Prima Secundae
146. The Cardinal Virtues: Why They Are Principal, Why There Are Four, and Why Not Magnanimity, Humility or Patience (Summa I-II, Q. 61, aa. 1-3)
Class of 2013-12-12
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/146-the-cardinal-virtues-why-they-are-principal-why-there-are/

[0:00] In the Name of the Father and of the Son, and of the, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, ordain illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand what you have written. In the name of the Father and of the Son, and of the, Holy Spirit.

[0:31] Amen. So, question 61. De virtutibus cardinalibus. Let me just read you this little quote they have from De virtutibus, right? Because it kind of explains the name a bit. It says cardinalis is said from cardina, right? In quo ostium, that's the door, vertitur, right? Huh? According to that of Proverbs twenty-six fourteen, right? As the what? Ostium, the door, turns in its what? Hinge and cardine so the piger the lazy man in lectulo suo, right?

[1:12] Huh? Whence the cardinal virtues are said to be those in which human life is what? Founded, huh? Through which one enters in, right? In the door, right?

[1:28] For human life is one which is proportioned to man. Now, in this man, however, there is found first a sensitive nature, sensing nature, in which he comes together with the brutes, huh? Then there is practical reason, which is proper to man according to his grade, and then finally the intellectus speculativus, right? Speculativus is the same as the word looking there in Shakespeare's definition, right? Okay. Aristotle uses the word looking to.

[2:03] Which is not perfectly found in man, as it's found in the what? Angels, right? But according to a certain partaking of the soul, and therefore the contemplative life is not propria humana, right? Not properly man, but super humana. I say it, very often, Thomas. The vita aut voluptuosa huh? The life of pleasure, which adheres to sensible goods, is not human either, but is bestial, right? Huh?

[2:37] And therefore the life which is properly human is the vita activa, the active life, which consists in the exercise of the what? Moral virtues, right? And therefore those are properly called the cardinal virtues, in which, in a certain way, Turns and is found in the moral life, just as in certain principles or beginnings of that life. On account of which, these virtues are also called what the principales, right?

[3:11] The chief virtues. S. M. D. virtutibus. Question five, article one. Okay. So, to the first, end, one. puts, okay. Let me explain them first. Then we ought to consider about the cardinal virtues. Of course, these will be used in the distinction of the virtues in particular in the what Secundi secundi, right? Because there he takes up faith, hope, charity, and then prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance, right? And then with the four cardinal virtues, he takes up the virtues that resemble them, right?

[3:52] And have some similarity, right? So, like with temperance, he takes up what humility. What humility is one? Yeah, yeah, humility, right? And one that you know modifies something or mildness, you know, that modifies. anger. Mildness, yeah. yeah. Yeah. I think I mentioned how Shakespeare there in As You Like It there, this man, woman have fallen in love very quickly, and they're talking about they're in the very wrath of love.

[4:20] Well, that's a metaphor, right? But it's a metaphor from one species to another species because there's a likeness there, right? Okay. So as you have you have a strong emotion here that needs to be what moderated, and so he'll take up mildness and humility, as you say, with what temperance, right? And so it's kind of important to understand the cardinal virtues, among other reasons, because of the fact that they will be used for the the consideration of the virtues in particular in the secunda secunda, right?

[4:54] I mentioned how Plato there in the Protagoras he has something like the cardinal virtues. He has the four cardinal virtues plus piety. He's more pious than we are, but it's not just altogether original with the with the Christians, huh? And of course, he's asking Protagoras, are these five names the same thing, you know, synonyms, or are they names of different things, like the nose and the ear and the eye and so on, different things?

[5:28] And Protagoras says that they're what names of different things, right? And then Socrates says, well, he has to argue, right? And he's going to try to show that that what temperance and wisdom, mean kind of practical wisdom, are the same what thing. And so he develops the statement that a thing is just one opposite, right? And then the opposite of wisdom is folly, right? And of course, the opposite of temperance is what.

[5:59] Folly, yeah, yeah. So the man who's who's making a fool of himself over the woman, right? That's the original meaning of the word "fond," right? I'm fond of a girl. I'm making a fool of myself over this woman, and if I drink too much, you know, I make an ass of myself. You know, I do something stupid, right? You know, because I had too much to drink or something, and so it seems that the opposite of temperance is some kind of foolishness, right?

[6:28] And so if there's only one opposite, and wisdom has its opposite, foolishness, well then wisdom must be the same thing as temperance, right? And he's gradually trying to, you know, do that, but you got to be careful about Socrates, right?

