Prima Secundae
148. Summa I-II q.62, a.1–2: Are There Theological Virtues, and How Do They Differ from the Intellectual and Moral Virtues?
Class of 2014-01-09
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/148-summa-i-ii-q-62-a-1-2-are-there-theological-virtues-and-how/

[0:00] Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios, gracias. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, bring the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angel doctor, pray for us and help us to understand all that you've written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. So we're up to question 62 here, which is going to be on the theological virtues, huh?

[0:42] And the distinction of these, right, from each other and from the other virtues, huh? Let's look at the proemium first, huh? Once you, Dionne, gave a whole course on what a premium is. Gee, Monsignor Dionne gave a whole course on what a proemium is was about those things, you know. Didn't.

[1:06] Then we're not to consider about the theological virtues, and about this four things are asked. And the first is whether there are some theological virtues, huh? What is Aristotle saying in the Posterior Analytics? Huh? The question an est, does it exist? Comes before the question what it is, right? So in the Summa Theologiae, the first question after the one on the nature of sacred doctrine is whether God exists, right?

[1:37] And then you have the whole treatise on the essence of God, what God is so far as we w we people can know, right? And incidentally, I asked Lady Wisdom I was out there with the grandchildren, right? Two or three times, I said to her, "Is God simple or put together?" And she answered three times, "God is simple." He's only about eight. He's only only about eight now, you know.

[2:00] So. Wow. She has to be 20 when he considers going to come out of her mouth. I mean, you know. Boy. That's Sophia. It's wisdom. That name, Sophia. Something. Okay, so you can see why he begins, and right, you see how ordered this guy is, ordering. I remember he kind of would stop sometimes and take the examples of Thomas, examples of Aristotle, and explain that there's an order among the examples.

[2:25] I says if I was making a modern Thomas to win the politics exam, what the order of the examples was, but these guys, but the order of these questions, right, is beautifully said, right? Then whether the theological virtues are distinguished from the two kinds he talked about before, the intellectual virtues, and the what moral virtues, huh? And that's more general, right? And then the distinction of what they themselves, how many there are, and which ones they are, right, huh?

[2:57] Okay. Where does it come before the fourth? What the ordinate here. Can't order if you don't know what they are. Yeah, yeah. Now I was mentioning, you know, Thomas there in the exposition of the sentences of Peter Lombard, right? he's got the best explanation and I've seen, the most explicit one on what order is, right? Huh? And Thomas explains there that order in general means a before and after, right?

[3:32] And then he says it also includes distinction, right? But then he says more precisely, or rather, it presupposes distinction, right? And I sometimes show the truth of what Thomas says by the axiom of before and after. Now the axiom of before and after is nothing is before or after itself. So today can be before tomorrow and after yesterday, but today cannot be before or after today, right?

[4:03] Huh? And so distinction comes before what order, right? Huh? So in the third article there, the third question, he's talking about the distinction, right? And then in the fourth one about their what order? Yeah, yeah. So it's well ordered, huh?

[4:26] So if you see the distinction of these four questions, you can also see, of course, you got to see distinction first, all right? There's even a what distinction between distinction and order? Because things are distinct when one is not the other, right? But things are in order when one is before or after the other, right? Huh? So distinction is distinct from what order, right? And distinction comes before order, which is before and after.

[5:01] So they're very basic, right? Huh? So these things have a way of coming back upon themselves, right? You know, when they talk about reason, now reason is really the only part of us that knows itself. The Greeks had the saying, "gnothi seauton, know thyself," right? But to whom is that addressed?

[5:28] Us. Yeah, but especially our reason, right? Huh? Because my hand can't really know what a hand is, but reason can know what reason is, right? And that's reflected in logic, right? Where you know you learn things like a definition, right? And now you can define a square, many things, but you can also define definition itself, right? Because the definition of definition sounds kind of strange, right? So it's not only a definition of other things, but a definition of definition itself.

[6:00] Just like reason not only knows other things. But it can eventually know even itself as the ability for a large discourse, right? Looking before and after, huh? Amazing. Okay. So I'm dying to know whether there are any theological virtues, aren't you? You wouldn't have any idea that there are, would you? I didn't look ahead.

