Prima Secundae
156. Summa I-II, Q. 66, Arts. 2–4: Equality of the Virtues, Intellectual vs. Moral Virtue, and Justice as the Chief Moral Virtue
Class of 2014-02-20
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/156-summa-i-ii-q-66-arts-2-4-equality-of-the-virtues-intellectual/

[0:00] The Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo Gracias. God, our enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, ordain the luminary images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, and John Doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand what you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit,

[0:31] Amen. So I guess we're up to question sixty-six, Article Two. To the second one goes forward. Thus, it seems that not all virtues in one and the same, in one and the same person, I guess, are equally what intense.

[0:53] For the Apostle says in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, chapter seven, that each one has his own gift from God. Right, one this and another that.

[1:06] But this would not be that one gift is more proper to one person than another, if all the virtues infused by the gift of God was had equally by everybody, right? Therefore, it seems that not all the virtues are equal in one and the same.

[1:27] More, if all the virtues were equally intense and one and the same, it would follow that whoever exceeds someone in one virtue exceeds him in all the other virtues. But this would seem to be false, because diverse saints are especially praised about diverse what virtues, as Abraham about what faith. What's that thing there? The way they explain the names at the beginning of Abraham, begot Isaac. Isaac begot Jacob.

[2:00] The spiritual sense is faith begot hope, and hope begot. Yeah. Moses of what mildness? Huh. That's interesting. He says about Moses, huh? Job. Job about patience. Whence about each confessor when one sings in the church there's not found anyone like him, right? Who can serve the law of the Most High? In that each one has some prerogative of some virtue. Therefore, not all the virtues are equal in one and the same.

[2:32] That's I would be convinced by that argument. Huh? I'm surprised, you know, that Thomas. That's the way that that text of the common confessors is always interpreted. Yeah.

[2:44] More the more intense a habit is, the more a man acts according to it in a more delightful way, right, and in a more prompt way. But by experience, it is clear that one man does with more pleasure and more promptly the act of one virtue than the act of another. Therefore, not all the virtues are equal in one and the same.

[3:12] But here he goes to his teacher, there, who's what? Augustine, right? He's somebody, this Augustine, huh? The kind you just say, you know, Aristotle, he's somebody, right? What you say about Augustine, right? He is somebody, right, huh?

[3:29] But against this is what Augustine says in the sixth book on the Trinity. Whoever are equal in what fortitude, courage, are equal in prudence and temperance. That's it. There you go. And that's about the rest, huh? But this would not be unless all the virtues of one man were equal. Therefore, all the virtues of one man are what equal. This is going to follow from the fact that they're connected, right, with prudence and with what charity, huh?

[4:07] Well, let's see what Thomas says in the body of the article, right? I answer it should be said that the quantity of virtues, as has been said before, or as clear from what has been said before, can be noted in two ways, huh? In one way, according to the ratio, the notion of the species, and thus it is not doubtful that one virtue of one man is greater than another, right?

[4:40] Just as charity is greater, for example, than faith and hope, huh? In another way, it can be noted according to the partaking of it of the subject, right? In so far as it is what made more intense or less so in the subject, right? And according to this, all the virtues of one man are equal by a certain equality of what proportion, huh? In so far as they equally what grow in the man, huh?

[5:26] And thus it's charity makes just as the fingers of the hand. What a what a concrete way, huh? Yeah. I lectured out there TAC day that they have a painting there of Thomas. I could see from the lectern, lecturing you know, there were just five fingers. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And he's but

[5:45] I was trying to steal you know for the five senses of before you know, but I mean it still steal it for this year too. Yeah. Just as the fingers of the hand are unequal in their quantity, right? But the equal according to what proportion, since they grow proportionally, right, huh? Okay. Suppose you said about your arms and legs, right? Now, the legs are, I suppose, longer than the arms, right?

[6:09] But they they grow proportionally as a person gets older, right? Okay. They seem to be longer when they're about twelve. No arms and legs are really long, their bodies are not so big. All arms and legs.

[6:26] Okay. Now the equality, huh? We have to take the reason in the same way for the equality of these things as their what? Connection, right? Huh? For equality is a certain connection of the virtues according to what? Quantity, huh? Now it has been said that the reason for the connection of the virtues is assigned in what? Two ways, huh? In one way, according to the understanding of those things of those who understand through these four virtues, four general conditions of virtues, right?

[7:08] Of which one is found what together with the others in every matter, right? And thus the virtue in every matter cannot be called equal unless it has all these what conditions for equal. And this reason of equality of virtues is assigned by Augustine in the sixth book of the Trinity. That's the one quoted in the second chapter, right?

