operations, good and bad are to be noted only according to the what, Where they measure well with the one operating. And these are necessary that good and bad are considered according as man is well or badly what affected about these things, right? An account of this is necessary. The virtues in such things are chiefly about interior affections, which are called the passions of the soul.

[13:09] Think about temperance and what Fortitude. right Do you like a cough drop? I have one. Look, I have one. Let's see what you have. Yes I know. I have to come, prepared here. This thing is bothering me for a while. Take some of your feet. Put it on the soles of your feet.

[13:30] Oh yes. Did you hear about this? What? Oh, sorry. I interrupted you. You should put Vicks VapoRub on your feet, the soles of your feet. When you go to bed, you will wake up without any problems. With with heavy socks on top. With heavy socks. I said before you go to bed, the Vicks VapoRub you used to put on your chest again, it does you more good.

[13:49] If you put it on the soles of your feet, wrap them in warm socks, go to sleep, you'll be fine in the morning. What my throat will be? Yeah. Any. Whatever. That's what we we were told this recently that they've done studies that figured this out that somehow or another your feet absorb this better and it has all kinds of so try that tonight and let us know how it works.

[14:13] It can happen that in the operations which are towards another right, the good of virtue is what set aside. Set aside. Account of the disordered passion of the soul. And then, in so far as the what commensuration of the exterior operation is corrupted, right? There is a corruption of what justice. But in so far as there is a what corrupted the commensuration of the interior passion, there is a corruption of another what Virtue, Virtue, right?

[14:51] Huh? As when someone, in account of anger, strikes somebody, right? Huh? In that striking itself unsuited percussion, right? Huh? Justice is corrupted, right? And the what in the lack of moderation of anger mildness. huh How do you translate Montesquieu? mildness, As a matter of meekness, of this Yeah,

[15:21] Um, is corrupted, right? And in this way, it's clear the response to objections, right? For the first argument proceeds from operation according as the effect of virtue, right, rather than the matter of virtue. And the other two reasons proceed from this that they run together, what both operation and passion. But in some of them, virtue is chiefly about operation; in some, about what passion. The fourth sentence, right?

[15:59] You know, some virtues where it's kind of hard to see which one it is. You know, like liberality and magnificence and so on. Right? But we'll leave that side. Those problems arise. Now, third article, right?

[16:23] To the third one goes forward. Thus, it seems that there is only one moral virtue about operations. For the rectitude of all exterior operations seems to pertain to what? Justice. But justice is one virtue. Therefore, there is one virtue alone about what? Operations.

[16:53] Moreover, operations most differing, right, are those the what? Ordered to the good of one, and those which are ordered to the good of the what? Many. Yeah. But this diversity does not diversify moral virtues, huh? For the philosopher says in the fifth book of the ethics that legal justice, right, which orders the acts of men to the common good, is not other from the virtue which orders the acts of man to one only, except in what?

[17:32] Reason. Therefore, the diversity of operations does not cause the diversity of moral virtues. This is a difficult text, I'm afraid. Does it mean, but Thomas will illuminate, illuminate us.

[17:50] Moreover, if there are diverse moral virtues about diverse operations, it would seem that according to the diversity of operations, there is a diversity of moral virtues. But this is clearly what? False. For it pertains to justice, huh? In diverse genera of commutations, right, huh? To to a statute statue? To establish what is right, huh? And also in what? Distributions.

[18:29] Now, commutative justice and distributive justice, the same justice or the species of it, huh? There are not therefore diverse virtues of diverse operations. But against this is religion is another virtue from what? Piety. Maybe he's thinking of piety towards your parents or something like that. Of which both there are what? Operations, yeah.

[19:04] What Thomas says. I answer it should be said that all moral virtues which are about operations come together in a certain what? General. General. Notion of justice, which is to be observed according to what is owed to another, right? But they are distinguished according to diverse special reasons.

[19:36] The reason of which is that because in exterior operations the order of reason is established, instituted, not according to a proportion to the affections of man, right? But according to its suitability of the thing in itself, by which a what, which according to which agreement, there is taken the notion of what of debt, right? From which is constituted the ratio, the notion of justice, because it pertains to justice.

[20:14] It seems that each one what They render what he owes. What he owes, yeah. Whence all virtues of this sort, which are about operations, have in some way the notion of what justice, yeah. But the debt is not of one what notion in all, for in another way is something owed to an equal and to a superior and to a what lesser, minor. Did you do the religious life?

