Prima Secundae
151. Infused vs. Acquired Virtues, and Why Virtue Lies in the Middle (Q. 63, a. 4; Q. 64, aa. 1–2)
Class of 2014-01-16
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/151-infused-vs-acquired-virtues-and-why-virtue-lies-in-the-middle/

[0:00] Go on to Article Four here. The fourth then one goes forward thus. It seems that the infused virtues are not of a different species from the what acquired virtues, those that are acquired by repeated acts.

[0:26] Interesting Thomas should see the necessity of this, huh? Even though it seemed pretty clear from what's gone before that they're not the same, right?

[0:36] For the acquired virtue and the infused virtue, according to the things foresaid, do not seem to differ except according to the last what end. But habits and human acts do not receive their species from the last end, but from the proximate. Therefore, moral virtues or intellectual virtues that are infused do not differ from those that are what acquired, right?

[1:16] So if I use my hands to to drink and lift it up, use my hands to pray, right? Still the same hand, isn't it, right? You know, even things ordered to a different ultimate end, but same hand, aren't they? Use my eyes to look at pornography or something. Use my eyes to look at crucifix. Yeah, yeah. Why isn't it the same way here then?

[1:44] Moreover, habits are known by their acts, right? But the same as the act of infused temperance, for example, right, and acquired, namely to moderate the desires of touch, right.

[1:59] And therefore they don't differ in what species. Moreover, acquired virtue and infused differ according to this that the one is immediately made by God.

[2:15] I suppose the other by the what? Creature. Yeah. But the same in species is man whom God formed and whom nature generated, right? So the first man was made from clay, right, by God, right? And the non-men are made by parents, right? And the eye whom the he gives a blind man born, right? And that which is formed in generation, right, the formative power causes. Therefore it seems that there is the same what the same in species is acquired virtue and infused virtue.

[2:58] You all convinced, huh? But against this, is it any difference placed in a definition? Any difference diversifies the what species, huh? I used to say sometimes in trying to emphasize that the students in a way proportion to them, right? They said it's like spelling, right, huh? If you leave out one letter, or you change the order of letters, you don't have the same what word, huh? A definition is that important, right, huh?

[3:40] I was reading about the poet Tennyson right now, and he had this famous poem. It's called "Maud M A U D," and it got a lot of bad reviews, right? Although Browning and others thought it's American, and some of those saying, you know, there seem to be one too many letters in there. It shouldn't be "M A D." So

[4:09] that's the way definition is, right? So do you have one part or you change one, right? Definitions are like what numbers, as you were saying, earlier, right? But in the definition of infused virtues laid down, among the differences, right, what God in us, without us, works. As has been said above, ah, above. Therefore, acquired virtue, to which this does not belong, is not of the same species with the infused one.

[4:47] I answer: It should be said that in two ways, habits are distinguished in what In one way, as has been said before, according to what special and formal reasons of their what objects, right, huh?

[5:21] Now, the object of any virtue is the good considered in its own what matter, right? Just as the object of temperance is the good of what things that are pleasant, huh? In the desires of the what sense of touch, huh? Aristotle talks about that. He's talking about temperance there, you know. The the the gluttony wanting the longer throat, you know, food going down, so like a like a giraffe or like a

[5:57] kind of way of sizing, you know, emphasis on touch there, you know. Would you find people like to think that a bit crunchy, you know?

[6:19] Which formal reason of which of which object the formal reason is what from reason, right? Which institutes the mode or the measure in these what desires, right? But that is material, which is on the side of the what desires themselves, huh? But is manifest that of another reason is the mode or the measure, right, huh? Thomasine will quote that quote of Augustine there where mode is what what measure fixes, right, huh?

[6:58] But is manifest that there is of another reason the mode or the measure which is placed upon these what desires according to the rule of human reason and according to the what divine law, right,

[7:15] huh? For example, in the taking of food, right, huh? The measure established by human reason is that it not harm the what health of the body, yeah, the well-being of the body, nor that it impede the use of reason, like too much venom, right? Yeah. Okay. But according to the rule of divine law, it requires that man what

[7:50] castigate his body, yeah, his body, bring it to servitude. And bring it into servitude. Now that's a quote from one Corinthians. To the absence of food and drink and others of this sort, right, huh?