[6:26] Yeah, some of these things, like like the way they put these things on it, they put the answer in bold black. You know, they say something just look ahead. Get the answer. We have we have a copy of the Summa here that was given to us from some library discarded, but it's the English translation of the Summa. Yeah. And whoever the student was went through and after each question, yes, no, yes.

[6:54] Just for the exam, you know, just to make sure you get the answer. Sometimes I see people underlining Aristotle the text or Thomas the text, you know, but every sentence important. Don't go on underlining those guys. Some, you know, Martin Flossy didn't like it because it wasn't the, you know, it had to be stuck in there somewhere. You

[7:15] want to pay attention to it. It was funny, now I was doing the text in the second book in the physics there with my students last night, and Aristotle was giving the corollaries of the ways of cause, and he says you second corollary should go to the and the Greek was akrotatos, which means go to the the highest cause, right, huh? And I was mentioning to them how in Greek and in Latin they speak of the causes being above the effect, and the effect is what hanging or dependent, right?

[7:56] We use the word depend, but depend means it, you know, to hang down like a pendant or woman's earring, you know. While in English we tend to use more of the word ground for cause, right? And so we imagine there's the cause to be holding up the effect, right? So a little different image, but it's the same thing we're trying to get at, right, huh? And I was reading a play by a guy called Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, right?

[8:23] In the last words, you know, Romeo says before he goes into the house of Capulet's, you know, he has some, you know, premonition that there's going to be something, you know, some consequence yet hanging in the stars, right, huh? Well, I mean, I see if you think of the stars influencing what happens down here, you think of the effect as hanging upon the cause because the stars are above us, right?

[8:48] So he uses the word hanging, right, huh? Just like in Greek and Latin, we sometimes would speak of the underlying cause too, you know, but

[8:57] Aristotle speaks of the causes if it's above the effect, right? And so you want to go to the the highest cause, which means the what first cause, right?

[9:09] Okay, to the first end one proceeds thus. It seems that there are are not theological virtues, right? For as is said in the seventh book of Natural Hearing, the Physics, virtue is a disposition of the perfect to the best. I read like that. It's first time I first heard that as a kid. I call perfect that which is disposed according to its what nature, right?

[9:42] But that which is divine is above the nature of man, right? Therefore, the theological virtues are not virtues of man, right? The virtue is something that what perfects the nature of the thing, right? That has it, huh? Well, this is not. This is yeah, okay. Top the charts. Moreover, theological virtues are spoken of as divine virtues, right? But divine virtues are exemplars. that we learned in the previous thing there, which are not in us, but in God, right?

[10:24] Huh? The virtues of God Himself are exemplars for us, right? So they're always holding up that priest there in mass yesterday. The text you know for about the love of God, right? Huh? Well, the love of God is an exemplar, right? We're supposed to be imitating, right? So God loves all men. Well, then we're supposed to love all men, and so on, right? So theological virtues then would be the virtues of God, right?

[10:51] Not the virtues of what of man, huh? Moreover, the theological virtues are said those by which we are ordered to God, who is the first beginning, right, and the last end of things, right. So what does he say in the book of Apocalypse? I am the Alpha and Omega, and then he says a little bit later, I am the first, the Protos, and the Eschatos, the first and the last.

[11:19] And finally, he actually says that a number of times. He he adds that he's the Arche and the Telos, the beginning and the end, and that's as it's used in that division of theology, right? We consider God by Himself, and then God is the beginning of things, and then God is the end, yeah.

[11:40] Um. But God, from the very nature of reason and of the will, has an order to the first beginning and the last end. So you know, I was reading there where Thomas is talking about the natural desire that we call wonder, right? Huh? Wonder is a natural desire, right? And wonder is a desire to know the what and the why of things, huh? And so, if you see the effect, then you wonder about the cause, right?

[12:13] Huh? But then, if the cause has itself a cause, then you wonder about the cause of the cause, and ultimately, the end of this whole thing is to know the first cause, like Aristotle was saying there in second book of the physics, right? So we're already ordered to God as an end, right? Actually, right. So we have to have this other. Did

[12:45] you ever read the the book of Boethius there, the Consolation of Philosophy, right? Well, he talks about how it's the first books is investigating happiness, right? Huh. And he's a very smart guy, so he takes up false happiness first, right? Before true happiness, on the grounds that false happiness is more known to us. Okay, but then as he brings out what true happiness is, it seems to be something altogether perfect, right?

