Prima Secundae
147. Are the Cardinal Virtues Distinct? Political, Purging, Purged-Soul and Exemplar Virtues (Q. 61, aa. 4-5), with a Coda on Summa Contra Gentiles III, ch. 64
Class of 2013-12-12
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/147-are-the-cardinal-virtues-distinct-political-purging-purged/

[0:00] Look here, at Article 4 here now. To the fourth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the four foresaid virtues are not diverse virtues and distinct from each other, right? It's reminding me of the Protagoras, right? Maybe, in a sense, you know, Socrates argues some probability that they were the same thing, right? Is a sign that there's two ways you can take them, right? Taking them in so far as they really are distinct virtues, which Plato is trying to defend, and then you can do what Socrates does there, right?

[0:36] And so they seem to be, you know, conditions of the same virtue, right, or any virtue. But anyway, we'll see what this says. So he's taking the Socratic side here, first right? For Gregory says in the twenty-second book of the Moralia

[0:57] that is not true what foresight, which what is not just, temperate, and what? Yeah, yeah. Yeah, funny and Shakespeare sometimes he talks, you know, that when the characters say, you know, it's your fear that is taking counsel, you know, huh? Is it as if you're, you know, cowardly? the prudent... Okay. Nor is that whole or integral, right? Perfect fortitude, which is not what prudent, temperate, and what just, right?

[1:40] But this would not happen, what Gregory says, if the four what foresaid four virtues were distinct from each other, right? Huh? For diverse species of the same genus do not denominate one another, right? Therefore, the foresaid virtues are not distinct from each other, right? So he's speaking a little bit like Socrates or the dad, like, huh?

[2:07] Moreover, of those things which are distinct from each other, what belongs to one is not attributed to another, right? But that which is of temperance is attributed to fortitude, huh? For Augustine or Ambrose says in the first book on the offices and duties, huh? Rightly, that is what called fortitude when each one conquers himself, right? Huh? And is not what made soft, right? By illicit things, right?

[2:41] Huh? Nor bent by them, right? Huh? And temperance, he also says that the mode or order it observes of all things which ought to be what done or said, we think, huh? Therefore, it seems that these virtues are not what distinct from each other, right? Huh? Okay. So we see someone who remains temperate, you know, in their youth, you know, as being strong, right? Huh? It's courage, right?

[3:15] So one thing said. Moreover, the philosopher says in the second book of the Ethics that for virtue these things are required: first, that if one is what knowing; secondly, if he is what choosing, right? Huh?

[3:37] And third, if firmly in immobility there, right? Huh? He has this and operates, right? Okay. But of these, the first pertains to foresight, which is right reason about things to be done; the second to choose, right? To temperance, or maybe more, to justice, that one not from passion but from choice he acts, right? Ah, the refraining passions. Third, that someone on account of his suitability operates, which contains in rectitude, which seems to what pertain to what justice, right?

[4:14] Huh? And the other firmness and immobility pertains to what fortitude, huh? Socrates, a very brave man, as a soldier, huh? Therefore, each of these virtues is general to all virtues, right? Huh? Therefore, they are not distinguished from each other.

[4:35] But against this is what Augustine says in the book on the Morals of the Church, huh? That quadripartita, which are the virtues, right? Four parts, it's divided, huh? From the what various affections of what love, right? Huh? And he joins under this the foresaid four virtues, right? Therefore, the four virtues are distinct from each other, right? Huh? Okay. We can argue both sides because there's some probability in both sides, right?

[5:09] Mm-hmm. Or some part of the truth in both sides, right? Hmm. I answer it should be said that as has been said above, the four foresaid virtues are taken in two ways by what diverse people, right? For some take them in so far as they signify certain general conditions of the human soul, right? There are different conditions, right? Mm-hmm. Which are found in all virtues, right? Huh?

[5:44] Thus, that foresight is nothing other than a certain what rightness of discretion in some acts or matters. Justice is a certain what rightness of the soul, which a man does what he ought to do in any matter, right? Temperance is a certain disposition of the soul. Which what implaces a mode upon some passions or operations, and fortitude is a certain disposition of the soul, through which is made firm in that which is in accordance with reason,

[6:19] against any impetuses of passion or labors of operations. These four thus distinguished do not imply a diversity of habits of virtuous habits as regards temperance, justice, and fortitude.

[6:40] For for any moral virtue, from this that is a habit, there belongs to it a certain what firmness. Yeah, that's a distinction between a habit and a disposition, right, in the categories here.