[8:08] So I was reading the life there of Benedict a little bit in Scholastica, right? Now you know the famous thing at the end of her life, Scholastica, was like three days away from her dying, But anyway, she wanted she would meet Benedict once a year, and she wanted him to stay. He said, "No, no. The rule says, you know, that if you're near the monastery, you can't stop off some other place, but you don't go to the monastery, right?

[8:35] " So she prayed to God, and this horrible storm arose, you know, and he couldn't go back to the monastery, right? So they they stayed there and awake and prayed and so on, huh? And then a few days later she died, and the oh he said to her we saw the storm, right? I said, What have you done, sister? Right? You know. And she said, "Well, you wouldn't listen to me, so I prayed to God, right?

[9:04] " No, but you can go home now if you want to. She says, "Of course, it's a horrible, horrible storm. You used to do it, right? " So then you've got to stay with her, you know, and pray and so on.

[9:17] Well, if you judge the point of human things, it was meaning him not to stay, right? Then you know, God saw otherwise, right, in this matter, right then. But he's going to go according to the rule of the law. I mean, the human law. Yeah, I mean, I mean, the monastery, right? The divine law, right?

[9:40] Once is manifest that infused temperance, right, and acquired different species, and the same reason about the other virtues, right. So they differ in their what?

[9:53] Their measure, yeah, yeah, because one is measured by a different thing than the other, right? Okay? In Another way habits are distinguished in species according to those things to which they are what ordered right, huh?

[10:16] For there is not the same in species the health of a man and of a horse, on account of the diverse natures to which they are what ordered right. And in the same way, the philosopher says, who's this guy? In the third book of the Politics, right? That diverse are the virtues of citizens, according as they have themselves well to diverse types of what cities, right? Okay.

[10:51] So what makes one a good citizen of a different kind of city, right? A monarchy or a democracy, right? Won't be the same. And in this way, the what different species, the moral virtues that are infused, through which men have themselves well, in order to this, that they are citizens of what The saints? Yeah, the domestic house of God.

[11:23] And the other acquired virtues, according to which man has himself well, in order to what? Human things. Yeah. In other words, by the virtues that Aristotle talks about, in the Nicomachean Ethics. One is disposed well to live in the city, right, huh? Get along with one's neighbors and so on, right, huh? But by these infused moral virtues, one is ordered well to being a member of the heavenly community, right, huh?

[11:53] Again, a good reason why it's going to be purgatory, huh? Okay. This is very demanding, though, right, huh? Because the the acquired moral virtues, you know, are pretty important, right? And people can feel pretty satisfied with those, right, huh? If they have them, right. Most of them don't have them, but but gotta get these other ones in addition.

[12:21] Now, to the first objection, he says it should be said that infused virtue and acquired one not only differ according to their order to the last end, but also according to their order to their own what objects, right, huh?

[12:42] To the second, it should be said. Second objection is saying, well, they're both trying to moderate the, desires of the sense of touch. But for a different reason, the what? Acquired temperance, right, moderates the desires of the delights of the sense of touch, right, and infused temperances has been said, ah, whence they do not have the same what act, ah.

[13:16] To third, it should be said that the eye of a man, what, born blind, ah, God makes for the same act to which He forms eyes according to what nature, right, and that's why they are the same what species, right,

[13:36] and the same, and there would be the same reason if God willed miraculously to cause in men the kind of virtues that are acquired by acts, right, but this is not what is being proposed, okay, because the ones He's made for different what

[13:59] end, right, than the other different measure. Question sixty four. Now, what's the significance of the number sixty four? I mean, we had that in the day. It's that cube, that's cube, it's cube of a cube. That cube and square. Yeah, it's the first number that is both a square and a cube, right? Yeah.

[14:42] It's a square of what? Eight. Eight, and it's a cube of what? Twelve. Yeah. So if you take the square of what of two, and the cube of that, or you take the cube of two and the square of that, you get the same number, sixty four. So it's the first number that's both a square number and a cube number, huh? Right.