[13:19] Then you realize that it seems to be God, right? And so, the more like God is the happiness that we pursue, the more what true is the happiness we're pursuing, right? We naturally want to be happy, don't we? See, so he's saying that in our reason and our will, we're naturally ordered to what to God, right?

[13:43] Thomas in his in his commentary on the eighth psalm, right? It's a beautiful passage where he says how men sometimes forget this, right, and go off, you know, but those who hold on to this natural order to God are the wise, he says, and the pure. Unassuming, the wise and simple, y'all. He calls them simple, y'all. I think he takes simple in the sense of they had pure heart and beautiful, beautiful sin.

[14:18] But now against this, huh? The precepts of the law are about the acts of what virtue, but about the acts of faith, hope, and charity, there are given precepts, commands, right, in the divine law. For it is said in Ecclesiasticus two, who fears God will believe in Him, right? Huh? And also hope in Him, right? And also love Him, right? Huh? The commandments of love and so on.

[14:52] Therefore, faith, hope, and charity are virtues ordering us to what God, right? Thus, therefore, there are what theological virtues, right? Okay. That's interesting, you know, that Thomas there in the third part of the Summa Contra Gentiles he takes up law before grace, right? Huh? He takes up law. He says that among the things that God commands us is to believe Him and to love Him and so on, right?

[15:31] Huh? And later on, he takes up grace. He speaks about the effect of grace in charity and faith and hope and so on, right? So he gets it from both angles, right? Huh? So there's laws about it. It also seems to be what. That seem to be virtues, right? Because laws about virtues. Hence, it

[15:54] should be said that by virtue, man is perfected. Towards those what acts by which he is ordered in what beatitude? huh, okay. Even Shakespeare says it right. The guy is studying ethics, that part of philosophy that treats of happiness by virtue, especially to be achieved, right? Okay.

[16:22] But there is, however, a twofold beatitude or happiness of what man? Interesting. Uses both words there, right? I think I mentioned how when I first started studying the Nicomachean Ethics,

[16:41] Aristotle, and you'd have in the English text, you know, they have the word happiness, right? And then go read Thomas, and they have the word felicitas, and then I read Aristotle in the Greek, and the word would be eudaimonia, right? Well, happiness is named from luck, huh? A little bit like in Latin, saying someone is fortunate, right, or unfortunate, right? Um.

[17:11] Shakespeare's play, the two gentlemen of Verona, one of them is going off, you know, leaving town, and the other guy says, "When you meet with good happiness, huh? Wish me, you know, partake of your happiness, right?" And then, but felicitas comes from the word felix, meaning fruitful, right? So it didn't seem to be saying the word felicitas that this is a result of luck or happiness, what happens, right?

[17:38] But it's a what result of this natural result of your doing what you should be doing, right? And but eudaimonia comes from eu, meaning good or well, and daimon, having a good daimon, right? Well, daimon there is not taken in our sense as something bad, right? But more like a guardian angel, we'd say maybe. And Socrates spoke about his what daimon that carried him, right? And so in his you know speech there at the trial, Socrates there in the Apology, Socrates says that the daimon always warned him he was in danger, right?

[18:19] Well, the daimon has not warned him now, huh? So maybe death is not the bad thing that it is, right? Maybe the soul, being freed from the body, will become perfect in virtue, right? So eudaimonia seems to say as if our happiness depends upon some higher being, right? Well, there seems to be a little bit of truth in all these, right? Because you can say, hey, luck has something to do with happiness, right?

[18:46] Um, you know, if I get in an accident and I lose my limbs or I'm blinded or something, right, that's going to make me miserable. I can't read the Summa Contra Gentiles anymore. Um. So, luck has something, to do with happiness, right? Misery, right?

[19:04] I find gold in my property, right? You know, it's everything I have, and buy the property, but it also seems to be the result of the natural result of what you do, right? But then there seems to be this question of some higher being, you know, influencing you, you know. It's interesting. Aristotle in the in the book on the poetic art, huh? He doesn't use the word eudaimonia, but the word eutychia, right?