[7:34] If one says that they are what equal, these in fortitude, right? But that one what stands out in prudence, it would follow that the fortitude this one was less what? Prudent. Prudent. And through this, that neither are they equal what in fortitude when the fortitude of one is more prudent than the what? Other. And thus it is about the other virtues you would find if you run through them all, right?

[8:06] By the same way of considering them, right? That's where you take these as being what four qualities of every what virtue, right? Huh? If you have one of them less than the other, then they're not what equal.

[8:23] In another way, one assigns the reason of the connection of the virtues according as we understand these virtues to have determined matters. That's where Aristotle speaks, right? He speaks of the virtues. And according to this, the reason of the connection of the moral virtues is taken on the part of what? Prudence, right? Because that what takes counsel about what should be done in all these things, and on the part of charity as regards the what?

[8:52] Infuse virtues, right? But not from the part of inclination, which is on the side of the what subject, as has been said above. Thus, therefore, the reason of the equality of the virtues can be taken on the side of prudence as regards that which is formal in all the moral virtues.

[9:18] For existing, for reason existing equally perfect in one and the same, is necessary that proportionally that the middle constituted in each matter of virtues is according to what right reason.

[9:33] But as regards that which is material in the moral virtues, to wit, the inclination itself to the act of virtue, it can be that one man is more prompt to the act of one virtue than to the act of what another, either by nature, or by custom, or even from the gift of grace. grace huh Okay, that's how he's going to solve the second. and. The third objections there, Right?

[10:04] He's not going to admit that one guy has what? This virtue better than the other man. the other guy has that virtue better than him, right? But he's more prompt in the act.

[10:15] Now, to the first, therefore, should be said that the word apostle can be understood about the gifts of gratia gratis data. Now, I've talked about this way of speaking before, right? Huh? Um. What are you doing here? And they distinguish gratia gratis data and gratia gratum faciens, right? And what's that way of? What kind of use of words is that?

[10:50] Because he calls one grace freely given, right? And another one making you what? Acceptable. Acceptable. Okay. But even that grace that makes acceptable is freely given too. Mm-hmm. So, what is he doing? His name is giving a new name. to the one that's. stands out. yeah, As something in addition, right? Huh? They're both freely given, right? Gratia gratis data in Latin, right? Huh. But one has an addition that makes you what?

[11:21] Stands out something notable. Yeah, has something notable that makes you what? God's favorite, you might say, right? Yeah. And so that gets a new name, gratia gratum faciens, and the other one keeps the common name, right? Okay. The opposite of gratum faciens is persona non grata. Yeah, yeah. You get something like in the class last night. Did you remember the word chance is broader than what luck, right?

[11:48] But luck is in human affairs, right? So it gets a special name, luck, and then the other one, chance in nature, just keeps the name chance, right? Mm-hmm. This is a common way of speaking, right? It's like when Aristotle distinguishes between habit and disposition, right? Well, habit is a disposition too, but a disposition is just a disposition. Habit is a firm disposition, so gets a new name, habit, right?

[12:14] Now, as you must know, if you're trying to overcome your bad habits, you know, it's hard to, get rid of them, right? Yeah, yeah. My teacher, Kasurik, you know, when he met De Koninck, you know, he went back to philosophy, right? But he had to get rid of all these bad ideas. It took a long time, you know. Get rid of all these bad habitual ideas.

[12:40] Okay. So the word of the apostle could be understood about the gifts gratia gratis data, right? Huh? Like miracles and so on, which are not common to all people, right? Nor are all equal and one and the same, right? Okay. So St. Paul enumerates those different ones, huh? The gift of tongues, you know. You might have the gift of interpretation, but not the gift of tongues, and some else person might have the gift of healing, and not something else, right?

[13:10] Or it can refer to the measure of gratia gratum, making what? Acceptable Yeah, facientis, huh? According to which one abounds in all the virtues, right? More than what another, right? On account either of a greater abundance of prudence, or also of what charity, in which are connected all the infused virtues, huh?

[13:40] Now, in the second and third objection, he's going to do so in terms of what he said in the body of the article there, right? According to a certain what inclination, right? To the second, should be said that one saint is praised especially about one virtue, another about another, on account of a more excellent promptitude to the act of one virtue than to the act of the other, but not that one has.

[14:07] This virtue doesn't doesn't have it. This one has a better amount of that virtue, and another one has more another greater amount of another virtue. No, the one person has greater amount of all the virtues than the other person, right? Okay, but one person more prompt in particular act.

[14:32] What's an example where Lord talks about the guy who, you know, dad wants him to do something. One guy. No. Yeah, went and did it. The other guy said, "Oh yeah, I'll go and he won't. yeah." But the other guy is is more prompt, but he's not. He doesn't do it. He's all talk. No. No. Now we get to Article Three here.