[15:15] Okay. Then we ought to consider about the properties of the virtues, right? And first about the middle of virtues, right? When Aristotle, you know, approaches that in the Ethics. There, how does he approach the idea that virtue lies in the middle?

[15:44] What does he take as a kind of likeness there, if I remember correctly? He uses the example of art. Yeah, yeah. Most people admit that, right? Huh? You can have the house too hot or the house too cold, right? Huh? It's too hot in here, you know, or it's too cold in here, you know. And when you cook the meat, you can cook it too much, obviously.

[16:08] Cook it not enough, right? Huh? This is raw, yeah. Right. This is burnt, right? Huh? You know. You put salt pepper on something, you can put too little or too much, right?

[16:22] Yeah, yeah. I still heard, yeah, still, you know, time to get to put too much pepper in the in the soup, you know. I was a

[16:31] star around the house for some time. It's kind of died down now. Now that the kids are gone. But you know, if you if you break a leg of the chair and you cut a board, you can cut it too long or too short. You got just right thing. Measure measure it three times, cut it once. Yeah. If you drink wine, you make it too much or too little, right?

[16:56] Thomas says you should add it, ad hilaritatem. Okay. Secondly, about the connection of the virtues, huh? That would be the next question, sixty-five. Third, about the what? Equality of them, right? That would be question what, sixty-six, huh? And then about the duration, question what, sixty-seven, right? So the first part of this premium is the next four what? Questions. Questions, huh? Okay, but now coming back to the first one.

[17:43] About the first four things are asked. First, whether moral virtues are in the middle. Secondly, whether the middle of moral virtue is the middle of the thing, or of what? Reason, huh?

[18:01] Of course, you know what Aristotle says, right? It's the middle of reason, right? So you bring out the turkey and thing. Should I eat half the turkey? That would be the middle of the thing, right? Or you bring out a jug, you know, and should I drink half the bottle? No. Should I drink? Was it

[18:25] too much for me, or too little for me, right? Should eat enough to maintain my strength, right? But not to get fat, right? So how does Aristotle define moral virtue? Habit with choice, existing in the middle towards us, right? It's determined by right reason, right?

[18:55] It's not the middle of the thing, then, is it? We have to have. I mean, justice seems to be different than the other two moral virtues.

[19:08] Seems to be a different thing. Okay. Now, third article. Would the intellectual virtues consist in the what? Middle, right, huh? What is Ken say? All my reports go with the modest truth, nor more, nor clipped, but so, right? Or what is Falstaff say? They say more or less than the truth. They are villains and the sons of darkness, huh? He wants them to lie across. We were talking about that before, you know.

[19:57] Often the truth is in between two extremes, right? And those who say that there are three persons in God and three natures, and those who say there's one person and one nature. The truth is in between those two extremes. Or in Christ, there is what two persons because there's two natures.

[20:19] Or because there's one person, there's one nature. Well, one of those is correct. The other one is what entirely mistaken, right? You can't explain why anybody would think that, right? If there's really only one person, one nature, why do you think there's two persons and two natures, right? But if there's one person and two natures, then you see how you could you can explain the two errors, right?

[20:47] But that's the truth, and it's in between those two extremes, right? What about the theological virtues, right? Do they consist in the middle? Do

[21:15] you love God too much as well as too little? If you believe him too much, we'll see what he says. Should be interesting. To the first one precedes thus. It seems that moral virtue does not consist in the middle. For the last is what repugnant to the idea of the middle. But it's of the notion of virtue to be what the ultimate. For it is said in the first book of the Ethics that virtue is the what.

[21:58] Yeah. Therefore, moral virtue does not consist in the middle. Virtue is the completion of the power right? It's the last word. Moreover, that which is greatest, maximum, is not the middle. But some virtue, moral virtues, tend to that which is the maximum. As magnanimity, right, is about the greatest honours, the magnificence about the greatest what expenses and so. As is said in the fourth book of the ethics, right, as opposed to what philotimia, which is about lesser honours, right, and liberality, which is about little sums, right.

