Prima Secundae
153. Summa I-II Q.64 a.4 & Q.65 a.1: Do the Theological Virtues Have a Middle? And How the Moral Virtues Are Connected
Class of 2014-01-23
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[0:00] Okay, to the fourth, I kind of anticipated the fourth here, right? To the fourth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that a theological virtue consists in the middle, right?

[0:13] For the good of the other virtues consists in the middle, as we've seen for both the moral virtues and the virtues of reason. But the theological virtue exceeds in goodness the other virtues. Therefore, the theological virtue much more is in the what middle, right?

[0:38] Moreover, the middle of virtue is taken, the moral, according as the appetite is ruled by what reason, right? The intellectual, according as our understanding is measured by the thing, right? But theological virtue perfects the understanding and also the what appetite. Therefore, theological virtue consists in the middle, right? There's some truth to this, it seems, right?

[1:12] But maybe some falsehood too. He wouldn't have put it in there if there was no truth. Now I get something more concrete here. Moreover, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a middle between desperation and presumption.

[1:39] Likewise, faith. Yeah, a middle between contrary heresies, as the great Boethius says in the book on the two natures, like we're talking about, right?

[1:52] I was talking to Warren on the phone there the other day, and I said, "Do you agree with me? I kind of say that Boethius is the greatest mind between Augustine and Thomas, you know, and he goes all day and says, 'I mean, he's a great mind. ' This Boethius is. "

[2:12] What an understanding is of Trinity, you know, and all kinds of things. Great guy. So the one who confesses in Christ, one person and two nature, is a middle between the heresy of Nestorius, right? Who says there are two persons and two what? Natures, right? And heresies of Eutyches, who says there's one person and one nature, right? Therefore, the theological virtue consists in the middle, right? Of course, you know, the man who says the truth consists in this case in there being one person, two natures, can explain why you have these two false opinions because they both have a part of the truth.

[2:58] Because there are what two natures? But only one person, so you could think that because there is two natures, there must be two persons, and because there is one person, there must be one nature, and so that the two errors can't explain each other. There is really two natures and two persons, and why should anybody think that one person and one nature? And if there is really one person, one nature, why do anybody think that there are two?

[3:26] Right, two of both. If there is one and two, well, then you can see that there is a part of the truth in both ways. Heresies, right? Huh? Yeah.

[3:42] So truth explains falsehood as well. But against this, in all things in which virtue consists in the middle, it happens that one can sin through excess, just as one can sin through defect. But about God, who is the object of theological virtue, it does not happen that one sins by excess, where it says in Ecclesiasticus chapter forty-three, "Blessing God, right? Exalt him as much as you are what?

[4:20] Evil, for he is greater than all praise. Therefore, theological virtue does not consist in the middle, right? So, how much should you love God, right? You know, nothing too much, as the Greeks say, right? So you shouldn't, you made a nagan, nothing too much. So you shouldn't love God too much, right? Don't want to be fanatic. Yeah, don't give up all these things to to love God.

[4:48] You know, that's just that's too much, right? Well, again, can you can you hope in God or trust in God too much? Or can you believe God too much?

[5:15] But yet we saw those examples there. The heresies, right? That there seems to be some truth in the other position, right? That it's in the middle between two things, right? And then there is between what presumption and despair, right? And is hope in between those two?

[5:42] Thomas speaks you know in the commentary in the Psalms there you know where he speaks about both hope and what fear, right? That hope without fear, yeah. But fear without hope would lead to what despair, right? Okay.

[6:01] If I just fear God's justice, you know, then I might despair of my salvation, considering my wicked ways, right? But if I just think of God's mercy, you know, like people say, well, he's in heaven now, you know, he's, you know, there.

[6:22] I was at a funeral not so long ago, a couple years ago, and the son of the deceased says, "You know, we don't know whether in heaven or not yet. We, you know, we think highly of the deceased, but we don't know. " So he's imploring you to pray for him, right? You know, I know my father died. The father Styner, my favorite priest, he says, "says to my mother, you know, never stop praying for him, right?

[6:49] We just don't know. " He said, "We don't know. " So my father died, you know. I said, "Well, he's he's he's through with his suffering, " so I said, "I hope so, but I don't know. I don't know. " He's going away in purgatory, and we've abandoned him. Yeah, he's suffering more than we. No, he's suffering more than he was when he, you know, whatever he died, you know.