[6:56] Which is said to pertain to what fortitude, right, some strength. From this that it is a virtue, it has that it is ordered to the good, in which is implied the notion of what is right and owed, right, which is said to what pertain to justice.

[7:17] In this that it is a moral virtue partaking of reason, it has the mode of what reason, and observes in all things, and doesn't extend itself beyond, but is of course of reason.

[7:32] Okay. It this is said to pertain to what temperance, right, doesn't extend itself beyond. Ah, but only this that is to have discretion, which is attributed to prudence, would seem to be distinguished from the other three, right, one and three, right. Okay. In so far as it is of reason itself by essence, but the other three imply certain partaking of reason, right, through the mode of application of some application to the passions or operations.

[8:09] Thus, therefore, according to the fore said, prudence would be a virtue distinct from the other three, but the other three would not be what virtues distinct from each other. It is manifest that one and the same virtue is a habit and is a virtue and is what moral, right, huh? But others and what a melius, right? Better. Take these what four virtues according as they are determined to special what matters, huh?

[8:46] And each of these are to one matter in which chiefly is praised one of the general conditions, right, from which the name of virtue is taken, and according to this is manifest that the fore said virtues are diverse habits. According to what? Distinguished according to a diversity of what? Objects. Objects, right? Okay.

[9:14] To the first, therefore, it should be said that Gregory speaks about the four, said four virtues, according to the first way of taking it, right? Which is according to the general conditions I found in every virtue, right? Okay.

[9:30] For that which is a prudence bounds over, overflows in the other virtues in so far as they are directed by what? Prudence, right? So we have a reasonable love and a reasonable fear and a reasonable choice and so on.

[9:53] Each of the other ones overflows in the others by that reason that. Who can what do what is more difficult is able to also do what is less difficult, hence

[10:10] the one who is able to refrain the desires for the pleasures of touch, lest they exceed what their mode which is most difficult right, from this also is rendered more able to refrain audacity in the what dangers of death right, won't be foolhardy right, lest he proceed beyond the mode, which is nevertheless much easier right,

[10:43] and according to this fortitude is said to be what temperate, temperance is said to be strong from the overflow of fortitude and temperance, in so far as the one who by fortitude has a soul that is firm against the dangers of death which is most difficult right, he is more able to retain the firmness of soul against the what impetus of pleasures right,

[11:13] as Tully says in the first book on the what duties or offices right, that is not what consistent would that be, is not inconsistent, yeah, for a man to be unbroken by fear and yet vanquished by cupidity, and that he should be conquered by lust after showing himself to be unconquered by

[11:42] torture, and through this also is clearly responds to the second right, for thus temperance in all things observes a mode, and courage against all the what unsuitable or illicit pleasures keeps the soul what unbent, or in so far as these virtues denominate certain general conditions of virtues, or through the fore said what redundancy right, okay, overflowing right, okay,

[12:30] to the third it should be said that those four general conditions of virtues which the philosopher lays down are not proper to the foresaid virtues, but they can be what appropriated to them right, according to the way already said, just like appropriation right. Is the Holy Spirit alone love?

[13:02] Is is the Son alone wise? Better appropriate them, right? Huh? May God the Father strengthen you. May God the Son enlighten you. And may God the Holy Spirit fill you with His love. Right? Can appropriate these to the Dream of the Trinity. You get time for the last one? I guess we do. Now, what the heck is this? Division into three, four. To the fifth one precedes thus.

[13:35] It seems unsuitably for these four virtues to be divided into what the exemplar virtues, virtues of the purged soul, the purging virtues, and the political ones, right? Huh? For as Macrobius says in the first book on the Dream of Scipio,

[13:56] that those are the exemplar virtues which are what in the divine what mind, right? But the philosopher in the tenth book of the Ethics says it's ridiculous to attribute to God what justice, fortitude, temperance. And truth and fortitude. Yeah. Therefore, these virtues are not what exemplars, right?

[14:20] Moreover, the virtues of the purged soul are said to be without what passions, huh? For Macrobius says that the what belongs to temperance of the purged soul, right? Not to repress cupidities or earthy cupidities, but wholly to what forget them, right? Huh? Okay. A fortitude to ignore the passions, not to what conquer them. Also, the Stoic almost the sense, huh? But it is said and said above that these virtues are not able to be without what passions, huh?

