Prima Secundae
157. Summa I-II, Q. 66, Arts. 5–6: Wisdom as the Greatest Intellectual Virtue and Charity as the Greatest Theological Virtue
Class of 2014-02-20
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/157-summa-i-ii-q-66-arts-5-6-wisdom-as-the-greatest-intellectual/

[0:00] So we're up to Article Five right now, where the wisdom is the greatest among the intellectual virtues. The word sapientia is a Latin word, right? So, we actually made a word out of sapientia I think we use that word sometimes in English, don't we? Sapientia that comes from the word sapiens, and I guess sapientia in Latin is related to what savory, right? Sapida. Yeah. So Thomas sometimes explains the word a little bit, you know, etymologically.

[0:36] Sapida scientia, savory knowledge, right? And I think it's a good way of describing wisdom, right? It's knowledge, savory things, right? I notice I was Shakespeare, and I tend to savory certain lines. I was thinking laying in bed last night. I was thinking of the way Shakespeare takes something, you know, as important as death, right? You know, you have, you know, just kind of recall the plays there, like in Macbeth.

[1:08] I mean, in Hamlet there, where his friend says, "You know, now cracks an old boy heart. Good night, sweet prince, and flights of angels sing thee to thy rest." I mean, just nobody else writes that well, right? Or when Juliet is found apparently dead in her bed there, and death lies in her like an untimely frost upon the sweetest flower of all the field. You know, I challenge anybody to do that.

[1:33] I remember there was a guy who had one of these photographic memories of all these passages in Shakespeare, and he challenged anybody to take any thought anywhere, and you know, any subject, and he talked, he toppled. Yeah, bang, bang, bang, bang, it's all dead, you know. And oh, the ones from King Lear are just tremendous.

[1:56] You have to really savory these lines. So my mother used to do that with me sometimes, sometimes assiduously, sometimes not, when I would be disobedient or some some dishonorable thing as a child, and she would say, more or less, what it says in Lear, but sharper than a serpent's fang is the tongue as the tongue of an ungrateful child.

[2:22] It's more or less what he says. Yeah. These curses, curses. What was that play? Oh goodness, was it Richard? No, yeah, Richard II. Was it Richard II? Yeah. Then his his who was the woman who was cursing him? Yeah,

[2:44] yeah, yeah. I know she. Yeah. Wow. I forget. I should memorize some of those. He just does throw them to us sometimes, you know, as your favorite politician.

[3:00] To the fifth, then one goes forward. Thus, it seems that wisdom. Is not the greatest among the intellectual what virtues, virtues, huh? For the one commanding is greater than the one to whom he commands, huh? But prudence seems to command what wisdom, right? For it's said in the first book of the ethics when Aristotle is talking about you know political philosophy, right? Which of the disciplines one ought to what be in cities, and what ones each one ought to learn, and up to what point these are preordained by politics, right, huh?

[3:44] And so you know the I guess in our state of Massachusetts you know this in American history you have to learn in high school you know or you're supposed to learn anyway, and they dictate that right, huh? But things just to study right, huh? Maybe you have to you know study some math maybe or something you know, and so on. So if it commands then it seems to be superior, right?

[4:07] Okay, which pertains to prudence as is said in the sixth book of the ethics, huh? I actually get the objection you know saying well isn't the logician the wise man the wise man orders everybody else right there's already nobody logician teaches all the other men how how to think so he commands them all right so isn't the logician the wise man not the wise man the first philosopher and there's some you know it's a probability argument right?

[4:37] Okay. Since then among the disciplinas right, huh? Wisdom is always contained. It seems that prudence is greater than wisdom, right, huh? Would anybody be allowed to study wisdom? Up to what extent are they allowed to study it, and so on? Okay.

[5:03] Moreover, it's the notion of virtue that it orders man to what happiness, huh? There's a text of Thomas where he says that virtue is the road to happiness and vice is the road to misery. You see it every day in the newspaper, you know.

[5:23] Never every article about someone being really happy, but it's always somebody who's miserable out of some vice. For virtue is a disposition of what is perfect to the what best. This is said in the seventh book of the physics.

[5:44] But prudence is right reason about things to be done by which man is what led to what happiness, huh? But wisdom does not consider human acts, by which one arrives at what Beatitude, huh? Therefore, prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom. So when Thomas says that virtue is the road to wisdom, well, ethics say or prudence is about the virtues, right? So isn't that superior?

[6:21] Moreover, the more a knowledge is perfect, the more it seems to be what greater, right? But we have a more perfect knowledge of human affairs, about which there is science, than about what divine things, about which there is wisdom, as Aristotle, what, Augustine Augustine distinguishes in the twelfth book on the Trinity, because divine things are incomprehensible, right? According to that of Job, chapter thirty-six, behold, God, the great one, huh, conquering our knowledge, right?

[6:59] Huh. Therefore, science is a greater virtue than what wisdom, huh? Moreover, a knowledge of beginnings is more worthy than a knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom concludes from indemonstrable beginnings, which are known by what understanding, right? Or what I call natural understanding, just as the other sciences. Therefore, intellectus is a greater virtue than what wisdom, huh? But against this is what the philosopher says in the sixth book of the Ethics that wisdom is as the head among all the virtues of the understanding.

[7:52] I answer: It should be said that as has been said, the magnitude of a virtue, according to its species, is considered from its what object, right? Now the object of wisdom excels among all the objects, among the objects of all the intellectual virtues, for it considers the highest what cause, huh?