[14:56] Whether the moral virtues are preeminent come before the intellectual virtues. That's an interesting question. Now, to the third one goes for it thus: it seems that the moral virtues are preeminent to the intellectual virtues, for what is more necessary and permanent is better. But the moral virtues are more permanent than the what? Disciplines, the sciences, and this is reference there to Aristotle in the Ethics, where he says that, which are the intellectual virtues,

[15:43] and they are also more necessary for human life. Therefore, they ought to be preferred to the intellectual virtues. We'll have to see what Lady Wisdom has to say about that. She excels, of course, in both. But anyway, moreover, is of the notion of virtue that it makes good the one having it. But according to the moral virtues, a man is said to be good. Not, however, according to the intellectual virtues, except perhaps according to only what prudence.

[16:16] So, if I'm a good geometer, am I a good man for that reason? If I'm a good carpenter, am I a good man? That's what Chesterton always says about shooting his mother-in-law between the eyes at fifty paces. He's a good shot. He's not necessarily a good man.

[16:39] Moreover, the end is more noble than those things which are for the sake of the end, which are towards the end. But as is said in the sixth book of Nicomachean Ethics, moral virtue makes for a right intention of the end. While prudence makes for a right choice of those things which are toward the end. Therefore, moral virtue is more noble than prudence, which is the intellectual virtue about what?

[17:08] Yeah, yeah. I'm convinced, aren't you? There you go. What do we pray there? You know, I was being considered more correctly. Yeah. But this is not a stupid position that this other position. No, no, it seems like it. Pretty convincing. But against says that moral virtue is in the part of the soul that is reasonable by partaking of reason. But intellectual virtue is in the part that is reasonable essentially, as is said in the first book of the Ethics.

[17:48] But what is reasonable essentially is more noble than what is only reasonable by what partaking. Therefore, intellectual virtue is more noble than moral virtue.

[18:01] My goodness, huh? It's like it's like the character says there in twelfth night, you know. O time! I must untangle this, not I. For. It is too hard a knot for me to untie.

[18:24] It's interesting likeness there between a plot and philosophy, right? Huh? Because Aristotle says that the plot consists of tying the knot and then untying it, huh? And then the plot analysis, like in the new Hudson Shakespeare, there they speak of tying the knot. The knot is tied, then tying the knot. The knot is untied, and they kind of divide the plot up that way. And philosophy's like that, huh?

[18:54] You what argue and see what can be said on both sides with some probability, and then your mind is tied in a knot, as Aristotle says, talking about dialectic there in the third book of wisdom, right? Huh? Then you have to untie this, right? And Aristotle says time is a good help, right? Sometimes it takes a long time before you you see it, right? Huh? I remember the one knot I couldn't untie.

[19:21] We certainly couldn't untie it, and it became relevant to my thesis in some way, doctor thesis. And I was reading something in Thomas, and I was following a lecture of Monsignor Dionne, and I said, Ah, now I've got it, you know. And so I ran down to Monsignor Dionne to check it out after all these years, and I began to raise Orde when he said, "Know where you're going, Duane?"

[19:39] He said. And I said, "Well, damn it! Can I go there?" We agreed, you know. But time is a good help, right? Huh? Oh, time! The must untangle this, not I. It is too hard a knot for me to untie. Can read the twelfth night. It's with the the knot is, huh? See how Shakespeare unties it, huh?

[20:03] You know, read the the critics there in the late play of Shakespeare. Cymbeline, right? Huh? No, they try to do each other by saying how many knots he unties in one scene there at the end. It's absolutely incredible what he does, you know. Which was that Cymbeline Oh, Cymbeline! Yeah, I remember that. That's a marvelous thing. Great. I was mentioning how I was reading the life of the poet laureate of England.

[20:30] There, you know, Tennyson, right? He's on his deathbed there, right? He wants to read the scene again, the Cymbeline you know, where Imogen and Posthumus are reconciled. It's a beautiful scene. Scene.

[20:43] But here, you're tying the knot, right? He had a beautiful example then in the dialogue of Plato there, the one in the introduction to logic, right? Where Socrates argues that virtue can be taught, and then he argues that virtue cannot be taught, right? Well, now the mind is tied into a knot, and he's got to untie it, right? And he comes back, and he seems to find a weakness on one side, right?

[21:08] But anyway, that's another topic. Okay, so here we've got tied into a nice knot here, right? It was probably built in both sides, wouldn't you say? Yeah, yeah. I think I think it's a good example of dialectic. Now we've got to untie the knot, huh? As you said, the ability to look before and after is included the ability to look for distinctions, right? And eventually, then you've got a good mind to see the distinctions, right?

[21:44] Well, here Thomas starts out seeing a distinction here, right? The answer, therefore, it should be said that something could be said more or less in two ways. In one way, simply; in another way, secundum quid, right? And that's a kind of distinction that you meet over and over again in Aristotle and in Thomas, right?