[7:14] And so it's it's hard to to strike the proper what balance there, you know. But that's why some of those psalms will mention hope and fear together, right?

[7:29] Doesn't doesn't Mary say that in in the? She has mercy to those who fear. Yeah, he said, "Well, why don't say those who hope in him, right? " Hope corresponds more to mercy as an object, right? Huh? We open the divine mercy, right? We fear the divine justice, right? So why say, you know, she's she's simplifying the thing, right? That you have to put them together.

[7:55] Let's see if Thomas can. I answer. It should be said that as has been said before, that the middle of virtue is taken by conformity to its what rule or measure, huh? According as it happens that one can go beyond that rule or measure, or one can fall short of it, right?

[8:21] But of a theological virtue, one can take a measure in two ways, huh? From one, according to the notion of the virtue itself, and thus the measure and rule of a theological virtue is God Himself.

[8:47] For our faith is ruled according to the divine truth, right? The first truth, as Thomas calls it in the Secunda Secundae on faith there.

[8:59] Charity according to his what goodness, huh? Hope according to the magnitude of his omnipotence and his what piety now piety taken in the sense of mercy, right?

[9:16] And this is a measure excelling every human capacity, right? Whence never nunquam, I guess, huh? That's never, isn't it? Whence never is a man able so much to love God as he should be what loved, Loved. But what does, in French, de Sales say you know, we're thankful that God loves himself as much as he is lovable, right? " Because none of us love him as much as he should be loved.

[9:50] I think Shakespeare should be admired more than most. he should be admired. I was telling you, I was reading this little biography of Tennyson, the poet, right? He died there with the the Shakespeare in his hands, right? Huh? Reading *Cymbeline He would have been better to die with the Bible in his hands, but it was kind of appropriate that poet should die with Shakespeare in his hands, right?

[10:13] Huh? It's like Washington Irving, you know, told his nephew there at the end of his life, there, you know, it's idle for me to, you know, you know to expect to credit, you know, or to or to be admired. He says, you know, Shakespeare and one or two others said it all. I mean, what what what? What more have I got to say? Yeah. What? Why should I be?

[10:33] You know, that's just the way. That's probably the way the way Tennyson felt a bit too. You know, he wanted to read again the conclusion of *Simple Cymbeline It's a marvelous play, beautiful, beautiful play. Um, one of those plays I came upon by myself. You know, never had the breakfast in class by some English professor. He said, "What a what a play."

[10:55] That's a play too, right? Where a man thinks his wife has been unfaithful, right? Because he's been deceived by a villain, right? But there's there's forgiveness there, right? It's one of the mercy forgiveness plays, you know. The beautiful plays. Shakespeare writing was at the end of his life. Mercy forgiveness plays.

[11:20] So one measure then of theological virtues, and one way of saying the object of them is what God Himself, right? Well, you can't love God too much, right? Huh?

[11:32] You can't believe him too much. This he says is a measure excelling every human faculty. Whence never can a man so much love God as he what ought to be loved, huh? So we got to ask, apologize to God, huh? For not loving Him as much as He should be loved, huh? But you always try to love Him more, huh? Nor so much to believe or hope in Him as what as he ought to be ought to be right.

[12:06] Whence multominus, much less, therefore, is it able for there to be there excess, right? So someone says you love God too much, and I say, well, you better rethink that. You believe God too much, you know.

[12:26] You really? You really? Really? That crazy woman there that writes in the Worcester paper there, you know, attacking Eucharist, you know, and people believe that he's there, you know. So you know. Now, who are we supposed to believe, him or you? Who's more? Thomas the Adorote Devotee talks about believing God, right? Yeah. Please, whatever Son of God says. Yeah, the Word of Truth. You hope, yeah, nothing more true than this.

[12:59] Verbum veritatis. And thus, the good of such a virtue does not consist in a middle, right? But the more it is so, right, the more it exceeds to the what summa, right? Okay.

[13:16] But the other rule or measure of theological virtue is in our part, right? Because. Even if we're not able to. We're not able to bear ourselves towards God as much as much as we ought to.

[13:35] Nevertheless, we ought to be born in Him, believing Him, hoping in Him, and loving Him, according to the measure of our what condition? Condition, right. Whence peradventure he says, right? There can be considered in theological virtue a middle and extreme from our. Part, huh? Mm-hmm. And that could be unfolded some more, right, huh? Yeah. Listen, a person grows in the spiritual life, don't they? They should go forward rather than backwards, you know.