[20:46] You owe something to the abbot. You don't owe to the novice. Yes, true. You owe something to the novice. You don't owe to the equal. The man who's in the maybe so.

[21:08] Certainly, by the superior. I was thinking of Shakespeare's plays there, the Northern European plays, Hamlet, Macbeth, and King Lear, right? It's kind of interesting reading about King Lear, you know. Shakespeare rarely has anything that's altogether original, and I guess there's about fifty, sixty King Lears before Shakespeare. Oh, really? Yeah. And he does, you know, orient. He takes something that's gone all the way down through history, you know.

[21:45] We used to have someone at Assumption there who was teaching, you know, particular story, you know, in four or five different languages or countries, you know, and they see all kinds of variations, right? Huh? Shakespeare is just just right, you know. But he never tried to be, you know, too original, right? You want something that really resonated with people, huh? Yeah, that's a wise way back thousands of years.

[22:11] Yeah, that's that's a wise way to proceed. It's really kind of striking, though, because. In some ways, I think King Lear is his greatest play, you know, and he wrote about sixty. Sixty versions of it. Yeah, and of course some of these scholars when they go back to it, one day's, you know, he's comparing forty different earlier accounts of King Lear and his daughters and so on.

[22:31] And I was thinking, you know, of which is worse, you know, like the uncle there of King of Hamlet has killed his own brother, like Abel or Cain killed Abel, right?

[22:46] But then, if you kill your own father, you know, that's him. Which is worse, to kill your father or to kill your brother? Kill your father. That would I'd be behind it then. Yeah, because you have much greater debt to your father, right? You get your life from your father, than you get your life from your brother your brother, right? So serious as that may be, right?

[23:09] You see how King Lear, in that sense, is is even hitting more upon nature, right? Huh? Because you have two fathers who are what? One is being, you know, plagued by two of his daughters, and the other by one of his sons, right? And then you have a faithful son, and you have a faithful daughter, right? So you see that nature was natural and unnatural. So. So

[23:47] he speaks of the difference with regard to a superior, right, an equal, and a lesser one, right? Another thing from an agreement and from a promise or from a benefit, what received, right? And according to these diverse notions of debt, there are taken diverse what virtues, right?

[24:14] So why do I owe my grandchildren obedience? I owe my mother and father obedience, right? Even Christ was subject, right, to Joseph and Mary, right? So it's really quite different, is it? So

[24:31] I got a little Sophia there saying, you know, what is wisdom, Sophia? The knowledge of God, she says. So I have a kind of duty, you know, to go out and what teach that little girl, you know, whose name means wisdom, right? I don't have the same duty to go and teach my father or my my mother, right? Huh?

[24:57] And then I have a different thing towards my brothers, right? Now, to the first objection, it should be said, the way we finish. Excuse me.

[25:20] Diverse notions of virtues. Yeah, and according to the diverse notions of debt, are taken diverse virtues. As religion is that by which one renders one's debt to what God. So religion is the virtue that's closest to the theological virtues.

[25:41] But piety is that by which one renders a debt to one's parents or to what country? Yeah. It's kind of beautiful in Socrates there,

[25:55] because if you take the last five dialogues, right, the ones around Socrates' death, right, not necessarily the five last in time, but the Euthyphro is a discussion of piety, right? And it's kind of a broad thing because you take piety. towards your parents, your country, right? Maybe even towards God. You can't quite figure out what piety is, right?

[26:23] You simply can't give God back equal what you received. But then, in the Crito, after Socrates has been condemned, right? Crito comes to him with a plan to spring him from prison, right? And Socrates says, "What's the discussion that I should do this? " You know, and he thinks that he should not flaunt the the laws of Athens, even though they made mistake in this particular case, right?

[26:53] But as if you owe more to your what country, right? So the American, you know, Ethan Hale's supposed to say, "I wish that, you know, for one life to give my country, right? " See, if you're always kind of what in debt, you know, and Cicero says that you're always in debt to your father, right?

[27:18] Okay. It's quite amazing how today it seems these have been turned upside down. So many of these concepts. Yeah. What you see in Crito and Socrates refusing to go along with his plan to spring him, right? His piety towards Athens, right? Towards his own country.

[27:50] And thanks is that by which one renders debt to one's what benefactors, right? And so on about others, right? So what does you have to pay back your benefactor what you received anew?