[22:09] And it's important there in the what in the Meno of Socrates, huh? Yeah. Because Meno is saying to Socrates, you can't investigate what you don't know. How can you direct your thinking to what you don't know?

[22:27] But secundum quid, you can know what you don't know. People are being paid to do research, you know, to find the cause of cancer or some other disease, right? Huh? They must, in some way, know what they don't know. Some way, yeah. Yeah. But if you can't see that distinction, then you are kind of caught, right? And t here is t here is a a kind of mistake there.

[22:51] Aristotle takes up in the book on Sophistical Refutations, which is tied up with some simpliciter and secundum quid, huh? Happens again and again. For nothing prevents something from being better simpliciter, as in Aristotle's example, to philosophize than to make money.

[23:13] Which nevertheless is better secundum quid, huh? That is, to one undergoing some kind of what necessity, right? Now, simpliciter, huh? Simply, each thing is considered simply when it's considered according to the very definition of its what species, huh?

[23:40] But a virtue has its species, huh? From its what object? Species now is opposed to the what? The genus, right? Okay. Whence, simply speaking, that virtue is more noble that has a more noble what object, right? Now it is manifest, however, and that the object of reason is more noble than the object of the appetite. That he should say this is impressive here.

[24:20] For reason grasps something in general, right? See, large discourse, as Shakespeare says, right? Discourse about the what universal. But the appetite tends towards things which have some kind of particular what existence or being. Being, yeah.

[24:43] Whence, simply speaking, intellectual virtues which perfect reason are more noble than moral ones which perfect the appetite. It's kind of a strange argument he gives there, huh? It's interesting.

[25:00] But if virtue be considered not in terms now its object, right? Which is, he says, simply, but in order to act, then moral virtue, which perfects the appetite to which it belongs to move the other powers to act, right? As has been said above, it is more what noble, right?

[25:29] And because virtue is said from this that it is the beginning of some act, when it is what perfection of a power or ability, it follows also that the notion or the definition of virtue more belongs to moral virtues than to what intellectual virtues. Although intellectual virtues are more noble habits, simpliciter My God, distinctions there, right? Huh?

[26:11] Okay. Now, what about the first objection? This more necessary and permanent, huh? Moral virtues, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the moral virtues are more permanent than intellectual ones because the exercise of them is in those things which pertain to our common life, huh? So you got to eat every day, right? Huh? So you got to exercise yourself in the virtue of what temperance, right?

[26:41] Huh? You don't have to do geometry every day, right? I try to do the geometry every day, but I don't get in every day, right? But I eat every day, just about, huh? Really. But it's manifest that the object of the disciplines, huh? Meaning of the intellectual virtues of the sciences, the objects which are necessary and always having themselves in the same way are more what permanent than the objects of moral virtues, which are some particular things to be what done, right?

[27:15] Okay. So it's this food in front of me. I got a individual piece of individual cake here, let's say, right? But I've got to use my my temperance with, right? It's particular cake, right? Or

[27:37] that, however, moral virtues are more necessary for human life does not show them to be more noble, simpliciter but towards this, yeah. So secundum quid, right? Okay.

[27:57] Moreover, that the intel, the speculative, huh? Now, speculative is a Latin word for what? Looking. Yeah, theoretical is a Greek word, right? Huh? The, um.

[28:13] Moreover, the speculative intellectual virtues. Aristotle, when he takes up the intellectual virtues, he takes up. He mentions five of them, right? Huh? Come interesting. He mentions five, right? You have art and prudence or foresight, and then understanding, and then reasoned out understanding, episteme, and then wisdom, right? Huh? Well, these three are. Speculative virtues, right? Natural understanding, reasoned out understanding. Aristotle calls nous and episteme, and then sophia, uh.

[28:48] Wisdom, right? Huh? Okay. Those are the, what? Speculative virtues, right? Theoretical virtues, and then foresight or prudence and art. Right, reason about doing, right, reason about making, right. Those are the practical ones, right? So he's saying. moreover, in these speculative intellectual virtues, From the very fact that they're not ordered to something as what. Useful. As useful as ordered to an end, they are more what? Of more worth, right?

[29:20] Huh. Okay. And this happens because, according to them, in a certain way, there's begun in us what? Yeah. The attitude, right? Huh. Which consists in the knowledge of truth, right? Okay. Now

[29:41] the famous words of our Lord, I am the what? Road, he says. Huh. The Greek, the word is hodos, right? I am the road, the truth, and the what? Life, huh? And Thomas, when he begins the third part of the Summa, right, he says, you know, it's about Christ, who, according as he is man, is the road, huh, the via, to what? Our beatitude, right. But as God, he's truth itself and life itself, huh?

