Prima Secundae
154. Aquinas, Summa I-II Q.65, Arts. 2–3: Can the Moral Virtues Exist Without Charity, and Charity Without Them? (Acquired vs. Infused Virtue)
Class of 2014-02-06
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/154-aquinas-summa-i-ii-q-65-arts-2-3-can-the-moral-virtues-exist/

[0:00] So, Article 2, I think, that's right. In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas.

[0:18] God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order them in our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand what you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. So, Article Two here in Question sixty-five, whether the moral virtues can be without charity? Huh?

[0:50] Thomas is going to distinguish in the article again between the acquired moral virtues that Aristotle talked about, that are acquired by repeated acts, and then the infused moral virtues, right?

[1:07] So, take in account some of the injections and so on. The second one goes forward thus. It seems that the moral virtues are able to be without charity,

[1:21] for it is said in the book of the Sentences of Prosper that every virtue, apart from charity, is able to be common to the good and the what? Bad. Bad. But charity cannot be except in the good, as it's said there. Therefore, the other virtues are able to be had or can be had without what? Charity. Huh? That's using virtue maybe in a somewhat loose sense, huh?

[1:55] Because the bad don't really have what virtue in the full sense. Virtue is what makes it's ever good, right? And is activity good, huh? I used to say to students, you know, what is the virtue of a knife? Sharpness, right? What's the vice of a knife? Dullness, right? Which makes a bad knife and its activity bad. Moreover, the moral virtues are able to be acquired from human acts, as is said in the second book of the Ethics.

[2:29] That's when Aristotle gets the question when the virtues are by nature, right? Huh? But they're really not in a complete way except by repeated acts. But charity is not had except from infusion, right? Flowing in, huh? According to that of Romans, chapter five, verse five, huh? That the charity of God is diffused in our hearts. By the Holy Spirit, huh? Was given to us, huh? So the charity is not acquired by repeated acts, huh?

[3:04] But by infusion. But the moral virtues are acquired not in that way, but by human acts, huh? Therefore, the other virtues are able to be had without charity.

[3:21] Moreover, the moral virtues are connected to each other, in so far as they depend upon prudence. But charity does not depend upon prudence. Hey, rather, it exceeds prudence, according to that of Ephesians chapter three, verse nineteen. He

[3:45] dwelling above, right, and the supereminent, huh? Charity of Christ, the charity of Christ exceeding all what science, he says, huh? But the moral virtues are not what. Therefore, the moral virtues are not connected with charity, but they are able to be had without them, huh? Well, Thomas would be distinguishing, as we said, these two kinds of moral virtue, huh?

[4:15] So against this is what is said in the first epistle of John chapter three, verse fourteen. Who does not love remains in what death, right? But through the virtues, the spiritual life is perfected. For they are that by which one lives rightly, huh? As Augustine says in the second book on free will. Therefore, they cannot be without the love of what charity, huh?

[4:52] That's a nice objection, huh? I answer: It should be said, this has been said above, huh? That the moral virtues, huh? In so far as they are operative of good in order to an end that does not exceed the natural ability of man, they are able to be acquired by what human acts, huh? And thus acquired, they are able to be without what charity, huh? Just as they were in many of the Gentiles, huh?

[5:37] But according as they are operative of good in order to the last end which is supernatural, thus perfectly and truly they have the notion of what of virtue. And they are not able to be acquired by human acts, but they are poured into us by God, right?

[6:04] So these are the infused moral virtues, and moral virtues of this kind, as I say, the infused ones, the ones that order us in sense, right, to an end that is above the natural capacity of our mind. They are not able to be had without what charity, huh? So he points out the distinction. I was going to give the reason why the infused moral virtues are not able to be without charity.

[6:38] It's interesting the way he develops this. It has been said above that the other moral virtues, as say the human ones, right, ones acquired by their acts, are not able to be without prudence, huh? But prudence is not able to be without the moral virtues, in so far as the moral virtues make one have oneself well towards the end, from which proceeds the what? Yeah. So you have to both know, in a sense, the natural end of man, right?

[7:16] And you have to be well disposed in your desiring powers for that end, right? Otherwise, you're not going to be what? Able to be prudent, right? And to find what is really suitable to achieve that what end, unless you're well disposed towards the end.

