Prima Secundae
145. Summa I-II Q.60 A.5: Aristotle's Eleven Moral Virtues and the Rule of Dividing into Two or Three
Class of 2013-12-05
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[0:00] Goes forward thus, it seems that the moral virtues, are not distinguished according to the objects of the passions, right? For just as there are what objects of the passions, so there are also objects of the operations. But the moral virtues, which are about operations, are not distinguished according to the objects of operations. For to the same virtue of justice pertains to buy and to what sell a house and a horse.

[0:38] Therefore, also neither do moral virtues, which are about the passions, they diversified by the objects of these passions, right? Let's look at the reply to objection. Just you know, the interesting point he makes here.

[0:59] To the first, therefore, it should be said that all objects of the same operation, according to species, have the same what relation to reason, right? But not all objects of the same passion, according to their what species, huh? Why? Because the operations are not repugnant to reason, as are the what passions, right? So sexual desire and desire to drink are not opposed to reason in the same way.

[1:32] You know, you got to see that from experience, right? Aristotle says you got to experience to understand ethics, right? Moreover, second objection: passions are certain acts or emotions of the sense-desiring power. But a greater diversity is required for the diversity of habits than for the diversity of acts. For diverse objects which do not diversify the species of passion, do not what species of moral virtue. Therefore, thus that about all things delightful, there is one moral virtue, and similarly about what others.

[2:20] Moreover more and less do not diversify species, but diverse delectables do not differ except according to more and less. Therefore, all things pleasant pertain to one species of virtue, and for the same reason all things terrible, and similarly others. Therefore, not every moral virtue is what. Therefore, not. therefore, moral virtue is not distinguished according to the objects of the what passions. Look at the reply to objections for a second.

[2:56] The second, it should be said that for a different reason, passions are diversified, and for a different one, virtues. Right. We'll see that in the body. But to the third, it should be said that more and less do not diversify species, except on account of diverse what? Relation to reason. Right.

[3:19] The document by the article. Moreover, virtue is operative of something good, so it also impedes something bad. But concerning the desires for good things are diverse virtues. To wit, as temperance about what? The concupiscences of the pleasures of the sense of touch. Right. Eutrapelia that's one concerning humor. right. The pleasures of play. About the pleasures of play. Right. Therefore, also about what, the fears of bad things ought to be what?

[4:04] Diverse virtues. Let's look at the reply to that. The good more strongly is stronger to move us than what? The bad, because the bad does not act except by virtue of the good, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter, Divine Names. Whence the bad does not make for a difficulty to reason, which requires a virtue, unless it be very excelling. right. Whence it seems to be one in one genus of passion.

[4:38] Whence about anger is there is not placed except one virtue. To wit, what? Mildness. Yeah. And about audacity is one only. fortitude But good injures a what? Brings to bear a difficulty which requires virtue. Even if it not be excelling in the genus of such a passion, and therefore concerning concupiscences, there are laid down diverse, moral virtues as has been said. Right.

[5:13] So it says against this is that chastity is about the pleasure in what Venereal things. Right. Abstinence about the pleasures of what? Food. eutrapelia about the pleasures of play. Yeah.

[5:35] I answer it should be said that the perfection of virtue depends upon what? Reason. Right. And the perfection of passion depends upon what? Sense appetite. Yeah.

[5:52] Whence is necessary that virtues be diversified. According to order to what reason right, but passions according to the order to the desiring power. Now the objects of the passions, according as they are diversely compared to the sense desiring power, cause passions differing in species right. But according as they are compared to reason, they cause diverse species of what virtue. Now there is not the same motion of reason and of the sense desiring power.

[6:35] Whence nothing prevents some difference of objects to cause diversity of passions, which does not cause a diversity of virtues, as in one virtue is about many passions. And some also difference of objects can cause a diversity of passions, which does not cause a diversity of what. Diversity of virtues, which

[7:02] does not cause a diversity of passions. Yeah. Since about one passion, to wit, pleasure, diverse virtues are ordered right, like in the said contrary there right.