[19:31] Which goes back to Greek word for luck or chance, right? So he said that's what the poet is emphasizing, right? Huh? So, I noticed Tom's used the word here beatitude, just the idea of being blessed by God, right? In felicitas, he doesn't use the word fortunate, right?

[19:52] Okay. So this is twofold happiness or felicity of man. One that is proportioned to what human nature, right? To which man is able to arrive through the principles of his own what nature, right? And this is what Aristotle is talking about in the Nicomachean Ethics, right? He realizes that that happiness is not altogether perfect, right? And so he says, well, let us call them happy as men, he says.

[20:30] Another is the beatitude exceeding the nature of man, right? To which man is able to arrive only by the divine what power, right? According to a certain what partaking of the divine nature, right?

[20:53] According to that, in the second epistle of Peter, first chapter, the fourth verse, that through Christ we are made consortes, sharers, you might say, right? Of the divine what nature, right? So grace is like a partaking of the what divine nature, right? Taking apart that's what it's meant, right? Okay.

[21:20] And because beatitude of this sort exceeds the proportion of human nature, the natural principles of man, from which he proceeds to acting well according to his own what ratio, they are not sufficient to order man to this foresaid beatitude, which is above his nature. Whence it is necessary that to be added above to man, divinely some beginnings, right? Some principles, some beginnings, through which or by which he is thus ordered to a what supernatural yeah beatitude that is above his what nature, right?

[22:12] Those are the two things that St. Thomas is saying in the third book of the Summa Contra Gentiles that man and also the angels, right? They differ from other things in creation, right, by being free and having dominion over their own action, right, and by being ordered to an end that is above their natural end, right. And that's why there is law given to them, and that's why there is grace given to them, right?

[22:46] So just as through the natural beginnings one is ordered to an end that is in accordance with one's nature, natural, but not nevertheless without what divine aid, right? And these beginnings are called what? Theological virtues, huh? Both because they have God for their object, insofar as through them they are what? Rightly ordered to God, right? Third and second also because they are poured into us by God alone, right, huh?

[23:28] Third another also because only by divine revelation are these virtues treated for us in what? Scripture. Yeah, yeah. That's kind of reason why you call them theological rather than divine, right? Apart from the understanding we have of what divine means there, you know. I used to you wouldn't say it's a theological best way. I used to be bothered by this way of speaking. You know, let's say about somebody, he has psychological problems, right?

[23:59] The problem, the problem is being named from the science that studies it, right? And that's how we name the problem correctly, right? Because the science is known from its subject, not subject from the science, right, huh? It's like saying, you know, instead of calling you know, instead of calling square and circle figures, you know, and so on, plain figures, you say they're geometrical objects or something.

[24:29] But if you take it as being something that has to be revealed, you know, then it belongs to that science which is based on revelation, right? So, well, if you know that theology is what about God and about him as the beginning of things and the end of things, then you can see a reason why these could be called theological, right? We can let them get away with it.

[24:50] But I'm bothered by another thing, right? We speak of social problems, right, or political problems. It's funny, huh? See, name things from the science that studies them.

[25:09] Saying colors a visual datum or something. To the first, therefore, the first objection, right? Taken from the text there, first stop. To the first, therefore, should be said that some nature can be attributed to something in two ways. In one way, essentially, right? And thus, the theological virtues of this kind exceed what human nature, the nature of man. In another way, what one can partake of a higher nature, right?

[25:59] Just as the fire, the wood, yeah, which is ignited, and it partakes of the nature of fire, right? And thus, in some way, man partakes of the what Divine nature. divine nature. And thus, these virtues belong to man according to the nature that he partakes of, right? So he's not denying the connection between what virtue and nature, but he sees a distinction. And virtue nature is essentially what it is by what participation.

[26:32] You know, Aristotle himself, in the Nicomachean Ethics, he talks about he part of the soul that is rational essentially, like reason, and then he part that partakes of reason, right? So that that distinction is not lacking.

[26:54] And so we can see the nature that God has essentially, the angels and the saints. Partake. Yeah. Okay. So he satisfied them, huh? So far.

[27:20] He doesn't deny. He doesn't deny what Aristotle says, right? Notice the virtues are in the will, or the virtues are in the emotions. They are in it insofar as what these things partake of reason in some way, right? And therefore, the human virtues in that way.