[7:47] So he says, prudence is not able to be without the moral virtues, in so far as the moral virtues make one have oneself well towards those end, from which, huh, the reason of prudence proceeds, huh, the argument. So, but to the right ratio of prudence, much more is it required that man have himself well about the last what end, huh? And that comes about not through the moral virtues, but through what charity, huh?

[8:30] That's more important than about the other ends, which are more particular, not the last one that comes about through the what moral virtues, huh? They don't need too much, right? Not the last end.

[8:47] He makes a nice comparison there to speculative reason, just as right reason in speculative matters. Maxime, most of all, right, needs the first beginning that is not able to be demonstrated, which is that contradictories are not able to be true. They cannot both be and not be at the same time, right? I used to quote my friend Hamlet, right? To be or not to be, that is the question, right?

[9:23] And it kind of you know, take a little bit from his attention there. It's a question because you can't both be and not be, right? You know, if you had things that were not contradictory, right? You know, to be healthy or to listen to music, right? That is a question. Well, no, you can do both of those, right? But to be or not to be, that is a question because you can't both be and what not be, right?

[9:51] Aristotle says you can't demonstrate that, but he manifests it in the fourth book of wisdom. That's the the Starting point of all thinking. So, can odd number be even? Why not? Against its very nature. Yeah, but an even number is divisible into two equal parts, and odd number is not divisible into equal parts, right? So you can't both be and not be divisible into equal parts. So an odd number cannot be an even number, right?

[10:27] That follows from this b this beginning here, right? This indemonstrable beginning. Whence it is manifest that neither can what infused prudence be without charity, right? Because prudence is what the art that directs us towards the end, right? Finding what is suitable to achieve the end, right? But you have to be well disposed towards that end, because that's the starting point for the reasoning of what prudence, right?

[11:09] And since the end here is something supernatural, and you're well disposed towards it by this charity that's diffused in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, you can't really have what this infused prudence, right, without charity, right?

[11:26] And neither then the what moral virtues consequently, right? Because they all depend upon prudence. So when Aristotle defines the moral virtues, even though he puts in the idea of prudence, huh? Right. It's a habit with choice existing in the middle towards us, as determined by right reason. That means prudence, right? To find out. All right, let's explain. Prudence falls under the intellectual virtues. Yeah, yeah. But the moral virtues are defined nevertheless with prudence in them, right?

[12:01] Because they they're they're the what? They're habit with choice, right? And choice involves the use of what? Reason, right? And that use of reason is the use of the virtue of what? Of prudence, yeah. So so the link is right.

[12:21] That on the one hand, this infused prudence can't be without you being well disposed towards your ultimate end. Can you be well disposed towards your ultimate end by charity, right? And the moral virtues can't be right, even the infused ones, without this infused prudence, right? Well, then you can't have the what charity without the what infused moral virtues, yeah. But you can't have the the

[12:54] moral virtues are acquired by what repeated acts without charity, right? Right. As the Gentiles. Some of them had human. Simply human. Now it goes on to distinction we met last night. There, remember that? What kind of distinction did we talk about last night?

[13:19] Yeah, yeah. Which Thomas usually expresses in Latin by simpliciter and secundum quid, okay? And he sees that kind of distinction here. Is clear, therefore, from the things said that only the infused virtues are what perfect, right? And simpliciter, huh? Should be called what virtues, right? Because they order man to the what ultimate end simply, right? The other virtues, to wit, the acquired ones, are secundum quid, right?

[14:00] That's the Latin has virtues. Not, however, simpliciter For they order man well with respect to what the last end in some genus, but not with respect to the last end simply, huh?

[14:21] Whence in Romans chapter fourteen, upon what it says in verse twenty three, everything that is not from faith and its formed faith is a what Peccatum right? Peccatum est. That's awfully strong, right? The gloss of Augustine says, "Where there is lacking the knowledge of truth, false is virtue even in what good morals, huh? " That's a very tough way of phrased, right? But it's that distinction between simply and secundum quid, huh?

[14:56] And that first objection, as you said, is taking kind of a weak idea of virtue, where it says you can have what virtues in the bad as well as the good, right? That seems like a contradiction, right? Because in the definition of virtue, even Aristotle's definition of virtue, it's what makes its haver good and its activity good, right? I should take the students and say, you know,

[15:28] he's a blur with my right eye, huh? He's kind of a blur over there. With my left eye, he's much more clear, huh? So I say my left eye is more virtuous than my right eye, right? Does that mean I look at the girls with my right eye and not with my left eye? No, no. What's the eye's own act is to see things, right? Huh? And I suppose an eye doctor could say why this eye is more virtuous than that one, right?