[30:11] Eternal life, right? Huh. Truth itself, right? So he's what? That's the end, huh? Truth, huh? Okay. So, insofar as the speculative virtues are aiming at knowing the truth, right? They are kind of a beginning of what? The end. The attitude, huh? Okay. And that's important. That's for their excellence, right? Okay.

[30:37] Now, what's the definition too? When you get to the to faith, which is in reason too, right? Huh. But is faith more speculative or practical? Do you think?

[30:49] It's more speculative. Yeah. The same way that Thomas said, argued that theology is more speculative than practical, because. It's chiefly about God, and you can't do anything about God, right? Can't do it. Can't do anything about it. Can't do anything about it, right? But he's the end, right? Okay. But what's the definition there of faith, right? The

[31:19] substance of things hoped for. Yeah, conviction of what is not seen, right? Now, substance doesn't mean it's at the essence, not the beatific vision yet, right? But it's a substance. Hypostasis I think is the Greek word there, right? It's kind of like a foundation, right? Now, you believe by faith what you're going to see in the beatific vision, right? So you're kind of beginning the attitude there, right?

[31:44] Isn't it? So you can see what Aristotle or Thomas is saying there, right? That the speculative virtues that have as their object truth, they're trying to know truth, and the end of man is to know the first truth, which is God Himself, right? Then that's already what kind of a beginning attitude, and that's the best thing there is, huh? That's the greatest good, huh?

[32:16] Shakespeare calls reason what? In the education he calls it godlike, right? Huh? But when is reason most godlike? Huh? Well, when it acquires some wisdom, right? Huh? You know, and the more the knowledge it has has the character wisdom, the more it is like what? God, right? So Aristotle, when he takes up wisdom there at the beginning of the fourteen books of wisdom, fourteen books of first philosophy, fourteen books meta ta physika after the books of natural philosophy, you know, he says that the

[32:57] the science is divine in both senses of divine, right? It's about God, and it's the knowledge which God Himself alone would have, or only God would have fully, right? I turn it into an ineffable there, right? And I say, wisdom, as as Lady Wisdom says, is a knowledge of God, right? In both senses, it's a knowledge about God, and it's a knowledge which, but God has, right?

[33:25] God's knowledge is chiefly of Himself, right? And so in knowing himself, he knows all other things, huh? And so when you get to theology, that's even more like God, right? Huh? Than than the first philosophy is, right? Huh? So the more this knowledge has the character of wisdom, the more it's what like God, right? Who's wisdom itself, huh? That's very interesting. Shakespeare to see that, right? Godlike, huh?

[33:56] Because it strikes me, you know, that in even the education itself. Shakespeare works out the what definition of what reason, right? And here you have the beginning of the image of the Trinity in man, right? Because in reason thinks out the what definition of reason, then in the definition of reason you have reason as understood, right? And then when you understand how good it is, then you start to really love reason, right?

[34:28] This is the image of the Trinity in God, right? So it's especially God-like when reason knows itself, and what then you love reason itself when you see that it's very good to have this ability for a large discourse, looking before and after.

[34:48] So it's really kind of marvelous that that uh Shakespeare should touch upon that. Godlike, right? Okay. But he also says, surely He that made us with such large discourse gave us not the capability and Godlike reason to fust on us and are used, right? You know, to go rusty and moldy and so on.

[35:11] I was reading about the the part on the incarnation there in the fourth book of the Super Con Gentiles, and Thomas, you know, he's beautiful what he does. You know, he begins with the heretics and he kind of refutes all heretics and finally becomes a position of the church about this, right? And then once he gets through with that, then he has a whole chapter where he's saying that this is impossible, right, for God to become man, right?

[35:37] And then he answers that, right? And after you know that what the church believes, and you know that it's possible, right? Then you say, well, but is it suitable that God should become a man, right? And then he, you know, has a whole chapter about twenty six objections to it, and and then he he you know shows with eight beautiful reasons why why he should become man, and then he answers the twenty four.

[36:00] It's absolutely absolutely beautiful to see that. But why do I want to get to that? Why? For some reason here. Beginning of beatitude, maybe. Yeah. Not exactly. Anyway, okay.

[36:26] Oh yeah, I was thinking of yeah when Thomas begins that he he has to talk about original sin, right? Because that's something Saint Paul seems to emphasize, right? And of course, St. Thomas is saying, you know, well, one can with probability estimate that there was something like original sin, right? And even apart from what the church, you know, teaches us in the Old Testament, right? I said, how clear it is, right?

[36:54] You know, where we have homosexuality now and this idea of homosexual marriage and so absolutely, you know, you know. But the chief, you know, the worst effect of original sin is is the mind is is clouded and and apt to make mistakes, right? And can't control its emotions and so I said, there's plenty of evidence, you know, you got to be blind to what's going on, you know, to just just absurd nonsense that comes out of these people, right?