[27:47] Okay, now there's equivocation. The second objection. To the second, should be said that these virtues are not called divine as those by which God Himself is said to be virtuous, right? But those by which we are made what virtuous by God, right? And in order to God, right? Whence they are not exemplar virtues, but exemplar virtues, right? Exemplified. Exemplate. Exemplate That's the problem

[28:29] Mark that down. send it with everything else. What kind of a cause is an exemplar? Which one of the four kinds of causes is it?

[28:41] Yeah, yeah. What kind of an extrinsic one, right? You know. So my father's company there is on the wall these patterns for the wagons, right? And so they take them down and they make something. they call it as an exemplar, right?

[29:01] Okay. To the third, it should be said that reason and will are naturally ordered to God, right? In so far as He is the beginning and the end of what? Nature. Nature, right.

[29:23] But nevertheless, according to the proportion of nature, right. But to Him, according as He is the object of supernatural beatitude, right. Reason and will, according to their own nature, right, are not ordered what sufficiently, right.

[29:47] So, are you convinced that there are theological virtues now, gentlemen? To the second, then, one goes forward. Thus, it seems. that theological virtues are not distinguished from the moral ones and the intellectual ones, right?

[30:12] For the theological virtues, if they are in, if they are in the human soul, right, is necessary that they perfect it either according to the intellectual part or according to the desiring part, right? But the virtues which perfect the intellectual part are called intellectual. The virtues, however, which perfect the desiring part are called moral. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinguished from the moral virtues. What could be more clear than that?

[30:45] I'm done. Figured that one out. Moreover, the theological virtues are said to be those which order us to God. But among the intellectual virtues, there is one which orders us to God, to wit, wisdom, right? Which is about divine things, as considering the what altissimam causam, right? That's the way. Imagine the cause to be above the what effect, right? A lot of times, they speak of the chain, right?

[31:20] You know, which link is held up by the one above it, right? To get to the top, they would screw it to the ceiling or something. Okay, so the first cause would be altissima, right?

[31:34] Therefore, theological virtues are not distinguished from intellectual virtues. Aristotle, he calls wisdom sometimes in the sixth book. There he calls it theology, right? When I was in college, he had a course in the philosophy department called Natural Theology, right? Moreover, Augustine in the book on the morals of the Church manifests that in the four cardinal virtues, right, there is the order, ordo amoris, the order of love.

[32:16] But love is what charity, which is laid down to be a what? Tail of a virtue. Therefore, the moral virtues are not distinguished from the theological. order. Okay? It's in the song of Songs. he gets into the. what someone put charity in order in it? Yeah, yeah. Thomas said the whole question against the charity there in the secunda secundae, right? Now you know about the order of charity.

[32:48] You're supposed to love the church more than yourself. Yeah. But against this is that that which is above the nature of man is distinguished from that which is according to the nature of man, right? But the theological virtues are above the nature of man, to which, according to nature, belong the intellectual and moral virtues, as is clear from the things said above. Therefore, they are distinguished from each other, right?

[33:26] So do you get the said counter? Yeah, it makes sense to me. Sometimes Thomas says, you know, objection, you know, our faithful and charity virtues. Where every virtue is either intellectual or moral, is not among the intellectual virtues, not among the moral virtues. Therefore, that virtue. That's a probable statement, right? Every virtue is either beneath the whole truth, you know.

[34:06] He does talk about the infused moral virtues too, which would be about man's nature, right? Yeah, well, let's not get too complicated here. We have to begin at the beginning.

[34:24] That's easy to swallow after you swallow this part. So, I answer: It should be said that it has been said above. Habits are distinguished in species according to what the formal difference of their what objects, right?

[34:48] Okay. Now notice, I can know the shape of this little box here by my sight and by my what? Touch. Yeah, but do I know it in the same way? Shape. I know it. Don't lose those things. Knows a beautiful color. I know it through yellow, right, by my eye, and I know it through what hardness, or you know. So the formal object is different, right? Even though the same thing is being known, right?

[35:25] Okay. So, remember when students would start to study philosophy and learn what the philosophy says about God? Say, well, that's what we were taught in in catechism or something, you know, huh? So how can you know? There is no difference between philosophy and theology, right? We're not knowing the same thing in the same what way, right?