[14:17] If you're not going forward, they say you go backwards. I guess that's what happens, huh? And I don't know about my friend there, Solomon, you know. Our liturgy used to say, "One of the prayers, speaking to God, you taught your divine wisdom to Solomon, and he became as one who knew no wisdom."

[14:39] Could maybe get a insight into what the second thing means here in the implied objections, right? Now, the first objection was arguing well that the theological, I mean, the moral, intellectual virtues have a middle way, don't they, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the good of the intellectual virtues and the moral virtues consists in the middle, by conformity to a rule or measure which one can what transcend, right, huh?

[15:16] You can say what is not is, right? You can eat more than you should eat, right? Drink more than you should, right, huh? Which is not in the theological virtues, Notice he says, per se loquendo, right, huh? It's quite a distinction, and per accidens. This has been said.

[15:47] Now, second objection. To the second, should be said that the moral virtues and the intellectual virtues perfect the understanding and the appetite, as do the theological virtues, right? But they perfect it in order to a measure in a rule that is what created huh? But the theological virtues, in order to a measure in a rule that is what Not created Yeah. Whence is not a similar reason, right?

[16:16] So where does Plato talk about that? Call upon that distinguished student down there. What does Plato say, huh? It's in the Laws, isn't it? He says, quotes the opinion of some people: "Say, man is the measure of all things." Says, no, no, no, no. God is the measure of all things, right, huh? But most fully you're in the theological virtues, right, huh?

[17:04] What's his name? Boethius. There, right in the Consolation of Philosophy, he says that happiness is a perfect good, right? Well, the only perfect good is God. Therefore, happiness is God, right? So, any human happiness is more happiness the more it is what? Godlike. Yeah, more is Godlike, huh?

[17:29] It's like if you think of food as what nourishes and sustains life. This is my own reflection, but but no matter how much food you put in your body, your body's going to die. So, what good that food does, you? So, it's more like food for your mind is real food. That's that's and that's what it says in the Gospel about blessed is he who eats bread in the kingdom of heaven.

[17:54] That's what this Father's all interpreting. That's to see God. That's food for thought. That's real food. Feast for reason. Convivium, Thomas calls it, huh? Sacrum

[18:10] convivium. Now, the third one, gets closer to that second thing that was said in the text. To the third, it should be said that hope is a middle between presumption and despair, right? Ex parte nostra, right, huh?

[18:31] No, saying ex parte nostra, not in the part of God, right? As if you know, it's between trusting God too much or not at all or not enough, you know, you know. But ex parte nostra,

[18:48] insofar as someone is said to what presume from this that he hopes from God a good that exceeds his what? Condition. Yeah. So myself, I am going to rank above the apostles and right next to Mary, or even above her next to Christ, right? You know, that's some presumptuous. When Thomas

[19:16] gets into discussions, you know, who's greater, Peter or John? You know, and if he ends up being the same, but perhaps it's presumptuous to, but to put yourself up there, you know, put the apostles on the same level That's that's okay. Or he does not hope for what, according to his own condition, he is able to hope, right? And that's, I suppose, the more like to despair, right?

[19:41] But there is not able to be a superabundance, an excess of hope on the side of God, whose goodness is what infinite, huh? Likewise, faith is a middle between two contrary heresies. That element of truth, right. But not by comparison the object which is God, to which one is not able to believe too much.

[20:07] But insofar as ipsa opinio hominis on the side of man, right, that the human opinion self is the middle between contrary opinions. That's a very subtle thing, you know. Beautiful, beautiful text. Let's take a little break down here, please. Then we're up to sixty-five now. It's very interesting this thing, the connection of the virtues. Then we have to consider about the connection of the virtues, huh? Thomas is very thorough, you know.

[20:41] And about this, five things are asked. First, whether the moral virtues are connected to each other. Secondly, whether the moral virtues are able to be without charity.

[21:00] Third, whether charity is able to be without them. I haven't seen about this thing. My goodness. And then among the theological virtues, whether faith and hope can be without charity. Well, I think in God you can have charity, but you don't have moral virtues, right? And then the reverse, whether charity can be without them, faith and hope. I'm dying to find out about these kind of interesting things.

[21:32] To the first, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the moral virtues are not connected of what necessity, right? Huh? For the moral virtues are sometimes caused from the practice of their acts, right? As is proved in the second book of Nicomachean Ethics.