[37:25] Insanity, yeah. Yeah. You remember Anthony Daniels, an Englishman, physician who is also a very astute cultural commentator, writes for the New Criterion a great deal, and he spent many years in the English prison system, and he's an agnostic essentially, but he is in full concurrence with the doctrine of original sin because he's saying that that's the only thing that I've ever found. That would explain this strange twisting of his soul from his incredible experience, a billion ugly experience within the prison system, as his psychiatrist.

[38:03] And so, very interesting. That's what Chesterton met a man on the street who said he used to read Chesterton's articles in the paper all the time. And he came up to Chesterton one day. He says, "I think, I think that Catholic Church is the only thing left in the world that makes sense. The only sensible thing left in the world." So Chesterton said to him, "You are Catholic?"

[38:22] He says, "No, I am an atheist." And and Chesterton he said, "Well, when Thomas asked the first question whether God exists, his first answer was, 'It seems not. ' So he says, 'So that's not the only reason we'll see how reasonable the church is, but still not believe in God. ' Give the guy the benefit of the doubt. Maybe he'll work it out."

[38:46] So this happens, he says, at the end of the five first objection. According to according to them, in some way, is begun in us, right? Beatitude, right? Which consists in a knowledge of the what? Truth, right?

[39:09] To second it should be said that according to the moral virtues, a man is said to be good. What? Simply, right? That's interesting, right? And not according to intellectual virtues. By that reason, because the what appetite moves the other powers to its what act. Whence through this also is not proved except that moral virtue is better secundum quid. That's interesting, right? That he said to be it's said to be better secundum quid, even though according to the man, he said to be good simply, right?

[39:47] It's it's a subtle thing difficult, yeah. To the third, it should be said that prudence not only directs the moral virtues in choosing those things which are towards the end, but also in what putting forward the end itself, right?

[40:08] For it is the end of each moral virtue to attain the middle in its own what matter. Which middle is determined according to the right reason of prudence, as is said both in the second and in the sixth book of the ethics, right? So Aristotle defines moral virtue in the second book. He says it's a habit with choice, right? Existing in the middle towards us, as determined by right reason.

[40:33] And then he determines what right reason is. There are prudence, and it gets to the sixth book, which takes up the virtues of reason.

[40:42] Okay. So he's putting the what with some qualifications, right? He's putting the speculative virtues, right? The virtues of reason before those of the what moral virtues, right? Yeah. But now he's going to go into among the moral virtues, which ones are greatest, right? Okay. And the question is, whether justice is what the chief among the moral virtues.

[41:16] To the fourth one goes forth. thus, it seems that justice is not the what chief among the moral virtues, right? And you'll be asking the same question about whether wisdom is the chief one among the virtues of reason, right?

[41:35] For it is greater to give to someone of one's own than to render to someone what is owed to them, right? But the first pertains to liberality, huh? Generosity. The second to justice, right? Therefore, it seems that liberality is a greater virtue than what justice, huh?

[41:57] Of course, magnificence is supposed to be greater than liberality because that's a great gift, right? So, when somebody gives money to finish a building there, Thomas Aquinas College, right? Now we say he's magnificent, magnificent gift, right? Now, see, it's not justice, right? That's magnificence, which is considered great sums.

[42:24] Moreover, that would seem to be greatest in each thing which is most perfect in it. But as is said in the Epistle of James, in the first chapter, patience has a perfect what work, huh? Therefore, therefore, it seems that patience is greater than justice, right? Huh? Okay.

[42:52] Moreover, magnanimity. Now, that's what Mozart presents in the what thirty-sixth symphony and in the what forty-first symphony, so which are both in C major, right? Okay.

[43:06] Further, magnanimity does great things in all the virtues, as Aristotle says in the fourth book of Ethics. Magnanimous man tries to be what excel in honor, right? Huh? What's honorable? Acts of virtue. So he tries to what great things in all the virtues, right? Huh? Okay.

[43:28] A lot of times Shakespeare will couple their magnanimity with what courage, right? Huh? Because courage seems to be a very honorable virtue, right? So we give the Medal of Honor for what one glorious day on the battlefield there, right? Huh? But you can be just all your life or tempered all your life, not going to give you a medal, right? You know, temperance, no Medal of Honor.

[43:56] But against this is what the philosopher. Now, who's he? Some guy, somebody. Somebody, somebody. Well, I think is it who's that comedy team? Britain. They had a lot of funny plays and stuff like that. Gilbert and Sullivan. They have a line: if everybody's somebody, then nobody, then no one's anybody.

[44:30] This is antonomasia right? Philosopher. Second Aristotle calls Homer the poet, right? Didn't know Shakespeare. That's an excuse. A little sliver. But in the Federalist Papers, right? They say in the words of Shakespeare. No, don't say Shakespeare. Say in the words of the poet. You know, long farewell to all my greatness. Well, it's Henry VIII, right? So please call the port.