[28:08] No, that'll be kind of. Just all gratitude. But you know, your thanks, yeah. That's what you say in the mass, right? You say that in the mass.

[28:22] Let us give thanks. How does it go? We have an answer. Right, and just. Yeah, it is right and just. That's what they say now. That's the translation for you. What do we say? Let's give thanks to the Lord our God. Right. Give thanks and praise. Yeah, and the Roman says it is right and just. It's a very dignified use of the mass. People say it, and the priest repeats it.

[28:49] You know, it's really. Very emphasized. And he says, "Very emphasized. " Very dignified use. Yeah. So he says, "Justice, properly speaking, to the first, it should be said. Therefore, the justice, properly right, said, is one special virtue, which pays attention to the perfect notion of what debt, right? " Which ought to be restored according to what equivalence, right? An eye for an eye. Okay, but that is said in the ampliato nomine, right?

[29:30] Amplified name, right? Justice according to the rendering of any kind of debt, right? And in this way, it is not one what special virtue, right?

[29:42] You see Aristotle devotes a whole fifth book to justice, right? Is this you know these kinds of complications? You talked about this. Yeah, studied

[29:54] moral theology at least the I follow a Dominican author and because he divides up to the cardinal virtues. And when he got to justice, it was like seven hundred pages of justice. That was a huge. The other didn't have to a lot, but temperance is a good bit, but justice was huge.

[30:15] Now, the second one here is touching upon something very difficult. The text didn't. The second, it should be said, that justice which intends the common good, right, is a different virtue from the justice which is ordered to the private good of someone, right. Whence the use commune, right, common, right, is distinguished from the private one. And Tullius, which is the great Cicero, lays down one special virtue, piety, which is ordered to the good of the what, fatherland, right?

[30:56] Filial piety, right. So patria comes from father, right? But the justice ordering man to the common good is general by way of what command?

[31:16] Because all the acts of what virtues are ordered ultimately to its end, right? To it, the common what good, right? Now a virtue, according as it is commanded by such a what justice, right, also takes on the name of what justice, right?

[31:47] And thus the virtue, and thus virtue differs does not differ from legal justice except by what Ratione, huh? Just as by reason alone differs a virtue operating by itself and a virtue operating to the. I may have another. Yeah. Yeah. Suppose you say this later on about charity, right? Now.

[32:17] Charity is the whole law, right? What do you mean? What do you mean? All kinds of things, you know. But they can all be commanded by what? Charity, right? Okay.

[32:29] So the same virtue acting, as it were, in so on what? Domain, right? Huh? And the same virtue acting under the command of charity, right? Differ in ratio, right? Doesn't mean it's real. The difference is not real, but it is. Okay.

[32:53] To third, it should be said that in all operations pertaining to special justice, right? There is the same what? Notion of debt. Yeah. And therefore, there's the same virtue of justice, especially as regards what exchanges, right? Commutative justice. But forte, perhaps distributive justice is of another species from commutative. But we will inquire about this later on, right? Okay. So when you say God is justice, does he have commutative justice or distributive justice?

[33:38] Both, I suppose. No, I think distributive. Distributive. Yeah, yeah. I don't think he's got commutative. Because that's exchange and mutual. Yeah, and Socrates gets in that problem there in the Euthyphro, right, then. Because how can you have a exchange between God? You you give me this God, I give you this in return, you know. And there's another problem: whether you can give God anything, right? Okay. And that's why Avicenna, you know, says, you know, God alone is what liberal in the full sense, right?

[34:16] Because he gives what? Getting nothing from. He gets nothing out of it. Yeah. Even if we all went to heaven and were the best we could possibly be. Okay. Now. Article four To the fourth one goes forward. Thus, it seems that about the diverse passions are not diverse. What? moral virtues. For those things which come together in their beginning and their end, there is one habit. Right. Just as is clear most of all in sciences.

[35:17] But of all the passions, there is one beginning. Love. And of all, there's the same end, to it, either pleasure or what? sadness. Therefore, about all passions, there is only one moral virtue.

[35:43] Moreover, if about diverse passions there are diverse moral virtues, it would follow that there are as many moral virtues as there are what? Passions. But this is clearly false, because about opposite passions there is one and the same moral virtue. Just as courage is about fears and what? Boldness. Boldness, yeah. And temperance is about what? Pain. Yeah. So temperance, I'm not too pleased with my food, right?