[7:14] And because diverse passions pertaining to diverse powers always pertain to diverse virtues right now. Therefore, a diversity of objects which regards a diversity of powers always diversifies species of virtue. As when something is good absolutely, and something good with a certain what Difficulty. difficulty. And because, in a certain order, reason, rules the lower parts of man, and also extends itself to exterior things. So also, according as one object of passion is grasped by the sense or by imagination, or also by reason.

[8:04] And also according as it pertains to the soul, the body, or to exterior things, it has a diverse what relation to reason. And consequently, is apt to diversify virtues.

[8:23] For the good of man, which is the object of love, and of concupiscence, and of pleasure, can be taken as either pertaining to the sense of the body, or to the interior what Grasping. Grasping of the soul. grasping of the soul. And this, whether it is ordered to the good of man in himself, or in regard to the body, or in regard to the soul, or whether it is ordered to the good of man in order to what other things.

[8:55] In all such diversity, account of its diverse order to reason diversifies the virtue. This is a mouthful he said, right? Thus, therefore, if we consider some good, if it is what, if we consider something good, if it is apprehended by the sense of what, touch,

[9:24] and pertaining to the what, consistency of human life in the individual and the species, there are the pleasurable things of food and venereal matters, right? It will be pertaining to the virtue of what, temperance, huh? But the pleasures of the other senses, since they are not vehement, do not what, render some difficulty to what, reason, right? And therefore, about them there is not laid down some virtue. Which is about the what?

[10:02] Difficult, as Aristotle says, just as hard is about some difficulty, right? So, is there a virtue that moderates the pleasure I take in the music of Mozart? I don't think so? No.

[10:26] Now, the good that is what grasped not by the sense but by an interior power, right? Pertaining to the man himself, according to himself, is as, for example,

[10:43] money, right, pecunia, and honor, right, of which the money is ordered of itself to the good of the body, but honor consists in the apprehension of the what? Soul.

[11:07] And these goods can be considered either absolutely, according as they pertain to the concupisable appetite, or with a certain what? Yeah, according as they pertain to the irascible.

[11:24] Which distinction does not have place in the goods which delight the sense of touch, because these are some lowly things, right, infima things, and they belong to man according as he comes together with the what? Roots. So I used to say to our cats. you know, we're having steak tonight, huh? Cats seem to perk up. Yeah.

[11:54] Now about the good of money, absolutely taken, according as it is the object of concupiscence or of pleasure or of love, there is the virtue of what? Liberality, right?

[12:10] And about the good of this sort, taken with what difficulty, according as it is the object of what? Hope. Is magnificence right? It's large sums, right? So Aristotle takes up those two virtues, liberality and magnificence. after, takes up

[12:33] courage and temperance, right? He takes up courage and temperance in a third book, right? And then in the beginning of the fourth book, he starts to take up these virtues like liberality and magnificence, and then what? The ones concerned with honor, right? Philotimia, he says in Greek, right, and maybe what magnanimity, right?

[13:04] So it distinguishes between liberality and magnificence because there's a difference here in the difficulty, right? When it is about great things, right? About the good which is honor, if it be taken absolutely, according as it's the object of love, that is a certain virtue which is called.

[13:26] Philotimia. Yeah, that is the love of what honor, Philotimia. But if it be taken or considered some difficulty, according as it's the object of hope, then you have what magnanimity.

[13:44] So, perhaps the highest thing in imitation in music is what imitate what magnanimity. So, Mozart in the thirty-sixth of the Linz and the Jupiter, right, represents magnanimity, and both are in C major, of course.

[14:09] Whence liberality in Philotimia seemed to be in the concubisable, but magnificence and magnanimity in the what? The good of man in order to another does not seem to have what difficulty, but is taken as absolutely taken, right? In so far as it's the object of the passions, the concupiscent,

[14:48] which good can be delectable to someone, according as he renders to another, either in those things which come about seriously, That is in actions, ordered by reason To a do end, To a do-end, on those things which come about what Play, Play, That is in actions ordered to pleasure only, Which not in the same way have themselves to reason as the first.