[21:59] But man can be exercised in the acts of some virtue without this that he be exercised in the acts of a what Another virtue. another virtue. Therefore, one moral virtue can be had without another. That makes sense, doesn't it?

[22:18] Moreover, magnificence, huh? Does great things with money, right? And magnanimity, right? Are certain moral virtues, right? But someone can have the other moral virtues without this that he have magnificence and magnanimity. He can have what liberality, and he can have Aristotle calls it philotimia, right? Small honors, right?

[22:49] As the philosopher says in the fourth book of the Ethics, that the what the poor The poor cannot be magnificous, right? I was able to have certain other virtues, huh? And he who is worthy of little things, huh, is dignified by them. Is temperate, but he's not magnanimous.

[23:17] Not the Jupiter Symphony in the words, right? Or the thirty-sixth Symphony. Therefore, the moral virtues are not connected. Moreover, the moral virtues perfect the desiring part of the soul, so also the intellectual virtues perfect the understanding part. But the intellectual virtues are not connected, for one can have one science without having another one. Therefore, also neither are the moral virtues what connected.

[23:57] Moreover, if the moral virtues are connected, this is not except because they are connected in foresight. Speaking. Thank you. But this does not suffice for the connection of moral virtues, for it seems that someone can be prudent about the things that should be done that pertain to one virtue, without this that he be prudent in those things which pertain to another. Just as one is able to have an art about some things that are makable, without this that he has art about others.

[24:38] Yeah, he might be able to build a house, but not bake bread. Mm. Yeah. But foresight is right reason about things to be done. Therefore, it's not necessary for the moral virtues to be connected. Huh.

[24:57] But against this is what the great Ambrose says upon the Gospel of St. Luke. Huh. For they are connected to each other, right? Huh. And the virtues are chained together, I guess. Mm. So the one who has one would seem to have many. Huh. Well, Ambrose is one of the four or five greatest doctors of the Western Church, right? Mm. Fathers. And Augustine, another one, says in the sixth book about the Trinity, the virtues which are in the human soul in no way are separated from each other, right?

[25:39] Wow. That's strong. No way. That's right. And Gregory, he's another one of the four or five greatest. Huh. Gregory says in the twenty-second book of Moralia that one virtue, without the others, is either not at all, right, or at least it's what imperfect.

[26:02] And now Cicero truly, says in the second of the Discipline Questions, if one virtue one confesses you not to have is necessary for you to have none of them, right? That's pretty strong, Tully, right? Mm. Guys, they're good men, so they must know.

[26:28] Well, Thomas says, I answer. It should be said that, moral, virtue can be taken either perfect or what Imperfect. imperfect. So, you see, that distinction is having something to do with the determination of the question.

[26:44] Imperfect moral virtue, as temperance or fortitude, is nothing other than a what some inclination in us existing towards some work of the genus of what good things, right? For doing, making, doing that. But such whether such an inclination is in us from nature, right, or from what becoming accustomed to it, and in this way taking moral virtues in some imperfect state, they are not what connected, right.

[27:19] For we see that someone, either from the natural complexion of his body, or from some accustomed to be prompt to the works of what Liberality. Liberality. who nevertheless is not prompt to the works of what chastity, right.

[27:38] So can man be brave? Like can have courage? Say without being temperate, right? They go berserk there and they take a town. They must have had some kind of some kind of courage, right, to take the town, but then they don't show too much chastity, right. You heard what what the great Euclid of Megara said, right? Huh? You know, when the city had been sacked, you know, what did you lose?

[28:09] You know, I lost my gold. I lost two of my daughters, and so on. And he came to what did you lose? And he says, I didn't see anybody carrying off wisdom. The medieval just you know confused Euclid of

[28:26] Megara with Euclid of Alexandria, author of the Elements. Now, perfect moral virtue is a habit, right? Inclining us into a good, right, work, right, and to doing it what well, doing it well, and taking moral virtues in this sense, perfect, right. It should be said that they are what connected, right?

[29:03] As by almost everybody, right, is laid down, right? Huh? You see, those great authorities there, Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory, and even the pagan there, Tully

[29:17] And Plato and Aristotle, I think. we see. of which reason, the reason of which is twofold assigned, right. According as in diverse ways some distinguish the cardinal virtues,

[29:41] so recalls what we said before about the two ways they distinguish them. As has been said, some distinguish them according to certain general conditions of virtues,

[29:57] as that discretion pertains to prudence, rightness to justice, moderation to temperance, and firmness of soul to what? Fortitude, right? In whatever matter these are what considered, right?