[6:47] But it's kind of interesting what, he does. So five things are going to be asked about them, right? First, whether the moral virtues ought to be called cardinal or principal, Of course, he's saying they can be called both in this other text that we gave you from David. to the books Secondly, about the number of them, right?

[7:14] And then what they are, right? And then it may seem strange at first. whether they differ from each other, right? And there's two ways of understanding the cardinal virtues. Sometimes they take the four cardinal virtues as attributes of what any virtue in some way, right? And then they're kind of appropriated to this or that one in particular because this is the special problem in that matter. But

[7:46] and then whether they are divided suitably into the political virtues, the purgatory ones, and what that is the purge soul and the exemplars, right? I seen that division before. That when Thomas is talking about was it the book of Proverbs, you know, the political virtues, and then the what?

[8:10] Vanity, vanity, knowledge, vanity. That's the purgatorial ones, right? And then you try to get to the virtues of the, what Purge soul, in, the next book, right? And so on, and the exemplars of that.

[8:23] Okay. To the first, what? Sorry. So he said that Proverbs would fall under political, the examples under. Yeah, and then and then the I guess it was the the songs songs would be the purged soul. If I remember right, but okay, okay. Don't know to quote me there. That's where I remember hearing Thomas talking about that, quoting somebody for this distinction.

[8:57] To the first, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the moral virtues ought not to be called cardinal, or what principles, right? Oh, that's not with this between those two, but with either one of those should be used, right? Because those things that are divided ex opposito are what simul natura, as is said in the predicaments. So, an Aristotle takes up the after the categories, and he takes up opposites, right?

[9:34] The four kinds of opposites. Then he takes up before, and what do you understand after? And then he takes up hama or simul, right? together, right? So the genus is before the species, right? But when you divide the genus to the species, those species are all on the same level, so they're simo or hama, right? In division of reason, right? Of the simo natura, I can see you divide the virtues right into their species, right?

[10:08] Unless one is not before what another, right? But all virtues are divided ex opposito, right? They divide the genus of virtue by what opposites, right? Therefore, none of them ought to be called principal or chief, right?

[10:32] Moreover, the end is more principal or chief than those things which are what towards the end. But the theological virtues are about the end, about God Himself, right? But the moral virtues are about those things which are ad finem towards the end, right?

[10:57] Therefore, the moral virtues ought not to be called the principal ones or cardinals, but more the theological ones, right? Moreover, that is more principal that is so through what its essence or nature than what is so through what participation or partaking.

[11:21] It's an interesting word, partaking, right? It implies that you gain something out in its fullness, huh? Partial, partial understanding, right? But the intellectual virtues pertain to what is rational essentially. The moral virtues to what is rational only by what partaking, right?

[11:48] So is is is love reasonable? It can be. It can be. It's moderate if it partakes of reason, right? There can be reasonable love, but there can also be a what unreasonable unreasonable love, right?

[12:05] Okay. So I brought for you wine and beer, and you take the beer, well then it's unreasonable love, right? The same with anger, right? There can be a reasonable anger, like when Christ sometimes shows some reasonable anger, right? But many times anger is unreasonable. So they seem to partake, right,

[12:30] of what the intellectual virtues have essentially. And therefore, the moral virtues are not principal or chief, but more the what intellectual virtues, huh? But against this is what Ambrose says upon the Gospel of St. Luke, expounding that blessed are the poor in what spirit, huh? For we know there to be what four cardinal what. Virtues, huh? Temperance, justice, prudence, and what? Fortitude. Not enumerated in particular order, there, but those four.

[13:11] But these are all what? Moral virtues, huh? For they call prudence or foresight a moral virtue because it's about moral matter, right? Okay. But it's not in the it's not in the desiring powers, huh? Okay. Therefore, the moral virtues are what? Cardinal ones, right?

[13:40] I answer, Thomas says. It should be said that when we speak about virtue, simpliciter, right? We understood we're understood to speak about what? Human virtue, right?

[13:58] Now, human virtue, as has been said above, is said according to the perfect notion of virtue, which requires the what? Rectitude of the what? Desire and power. Yeah, of the appetite. Yeah, the desire and power.

[14:17] For this kind of virtue, not only gives one the ability of acting well, but also what causes the use of a good what? Doing, right? And inclines you to do good, right? You make you capable of doing it, and inclines you to do it.