[22:59] Therefore, not every moral virtue is in the what middle, right? The magnanimous man does great things in all the virtues, right. It's like Caesar right now, or Alexander weeping no more, worlds to conquer right.

[23:30] Moreover, if it's of the notion of moral virtue that it be in the middle, is necessary the moral virtue not be perfected, but more be corrupted, to tending towards the what extreme right? But some moral virtues are perfected through this that they tend to the extreme, as virginity right, which abstains from all venereal pleasure, and thus it holds the extreme, and is the most perfect chastity right.

[23:59] And to give all things to what the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore, it seems that it's not of the notion of moral virtue to be in the middle right. Thomas, in the last part of the this third book. of the Summa contra Gentiles takes up the religious orders, right? And he takes up the three vows and so on, right? These are the kind of objections you get against these things, right, that they're going outside the mean, right?

[24:28] Okay. But here he's not attacking. This objection is not attacking those things, but holding them up because they're good, right? But they obviously go off the mean, right? Therefore, right? Okay.

[24:43] And what does the character say in, Shakespeare? Do you think there'll be no more cakes and ale because you're virtuous? But Against this is what the philosopher says, huh?

[25:00] Not just any philosopher, he is the philosopher, right? Did the guy say Aristotle is somebody? He says. He sure is. For as the philosopher says in the second book of the Ethics, that moral virtue is a habit with choice, right? Existing in the what middle? That's not the whole definition, but but the middle is determined by right reason, right? As the wise man would do.

[25:39] Answer should be said. It is clear from the things foresaid, that the virtue of its very what definition notion orders man to the good, right? But moral virtue properly is perfective of the desiring part of the soul. But about some determined what matter, right?

[26:06] So moral virtue is a virtue of the part that is not rational essentially, but that partakes of reason, right? Now the measure and the rule of the motion of the appetite about things that are desirable is reason itself, right?

[26:29] So does anger know how much you should be angry? So if you bump into me, should I get angry? Maybe not if it's just a pure what accident, right? If you want these high school kids to go down the thing, knock everybody's goes down. If you should get a little bit angry, right? So on. But only reason can consider the circumstances of your collision, right? Are you being careless, right?

[27:09] You know, did you do it on purpose, etc. You step on my toe. But the good of anything measured and ruled consists in this: that it be conformed to its what. Just as the good in what artificial things that it follow the rule.

[27:41] For the bad is consequently right things of this sort. Through this that something is what not in accord with its what rule or measure. Which happens from this that either it exceeds the measure or that it falls short of it. Just as manifestly appears in all things that are ruled and what measured right. So when you make a cup of tea, how long should you leave the tea leaves in them?

[28:12] Right. I get the thing from sometimes from the tea importer there. You know, they say this should be, you know, three minutes and ten seconds. I think four minutes. You know, I always put about four minutes. Any once I make it, I'll get that exact. You know, but some people, you know, they talk about that. You know, I know some guy in some tea shop there in Quebec.

[28:35] You know, and don't do this more than you know. You know, but you know, if you let me rule my life. Yeah, yeah, but if you say you know, I know it's around seven or eight, something like that. Different chemicals start to be released from the tea leaves, right? So now it's going to get a bad taste. You get a bitter, a bitter tea. You know, so there is excess there, right?

[28:58] And then you could not leave it in enough to really absorb the tea. right? And therefore, it is clear that the good of moral virtue consists in its being what equal to the what measure of reason, right?

[29:18] It is manifestly obvious that between excess and defect, equality or conformity is the middle. Whence it manifestly appears that moral virtue is in what middle. Yeah. Aristotle, after he brings out the definition of this, he goes through briefly all the moral virtues and shows that between two extremes. So courage is between what? Cowardice and foolhardy. Yeah. And temperance, he says, is kind of hard to name the two because when is really rare.

[29:51] But between what? In temperance and say in puritanism, something like that. Then he goes on later on to say that it's not equidistant between them, right? The middle, right? So courage is closer to foolhardiness than to cowardice. Temperance is closer to puritanism than to intemperance, as we call excess. Yeah.