[15:05] Therefore, these virtues are not able to be of a what purged soul, right? So now getting back to the Stoic business, huh? Moreover, the what purging virtues, right? Are those who what

[15:28] by kind of flight from human things what insert themselves only into what divine things, right? Huh? But this would seem to be vicious, right? For Tully Tully or Cicero in the first book of the Offices said that what

[15:51] those who despise, huh? The commands and the rules, right, that many admire, these not praise, but what I think ought to be given over to what

[16:13] vice, huh? Okay. So it doesn't do his civic duties, right? Okay. Therefore, they there are not some purgatory ones, huh? The kind, the way that they they distinguish between the proverbs and the what, Ecclesiastes, right, huh? In the proverbs, you're using the goods of this world, right, but moderately, right, huh? Reasonably, right, huh? But then you're kind of what in the, you know, vanity, vanities, and all's vanity.

[16:48] You're kind of what? Restrained. You kind of have contempt for them, you know, because of their what insignificance, right, compared to the higher things, right? Okay. So good or not? Okay.

[17:05] Whatever political virtues are said, those by which what good men, right, huh? Console the republic, right, huh? And keep the cities what safe, I guess, huh?

[17:20] But to the common good, only what legal justice is ordered, right? Because the law is defined by the common good, as the philosopher says in the fifth book of the ethics. Therefore, the other virtues ought not to be called political. But against this is what Macrobius says there, huh?

[17:42] Plotinus, among the professors of philosophy, right, with Plato the prince, huh? Quattuor sunt inclin. Thomas quotes Plotinus in this place after me, right? But anyway, there are four genera of what virtues, right, huh? And from these, the first ones are called political, the second, the purging virtues, the third, that of the purged soul, right, huh? And then the fourth are the what exemplars, I guess. Maybe there's some God, right?

[18:13] So Thomas makes use of that to distinguish these books. Answer should be said. As Augustine says in the book on the morals of the church, it is necessary that the soul what follow something, right? In order that it might what possess which? Yeah, that might be born in it, right? And this is God, whom if we follow, we live what well, right, huh? Be perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect, right?

[18:57] It is necessary, therefore, that the exemplar of human virtue pre-exist in God, right? Just as in Him pre-exists the reasons of all things. Thus, therefore, virtue can be considered either in so far as it is exemplariter in Deo, and thus there are said to be what exemplar virtues, right? Kind of extrinsic form, right? The other things are modeled after, right? We were reading the text here last night, the second book of the Physics, there with my students, there.

[19:37] And Aristotle gets to the second kind of cause, right? He speaks of eidos, species, and then what paradigm, right? Just like the exemplar. So I used to sit the students, and we got through the four kinds of causes, and I said, How many kinds of causes got a cause? And how many ways has got a cause? I said well, Two and a half two and a half, yeah.

[20:05] Okay. So this is the formal cause in a sense, but the extrinsic form, right? Thus, however, that the divine mind itself, God, is called what? Prudence, right? Temperance, the conversion of the divine intention to himself, just as in us, temperance is said to be that to which the concupiscible is conformed to reason, right? The fortitude of God is his immutability, right? The justice of God is the observance of the what?

[20:43] The eternal law. In his works, as Plotinus says, right? Now you could come back and and say that that more properly speaking, you have in God foresight, right? But a more universal foresight than we have, and justice in God, right? But there are no what emotions in God, so although he has an idea of what fortitude is, what temperance is, he doesn't have those two virtues, what?

[21:10] Properly, right? And that's why too, you know, I think when when he takes up these virtues in the Secunda Secundae, he takes up what prudence first, right? And then justice, and then fortitude and temperance, right? Because the first two are found more in God than than the second two is kind of a very extended, almost metaphorical sense, right? And temperance even metaphorically, I think Thomas says that fortitude can be said metaphorically of God, but temperance not even metaphorically, right?

[21:44] You know, is God chaste, or you know, temperance, you know, sober, you know, there's not even a likeness there for for metaphor, right? But and it's kind of reverse order, but Aristotle does, right? Because he takes up fortitude and temperance first, then justice, and the last.

[22:08] See, difference in the order of ethics and and moral theology, right? Okay. And because man, according to his nature, is a political animal, it's Aristotle's famous statement in the Politics. Right, man is a political animal. Virtues of this sort, insofar as they exist in man according to the condition of his nature, are called what? Political, right? Insofar as man, according to these virtues, has himself rightly in carrying on what human things, right?

[22:59] According to which mode, up to this point, we have what spoken about these what virtues, right? But because it pertains to man, that also he what draw himself to divine things as much as possible, right? This is the famous thing that Aristotle says in the tenth book of the Ethics, right? No, he disagrees with those who says, being men, we should think of human things and being mortal, mortal things.