[45:09] It's a nice figure of speech, yeah. Antonomasia. What does the philosopher say in the fifth book of the Ethics? That's the book that's about justice, right? Justitia est praeclarissima, right? The most what? Brilliant of virtues, right?

[45:37] I answer it should be said that some virtue, according to its species, is said to be greater or lesser, either simply or secundum quid. I can't get away from that distinction, Thomas. He's really tied up with it, right? He's milking it for all it's worth. Yeah. You know when he talks about when Aristotle talks about being, right? In in wisdom there, the two fundamental divisions of being are called substance and accident, right?

[46:04] And then act and ability, right? And substance is being simpliciter, and accident is being what? Secundum quid, right? And act is being simply, and ability is what? Secundum quid, right? So it's kind of a fundamental distinction, right? It's found in the most universal thing of all, which is being, right? That distinction comes up again and again, but it's it also is tied up with one kind of fallacy, right?

[46:37] The fallacy that comes from mixing up what is simple with what is secundum quid, huh? It's one it's one of the thirteen kind of fallacies, but those are what mistakes that are not tied to any one particular science, right? And they run through everything, right? So dialectic is you know kind of universal like wisdom, huh? Aristotle compares dialectic to wisdom, right? In terms of universality, right? And you see that in this particular thing, this distinction of simply and secundum quid, right?

[47:18] Simply, a virtue is greater, according as in it more what shines through, right? The good of what? Reason. Reason, huh? Okay. Because it's what does it mean? Was what Shakespeare teaches us in the agitation, right? We should live in accordance with what reason, That's what Dionysius says, right? Aristotle teaches us, right? So, what is a good human act? You know, when one word, it's a reasonable act, right?

[47:56] So the more the light of reason shines through, right, the more it seems to be, you know, excellent, right? Simply, a virtue is said to be greater, according as in it a greater good of reason shines, yeah.

[48:16] And according to this, justice among all the moral virtues excels, right, as being nearer to reason, huh? That's why justice is in the what will, right? That's interesting. Now, the Aristotle he takes up the moral virtues that are tied up with the emotions, you know, in books three and four, and then book five he takes up justice, and then book six he takes up the the intellectual virtues, right?

[48:44] You can see kind of in order there, right? Because justice is what closer to the other moral virtues than the virtues of reason, but it's closer to reason than the other moral virtues.

[49:02] Which, is clearly, he says, both from the subject in which it exists, right, and from the object about which it is. For from the subject, because it is in the will, as in a what subject, right? But the will is the reasonable, the rational, desiring power, right? Huh? Aristotle speaks of the will as being in reason, right, in the rational part of the soul, right? That's why you have will in God, but you don't have emotion in God, right?

[49:38] Okay. According to its object or matter, because it is about operations by which a man is ordered, not only in himself but also to what another. Whence it justice is the praeclarissima right? The most shining, you might say, right now, are the virtues, as is said in the fifth book. Did we ever stop in praise to the evening star or something? Remember something like that in there, don't you?

[50:16] Prae clarissima, right? The evening star. huh? I was getting quite a good style there. Okay? Among the other moral virtues, which are about the what passions, right, or the emotions, right, feelings.

[50:44] More in each of them shines forth the good of reason. The more, right, about what the greater things, Desiring motion subject to reason, subject to reason. But most of all, in those things which pertain to man, is life, right? From which all other things depend. Depend. And therefore, fortitude, which subjects the repetitive motion to reason, in those things which what pertain to death and life, holds the first place among the moral virtues which are about passions.

[51:26] So he puts courage above temperance. Nevertheless, it is ordered below what justice, right? Where the light of reason shines forth even more. Is that with Solomon there? You know whose baby is it?

[51:48] To whom should you give the baby? Right? To whom does it belong? Yeah. But the wisdom, though, of Solomon shows through, right? And what he says, huh? Let's divide the baby and give each a share. Oh. Tell right away who the mother is. Whence the philosopher says in the first book of rhetoric, it is necessary for those to be what the greatest virtues which are what more honored among them, huh?

[52:24] If virtue is a what a power or ability that does well, right? Huh? An account of which the what brave and the just are most of all what honored, right? Huh? These in war to it fortitude, right? Huh? And this justice is useful both in war and in what peace, huh? Okay. Now after fortitude is ordered what temperance, huh? Which subjects to reason the appetite about those things which are merely ordered to life, huh?

[53:04] Either to the individual, right? Or in the same kind of species, huh? So therefore, in food and reproduction, right? Mm-hmm. And thus these three virtues, together with what prudence or foresight, are said to be the chief ones, also in what in war, huh? Dignity, huh? Secundum quid, huh? One virtue said to be greater, according as it is a what a prop, huh? Support or an ornament to a principal virtue, right?