[15:23] In serious things, one shows oneself to another in two ways. In one way, as what pleasant, agreeable, by suitable words and what deeds, and this pertains to a certain virtue which Aristotle calls what friendliness. Yeah, it's quite friendliness, you know, not the virtue of friendship, right? Friendliness, and can be called affability, right?

[15:55] Another way he renders himself to another is manifest through his words and deeds, right, and shows himself as he is, right. And this pertains to another virtue, which is called what? Truth, right?

[16:16] So if I try to make you think I'm other than I am, that can be a vice, right? Huh? Villain, son of darkness. Like Iago, right? Huh?

[16:32] Treachery. Iago, you know, represents himself as what the friend of Othello, when he's considered the good of Othello, right? Now, manifestation more what? Closely approaches to reason than pleasure, and the serious things and the what? Jocular, Jocular things. Whence concerning what? The pleasures of of play. There's another virtue which the philosopher names eutrapelia, right? Which means easily what? Turning. Turn, good turn. Yeah, yeah. Shakespeare speaks that way, right?

[17:18] One good turn deserves another. There's turning in my head. I always understand it is that when you're constantly given serious things, you need a break, so you have a turn. It's a good turn. That's why I think it's a good turn to relieve you the strain of ordinary things. It's one way of explaining it. Thus, therefore, it is clear that according to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the what?

[17:50] Passions. To wit, fortitude or courage, temperance or moderation, liberality, right? Magnificence, huh? Magnanimity and philotimia. Mildness, friendliness, truthfulness, and eutrapelia. And they are distinguished according to diverse matters, or according to diverse passions, or according to diverse what? Objects, right? If therefore one adds justice to the operations, there are what? Eleven, right? So Aristotle didn't say there were ten. Highest gener, because he had ten fingers, right? Because here he's got eleven, right?

[18:50] Are there ten commandments? Because you know Moses had ten fingers, wasn't he? Easy to remember. He couldn't. He couldn't. Yeah. He had to remember them, so it was easier.

[19:06] I have a question for you. If there's a rule of threes that you talked about before, is there anything involving ten? Since you have the Ten Commandments, you have well, you have the metric system, which is a human. You see, there are two tablets, you know. There's three on one tablet and seven on the other, right? So the first division is into what? Two. Two, right? And then the what?

[19:33] The three. we've got the division of three, right? Right. Okay. Well, then the seven, huh? You divide the what? Fourth Commandment against the last six, right? But then they're divided according to what? The yourself or your neighbor. Your neighbor, in terms of it. Yeah, but the doing something, and then the what? Desire? Words and then desire, right? So that's into three, right? So you divide by two or three until you get ten, right?

[20:11] That's what St. Thomas does with the ten categories of Aristotle, right? He said they're distinguished by the way something can be said of what, of individual substances, right? And he first gives a division into three, right? Something is said of individual substances like you and me, per reason of what we are, like you're a man, we're generally an animal, right? We're generally a living body, we're generally a body, most generally a substance, right?

[20:40] Other things are said of you and me, not per reason of what we are, but per reason of something existing in us, right? Either absolutely, which would be quantity and quality, right? Or towards another, like I'm a teacher of something, right? Or I'm a father, I'm a brother, right? So you divide the second group there of things said of you per reason of what is in you in you, right?

[21:07] Into what, two and one of them is subdivided, right? So you're getting three there, right? And then you have the last what, six, right? And he divides those again into what, two or three, right? Yeah. You usually divide the the man's category, right, against the other five. Man has something proper to himself, like being clothed, right? Being armed, right? Being shod and so on, right? And then you have the five divided into the three according to what?

[21:48] Extrinsic measures, place and time, and then cause and effect, right? Acting upon, undergoing, right? So you divide the six into five and one, then you divide the five into three and two, and so that's the only way, you know, to follow the rule of two or three, right?