[14:37] But according to the imperfect notion of virtue, right? Huh? That is said to be a virtue which does what? Not require rectitude of the appetite, huh? Because it only makes the ability of what acting well, but it does not cause the what?

[14:58] Use of it for a good work, huh? Okay. So you say the medical art, right? You use that for abortion or something, right? And you kill somebody, huh?

[15:09] But now it is clear that the perfect is more principal than the what? Imperfect, right? And therefore, the virtues which contain a rectitude of the desiring power, huh? A rectitude of desire, are said or to be what? Principal, right? We saw this distinction before in the talk about what a virtue is, right?

[15:37] And these are the what? Moral virtues, and among the intellectual virtues, only prudence, which is quodammodo moralis right? It's moral insofar as it's about moral matters, right? Okay. Secundum materiam says, right?

[15:57] Okay. Whence suitably among the moral virtues are placed those which are called what chief or what cardinals you can call me the one right

[16:14] now he's got to reply to these nasty objections right now to the first therefore it should be said that when a genus that is what univocal right what does univocal mean yeah said with one meaning of many things differing in kind right like quadrilateral said of square and rhombus and rhomboid right numbers said of

[16:47] odd number and even number right okay so when a genus that is genus in strict sense univocal is divided into its species right then the parts of the division don't use the word parts there right they call them subject parts sometimes right as opposed to composing parts then the parts of the division ex equo, equally right have themselves according to the notion genus

[17:19] okay so if you divide animal into dog and cat is the dog more an animal than the cat or is the cat more an animal than the dog no

[17:36] now he says they have themselves ex equo according to the notion of the genus right okay although according to the nature of the thing one species might be what more principal and perfect than what another right then just as man I'm using that as a difference now right is better than the what more perfect than the other animals right

[18:05] when Aristotle in the sixth book of the metaphysics he divides looking philosophy into what natural philosophy and mathematics and what wisdom right then it's kind of like dividing genus into its species right we get wisdom is superior to natural philosophy and natural philosophy is superior to mathematical philosophy so Aristotle calls wisdom there usually first philosophy right and calls natural philosophy second philosophy

[18:43] okay but when there is a division of something that is what analogous right what is said of many secundum prius et what posterius right

[19:06] Before and after Before and after, yeah. As soon as they speak of the analogous as being equivocal by reason, right? Well, by reason means is before and after. That's what reason is characterized by. Then nothing prevents one to be more principal than another, even according to the common what notion, right? Just as when you divide being into substance and accident, right? But said chiefly of what substance, right?

[19:40] Okay. Then an accident, huh? And so when I came in here today, did I come to be? In some way. Yeah, that's qualified, right? I came to be in this room, right? Yeah. But when I was conceived, then I came to be, right? Right. Okay. And such is the division of virtues into the diverse genera of virtues, in that the good of reason is not found according to the same order in all, but found more in one before another.

[20:15] Right. Now, what about this terrible objection here from the theological virtues, right? To the second, it should be said that the theological virtues are what above man, right? That doesn't mean that man doesn't have them, but they're what above the human status, right?

[20:38] Once they are not properly said to be human virtues, but superhuman right? Or you can call them divine, right? Okay. Kind of fun the way we name the theological virtues because they're studied, I suppose, in theology, right? I mean, you better call them even superhuman.

[21:01] So somebody believes that he's got superhuman virtue, divine virtue, right? Now, what about the third objection here, right? About these ones that are essentially reasonable and so on.

[21:25] To the third, it should be said that the other intellectual virtues, apart from prudence, although they are more what principal than the moral, as regards their subject, because it's reason itself, right? They are not, however, more principal as regards the notion of virtue, which regards the good, which is the object of the what appetite, right? So Ar Aristotle was saying, or Thomas was saying before, that you could speak of foresight or prudence as being more a virtue than the other virtues of reason, right?

[22:00] Because it presupposes the rectitude of what? Yeah, yeah. So unless I want to eat and drink moderately, right? I can't really have foresight as to how much.

[22:17] And my own experience with people who drink a little too much, right? They don't really deny the principle that you shouldn't drink too much, but but they deny that they've had too much. That's what the boy said. a couple of lousy beers. Okay. so that does a subtle distinction then, right? Huh?

[22:46] I always think of the one psalm that I say sometimes, Sing joyfully to the Lord all you land. Serve the Lord with gladness, right? Come before him with joyful song, what the Lord is God, He made us as we are. His people the flock, He tins. Well, the second thing he says, and so that's me. That's me and Summa Contra Gentiles, right? The parts, you know. But in the Psalm, the first, you know, you got to serve the Lord with gladness, right?