[15:53] But there's it has more the virtue of the eye, right? Because it makes it that's my good eye at least for a distance, right? Now for reading, this is my good eye, right? And this is my bad eye, right? Okay. So nature has been kind to me, right? So I can't find my glasses. I can still do some reading with my right eye, and I can still, you know, see some clock in the distance, what time it is, or something, you know, with my left eye, huh?

[16:25] But my friend has that sign in his kitchen, I think I've told you about before, huh? Much virtue in herbs, little in men. But there you see the common meaning of virtue, right? Now the same friend, he comes down, you know, if I've had an herb in the shelf that's been around for a while, Say, this is no happy but you know, it's lost its virtue, right, huh?

[16:50] But our Lord used that connection too, right? And He said, The salt. yeah, yeah, the salt loses its what? Virtue, you could say, right? It's it's it's you can't.

[17:04] Yeah, yeah, thrown out and run over, right? Okay. So you should always go back to that, you know, idea of virtue is what makes its half or good, right, huh? So we can even speak of the virtue of a knife, right? Like sharpness is what makes it a good knife and makes it what cut well, right? And dullness is like the vice of the knife, right? It doesn't cut very well, huh?

[17:28] Okay. So you got to find what is to man like sharpness is to the what knife? It's a little more complicated, right? But again, I may have to make it a little more of a study, right? I suppose the eye doctor can examine my eye and tell me why I don't see him clearly with the right eye, huh? He's a blur over there. He

[17:51] said, yeah, yeah. Okay. So in regard to the first objection, then he says virtues there are taken according to a what imperfect notion of virtue. Otherwise, if moral virtue, according to this perfect definition of virtue, is taken, it makes its half or what good, right, huh? So you couldn't have virtues that are shared by the bad as well as the good in the full sense of virtue, and consequently, not able to be in the what bad, huh?

[18:35] Okay. Now the second objection that says well some moral virtues are acquired from human acts, he admits that, right? They can be had by what without charity, right? The ones that are acquired by repeated acts, but it's infused moral virtues that he pointed out in the beginning of the body of the article that cannot be had without what charity, Charity, right?

[19:09] And to the okay, that's the answer to that. And the third one is to the third. It should be said that although charity exceeds knowledge and prudence, nevertheless prudence depends upon what charity, and consequently all the moral virtues infused, because they depend upon prudence.

[19:36] Now, Article three is going to be in a sense the reverse, isn't it? Article two, Article two is saying, can the what moral virtues be without charity? And the answer is no. If by moral virtues you mean the infused ones, right? Okay, now he's going to say, can charity be what without moral virtues. Without the moral virtues? Right?

[20:00] Okay, that's a more difficult question. Why should the higher depend upon the lower? Right, but the lower should depend upon the higher. Is not so strange, is it? But is there some necessity for the infused moral virtues to be there with charity? Is there? To third one goes forward. Thus, it seems that charity is able to be had without the other what? Moral virtues, huh?

[20:45] For to that to which something one suffices, it is unfitting that many things be ordered, right? But charity alone suffices, huh, to fulfilling all the works of virtue, huh? As is clear through that which is said in the first epistle to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen. Charity is patient. Charity is benign, and so on, so on, right? Okay. Therefore, it seems that charity being had, all the other virtues are what?

[21:19] Superfluous, right? Okay. What? It's a good objection. Yeah. Moreover, who has the habit of virtue easily does those things which pertain to that virtue, and they are in themselves what? Or by themselves pleasing to him, right? Whence Aristotle says the sign of the habit is the pleasure which comes about in the what? Work, right?

[21:58] There's a problem there, you know, when Aristotle is talking about the acquired moral virtues, and he says it's by doing brave things that we become brave, and it's by doing just things that we become just. How can this be? If we do just things, must we not also be just already, right? And if we do brave things, must we not be brave? So what does it mean to say that by doing brave things we become brave?

[22:29] A brave man by doing just things, right? A just man. Have you done them perfectly? Yeah, yeah. And it's difficult to do them, right, huh? Okay. But once you acquire the virtue and it becomes a habit, then becomes easy and it becomes pleasing and agreeable, right, huh? Practice makes perfect. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So this is a sign that you've acquired the habit, right? That's now what pleasing to eat moderately and drink moderately, right?