[35:53] So he says the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, who is the what Last end of things. insofar as he exceeds the knowledge of our what reason, but the object of the moral virtues, intellectual virtues, and the moral virtues is something that is able to be comprehended by human what reason, right? Comprehend is kind of perfect grasping there. Hence, the theological virtues are distinguished in species from the moral and the intellectual, right?

[36:41] So that seems to be sufficient. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the intellectual virtues and the moral virtues perfect the understanding and the desiring power of man according to the proportion of what human nature. But the theological virtues perfect reason and the will in a supernatural way.

[37:10] To the second, it should be said that the wisdom which is laid down by the philosopher to be intellectual virtue considers divine things according as they are able to be investigated by human reason, but the theological virtues about those things which exceed human reason.

[37:34] Thus, Aristotle says, and he says that wisdom is a divine knowledge, right? He says it's a knowledge which either God alone has, or only God has, most of all, right?

[37:49] So he admits that the human wisdom is something less than the divine wisdom, right? So if man could partake of the divine wisdom, right, that would be wisdom in even higher sense than Aristotle is getting by his natural reason. But Aristotle himself would admit that, right? Because he'd say either he says either God alone should be said to be wise, or God what most of all.

[38:25] So I said, you know, a Catholic philosopher wasn't just in theology; it was a kind of contradiction, right? You know, Aristotle said, "What's the matter with you? " You know, they're into some, you know, Catholics, you know, in philosophy, you know, you know, yeah, but that's theology, you know.

[38:50] You study philosophies so you can eventually study theology, right? You study the lower so, you can study the higher. If not, you have as Albert the Great says a perverse attitude towards knowing, right? Unless you be forced to it by necessity, right? Was reading of Thomas's first teachings at the University of Naples, huh? He had Martin was teaching him logic, right? And Peter of Peter of Ireland was teaching him natural philosophy, huh?

[39:23] And they were translating there, you know, the commentaries of Averroes and so on, you know, at the University of Naples and that area. But of course, this is the origin of the word philosopher, right? That they wanted to call Pythagoras what? Wise. Wise. And he says, don't call me wise. God alone is wise. What the hell should we call you? You've got to call me something. Call me a lover of wisdom, right?

[39:53] So it's not only the love of wisdom in the origin of philosopher. In the etymology of the word, is in there, but in the origin. of the word there's also this humility, right? That we're not wise in the way God is wise. Huh?

[40:13] Who was it? Was it? uh Greek. uh where is there, you know. Athena comes down to help him. No, I don't need you. You know, that's asking for trouble. Even they could see that, you know.

[40:32] Okay. So, kind of the more the more strict name for metaphysics is not wisdom, but first philosophy, right? It's first in dignity and worth, among all parts of philosophy, right? But the word philosophy indicates you're talking about a human thing, right? God is not a philosopher. Okay. To

[41:14] the third, it should be said: is ordo amoris right? Order of love. virtue. That although charity is love, not nor is every love, charity. Huh?

[41:30] When, therefore, it is said that every virtue is an order of love, it can be understood either about love, communiter dicto, said in common, or it can be understood about the love of charity, which informs all the virtues, right? If, therefore, it is said of love, commonly said, then it is said each virtue is said to be an order of love, in so far as for each of the cardinal virtues there is required a ordered what affection, right?

[42:05] But all but the what every what root and beginning of affection is what love, huh? So why do I want steak? Because I like steak, right? Why do I enjoy steak? Because I like steak, right? Um. Why do you hate salmon? Because you like steak.

[42:35] Am I concerned? I'm afraid that the steak might get spoiled, right? Because I I love steak, right? So it gives rise to all the affections, right? So Augustine's looking at the what? He's looking before and after, like Shakespeare says, right? He's looking at the root, right? The love is the root of all the other what? Affections, right.

[43:01] Why do we hope to understand what Thomas has written? Because he loved to understand it. He loved to understand this stuff, and therefore that's what he hoped to, right?

[43:13] Why do fear you might not understand it. You love to understand it, You love to understand it yeah, yeah. If, however, it's understood about the love of charity, right, one is not given to this to understand that every other virtue essentially is charity, right? But that all the other virtues, in some way, depend upon charity, as will be made clear later on, right?

[43:49] What a marvelous mind these guys have. Got student Thomas, huh?