[23:12] Which is more in the, rectitude of the appetite, right? And so I could be studying, you know, this Summa Contra Gentiles with a bad appetite, right? But it's very enjoyable, very interesting, you know. And so it's kind of interesting order of those two things, I think, right? You know, and Thomas is commenting on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, and Aristotle considers the moral virtues before the virtues of reason, virtues of reason he takes up in Book Six, right?

[23:49] And the moral virtues in Books Two through Five. And Thomas gives two reasons why he takes up the moral virtues before the virtues of what reason, right? And one is he says that they're more known to us,

[24:05] and that's a good reason. But the other reason he gives is that by them we are disposed for the virtues of what reason, right? So Thomas talks a lot about how temperance is a help to the life of the mind, right? And so when Thomas chased the woman out with the with the poker, whatever it was, the fire, you know,

[24:32] this disposes the mind for what thinking about these higher things, right? So to some extent, that psalm seems to fall in that order there, right? See the Lord with gladness, right?

[24:52] Now, whether there are four what cardinal virtues, huh? Distinction of four, right? Right. And see, if someone says to me, well, your favorite book, you say, is the Summa Contra Gentiles, and that's divided into what four books? Say, yeah, yeah, but how does he get it into four books, right? Well, the first three books are divided against the fourth book, right? Because the first three books are about those things that natural reason as well as faith can know about what God, right?

[25:28] And then the fourth book is about those things that we know about God only through faith, like the Trinity, right? And the Incarnation, right? And so and so that's really a division into what two, right? And then the first three books he divides them according to God and Himself. Then God is the Alpha, and then God is the Omega, right? In the third book, he actually divides the fourth book into those three parts too, but they throw on one book because not as lengthy treatment there and those things, but...

[26:03] So, now in Aristotle, in the beginning of the categories, there, when he divides, what is into universal substance and particular substance, and universal accident, and, particular accident. Well, then he's crisscrossing two divisions into two, right? Universal and singular, and substance and accident, right? What exists in another, and what does not exist in another, right? What is said of another, and what is not said of another. Sometimes do you know two twos, and sometimes do one and three, right?

[26:37] But to some extent, I suppose you could you could say that foresight could be divided against the other three because they're in the three desiring powers, right? Foresight is directing all them to some extent, but it's in reason, right?

[26:55] To the second one proceeds thus. It seems that there are not for what cardinal virtues, for foresight, just the English word for prudence. You look at Thomas's treatise on prudence, you know.

[27:14] You'll explain that the word prudence comes from the word foresight, huh? So Churchill and myself we use the word foresight rather than the word prudence.

[27:28] So the virtue is named from one of its chief parts, right? Foresight. For foresight or prudence is directive of the other moral what virtues, right? But that which is directive of others is more what principle, right? Therefore, foresight alone is the principle what Virtue, right? Now, whatever you think of this objection and significance, it does contrast that one with the other three, right?

[28:04] Moreover, the chief or principal virtues are in some way right moral, right? But for moral operations, we are ordered through two things: practical reason and right what desire. Therefore, only two virtues should be called what cardinals, right? Right reason and right desire.

[28:38] Practical reason. Moreover, among other virtues, one is more what principle than other. But in order that a virtue be called principal, it is not required that it be principal respect to all, but only respect to some. Therefore, it seems that there are many more principal what virtues, huh?

[29:08] But against this is what Gregory says in the second book of the Moralia. In what? Four virtues, huh? That's the fourth cardinal virtues. Tota boni operis structura structure, the whole structure of good doing rises up, huh?

[29:29] It's a good way to remember con-surgit, it rises up. Surgit; anytime the surgere in Latin, con-surgit rises up. Now Thomas says, "I answer that it should be said that the number of some things can be taken either according to the what? Principia formalia."Or according to the subject, right. Now, what is this distinction? We'll soon get into the text here. And in both ways, there are found four cardinal what virtue, right?

[30:18] Now, the formal principle of virtue about which we now speak is the good of what, a reason, which can be considered in two ways. In one way, according as it consists in the very act of reason, the very consideration of reason,

[30:42] and thus there will be one principle of virtue which is called what prudence, right? In another way, according as it lays down some order of reason, some reason of order about something, right?

[30:59] The order means before and after, right? And this is either about operations, and thus it is what justice, right? Or it's about emotions or passions, right? And thus is necessary for there to be what two what virtues, huh?