[23:04] And pay your debts and so on, right, huh? You know, I don't have to struggle, you know, to pay somebody what I owe them, right? I don't have to struggle, you know, to to put the plate away when I got enough to eat, you know. No, I have them, right? I need them.

[23:23] I enjoy them. Putting the bottle away, but I don't. know. That's a sign I've arrived, right? I don't enjoy it. That's true, even in a way about the speculative virtues too, right?

[23:42] If I enjoy doing Euclid there, you know, then I have something to have the habit of geometry. I think, right? You first begin if you don't enjoy doing it, maybe, huh? Did you enjoy it for the first moment? No. Yeah, but once you have to have it, then I enjoy it, right?

[24:13] But many having charity, right, huh? And being without what mortal sin, right, huh? Nevertheless, undergo what or suffer difficulty in the works of the what virtues, huh? So maybe you'd find it in the lives of the saints, right, huh? He's a man who has charity and he's without mortal sin, but he's still having what difficulty controlling his temper or something, right?

[24:50] Nor do they please them secundum se as such, right? But only according as they refer to what charity, right, huh? Therefore, many have charity who do not have the other what virtues. Moreover charity is found in all the saints, huh?

[25:15] But some are saints who nevertheless lack some virtues. They see how much Jerome he had a temper, didn't they? See how much Jerome? For as Bede says, huh? He's a great.

[25:33] For as Bede says, the saints are more humbled, humble about the virtues which they do not have, than they glory about the virtues which they do have.

[25:47] Therefore, it is not necessary that who has a what, who has charity, have all the what moral virtues, huh? It's a pretty good objections, right? But.

[26:02] But against this is that by charity the whole law is fulfilled, huh? For it is said in Romans chapter thirteen, the eighth verse, "Who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the what law." But the whole law cannot be fulfilled except through what all the moral virtues, because the law commands about all the acts of virtues, as is said in the fifth book of the what ethics, huh? Therefore, the one who has charity has all the what moral virtues, huh?

[26:45] And Augustine also says in a certain what epistle, huh, letter, that charity includes in itself all the what Cardinal what virtues, huh? He's a big authority, Augustine, right?

[27:07] You look at the catechism of the Catholic Church, you know, and see how many quotes are from Augustine, right? It's amazing, huh? Not by Thomas, but even more by from Augustine, there, right? In the but those two guys, you know, they get really a lot of quotes, huh?

[27:30] So Augustine says so; it is probable, right? I answer: It should be said that with charity, at the same time, are poured in all the what moral virtues. Those are what we called before the infused moral virtues, right?

[27:58] Now, Thomas gives a reason why this is so. The reason for this is that God does not less perfectly act in the works of grace than in the works of what nature. But thus we see in the works of nature that we do not find the beginning or source of some deeds in something without finding in it those things which are necessary for perfecting those works. Just as in animals are found the organs by which they are able to be what perfect the works to which the soul has the power of doing them,

[28:47] is manifest, however, that charity, in so far as it orders man to the last end, is the beginning of all the good works which can be what ordered to that last end. Whence it is necessary that with charity, at the same time, are poured in all the moral virtues by which man is perfected, perfects the what each kind of what good deeds, huh?

[29:25] And thus it is clear that the moral virtues infused not only have a connection on account of prudence, but also on account of what Charity. charity, huh? And that who loses charity through a mortal sin loses all the moral virtues infused. That's a serious thing, right? That's what I was mentioning before. You know, when people said, "What do you need these acquired moral virtues?" Right? These moral virtues that are secundum quid virtues, right?

[30:05] And that are acquired by repeated acts, right? Well, if you do one eating too much, you don't, for that reason, lose right away the virtue of what temperance that was acquired by repeated acts. You have to start overeating for a while, you know, before you start to make that virtue. start To go away, right? So they have a certain stability, right? That the what acquired, I mean, the infused moral virtues don't have, because they're tied with what charity.

[30:44] When you lose charity, you lose the what. All of them, right? So you need those what? Those acquired moral virtues, as well as the infused ones. Even though infused ones are more perfect, right? Huh? But they're not as, in one sense, as stable, right? As the acquired ones, huh?

[31:10] My mother and father brought me up to be just, you know. Just, just can't be unjust. I just can't take somebody else's money, you know. Somebody draws some money, I just can't take it. I try, but I can't, you know.