[22:19] Thomas divides the Gospel of Matthew. He divides it into what? Three parts, right? Because he emphasizes the humanity of Christ, whereby he came into the world, he proceeded to the world lecturing and so on, and then he passed out of this world into his death and so on. So then, you know, he's always dividing into two or three or subdividing, you know.

[22:42] The way Augustine and Thomas divide the Psalms, right? You can't understand division of nine and fifty, it wouldn't make any the mind, the mind would break down, right? So they divide the Psalms into three, right? And and if you take the correct numbering, which you didn't have in your, you know, I'm You're not correct numbering of the Psalms. Yeah, you had the Protestant numbering, right? He did.

[23:07] I got the text. I got the text from Brother Elias. He got it from the Chancery. We have to report this to the Holy See. But

[23:18] the 50th psalm is the psalm of penance, the one that Teresa of Avila likes so much. And then the hundredth psalm is one of good deeds, right? And the hundred and fifty is one of resting in God. So this corresponds to the three stages of the Christian life, right? The beginnings, right? And then the progressing, and then those who are resting in God, right? And so you divide it into three, right?

[23:42] And then you keep on dividing into two or three, right? That's interesting, man. But of course, it's not the division of the Our Father, right? Then the Our Father you divide across the ascent to God, Our Father who art in heaven. Well, then you have the seven petitions, right? And you could divide them into two, the four about the good and the three about the bad, right?

[24:10] But Thomas, like in the Summa Theologiae, divides them into three. Two of them pertain to the end: "Hallowed be Thy name," and "Thy kingdom come." Two to the means to the means the end: "Thy will be done," and "Give us this day our daily bread." And then three about removal of the impediments to the end: your past sins and your future temptations and so on, right? And that corresponds to the division of the of the psalms, right?

[24:38] But it's in the order of intention, while the psalms is in the order of carrying it out. So it's really beautiful, you know, that way. Augustine, Thomas, you know, divide them, but it's kind of lost when you when you start screwing up the numbering.

[24:56] I think his ordination is invalid. I think so. We're going to have to call the bishop off. Some other ordination. Yeah, renumber these things. In forgive me, because they haven't gone to some of the classes, don't have the background, but within nature itself, does this rule of two and threes reflect what we see in nature? You know, outside of human discoverable things. How do you divide a plant?

[25:31] Well, you could say into three: the leaves and flower, the stalk, and the roots. Yeah, you get the roots there, and then you get the stem, and then you get the branches, right? You know, that makes some kind of sense, doesn't it? Yeah. Because there's an aesthetic sense of rightness of proportionality, I think, which is natural to men. When you are looking at something in nature, looking at a tree, there is a balance, and you can see this reflected in art as well, where that balance is it satisfies a certain instinct for order, maybe an aesthetic sense that's connected to art.

[26:07] Yeah, We were giving a passage from John Danesina, just yesterday. It was last while ago, yeah, Yeah, it was just a day ago, I think we had the Feast of St. John Danesina. Yes, actually, it was yesterday for you. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But I brought the text in there. You know, he's saying, you know, most divisions are into two or three, right? Rarely four, right? Never more.

[26:30] And so, even if there are some exceptions to this, right? Um, there is a famous division that Aristotle gives of the quality into four, species, right?

[26:46] But you still have a rule that's good and is true for the most part, right? In other words, you you better you know think twice before you accept a division into more than two or three, right? I am not saying you know in an absolute sense that there's not. a thing. I divide Shakespeare's plays into four kinds, right? But you know, some might say you know you could divide them into the tragedies at one end, the comedies, and then the ones in the middle, and then subdivide the two kinds of romances you have in the middle.

[27:19] One that goes back to the Greek romance, and then it goes back to the medieval romance, and but I just divide them into four, you know. You know the the one interesting way of showing the four kinds is to take something that you find in all one where a man falsely thinks his wife, a wife to be, is false. And of course, in Othello we have a real tragedy, right?

[27:45] But in the love and forgiveness romances, right, the pride wife doesn't die, right? But there is a long you know time before forgiveness comes. Not to be, you know, and then in the the what you do about nothing, right?