[36:25] I'm not too sad. I don't get what I want to eat tonight. So it's about both sadness and pleasure, right? Therefore, it's not necessary that there be diverse moral virtues about diverse passions.

[36:47] Moreover, love concupiscence, desiring or wanting, and pleasure are passions differing in what? Species. That's not long ago. But about these, there is one virtue, to it. Temperance, right?

[37:07] So tempest is going to modify my what? Love of food, right? My desire for food, right? The pleasure I take in food, right? All three of them, right?

[37:21] But moral virtues are not about what? Therefore, moral virtues are not diverse about diverse passions. But against this is that fortitude is about fears and boldness, right? Temperance about concupiscence. And mildness about what? Anger. Yeah.

[37:54] The answer should be said that there's not able to be said that about all passions there is one what? Moral virtue. One moral virtue. For there are what certain passions pertaining to diverse powers.

[38:10] For other ones pertain to the irascible, and others to the what? Concupiscible right? That's what's most obvious, right? Just like a virtue in reason and a virtue in the will can't be the same thing, right? So a virtue in the irascible appetite and one in the concupisable can't be the same virtue, right?

[38:39] Nevertheless, it is not necessary that every diversity of passions suffices for what? Moral virtue. Yeah. So you take it it to extremes, right? First, because some passions there are which are opposed to each other, according to what? Contrariety. As pleasure and what? Sadness. Fear and what? Boldness, huh?

[39:16] And about passions that are thus opposed, there is necessarily one and the same what? Virtue. Yeah. That reminds a little bit of what you have with the knowledge, right? Plato and Aristotle says it's the same knowledge of what? Opposite fact. So is the one ethics about virtue, another ethics about vice? Is the one medical art about health, another medical art about sickness? No. Okay. It's the same, huh?

[39:54] Knowledge of opposites. Is the one science about longer, and another one about shorter? Okay. For since moral virtue consists in a certain what? Mean, right? Golden mean. The mean in the contrary passions is instituted according to the same what? Reason, right? Isn't that true? I mean,

[40:43] if I want my wine or my beer or whatever it is too much, right, huh? Then there's no wine or beer. I'm too sad, right? It's the same what reason, right? Huh?

[41:05] I'd be upset that there's no wine. That's because I want the wine too much. Ruining your meal and everybody else's. Just as in natural things, there's the same mean between contraries, right? As between white and black.

[41:38] When you cook a steak, you can cook it too much. I suppose you can cook it too little too. But it's the same thing in a sense, isn't it, right?

[41:51] Got to have a mean there between these two, huh? Too much and too little. Secondly, because diverse passions are found repugnant to reason in the same what way?

[42:17] As according to the impulse to that which is against reason, or according to the withdrawal from that which is what? According to reason, right? And therefore, the diverse passions of the concupiscible do not pertain to what? Diverse moral. More virtues, because their emotion follows upon what? Certain

[42:50] order, falling compared to what you say. Because they their emotions follow according to a certain order each other, right? They Follow each other, I should say. As they are being ordered to the same thing, right? To it, to achieving the good or to fleeing the bad, right? Just as from love proceeds what desire or wanting, right? Concupiscence. And from concupiscence, one arrives at what? Pleasure. Pleasure, right?

[43:20] Huh? But the passions of the irascible are not of one order, but they are what ordered to diverse things. For audacity or boldness and fear are ordered to some great danger, right?

[43:43] Hope and desperation to some what difficult good. Anger to overcoming something contrary that is harming oneself, right? And therefore, about these passions, diverse virtues are what Order. As temperance about the passions of the concupiscible, fortitude about fears and boldness, magnanimity about what hope and desperation, and mildness about what anger. Right. Remember, there was what there was what six what virtues in the concupiscible, right? And three of them are contrary to three of them, right?

[44:36] So liking is contrary to disliking, right? Or love to hate, right? And then wanting or Fleeing, and then pleasure and pain, right? Huh? So, the reason to put these together, right? Because they're contraries, right? But even when they're not contraries, like love is not contrary to wanting or to pleasure, right? But there's a certain what order, right? So love gives rise to wanting when you don't have what you love, and gives rise to pleasure when you get it, right?

[45:10] So they're connected, right, in that way, right? But in the irascible, you have these five emotions, right? And fear and boldness are opposites, right? But then hope and despair are opposites, right? But it's one of those things with the other so much. No, and then the anger is kind of an odd thing too, right? Huh? So you have, it seems, different virtues concerned with those, right?