[31:24] There's instability there, right? huh? We're we're playing down there at the Minnehaha Parks there in Minneapolis, there, and we found a billfold, right? Huh? My brothers and I, you know. And somebody lost his billfold. and so we went down to the in section stand, there, somebody was a billfold, and they had no record of it, like that, you know. So we brought the billfold back home, and so on.

[32:00] And sure enough, they appeared in the paper. the guy said he'd lost his billfold in the place, right? Huh? So we called him up, and he came out, and we could identify him as a person who, you know, that was his billfold. He wanted to give us an award, you know. My father and mother, no, no, don't take any award, you know. So that's it, and and just like that, you know, huh?

[32:22] So you're kind of brought up, you know, huh? So Aristotle says in the Ethics, you know, it makes a great deal of difference how you're brought up, right? Or he says, or rather, all the difference, right? You know, we get to use repeated acts, right? Now, I never listened to bad music around the house, you know, but my brother Richard Marcus would never tolerate any bad music in the house.

[32:47] We didn't think of doing it, you know. So there's a certain stability in those things when they're built up as you know, a child, huh?

[33:06] Now, what about this first objection, right? Huh? Well, to the first, therefore, it should be said that in order that the act of a lower power be perfect, right? There is required that not only is there perfection in the higher power, but also in the what? Lower, yeah.

[33:33] So if the chisel isn't good, that's gonna. Influence what? Michelangelo, right? He won't be able to make the Pietà, so he did, right? You get the wrong screwdriver, right? And it's just not going to work, right? Not a big deal the screw thing, but you know, not the right size screwdriver, it just doesn't. Yeah. So even though that's that's the the lower power, right? It requires that, okay?

[34:12] If the principal agent, huh? If the chief agent, huh? Has itself in a suitable way, does not follow a perfect action. If the instrument, if the tool, is not well what? Disposed, right? Whence it is necessary in order that man act well in those things which are towards the end, that he not only have the virtue by which he has himself well about the end, but also the virtues by which he has himself well about those things which are toward the what?

[34:50] End, huh? For the virtue which is about the end has itself as chief and a motor, a mover, with respect to those which are what? To the end, huh? And therefore, with charity, it is necessary to also have the other what? Moral virtues, huh? That's because the lower power needs to be what perfect, right? In order to obey, right? And it should be higher power.

[35:31] It almost seems as if our souls being made for the lower virtues, that there it's kind of a a safety feature built into us in a way of giving us the stability so that when we do sin gravely, there's a there's a greater chance, I guess, that we'll lose. Yeah, But now he's talking about the infused moral virtues here, right? Yeah. Okay. I was just mentioning, apropos of the fact that you lose them, you lose charity, right?

[36:02] Yeah. So one act could be that, right? Um, you know, with poor David there with Bathsheba, right? So you're going to lose the what? Infused moral virtue at the same time. So I mentioned at that time that's the reason why we say you have to try to get these acquired virtues too, right? Even though they're not as perfect virtues as are the infused one, right? But they have one thing about them, which is that they are more what?

[36:32] Stable, right? Because they're produced by repeated acts rather than infused all at once by God, right? Okay, and they're infused with charity. So when you lose charity, you lose what them, right?

[36:48] The idea is see more, right? As opposed to before and after, right? You get the acquired virtues by repeated acts. After many repeated acts, right? He's saying that you need the the infused moral virtues to dispose. The lower power is to obey the higher. Higher in charity, yeah.

[37:12] And but with the the acquired moral virtues, that gives you sort of a a basis in order to seek a confessor and to repent of your mortal sins and to reacquire infused virtues. Sort like a yeah, like a there's a symmetry in that way. Yeah, yeah. Now you know a lot in a lot of popular you know Christianity, you don't have these distinctions seen and and taught, you know, between the acquired moral virtues and the infused, right?

[37:50] And the necessity of both for different reasons, right? See very much. Don't see the distinctions. Distinction is the most fundamental thing in sense the mind sees.

[38:10] I was reading about the Word of God and the Son of God, huh? And Thomas says, you know, the Son of God, he says, can do nothing from himself, but he can do everything through himself.

[38:28] Now, why can't he do anything from himself? Huh? Well, God's operation is the same thing as a substance, and he has his substance, his nature from the what, Father, right? So he can do nothing from himself, but only from the Father, like he says, huh? But because he has received the divine nature, then he has the power, infinite power, right? So, and and he uses the same as his power, right?