[31:25] For it's necessary to place the order of reason around the passions when you consider the repugnance of them to what reason, right, huh? And this repugnance to reason can be of two folds, huh? In one way, according as a passion impels one to something contrary to reason, right?

[31:55] And thus it is necessary that the passion be what Repressed in a sense, right, huh? And from this is named temperance, right? You've got to temper or call it moderation too, right? You've got to moderate this thing, huh? So, your desire for the pleasure of food or drink or something like that, you tend to what? Overdo it. Yeah, yeah. Okay. So you need to mainly be what moderated, right, huh?

[32:31] That's what Aristotle says in the Ethics there, right? You know, he's talking about how virtue is between two vices, right? But sometimes one of the vices is not named, right? Now in the case of of fortitude or courage, the two vices are named, right? Foolhardiness and cowardice. But in the case of temperance, huh? Intemperance seems to me the excess, right? When, we have a name for the person who doesn't enjoy his food at all, or, enough, right, huh?

[32:59] Because that's so rare, Aristotle says, right, huh? Yeah. So sometimes I call it puritanism, something like that, you know. From you know, but kind of inventing the word, right? Because it didn't really have a word, you know.

[33:14] Another way, according as the passion tends to withdraw one from what reason dictates, you should what do, right? Huh? And thus the fear of what dangers, right? Huh? Or of labor, huh? And thus is necessary that a man be made firm in that which is of reason, and does not retreat from it. And from this is named fortitude, right? It's almost like you're making something fortitudinous, strong, right?

[33:43] Huh? Well, my desire to eat and drink is naturally made strong. It's probably too much as it is, right? See, but it's here. In this case, you know, fear you naturally, but tend to refuse that, right? Huh? So most men are, to some extent, cowards, right? Huh? You know. And what does the officer say? And I'll be behind you, you know. But to the extent, right? You know, the officers do that, huh?

[34:10] And especially at the beginning of American, you know, War of Independence, right? You know, the men were not used to battle at all, you know, and they kind of scatter when the when the English come and start lined up and start shooting, you know, and and you know, Rose, I mean Washington, you know, threw his hat down and down. How am I supposed to fight with this kind of an arm, you know?

[34:35] But you know, he's not used to this, right? Huh? So two different ways, huh? Likewise, according to the subjects, right? The same number is found. For fourfold is found the subject of this virtue about which we now speak, right? The rational by essence, which foresight or prudence perfects, right?

[35:13] And the rational by participation, which is divided into three: in the will, which is a subject of justice; and in the concupiscible, which is a subject of temperance; and in the irascible, which is a subject of what fortitude, right? So in Greek, what do they call those two last ones? Epithymia right? Where temperance would be an epithymia and then thymos huh? Which would be the irascible appetite, right?

[35:44] Huh? And Plato in the Republic and things like that, huh? You talk about how gymnastic and what music, right? Huh? Gymnastic is make you more, you know, gun ho, right? You know, those guys, right? And you know, at West Point, there, you know, they had the words of MacArthur, you know, or On these friendly fields of this thing, they'll do it. They'll do it in battle, you know.

[36:10] It's preparation, right? But then music was to what, you know, tame the savage beast and make a gentleman, officer, and a gentleman, right? An officer, but a gentleman, right? So you know these two different things, huh?

[36:29] In in Mozart, now you know the Mozart is very sensitive to the keys, right? So like say G major, right, or B flat would be more representing the what, the concupiscible emotions, right? But D major, right, or C major, you know, for the irascible huh? Interesting

[36:54] you know those last five symphonies of Mozart, now you have the two symphonies, the thirty-six and the forty-first, there, which are right in C major, and they're both representing magnanimity, right, which is sort of hope, you know, and doing great things, huh?

[37:11] It doesn't unwind to mention those last five symphonies, right? You have the you have the middle one there, the E flat, you know, which is kind of in between, you know, so it's kind of relaxed a bit, but the magnanimous man doesn't, you know, get too doesn't descend too much, you know. But you get these love arias that might be G major, you know, or B flat, and so on.

[37:33] So when you compare Mozart with his great contemporary there, Joseph Haydn, you know, Haydn would change from one key to another, you know, kind of for variety's sake, you know, kind of. By Mozart, it's always very significant, you know, the change of the emotions, you know, the change of the keys, and very sensitive to those things.

[37:53] Musician, composer. Okay. So it's kind of like in the what subject of the powers, right, in which. And so if you study, you know, these different powers that we do, sense and the dianoia and so on, then you kind of see the significance of this argument, right? So there's one that affects reason, and then the three desiring powers, right?