[30:26] To the first, therefore, it should be said that moral virtue has goodness from the rule of reason. For matter, it has the passions or the operations, right?

[30:42] If, therefore, moral virtue is compared to reason, according as it is a reason, it has the reason of an extreme, which is conformity, right?

[30:58] But excess and defect have the reason of another extreme, which is what deformity. If, therefore, one considers moral virtue according to its matter, it has the notion of a middle, in so far as it reduces the passion to the rule of reason. Hence, the philosopher says in the second book of the Ethics that virtue, by its substance, is a middle, in so far as the rule of virtue is placed around the proper matter.

[31:27] But according to what optimum, best, and bene, it's an extreme. To what, according to the conformity reason? So what does Shakespeare say? They are as sick that surfeit with too much, as they that starve with nothing. Right. Therefore, it's no mean happiness, he says, to be constituted in the mean. Well, there's two different senses there, right? Um, it's no mean happiness; it's an extreme happiness, right? To be constituted in the mean.

[32:07] Okay. So, one sense, virtue is an extreme, right? It's extremely good. It's extremely what reasonable, right? But in terms of the matter, right? It's a middle between two extremes. Yeah. But a middle that is in conformity to reason, right? You know, one of the reasons why virtue is rare, right? Thomas gives, apart from the fact that men are inclined to pursue their the sensible good, which is more known to them, right?

[32:43] But that the virtue is like the the target, the like the the center of the target, right? And there's only one way when you hit the center of the target, and there's what many ways to miss, right? Yeah. Yeah. So in that sense, it's what

[33:03] couldn't be better than that, huh? On the old contest here in England, there was the thing was to shoot the. arrow, basically that guy's here, right? If he hits the target, you know. But that's the culmination, you know. You know, you know, the other guy hits the target right in the middle, you know, and nothing you do is to correct. Didn't they do that, huh? Now it's in in the Sherman Forest, so you know you could you could you know take the thing and try.

[33:32] Yeah. So, is moral virtue in the middle or an extreme? Yes. Distinction, right? Yeah. It's extremely good, right? Couldn't be better, right? But it's what, in terms of the matter, it's not extreme, but a middle, right?

[34:00] Miss Lassiter does it better. Shakespeare says it better, right? It's no mean happiness, therefore, to be constituted in the mean. He's a pretty smart guy, than Shakespeare, I don't know if we got all his wisdom. but. He's a pretty smart guy. What play of Shakespeare now are you currently reading? Currently? Yeah. Not right now, no. Not not

[34:26] presently. I remember one one of the Americans that Laval there, you know, and Chris Dion or DeKoninck or, somebody would be quoting Shakespeare, you know, and they say it's really embarrassing, you know, that these guys know Shakespeare better than we do. That's being

[34:49] about the the last day of Tennessee, you know, the poet laureate of England there in the 19th century, famous. But he asked for his copy of Shakespeare, you know, so he could read, you know, Cymbeline again, you know, and his eyes were kind of failing; he couldn't see it the first day, and a couple of days later he asked to see Cymbeline again because he wanted to read that scene there where Posthumus and Imogen are reconciled again—a beautiful scene, you know—and then he finally dies, and they say with Shakespeare still in his lap.

[35:17] No, I think it's very appropriate for the poet laureate of England to die that way, right? So it's better doubt that with the Bible in your lap. But I mean, if you read the Bible there then Shakespeare, would be a good second, you know.

[35:37] I guess towards the end of his life, there he started try to write plays, you know, an imitation of Shakespeare, you know, and he was going to write some historical plays, you know, so. Queen Mary had a little bit, you know, about the Catholics, you know, but it's other ones, you know, didn't succeed too well, you know. But earlier he had written the Idols of the King, you know, and things on the King Arthur, you know, the Death of Arthur was better.

[36:05] Okay. So Aristotle and Shakespeare didn't see the distinction. Maybe you guys see it too. To second it should be said that the middle and extremes are considered in actions like in justice, right, and passions like in courage and temperance, according to diverse what circumstances, huh? Once

[36:44] nothing prevents, in some virtue, for something to be what extreme according to one circumstance, which is nevertheless in middle according to other circumstances, by conformity to reason, right?