[23:29] No, no, we want to strive to be, you know, to divine things so far as possible, right? Okay. And this, for us in sacred scripture, is in many ways what commended, right? Huh? As even is said in Matthew five, be perfect even as your heavenly Father is what perfect, yeah. Is necessary to lay down some virtues to be in the middle, right? Between the political ones, which are the virtues that are what human, right?

[24:03] And the exemplars, which are the divine what virtues, huh? Which virtues are distinguished according to the diversity of what motion and the term or end of motion, right?

[24:19] For some are the virtues of those what passing over and tending towards a divine what likeness, right? And these are called the purging virtues, right? The purifying virtues, right? Purging.

[24:39] Thus also that what prudence, prudence and all worldly things, huh? By the contemplation divine things, right? Huh? And all the thinking of the soul it directs towards God what alone, right? Huh?

[25:04] Temperance he leaves aside insofar as what nature will allow, right? Huh? Which requires use of the body, right? Huh? Fortitude that the soul does not what fear in account of what

[25:22] excess from the body, right? Huh? And excess to higher things. Justice that the whole soul consents to the way of this thing what proposed, right?

[25:37] But some virtues are those what now attaining to some divine similitude, right? Following them? which are called the virtues of the soul now what? Purged, yeah. Thus, that prudence only what looks upon divine things, right? Huh? Temperance doesn't know what earthly what desires. Fortitude ignores the passions. Justice with what a divine what? Yeah.

[26:18] That it wouldn't divine things by, what perpetual what? Covenant, Covenant you might say, treaty yeah. Imitating him, right now. Which virtues are said to be those of the blessed, right now? Okay, or of those most perfect in this life, huh? Okay. So, maybe you won't get to the virtues of the purged, soul until you get to the blessed, right? Unless you're among the most perfect, right now.

[26:51] When the process of the application canonization, that declaration of heroic virtue, he's talking about something like that, right? Yeah. Degree. I mean, it's not like they're distinct species of virtues, but their virtues live in a higher degree. Yeah. Yeah. If you have one at that degree, you should have them all at that degree.

[27:28] To the first, therefore, it should be said, huh? That the philosopher speaks about these virtues according as they are about human things, right? That justice is about buying and selling, so on, right? Fortitude about fears, temperance about guileless, and thus it is ridiculous to attribute them to what God, huh? Okay.

[27:55] To the second, it should be said that the human virtues are about what Passions. passions. These are the virtues of men living in this world, right?

[28:16] But the virtues of those who seek what full beatitude are what without what Passions. without the passions, yeah. When Plotinus says that the passions of what soften the political virtues, that is, reduce them to a middle, right now. But the second one, the purging ones, take away them. Huh? The third. Which are the purged, soul, they are forgotten, right? And those in the fourth, the exemplars, one cannot name them, right?

[29:02] Although it can be said that he speaks here about passions, according to signify some disordered emotions, so you see, they're all suspicious of those stoics, right?

[29:14] But this is an element of truth in this distinction of these three kinds of virtues, or four kinds of virtues, you know, in Macrobius and Plotinus and so on. Now, to the third, our, you know, practical man is a little bit disturbed by this. To the third, it should be said that to desert human what, human things, where necessity is laid down, is what vicious, right?

[29:45] Otherwise, it is virtuous. Once a little bit above that, Tullius, what, premises? Huh? These perhaps it should be conceded. right To not what They did not serve the republic right They're not people

[30:17] who by an excellent genius right give themselves to doctrine and teaching right huh or into these who either by the what weakness of their strength right or some other more grave cause recede from the public, right huh

[30:39] and they concede right the power of administration and so on and praise to what others right they start to do these things huh and this agrees with what Augustine agrees with this right huh or agrees with what Augustine says in the nineteenth book in the City of God huh that otium the idleness the holy idleness it seeks what the charity of what truth right huh

[31:17] the just negotiation receives the necessity of what charity right huh once if nothing what what sarcina is that the burden if no one imposes that right um one can give yourself over to what the truth right okay

[31:48] but if it is imposed one ought to take it on in the kind necessity of what charity right huh okay because Thomas says he's talking about the religious orders right you know that someone might have to do something practical in the religious order right huh to support the others right but this is a necessity of charity right

[32:16] Or sometimes they want to make you know somebody like Thomas the bishop and he always refused right You know because he can give himself over to the pursuit of truth They got misused in making what uh uh Albert the Great a bishop I think he retired as soon as he could

[32:43] didn't Gregory always want to go back to the monastery but he couldn't And he made him pope you know What did Gregory say, you know that uh...