[30:17] And according to this, there manifestly appears a reason for their what connection, right? For firmness does not have the praise of virtue if it be without what moderation, right? Or rectitude or discretion, and the same reason can be given about the others, right? These are conditions, general conditions that are found in every virtue, right? Although one of them may be more in one than another, but in all of them, right?

[30:47] Okay. So you can say, you know, the courageous man is is just, I mean, strong, but so is the temperate man, strong, right? Refusing, you know, to go to this den of iniquity, you know, with you and so on. And this reason of their connection is assigned by Gregory in the twenty-second book of the Moralia, saying that the virtues, if they are what disjointed from each other, right, disconnected, are not able to be perfect, right?

[31:20] That goes back to Thomas's time with that distinction, right? You see Gregory using it, huh? According to the ratio virtue, because neither is that true prudence which is what

[31:36] just temperate, or is not? Yeah, that is not true prudence, which is not just or temperate or strong. Yeah. And same thing he joins about the others virtues, and a similar reason is assigned by Augustine, right? Studied under Ambrose in the 6th book of Trinity.

[32:00] Others distinguish the four virtues virtues according to their what matters, huh? Where they name what four different special virtues, right? And according to this, the connection of them, the reason for the connection of them, is assigned by Aristotle in the sixth book of the Ethics, huh? Because as has been said above, no moral virtue can be without foresight. can be had without foresight, huh? In that it is what a property of moral virtue to make a right choice, huh?

[32:41] Since it is a habit of choice with choice, huh? But to a right choice, not only does it suffice an inclination to the proper end to the suitable end, of the

[32:56] which is directly through the habit of moral virtue, but also that one directly choose those things which are towards the end, which comes about through foresight, which takes counsel and judges and commands those things which are towards the end.

[33:16] Likewise, prudence cannot be had without having the moral virtues, since prudence is right reason about things to be done. Which, just as they proceed from the beginnings, from the ends of the things to be done, to which one has himself rightly only through the what? Yeah.

[33:42] Whence, just as speculative science cannot be had without the understanding of the beginnings, so neither can prudence be without the moral virtues. You have to know what the ends are, and you've got to be stable in them by the moral virtues, right? Otherwise, you're not going to take counsel well and judge these things well. let alone command them command them, right?

[34:06] And thus prudence cannot without the moral virtues. From which manifestly it follows that the moral virtues are what Connected connected, huh? Those are the two ways that they must be connected for them to be what perfect, right? Huh? Two ways of understanding the cardinal virtues.

[34:35] Now, what about the first objection here? Right? This is can't you be exercised in one of these things? Right? So we get this. The what does Plato have there in the city? There, you know, they're using the gymnastic exercises to produce what courage? Right? Huh? You know, my son's at West Point. There, you know, you're jumping off this high bridge. You know, you got the you know all this arm in you and stuff.

[35:03] You know, that gives a little gives you a little bit of courage, right? This sort of stuff. That'll kill you. You know, yeah. But but are you being you know you know trained in temperance at this point? I don't know. To the first, effort should be said that of moral virtues, some perfect man according to the common status, right? Huh? That is, regards those things which are commonly occur to be done in the whole life of what, or in every life of man, right?

[35:42] Whence it is necessary that man, at the same time, be exercised about the matters of all the moral virtues, right? That's why Plato had music as well as gymnastic, right? Because they're both, courage and temperance, huh?

[35:57] And if one is exercised about all of them operating well, he acquires the habit of all the moral virtues. If, however, he is exercised by acting well about one matter, not about another one, right? If, for example, he has himself well about anger not about concupiscences, right? Huh? He acquires a habit to refrain what angers,

[36:27] which does not have the notion of virtue. On account of the defect of what foresight, right? Which is corrupted about what? Desirees, concubicenses. Just as natural inclination does not have the perfect notion of virtue, if prudence Lacking. Yeah. If you don't have all the virtues there, you have some vices in place of some of the virtues. Then your what? Foresight is corrupted, right? Can't judge right, can't think, not so well, right?

[37:06] Now, it distinguishes some moral virtues there are which perfect man according to some eminent status, right? Huh? Not just what are commonly in every life, huh? As magnificence and what? Magnanimity.