[38:24] You know, in in the Republic, there Plato or Socrates kind of convinces them of the truth of what he wants to say in the first book, you know, but then being the second book, somebody says, "No, Socrates, did you want to appear to have convinced us, or to really convince us?" Sorry, well, we want to convince you this is true. And so, well, how do you do that?

[38:51] Well, Socrates said, "Well, I'm going to blow it up big, right? " And so he makes his famous comparison between the parts of the city and the parts of the what, soul, yeah. And so he has the rulers, and then you have the soldiers, then you have the common people, right? And so there you have the three virtues, right? Now, well, then he's got a problem when you put justice, right?

[39:19] And so that's the, you know, the harmony of these parts of each other, you know. So he doesn't quite distinguish the will from what the irascible, which is what the soldier has, you know. And the

[39:36] I remember as a student, now he's teaching me, going out to the military base there, you know, the soldiers say, "But you're killing something with your own hands," you know. Scared the wits out of him. you know Most soldiers aren't like that, anyway I mean, you know, they're toughs on these guys, you know.

[39:56] And uh the uh but the very clearly you had the soldiers. You know, separated from the common man, right? huh The common man, the laborer, you know, peasant, so to speak. He was what he's got to control his appetite, right? So you have these different parts of the soul, right? And

[40:16] but then if you distinguish the will from emotions, then you've got the four. So a lot of distinctions here, right? Between emotion and operations, and then between prudence, right, and the others.

[40:44] So you can divide this into three if you want to, right? The emotions and the operations, and these. So we're left with four, then, huh? Yeah.

[41:02] It's interesting. I was wondering when you were studying temperance why you know he puts meekness in temperance because it's a moderating anger, yeah, yeah, moderating irascible appetite, Yeah, yeah. This explains why. And now he's he's doing it according to the formal the formal aspect, right, rather than. Yeah, I mean, every time I pick up the newspaper, you know, somebody's hit somebody or killed somebody out of anger, right?

[41:26] Like every every day's newspaper, you know. I mean, so so this is an emotion that moves you to do something unreasonable, right? And and therefore it needs to be what moderated, right? And then someone else gets into trouble because they drink too much or something, you know. And so this had to be moderated, that right? Or they pursued a woman too much or something, you know. And uh...

[41:51] But he- when he was- when he was, organizing his virtues, there. I mean, he could have put meekness in the section on the irascible appetite under fortitude, right? I mean, he could. Well, insofar as anger is that emotion, yeah, yeah, but he's he's concerning what he calls the mode of the virtue, right? Yeah. Does consist in strengthening the character or in moderating it? You know, which is more the formal aspect of Yeah.

[42:16] what he's saying here. Yeah. Yeah. So it needs to, which would make more sense when you're making your division to do according to the formal. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. What's more? No, because I was always I was kind of confused by you know why would he put meekness with temperance down? Yeah. Where is that? I think it's beautiful the way Shakespeare has those metaphors, huh? They're in the very rapture of love, right?

[42:40] You know that you carry that kind of a likeness, you know. Um, all of them virtually have the same mode, you know. Okay, so that's going to be the reply. Let's have a look at other objections here. To the first, therefore, it should be said that foresight is simply more chief than the rest, right? But the others are laid down as being principal, each in its own what genus, right?

[43:22] To second, should be said that rational by participation is divided into what three? There you see one and three, right? Like in the Summa Jatila So don't try to get away with any divisions in four

[43:45] To third, it should be said that all other virtues of which one is more principal than another are reduced to the foresaid four, right? As regards their subject and as regards their what formal ratio?

[44:03] Now, to the third, then one proceeds thus: It seems that the other virtues ought to be called what more principal than these, huh? For that which is greatest in each genus would seem to be more what chief. But magnanimity does the great thing in all the virtues, as is said in the fourth book of the Ethics, right? Therefore, magnanimity most of all ought to be called a what principal virtue, right?

[44:35] So, it's saying in Mozart's last five symphonies, right? The first and the last, right? The two ones in C major are both representations of what magnanimity, huh? I remember taking an exam from De Koninck, you know, and I took the exam and I was leaving his office, you know, I said, "Do you think Jupiter Symphony is a representation of magnanimity?" I said, "He says you're probably right there."

[44:56] He says, "I told you, you know, when I was in high school there and Warren, Murray says to me, I was talking to Jupiter Symphony, which I really liked, ' he said, 'You know, he does at the end there. ' I said, 'Kinda. ' Well, he combines four or five melodies, right? Huh? So you get the impression of a magnanimous man, you know, you know, do all this at once, you know, great, great stuff.