[53:52] Just as substance is simpliciter. More worthy than accident, right? But nevertheless, some accident is secundum quid of greater dignity than substance, in so far as it perfects substance in some accidental what being. huh Okay

[54:14] Like your health maybe Yeah Okay. Now, what about this objection from liberality? Now, it's pretty much it convinced me, you know. To the first, therefore, should be said that the act of liberality must be what necessary for the act of liberality that be founded upon the act of what justice. For that is not a liberal giving. There is not a giving of one's own, right? Yeah, actually, see about that.

[54:45] Liberals—they say the liberals like people's money, right? Yeah. Whence liberality is not able to be without justice, right? Which separates one's own from what is not one's own, right? Huh. But justice is able to be without liberality, right? Whence justice simply is greater than liberality, as being more common in this way, right? And as being its what foundation, right? But liberality is secundum quid, Mayor, right? Since it's a certain what ornament of justice, supplement of it.

[55:38] That's why Saint James will say that mercy prevails over justice. Yeah. In that sense. It's interesting how you know Aristotle. I think when he gets into the books on friendship, you know, I think he speaks of friendship as being even higher than justice, right? Because if you have friendship, you don't need justice, right? Because your friend will not only give you what is owed you, but he'll do more than that, right?

[56:02] And we need people to give you more than just what's owed to you. You know, it'd be pretty rough. We just got what was owed to us, you know.

[56:19] So no, sound. There is an element of truth in the first objection, in that in some way liberality is what greater. Yeah, but secundum quid, right? As an ornament. Yes. To the second, what about this famous text of patience there from our friend James? To the second, should be said that patience is said to have a perfect work in the tolerance of what bad things, huh? In which not only does it exclude what an unjust punishment, punishment, revenge.

[56:55] Which justice also excludes, right? And not only hate, which charity makes us devoid, right? Not only anger, which mildness, right? But it also excludes disordered sadness, right? Which is in some way the root of all the what? The force, that's right. Yeah.

[57:20] And therefore, in this it is more perfect and greater because in this matter it extirpates, pulls it up by the root. The root, yeah. I like that word, yeah. Yeah. And much ado about nothing, there, you've got Don John, the villain, right? He's got that sadness right up bottom, you know. He can't stand

[57:46] others that are enjoying themselves, right? Then he does the horrible thing, you know. He's the denunciation of poor hero and so on. But is not simply, so put it there, more perfect than the other what virtues, huh?

[58:10] Because fortitude not only sustains what Being molested. being molested, yeah, without disturbance, which is patience, but also it what bears itself, yeah, goes to them, right? Yeah. When there's need, right? Huh. Whence whoever is courageous is also what patience, but it's not convertible, huh? For patience is a certain part of prudence, right? Huh. For it yeah Well as I mentioned you know you take Mozart's five last symphonies, son.

[58:50] The first of those is the thirty-six, right, and the last is the forty-first, and they're both representations of what Magnanimity. magnanimity, right, and they're both in C major. And then the 38th, there's no 37th symphony, it's a mistake, and people thought it was his only. The thirty-eight symphony and the what forty symphony are dealing with what courage, right? Huh. But the thirty-eight is more courage in the strict sense, right?

[59:21] And the forty is more like patience, right? Huh. So he had that those two things he talks about there, right? And then the the odd one is the the E flat major one, huh? Thirty-nine, huh? You had perfect symmetry there, you know, the five, huh? E B C B A, huh? Same symmetry you have in the Mass, right? We have the what the Kyrie, the Gloria, the Credo, Sanctus.

[59:52] And then the August Day, right? So the August Day and the Kyrie, are prayers asking for God's mercy, right? And then the Gloria and the Sanctus are more praise. And then the Credo is the odd thing, right? Because that's that's profession of faith, right? So it's A B C B A, right? The same symmetry you have in Midsummer Night's Dream, right? A B C B A at first.

[1:00:22] You point out to me, right? Okay. I keep looking at the symmetry. everywhere See where I can. put it in. Now we come to the third objection, which is talking about magnanimity, right?

[1:00:45] That's what Mozart does, in the 36th and the 41st. To the third, it should be said that magnanimity is not able to be unless the other virtues are what Preexistent right? As is said in the fourth book of Ethics,

[1:01:03] once it is compared to the others as a what ornament of them, right? And thus, a couldn't equate it as greater than all the others, right? But not, however, what Simply'cause it presupposes them. huh? Magnanimous man is very hard to find. Remember, Warren Murray was directing somebody's very good thesis on magnanimity, He's trying to find a good example, but what they could find was Christ. Yeah.

[1:01:37] Okay, should we take a break now? Sure. On to wisdom here.