[37:27] And because the exercise about the matters of these virtues does not occur to each one commonly, right? Huh? One is able to have the other moral virtues without this that he has what? Has the habit of these virtues in act.

[37:49] Speaking about the virtues that are what acquired, right? Huh? But nevertheless, having acquired the other virtues, he has these virtues in ability that is near, right? Okay. So that if I suddenly get a lot of money, then I can I am a generous man, right? I can easily get what magnificence, right? Huh?

[38:18] So when someone, through exercise, is adept at having liberality about what? Little donations and expenditures. If it comes to him an abundance of money, right? Huh? By a modico eruditionis right. He acquires the habit of what? Magnificence, right? Huh? Just as a geometer, by a little bit of study, acquires the knowledge of some conclusion which he never what considered, right? Huh? Would you agree to that, there, my geometer friend?

[38:55] Yeah, you should cover that, huh? Okay. That, however, which we have that in what quickness is that we might have. Okay. So we said to have that, right? Which we can quickly get, right? Okay. According to that of the philosopher in the second book of the physics, what differs little as where seems to be what nothing, right? Huh? Okay.

[39:26] And to this he says is clear the response to the second one right? That was based upon magnificence and magnanimity right now. So you may not have these enact, but you're not too far away from them right? Okay. Now, would you agree with that first paragraph? If a man you know has meekness, he can control his anger, but he doesn't have temperance. Wouldn't he be a good judge of in in meekness?

[39:55] In in that area, wouldn't he be a good judge? What's the right property? Yeah, but it's really one temper or foresight is really one virtue right now. And so foresight is corrupted by. You say his concupiscence or whatever. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Then, then, then, how can a judge well right now? He wouldn't. He honestly wouldn't be a good judge in that area. Yeah, yeah. But he would be a good judge.

[40:19] So I see. So he wouldn't have the virtue. The virtue is weakened. Yeah, the virtue of foresight, But he would be a good He would have some judgment, yeah. but it but he would be weakened he'd be weakened by that right? Because like courageous men who you know seem to have real courage, but they're not temperate, they're not chaste, whatever. Yeah. They seem to have good judgment in the area of courage.

[40:40] Yeah. You know what I mean? They seem to be able to. Yeah. But there's there's still one virtue there though, foresight, right? Which is somewhat corrupt huh Mm-hmm.

[40:53] Yeah That's not affected even in judging the things he's able to judge to some extent that would be why. It's explaining to me as I'm thinking this through, about a comment Francis the Sales makes about two things. One is is when he says if you look at the pagan virtues compared to vice, they look virtuous, but compared to the saints, they seem to have no virtue at all.

[41:14] Mm-hmm. And then he says also about like Saint Paul, the first hermit we had his feast a couple weeks ago. Mm-hmm. He said, well, he didn't have occasion to practice, you know, liberality or patience or anything else. He lived by himself. He said, but he had the perfection of charity, so it wouldn't take him much to exercise. Yeah. Any of those virtues in any circumstance because he had the perfection of charity.

[41:33] They think he couldn't be able to practice magnificence, huh? Probably not. But if we have the perfection of charity, it wouldn't take much. Yeah.

[41:56] Okay. Because if all it's lacking is the money, big deal. Okay. Now just to reply to the third objection, maybe to touch upon your question a bit. The third objection is saying that can't you have one of the intellectual virtues without another one, right?

[42:19] So why can't you have that one moral virtue without the other ones, right? To the third, it should be said that the intellectual virtues are about diverse matters that are not ordered what to each others. Just as is clear in the diverse sciences and arts, right?

[42:39] And therefore, they are not found in them the connection which is found in the what Moral virtues existing about the passions and operations, which manifestly have an order to each other, right? No. Before we go into that, right? Manifest the thing about the intellectual virtues, huh? I was always struck, you know, in my early days when you'd read about the the great atomic physicists, some of them, right?

[43:08] They're pretty smart physicists, right? But some of them, you know, were kind of naive about communism, right? They said, we've got to give the secrets to the A bomb, you know, to the to the Russians, so that you know. Well, they seem to be lacking in in political knowledge, right? You know, and even Oppenheimer had some, you know problems that way, you know. And but I mean Oppenheimer had stayed under a board in Copenhagen and so on, one of the great guys.