[32:56] When he doubted his salvation, they made him a bishop. they made him pope. He really began. Okay, the fourth one touching upon what Aristotle calls legal justice, right? Huh? Legal justice directly regards what the common good, right? Huh? But by command, huh? It draws all the other virtues to the what common good, right? As Aristotle says in the fifth book of ethics, You see where Aristotle devotes the whole book to justice, right?

[33:29] Because you got to talk about you know commutative justice and distributive justice and this legal justice, right? Which you know the definition of law, you know, is an ordering reason for the common good, right? So it's called legal justice because its object is the common what good, and then you call these other ones in what service to the common good, huh?

[33:55] It ought to be considered that to the political virtues, according as they are here said, it pertains not only to do well towards the common, but also to operate or to do well for the parts of the common, To wit to one's house, right? Huh? Or also to somewhat singular what person? Yeah, yeah.

[34:21] Well, that's quite a thing, this cardinal virtues, eh? We should stop there. So the theological virtues next time, huh? 62 here. We just got through finding out that God is the end of the universe, especially the end of us rational creatures. That's the first of the three parts there, of the third book of the Summa Contra Gentiles. Now the second part, which is talking about divine providence, now, right?

[35:15] Begins in chapter 64, right? What's this significance of number 64? Cube, first cube. Yeah, but is both a square number and a cube number, right? So eight times eight is 64, and four times four times four is what 64. So is 64 the first number that is both a square number and a cube number? One, three, two, one,

[35:50] two times three is nine, three is twenty-seven, twenty-seven. No, it's not a square number. It doesn't work. Might be two times, four times, two is eight. Yeah, eight times two. I can't think. I guess. It used to be when I was a little kid on the radio or something like that. There's always you know this question, you know, sixty-four dollar question, right? It wasn't very big sum of money, but those days it seemed like a sum of money.

[36:24] No, sixty-four would be kind of joke, but I always wonder why they took sixty-four as being the the the thing, you know. But Thomas says that a square number has a cube number has the same meaning as the number being squared or cubed.

[36:46] Yeah, you know, if you if if if ten has a certain signification, the number ten, right? Then ten times ten or ten times ten times ten has the same meaning, right? Oh, that's interesting. So you know the numbers I attribute to two and three, right? So if sixty-four is the first number that is both what a square number and a cube number, right? Well, then we have the two and three, right?

[37:18] I just I said I play these numbers because I want to remember where where the things happen, right? So I remember how the you know the first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, he begins to talk about the perfection of God in chapter twenty-eight. Chapter twenty-eight is the second what perfect number. First perfect number is six, and the second perfect number is what twenty-eight. Is that right?

[37:41] Yeah. So it's appropriate, huh? That Thomas begins talking about the perfection of God in the twentieth chapter, right? So it's appropriate that begins the second part of the third book of the Summa Contra Gentiles with chapter 64.

[38:00] I remember that now. Chapter 28 to 63 is the last chapter on God being the end and how the vision satisfies all our desires. and it's beautiful.

[38:20] Very good, man, Thomas. there. I was reading, starting to read now Macbeth again. You know, I guess the historic Macbeth Macbeth was a very good king. Is that right? Yeah, yeah. The Scottish historians, you know, have gone back and studied, and so it has a little bit on on the historical, you know, the notes or the things historical Macbeth, and then the way he started to be, you know, this fictional Macbeth, right?

[38:55] And I guess has something to do with the fact that he somehow interrupted the line of the of the Scottish kings. You know, it was very important to keep the line. You know, and so must have something wrong with the guy. You know, and then you know, it was priests already writing about this. You know, and then it gets worse. You know, along and finally, you know, he is, yeah.

[39:20] but just like some people try to defend you know Richard the Third as being a monster that Shakespeare hasn't made, but they think you know that the people who defeated Richard the Third kind of blackened his reputation. You know, even St. Thomas More, even St. Thomas More, you know, thinking Richard the Third. I think, and he lived in the house. You know, those you know, you know these old stories.

[39:49] Oh, the one historian was making the same point about the Borgia Pope. You know, Alexander the Sixth, I think, was you know was got a very bad reputation. He was Spanish, but he was making the argument that you know the propaganda of those days, you know, National Enquirer of those days was putting all kinds of propaganda against him, because they didn't like his policies because he was Spanish and he was doing certain things that they didn't like, and so they said maybe he wasn't such a bad guy.

[40:15] No, but you go to the grocery store now, you get all those those things, you know.