[45:21] I think it's kind of the highest thing that that that the you can do in music, huh? Represent to magnanimity, huh? Aristotle talks about the music there at the end of the eighth book of the Politics. I know if you ever read that chapter, you know. But he says that the he can represent not only what the emotions, right, but also virtue, right? But I think he means the virtues that are concerned what with the passions, right?

[45:51] So, as a little boy, I used to love to try to find marches. You know, find marches and the used to play the marches for the kids in the little bit, you know. You know, I remember I saw some Marcus, he was a little boy there. You know, oh, I want to be hero. You know, I want to be hero But it does kind of inspire you know with that with the idea of courage, right?

[46:09] Huh? The marches and so on, right? Huh? And so, but I think it's the virtues that concern with emotions, which in this case would be courage, right? I mean, but I think the the highest virtue there is kind of magnanimity with the emotions, and so it's kind of the high point there in Mozart, huh? But he does it in C major in both pieces, huh? Just key of you know, it's it's in the Ratso, but it's a key of great what tranquility, right?

[46:43] While in D major you might do more fortitude in D major. or Yeah Okay So, why not make that the principal virtue, right? Magnanimity. huh Magnanimity is about great honors, right? Huh? What's honorable is what virtue, right? Huh? But to be greatly honored, you got to have what you got to excel in all the virtues, huh? This isn't the magnanimity of being generous. Yeah, yeah. And Shakespeare often would tie magnanimity with what courage too, right?

[47:22] Huh? It's courage, in a sense, is the most honorable virtue, right? You know, as I always say to my students, you can get the medal of honor for one glorious afternoon in the battlefield, right? But you can be just all your life and pay your debts, and they're not going to give you the medal of honor. Or you can be temperate and not get drunk, you know, and they're not going to give you the medal of honor.

[47:42] But I mean, so it's kind of most honorable of virtues, right? And it's kind of interesting because virtue comes from the word vir, right? Has the idea coming from from the virtue of the man as opposed to the virtue of the woman, which is more temperance, right? So the courage is, you know, I mean, a virtue is an honorable quality, right? And this is is is most clearly the most honored, eh?

[48:06] You know, the medal of honor. So now this is what I was thinking of humility. This kind of foundation of the virtues, right? You have to build on that. So second objection, beautiful Magnanimity, the first one, Of course sometimes people try to, you know, they have a hard time understanding, you know, how magnanimity and humility can go together, right? Huh? They they can, but they can't understand it, you know.

[48:37] They think they're in conflict, right? They are mistaken. Christ is both magnanimous and what humble. More with that through which other virtues are made firm would seem most of all to be principal virtue, right? Huh? But humility is of this sort, huh? For as Gregory says, huh? Who congregates or gathers the other virtues without humility is carrying what straw, I guess, in the wind, eh?

[49:15] If humility seems to be most what principle, right? huh See Yeah like Saint Augustine says Yeah Humility humility humility Yeah, yeah. Well, the Christ says to learn me, for I'm meek, and humble of heart, right?

[49:34] Moreover, that would seem to be principle which is most perfect. But this pertains to what patience, son? According to that of James, one four, for patience has a perfect what? Work. Beautiful, objections, aren't they? All three of them are beautiful.

[49:55] Therefore, patience ought to be laid down as principle. But against this is that Tulli now being in Cicero, right? In his rhetoric, right, reduces to these four all the what others, right? So we mentioned, you know, Socrates there, and Cardinal Virtues has piety in there too, but it's the four that we have. Okay.

[50:29] I answer. It should be said that, as has been said above, these four what virtues are taken what according to four formal what reasons of virtue so to speak speak, huh? Which, in some acts or passions, are found what principally, right? Huh?

[50:57] For just as the good which consists in the consideration of reason is chiefly found in the command of what reason, not over in counsel, nor even in what judgment, right? Judgment. Sometimes they speak of these as being three acts, right? But the one that perfects them is the command, right? Okay.

[51:21] So Augustine is considering his life, right, and thinking about taking counsel, right? Finally, judges got to change, but not quite yet. Okay. Likewise, the good of reason, in so far as it is placed in operations according to the notion of what's right and owed, right? Huh?

[51:47] Is chiefly found in the exchanges and in or in the distribution, right? That's talking about the two kinds of justice, right? Commutative justice and distributive justice, right?