[39:00] So through himself he can do all things, right? I said, gee whiz! I said, I would sort of get all confused in that, you know, not see that distinction, right? Huh? It's kind of amazing, you know, that you can see the Son of God can do nothing from himself, but only from the Father, right? But he can do everything through himself, huh?

[39:25] But you can see those distinctions, right? Just like Boethius and Marius Aristotle for seeing the distinction of the ten highest genera, you know, he could see, you know, these highest genera under which everything falls. Gee whiz, you know. He's really amazed at that, right? Yeah.

[39:53] Now, what about the second objection, right? That sometimes even those who have what charity, right, Has some difficulty in some particular matter. To second should be said that sometimes it happens that someone having a habit, right, undergoes difficulty in operating, and consequently does not what sense pleasure and agreement in the act on account of some impediment extrinsic huh In an extrinsic way, coming upon him, right? Just as the one who has the habit of science undergoes difficulty in understanding on account of what Sleepiness.

[40:38] Sleepiness or so infirmity, right? Huh? Okay. Can't remember something, right? Tired. And likewise, he says the habits of the what infused moral virtues, right, undergo sometimes a difficulty in operating on account of some contrary dispositions left over from preceding what acts, huh?

[41:12] So was it some of them regard the body as kind of a what? Not a guy to trust, right? So I mean, I may have something to do also with with maybe not having the what the acquired virtues, right? Huh? Okay. So you have certain bad acts, and then you're kind of what?

[41:38] Yeah, you don't take pleasure maybe in in the acts even of infused virtues, right? Because of something outside of them, right? Huh? Left from these bad acts that you were engaged in.

[41:53] I visited you know on the trip over to Monte Cassino there, right? Huh? That's where Benedict is buried, Monte Cassino, and and I think he finished the the the rule there, right? And Scholastic is buried there too, His sister, you know. And but in the early days there, you know, he was being tempted, you know, to call some girl, I guess he knew, and he jumped in the what?

[42:22] thorn. bush? Okay. Which he says difficulty does not in the same way happen in the acquired moral virtues, right? Huh? Because they are acquired not all at once, but by the exercise of of acts, huh? And by which is taken away what the contrary dispositions, huh? That's interesting.

[43:13] Yeah. You do the the contrary dispositions are still there. Yeah. Yeah. It's almost like being a dog Being adopted. Where is it in the confessions there where Augustine suffered from? Was it toothache, right? It's quite bothersome, right? That can interfere with your thinking, right? Even if you were well disposed to think. I'm sorry. What was it that you said? He is suffering from a toothache. Remember, Augustine.

[43:45] Okay, that can make it hard to think, right? You have a headache or something, right? Okay. What about saints not having some of the virtues? Well, it's for the same reason they said that. You know, some saints are said to not have some of the virtues. That is the infused virtues, right? Insofar as they undergo some difficulty in their acts, right, for the reason already said and applied to the second objection.

[44:19] Although they, in fact, do have the habit of all the what virtues, huh? Now he's going to get into the last two articles here, right?

[44:45] Again, he's going to go both ways, right? He's looking before and after, right? Whether hope, whether faith and hope can be without what? Charity. And then whether charity can be without faith and hope, right?

[45:08] He usually tends to that faith, though. Some always like to call it belief, though, right? Some ways we believe something to be more accurate, you know.

[45:18] Because sometimes people talk about faith, they seem to almost mix it up with hope, you know. The word kind of lends it, you know.

[45:31] If I say I have faith in you, I trust you, or something like that, you know, doesn't get to me as sharply with what it is as the word belief does, right? And actually, what do we say in the creed? You know, we say, "I believe," in it. So why not call it belief, you know,

[45:53] and they think they're enriching the virtue, you know, by bringing in this faith in the sense of trust, you know, but isn't trust, trust to me, seems to be more hope, you know. But what does they say? You know, the the trust surround you somewhere. You have one of these ones in your trust in you, right? God's mercy. Oh, divine mercy. Yeah, yeah. But she says, "I trust in you," right?

[46:19] But trust is hope, isn't it? There. It's not. It's not belief. And and mercy seems to be almost the object of what hope, right? You know, the justice of God is kind of the object of your fear of God, right? And and the mercy of God is the object of your what? Your hope.

[46:47] So use the word trust there, right? So sometimes the word faith, they kind of use it to mean trust, you know. It doesn't seem to me as. Confusion there sometimes I think.