[45:43] Men, you get powerful men now. They tend to have a sense of anger, right? Huh? I remember when I was teaching at Saint Mary's there in California, and it was the 100th anniversary of the college, right? So they're having a big celebration and so on. And somebody knew LBJ, right? He was Vice President at the time, wasn't President? And so he was came out to give a little say a few words, you know, huh?

[46:10] Well, they had him kind of in a side room, you know, huh? Before he came out on the rostrum, you know, huh? He was chewing out his supporters there.

[46:22] These guys, you know, you know, they really have that sense of of anger, right? I think you have to have that, you know. Used to say, you know, some people when they get drinking too much, they get what irascible, they're ready to fight, you know, huh? Other people get more amorous, right? You know. But depends on where where they're they're naturally inclined, you might say, right? Huh?

[46:56] Yeah. Strange. Who's got anger there in Shakespeare? Coriolanus. Coriolanus, yeah. I'm trying to stop him from getting angry, you know. Have to be false to myself, he says. Why, why

[47:23] Proteus, right? As his name indicates, Proteus in Greek mythology is always changing his shape, right? So he has, you know, got engaged to Julia I guess, with twenty thousand soul confirming oaths, and then he sees Sylvia, you know, and he's ready to, you know, so. And he says I can't be true to myself without being false to Julia, being false to his friend, right? And Valentine, yeah.

[47:52] So two good examples there, you know, that they're not really being true to themselves, but they're being true to their passion, you might say, right? So if you're mainly passion, you think that's what you're mainly are, a passion, then then you can see they're being true to themselves, right? But if you're mainly reason and will, right, well then you're not being true to your reason and your will.

[48:23] Talking to a young man, there he's going to get married there in about a month, and I'm saying now, if the man gets married and then he starts having affairs with some other woman, right, is he being true to himself, right? Well, the point is, is marriage, you know, an expression of mutual feeling? When the priest says, do you take someone as your husband or your wife?

[48:51] Is he saying do you have wonderful feelings about this person? Well, presumably you do, but is that what he's asking? No, do you choose this person as your what, husband or wife, right? So if after you're married, then you're tempted to pursue someone else, you're not being true to your choice, right?

[49:15] And that choice is more you than your what? Yeah, yeah. I used to take students in class and say, you know, other things being equal, which do you look upon more seriously, a crime of passion or premeditated murder, right? Both serious, but the premeditated murder they always say, yeah, because it's more that you've done it, right? And they say if you want to break off your friendship with somebody, you know, you say I don't want to see you again.

[49:45] again. That's not as serious as if you sit down write a letter and say I never want to see you again, right? Because you had time to sit down and think about the nasty things you wanted to say. You know, and all once you can, you know, you know, blow off and then I'm sorry about it, carried away, you know. But as Hamlet says, that's not me, you know, it's my anger, that's my, you know, madness or something, you know.

[50:14] But so what is you, right? See, the choice is more you, right? I take the example of the guy who realizes he's an alcoholic, right, and then he decides to, you know, just give it up and join Alcoholics Anonymous and so on, right? He's going to be tempted again, right? But is he true to himself if he goes back to the bottle, right? Well, if his desire to drink, which is something bodily, I guess, is what he means, he is.

[50:47] But that's up him as much as his his choice, right? So he's being true to himself, who is true to his choice to to give this up,

[51:00] or in principle, anything like a diet or something, you know, because he realizes his health is suffering from this or something, you know, and then he can't resist the. And then, was he

[51:16] being true to himself, right? But your reasonable choice is more you than your what sudden desire for a donut, whatever. Yeah. It's very kind of cultural today. Yeah, addiction is the culture today. We're victims. We're victims of our addiction. Victims of whims of passion too. Victims of whims of passion. Yeah, with yeah, being able to rationalize not being true to yourself to your rational self. Very interesting.

[51:48] I used to say, you know, when when Polonius says, "This above all, to thy own self be true," and it must follow as a night the day that it cannot then be false to a man. Well, here's Proteus right who's saying I can't be true to myself without being false to his best friend, the other gentleman of Verona, right, and being false to his fiancée, right.