[43:40] But you can kind of see that you can have one without having the other, right? And you can say, "ah, how could a guy be so naive in this area and be so good here, right?" But you can just contrast what he's saying, right? I mean, he doesn't think it's the same way that the moral virtues, right? Well, let's see how why that is so.

[44:05] And therefore, there is not found in them the connection which is found in the moral virtues existing about the passions and the operations which manifestly Thomas says, at least manifestly him, right, have an order to each other, right? For all the passions proceeding from certain what primary ones, right? Certain ones that come first, to wit, love and what hate, huh? And they all what terminate in some other ones, namely in pleasure and sadness, right?

[44:43] And likewise, all the operations which are the matter of moral virtue have an order to each other, and also the passions. And therefore, the whole matter of moral virtues falls under what the one notion of prudence, right?

[45:13] Now, all understandable things have an order to the first what beginnings, and according to this, all the intellectual virtues depend from the understanding of the what principles, just as prudence from the what moral virtues, right? As has been said before.

[45:37] Now, the universal principles of which is the understanding of principles. They do not depend upon the conclusions about which are the remaining, right, or the other ones, the other intellectual virtues.

[45:54] As the morals depend on prudence, in that the what appetite in some way moves reason, and reason moves the appetite, huh? You see those connections then a little bit, as kind of connected related to also his question about whether there's how does he put it whether there's I think he asked about merit and meditation or something like that. I forget. Or thinking over articles of the faith.

[46:32] Anyways, I go to mass in the morning. They start thinking, "See, I'm hungry. You know, why don't we have for breakfast now in there? " These are connected, right? One one distracts from another, right? I'm

[46:58] falling asleep here at church. Like they have a nice coffee or a nice tea or something. So you got to, you know, kind of go on experience there, right, to see that connection.

[47:20] But no, reason is moving desire, and desire is moving what? Reason, right? You counsel out of fear. You find a character saying in Shakespeare's plays, right?

[47:40] Am I being cautious, or am I counseling out of fear? They're connected very closely, right? What's that statement of falls down? I mean, because he has too much flesh. No but the

[47:58] Discretion is the greater part of valor. Yeah, discretion is the greater part of valor. Yeah. Said like a real coward. That's the coward talking. It comes out in a serious way in Coriolanus too, right? Where the other soldiers think he's foolhardy, right? And actually, he's a courageous man, right? The courageous man is, you know, looks to the people a little bit cowardly, like a foolhardy man. Yeah.

[48:47] To the fourth, it should be said that those things to which the moral virtues incline, which are the ends, right, have themselves to prudence as beginnings, right. But makable things, huh? Don't have themselves to art as the beginnings, but only as the the matter.

[49:12] Now it's manifest, however, that although reason is able to be right in one part of matter, not in another. In no way can reason be said to be recta, right? If there be a defect in the beginning, right?

[49:31] Just as if someone errs about this beginning, every whole is more than its part. He cannot is not able to have geometrical science, right? Because it would be necessary for him to recede from the truth much in things that follow, right?

[49:53] That's a famous thing. Aristotle says, "No mistake in the beginning is a great one in the end." You take the wrong road at the fork. There's no much difference between the right road and the wrong road, but the further you go, you know, you become almost infinitely apart.

[50:13] And moreover, things to be done are ordered to each other, right? Not, however, what. Makeable. Yeah. And therefore, the defect of prudence. About one part of things to be done induces a defect also about other things to be done, which doesn't happen in things.

[50:37] Example I give of Macarthur there, you know, where the guy came through and he knew Macarthur, so he stopped to see Macarthur, you know, and sat down to eat a little breakfast or something like that, and I mean to eat some dinner like that. And the guy was eating, you know, Macarthur wasn't eating at all hardly, you know, and he said, "Why aren't you eating?" Macarthur said, "I'm too tired to eat."

[51:06] So he went to bed, you know. Gets up the next morning, he's going off to another position, and so he didn't want to wake Macarthur up, you know. And so he said, "Say goodbye to Macarthur for me. I don't want to wake him up," you know. He says, "Wake him up! He went to the front two hours ago." Because all these things are related, right? You know,

[51:29] somebody else may not have gone to the front for another hour, a couple hours. Because of hunger or something, right? Huh? Okay. Good time for another article or not? We could cut it off. Yeah, maybe we stop. Yeah, because these things are about charity, huh? We're kind connected now. Yeah, it's good stuff.