[37:00] My examples to be what eat more on Thanksgiving day than other days, especially if grandma's gone to a lot of work to prepare the turkey, right? You might eat. Generously in the turkey that she's preparing, right? You know, just sit down and have an apple or something. Yeah.

[37:21] But in different virtues, and thus in magnificence and magnanimity. For when considers the quantity absolute of that to which the magnificent man or the magnanimous man tends, it is said to be an extreme, and what maximum. But if this is considered in comparison to other circumstances, it has the notion of a middle, right? Because these virtues tend towards this, according to the rule of what? Reason. That is, where is necessary, and when is necessary, and account of which is necessary, right?

[38:12] But there's an excess if, in this maximum, it tends when it should not be necessary, and where is not necessary, or an account which is not necessary. But there's a defect if it does not tend to this where is necessary and when is necessary, right? And this is what the philosopher says in the fourth book of the ethics. The magnanimous man is in magnitude extreme, but in that which is necessary, in the middle, right?

[38:49] When Mozart represents the magnanimous man as he does in the thirty-sixth symphony and especially the Jupiter symphony, right? Um. He represents this as not being beyond the man who's experiencing that what emotion of hope, right? Huh? So in the last part of the fourth movement, what does he do? He combines four or five melodies together, right? The greatest of ease, right? You know, you see the idea that this guy can do great things, huh?

[39:18] But I think more of Thomas says if you look, you read the the opening chapters there, the first book of Summa Contra Gentiles, where he's talking about what is the role of the wise man, right? And if he proposes to have that role, right? Well, he's capable of that, right? And it's necessary that someone do that, right? Who's wise enough to do that, right? Huh? Now, if I was to say, now, this is what a wise man does.

[39:40] Now, I'm going to do this. I'm going to, you know, then then then you can say this is laughable, right? No. But when Thomas does it, and then actually exceeds exception your your anticipation, right? You say, well, he he did something that was necessary to do, and when is necessary to do it, right? He even defends religious three vows there in the third book, right, which was necessary in the Middle Ages, there, huh?

[40:07] You see, ritualized in the middle. They were saying, you know, and give away everything. That's obviously extreme, yeah. So Thomas has to defend these things. Somebody has to do what's necessary, huh?

[40:20] Okay. Now, to the third, should be said that there is the same reason about what? Virginity and poverty, which is about magnanimity huh. For virginity abstains from all venereal things, and poverty from all what? Rich, which is an account of which is necessary, and according as is necessary, that is according to the command of God, right? And an account of what? Eternal life. Eternal life. If, however, this came about according as it is not necessary, that is according to some illicit superstition, right?

[41:01] Or account of some empty glory, it would be what? Superfluous, huh? If, however, it does not come about when it should, or according as it should, is a vice for what? By defect, as is clear in those going beyond the vow of virginity and poverty, right? Transgressing it, right? That's what Father Hardon points out about poverty in canon law is defined as being sober, and he says whereas Marxism is drunken, he says that's that's the envy of the poor.

[41:38] That's like a drunken poverty. It's not sober, like religious. poverty. These terrorists, you know, blow themselves up. You know, and so it's kind of in excess there, but it's not actually not virtue there. either Okay, crazy.

[42:02] That's what Chesterton used this for an a fortiori He said for some of these lesser things. Yeah, yeah. You find such extreme things, extreme behavior. Says all the more if it's something really divine, should we expect this kind of behavior? And that's because people say religion is the cause of wars. Well, we should expect that. That's normal. If people are destroying civilization for the cause of some political party, all the more should we do it for the sake of God?

[42:32] There might be some people that abstain from meat because they think it's it's sinful to eat the the other animals, right? Huh? Mm hmm Yeah it's a little like that too huh You guys think like that, you know? That's cruel. Well, this is not really a virtue in that sense, right? It's just some kind of superstition, right?

[42:53] Abstain from wine. We got teetotalers We got teetotalers and we have. We have abstainers. Yeah, teetotalers We got a girl here who works for the SPCA in Massachusetts, and. She works with these people more. It's really amazing. So if they if they take, they also receive not only the stray dogs and cats, but you know like farm animals and things and a lot of roosters. You know people.