[52:11] Who's right, Polonius, or? And then it raises the question: Is he really being true to himself, Polonius? My reasonable choice is more myself than my passion, right? For a woman or for the bottle, wherever it might be, right. I

[52:51] wanted to ask you a question with the four temperaments, and being true to oneself. It seems that there's an objective way of being true to oneself, regardless of what one's temperament is. But the various winds and storms of passions that come from different temperaments, yeah, yeah, that can, yeah. See, when Aristotle says in the tenth book of the Ethics, right, that reason more than anything else is man, right?

[53:27] If that's true, right, then when I'm true to reason, I'm being true to myself, right, and. When I'm true to my emotion against my reason, then I'm being false to myself, right?

[53:45] So that's the truth of what Polonius is saying, right? Okay. Okay, we have objections I guess. Yeah. Notice we have three different virtues so far in the irascible, right?

[54:21] Courage and what? Magnanimity, right, and then the magnanimity right and at least one in the what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean later on there'd be more precise, questions right? In other words, if temperance is About what is pleasing to the senses, right? Well, the food can be pleasing to the senses, right? Drink can be pleasing to the senses. The woman can be pleasing to the man, and so on.

[54:57] And these different, you know, virtues concerning these things, right? So the moderation in eating, right, you know, chastity, and so on, they're many different virtues, huh? There are more subtle differences, right, huh? You know, but

[55:17] is the difficulty of controlling your desire to eat, right, and controlling your sexual desire, they really the same kind of difficulty, right? Aristotle says that virtue is about the what, the good and the difficult, right? So when there's another kind of goodness or another kind of what, difficulty, right, huh? Okay. So maybe the difficulty of controlling your desire to eat or drink, and maybe there's a difference, right?

[55:47] I mean, alcohol, you know. I know, he said, I don't eat very much, but I do a lot of drinking. you know, On Thanksgiving he had a case or two of beer, you know, just by himself, you know. I say, well you may not have a problem, eating, but you might have a problem drinking, you know. I mean, isn't there a different, you know, difficulty in, you know, an alcoholic, so to speak, right?

[56:12] And and in the glutton, right? the person who eats too much, right? And the sexual desire it seems to be a different kind of thing, right?

[56:29] But Thomas doesn't enter into those details here. That's going to be maybe in the Secundae, Secundae, right? So so far all we know is that there's one virtue, which is generic or not, right? Mm-hmm. Whether temperance is a generic virtue that has species, right? Chastity, with regard to this, and sobriety, with regard to this, and moderation is something we have to find out later on, right? At least we know that this temperance, whether it's one virtue or generic virtue, is different from these three we've seen in the irascible, right?

[57:13] Man has to proceed what paulatim as Thomas says, to the truth, little by little, little by little bit by bit, yeah. I think that's what Thomas says, doesn't he? Yeah. I think you're imitating nature when you do that, don't you? Yeah, his commentary on Job. That's what it, is? I think. That's what he says it. I think it is. I think he says it in other places too, yeah.

[57:33] Maybe, yeah. He says, "To the first, it should be said that all passions come together in one what? Common beginning and end, right? Like happiness, right? None other in one what? Private beginning or end, right? Whence this does not suffice for the unity of what? Moral virtue, right?

[58:18] On the second objection, there, right? See, good in just as in natural things, there is the same beginning by which one proceeds from one beginning and approaches the other. So in rational things there is the same reason of contraries, right? So also moral virtue, which consents to reason in the manner of what? Nature, it's like a second nature. There is the same virtue of what? Contrary passions, right?

[59:10] Now to the third objection about love, concupiscence and delight. He says those three passions are ordered to the same object according to a certain what? Order, right? And therefore they pertain to the same what? Moral virtue, right?

[59:38] So if I like some particular food, then I want to eat that food from time to time, right? And I enjoy eating that food, right?

[59:50] So doesn't moderation gonna be the same in those three? If I like that food too much. I'll want it too much, won't I? And then I'll get too excited with it. Sorry, too much, huh?

[1:00:11] See these advertisements on TV for beer, you know, young people having having a good time with the beer. I kind of lost my taste for beer, you know. I never buy beer for myself anymore, you know. The only time I have beer is when I had brought beer over for my brother-in-law or something, you know, or something like that's coming, you know, and then there's a few balls left, so Maybe I'll have it with a hot dog or something, you know.

[1:00:36] Instead of now a decent meal, you know. Yeah The pizza is good That's interesting to see that, though, right? Opposites and then order, right?

[1:01:00] Just take a little break now.