[28:08] It's not a long thing, you know, but there is a villain who's deceived him, you know, but but it's discovered right by these clowns, you know, run the police that night. And then, and you get the Merry Wives of Windsor, you know, where the husband thinks his wife, you know, and he gets all his friends to come up there, and he can pull himself right. So he's, you know, you know.

[28:33] You read the play; it's funny, right? But it's the same thing, you know. A man is falsely, you know, and you can see kind of the four kinds of plays, right? You go from comedy, and then. Yeah. I told you, I worked with this guy, you know, Charlie, and his wife was insanely jealous, right? And the boss had them out to the house one time. The boss's sister was there, and she wanted to show Charlie something in her bedroom.

[29:03] She went into the bedroom. You got to talk that way. Oh boy! And then the the the girls from the the bank used to come over, you know, to get a coke or something, you know, from the package store. And one time, you know, around summer, Charlie's talking. Where are you going vacation this year? You know, it seemed they were going to the same place to Charlie.

[29:25] His wife was going. He says, "For heaven's sake, do you see me? Don't say hello. It's ridiculous this woman, you know, I mean, it's laughable. You know, huh? He's been trained. But you know the the

[29:44] yeah, but then there are times when it's just a tragedy, right? And then there's you know ones in between, you know. or there's there's I've been wondering about this just over the last few days because with the Triune God and thinking about way back. When I was a kid, there was a friend of mine who was involved in you know amateur magician stuff. And one question that he would ask is part of the magician's repertoire at a very super basic level.

[30:14] If you ask somebody about to choose a number, chances are between one and ten, they're going to choose three. For some reason, most people choose three. And so I was wondering if because of our Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and the rule of twos and threes, especially threes, if there's a principle of this of three in nature. Yeah. In addition, Aristotle gives a sign, you know, that three is the first number about which we say all right.

[30:43] See, if you and I were going to the movies, we'd say we're both going, right? See, but if there was, you know, three of us, three of you know, we're all going, right? Right. Yeah. You wouldn't say for two of you, you'd say we're all going, all three of us. See, for the son, it's not even redundant. We are, y'all. We are. I mean, that's a kind of sign there, you know.

[31:05] They think of of this going the three, you know. The Divine Comedy, right, naturally falls into three, right? You know, trilogies are most common, you know, in fiction. You know, trilogies. It's like when you get to Mozart's music, there, you know, you got to

[31:31] have at least three movements to make a piece complete, right? So some of Mozart's symphonies, especially ones are just three movements, right? But even a late, you know, symphony like the Prague Symphony, right? It's writing for his favorite town, you know, the one that received him the most. It's three movements, right? You know. So even though most of the late comedy, or I mean, late symphonies and quartets are in four movements, the earlier quartets are in three movements, right?

[31:58] Of course, concerto and Mozart is always in three movements, right? So three seems to be what enough, right? The only famous symphony that's in two movements is Schubert's unfinished symphony. There you go. Explains that. Yeah. But it seems you got to have it three, right? Aristotle says, you know, Sophocles introduced the third actor at the stage, right? And that's enough to make the greatest plays the Greeks had, right?

[32:27] But you have to have that third one, you know. Another one's in a story too. What? Can't quite remember, but there's the sort of beginning and yeah, and like where you have the. That's the plot you have. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But even something that's disordered as history, you know we want to divide into ancient, medieval, and modern, or something like that, in this world historian there, McNeil, there, it's divided into three differently than that, but it's divided into three, right?

[32:53] It seems the mind seems to be able to grasp that. A complete meal in Quebec. A complete meal. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, we say in Quebec, we say repas complet. What does that mean? It means you're going to have some kind of an appetizer, maybe just a jello or something, but the main course and some kind of a little dessert, right? And that's called repas complet,

[33:25] you know, the sonata movement, you know, tend to be formed into three parts: exposition and the development and recapitulation. It's a natural thing. So, let me stop here. You know, this is helpful here, right?