[43:22] They don't want them. They don't want the roosters. But there's a rule that if they if they have to kill them like the roosters, they start you know tagging each other and you know they don't like that either because they're causing each other pain. So they put them down, but they can't eat that meat. They can't sell it. They can't. They can't do anything. But they can't.

[43:40] They kill the pig because it's wounded. They can't. And if somebody wants to take one of those roosters, they have to promise that they're not going to kill it and eat it. I would say I would say I was under duress if I promised a pig. Yeah. And they got this three hundred pound pig that they've been feeding for the last. time. Of course, nobody wants to take it.

[43:58] Say I'm not going to kill it and eat it. Yeah. Hey, all you got to do is just tell them you just do promise under duress. Bangers. Christ, bangers.

[44:10] Make the promise, but have somebody else kill it, and then you can all leave So technically, you're not breaking the promise. So we have a chance for another article, or what? Uh, yeah, looks like it's not too long, for sure. To the second one proceeds thus: it seems that the middle of moral virtue is not a middle of reason, but a middle of the thing.

[44:34] But for the good of moral virtue consists in this that is in the middle. But the good, as is said in the sixth book of the metaphysics, is in things themselves. Good and bad are primarily in things, and truth and falsity, are, primarily in the mind, Aristotle says in the sixth book. Therefore, the middle of virtue is the middle of the thing.

[44:56] Moreover, interesting argument. Moreover, reason is a power that what grasps things, right? This apprehensiva. But moral virtue does not consist in the middle of grasping and apprehensions, but more in the middle of operations and passions. Therefore, the middle of moral virtue is not a middle of reason, but a middle of the thing. Moreover, a middle which is taken according to arithmetical or geometrical portion is the middle of the thing.

[45:32] But such is the middle of justice, as is said in the fifth book of the ethics. Therefore, the middle of moral virtue is not a middle of the thing, but a reason, but of the thing. But against this is what the philosopher says in the second book of the ethics that moral virtue consists in the middle towards us is determined by right reason. The answer should be said that the middle of reason can be understood in two ways.

[46:08] In one way, according as the middle exists in the act itself of reason, right? As if the act of reason itself is reduced to a middle. And thus, because moral virtue does not perfect the act of reason, but rather the act of a desiring power, the middle of the moral virtue is not a middle of what reason, in that sense. In another way, that can be said to be a middle of reason, that which is laid down by reason in some matter.

[46:45] And thus, every middle of moral virtue is a middle of what reason. Reason says how much should be too much, and how much should be too little. How much should be just right?

[46:59] Because as has been said, moral virtue is said to consist in the middle, in agreement to rational, to right reason. Just prudence. But sometimes it happens that the middle of reason is also a middle of the thing. It happens sometimes, huh? And then it is necessary that moral virtue, that the middle of moral virtue, be the middle of the thing, just as in what, justice?

[47:33] But sometimes the middle of reason is not a middle of the thing, but is taken by comparison to us, and thus it is a middle in all the other moral virtues.

[47:49] Now the reason for this is because justice is about operations which consist in what, exterior things, in which the right is instituted, ought to be instituted, simply and what, as such, as has been said above. And therefore the middle of reason in justice is the same as the middle of the thing, in so far as justice gives to each one neither more nor less than what is owed to him.

[48:24] But the other moral virtues consist about the interior passions, in which there is not able to be what a right constituted in the same way, on account of this that men diversly have themselves to the passion, and therefore it is necessary that the rectitude of reason in the passions be instituted with respect to us, who are affected according to the passions, huh?

[48:53] So Aristotle gives example: a mild man eats a lot every day every day, right? Huh? Well, the middle for him would not be the same as for the little boy, right? So the working man might eat more than the little boy, right? Or the professor or something, okay?

[49:15] And to this is clear the response to objections. For the first two arguments proceed from the middle of reason that is found in the act of reason itself, right? The third reason proceeds by the middle of what, justice?

[49:51] Okay, That's nothing, else?