[52:00] Which are to another with what equality, right? Huh? That's why we have these words like equity, right? Huh? And equality. Okay. The good of what refraining the passions is chiefly found in the passions which are most difficult to repress, to it in the pleasures of what touch so that's in food and sex and so on, right? Okay. and then Mary says something about people going to hell almost because of the flesh, right?

[52:36] So Mary was very much in need of being repressed. It was kind of a principal case, right? Okay. And I suppose you know the the sexual desire or the desire to drink and so on that causes more problems even than anger, I think, huh? Okay.

[52:56] But the good of firmness and standing in the good of reason against the impetus of the passions is especially found in the dangers of what death, against which it is most difficult what to stand.

[53:17] Thus, therefore, the four said four virtues we are able to consider in two ways. In one way, according to their common or general formal reasons, and according to this, they are said to be principal because they are common to all the virtues. Right? This is a different way of looking at it, right? Where they're not talking about four distinct virtues, but four qualities that must be found in all virtues, although some of them stand out more.

[53:49] One in particular than another, right? As that every virtue which makes good in the consideration of reason is called what foresight, right? And every virtue which makes good what is owed and right in operations is said to be what justice. And every virtue which what restrains passions and depresses them is called what temperance, right? And every virtue which makes for firmness of soul against some passions is said to be what fortitude, right?

[54:30] And thus many people speak about these virtues, both the sacred what doctors and fathers of the church, and also the what philosophers, right? They quote Seneca down here. huh?

[54:49] But you also went in Cicero, right? Okay. And thus other virtues are contained in them, right? Whence the objections what cease. huh? Okay, the thing is it's not what Not putting one particular virtue into another virtue, but you're talking about general conditions that must be found in all virtues.

[55:20] In another way, right? One can take these according as these virtues are named from what is what principal in each matter, right? And thus they are what not general conditions as the previous way, but they are special virtues, right? Divided against others, right? So that first way of dividing is not giving you what dividing species of virtues, right? No, no. This is something that's found in all virtues, right?

[55:50] Okay. But Each of these is found chiefly in some matter, right? And you can talk about particular ones, because prudence is called what is what, commanding, right? Prima, justice, which is about actions, what, that are owed, right, among what, equals, right? Temperance, which represses concupiscence of the pleasures of touch, right? This Aristotle teaches down these things, right? And fortitude, which makes one firm against the dangers of what, death, huh?

[56:33] And thus also the objection cease, right? Because the other virtues can have what, other principalities, right? Huh? But these are to be principled by reason of the what, matter. So put down your pipe and smoke it for a while. What is the matter of Well, see, magnanimity is about what, great honors, huh?

[57:09] I mean, would be related to fortitude. Yeah, yeah, especially because that's most honorable, right? Huh? But you can have what the great the great soul in there, you know, who rectified Athens, right, by changing the laws, right? Very just man, right? And very prudent man, right?

[57:51] It's especially hard to be firm in the face of death, right? So on the battlefield there. Especially hard to be what, restrain these pleasures of sense of touch, huh?

[58:24] But you know, you talk about things like like humility and and and magnanimity, right? Must be some other way that they're kind of principal too, huh? Doesn't really, how do you get it out here, does it?

[58:46] Interesting, you know, for a long time there was this, you know, people reading what Aristotle says about magnanimity. Well, he doesn't talk about humility there, right? In in the virtues and the commagian ethics, and so that's an objection. Thomas says, "There's humility of virtue, right? Why does Aristotle talk about it, right, and so on." And Thomas says, "Well, by humility, one is first humble with respect to God, right?

[59:18] And then towards others, in order to God, right? Towards the habit or something, right?" Aristotle is talking about those virtues whereby one is what disposed well for life in the what city, right? He's not considering in comparison to what God there, right? Okay.

[59:43] Well, peace in the city requires what justice, right? Often they say that justice is the work of peace, right? And uh so. And the very survival of the city depends upon the courage of its soldiers, right?

[1:00:10] And then all the squabbles of the city, you know, somebody rapes somebody's daughter, or he gets drunk and runs on somebody over or something, right? So that's really necessary, right?

[1:00:30] If men were just and brave and temperate, right, there'd be great peace in the city, right? Okay. Take a little break here now. Didn't give me any water today. You're losing

[1:00:59] your reward, though. You can take a cup of cold water. I'll bring it right now Not too late Um but then doesn't he also speak besides these general qualities, virtue and special virtues. He also speaks about general virtues, right? General treating.