[8:20] Which is God, as is said in the beginning of the Metaphysics, huh? And because we judge about the effect through the cause, and we judge about the inferior causes through the higher cause, right? Hence it is that wisdom has judgment about all the other what intellectual virtues, and it belongs to it to order all the other ones, right? But Probus says logic orders all the others. Maybe it's good Doesn't have the objection, does he, huh?

[8:58] You couldn't face it, Thomas. So this is why. Maybe it's a secundum quid. So how do you how do you solve Probus's objection, right? Maybe it's a secundum quid thing. It's one of them secundum quid things. And it is architectonic respect to all.

[9:23] To the first, therefore, it should be said that since foresight is about human things, wisdom, rather, about the highest cause, it's impossible that prudence be a greater virtue than what wisdom, right? Unless, as is said in the sixth book of the Ethics, man was the greatest of those things which are in the world, right? Aristotle finds you know laughable, but anyway.

[9:57] Whence it is, it should be said. as is said in the same book, huh? That prudence does not command what wisdom itself, but rather the reverse, because as is said in 1 Corinthians, the spiritual one judges all things, and he is judged by no one. And wisdom is about spiritual things, immaterial things, right? Okay. That's why I remember Dionne saying, you know, towards immaterial, towards immaterial. That's the way it goes.

[10:34] The science, right? Now prudence doesn't have what entrance into the highest things which wisdom considers, but it commands about those things which are ordered to wisdom, right? In what way men ought to be to arrive at what wisdom, right? Huh?

[11:00] Whence in this prudence or the political is a what servant you might say, or minister of wisdom. It introduces to it and prepares the way to it, just as the guy at the door to the king.

[11:22] Prudence in this place, right? No, it's the only art he doesn't talk about. The only virtue doesn't try to give you argument for is art, right? That's that slows down, right?

[11:36] To the second, it should be said about happiness. There, prudence considers those things by which we arrive at what happiness, right? But wisdom considers the object itself of happiness, which is the highest thing that is understandable, right?

[11:54] And if there is a perfect consideration of wisdom with respect to its objects, there would be perfect what happiness in the act of wisdom, huh? But because the act of wisdom in this life is imperfect with respect to its chief object, which is God, right? Huh? Therefore, the act of wisdom is a certain what beginning or a certain partaking of future what happiness. And. That's why you know Thomas often quotes, you know, what our Lord says to Martha and Mary, right?

[12:27] Huh? Mary hath chosen the better part, and it shall not be taken away from her, right? She's chosen the contemplative, you know, and will not be taken away from her because it will be continued next life and perfected there, right? But the practical life is what the lesser part, and it's going to come to an end at the end of this life, right? Okay, so won't be building houses or going shopping, the rest of that nonsense, right?

[12:55] And therefore, it has itself more nearer to what Happiness Happiness, then does what prudence, huh? Now to the third, Aristotle says we know more perfectly, like geometry, we know better triangles and circles and so on. then we know, God, right? To third, it should be said. There's the philosopher says in the first book about the soul. One knowledge is preferred to another either from this that it is about more noble things, or it's a more whether it's certain, huh?

[13:51] If therefore the subjects are equal in goodness and nobility, that which is more certain will be a greater what Virtue. virtue, right? But that which is less certain, but about higher and greater things, right, is preferred to that which is more certain about what Lesser things, right?

[14:18] Whence the philosopher says in the second book on the universe that it is a great thing, right, to be able to know something about celestial things even by a weak and a probable what reason, right, huh?

[14:34] And that's because you thought that they have new bodies, right, which higher than the bodies down here, right? And therefore, but they're higher to know, right? But to know them imperfectly was better than not, and to know well the things that are less. But the text we usually use is the one that he gives here from the parts of animals, where he says it's lovable to what?

[14:59] It's more lovable to know a little bit about the higher things than much to know about the what lesser things, right, huh? Aristotle gives an interesting

[15:13] likeness there at that text there, you know. He says just as a glimpse of somebody what we love, right now, is worth more than a what long view of someone we don't care about, right? It's a little view here of the you know, it's preferable to a glimpse of the one you love than, I would say, the boss you have to see all day, you know, you know, you don't care for the boss, maybe.

[15:43] It's got a beautiful way, you know, kind of showing that it's better to know imperfectly a better thing than to know something else. Yeah.

[15:57] I'd say about Homer, you know, I'm not. Up to reading Homer, reading fluently in Greek, you know, in a good English translation, he's still better than the guys who are what writing in English. But you're getting Homer imperfectly, right? When you read him in translation, you know, you're dumpy in translation, like that. You know, it's imperfect way of reading him, right? Huh? But it's better to know him imperfectly than to what?

[16:23] anybody else. yeah. And I'd rather hear Mozart even on an imperfect machine. I hear a lot of people post on a perfect, you know, machine where everything's clear and and no scratches on the thing or anything like that, right? Yeah.

[16:49] So we apply to this the the old distinction of simply and secundum quid, right? If wisdom is about better things than geometry, right? Well, geometry is more certain for us, right? Than wisdom, then geometry is better. secundum quid, right? But simply, wisdom is better because it's about better things, right? So Thomas will stop and take up those two criteria that Aristotle gives: why one knowledge is better than what another, right?

[17:24] And simply, it's because the object is better, right? So does this answer your logic objection? No, I'll answer that, as soon as we get through these objections, okay? Okay.

[17:49] Wisdom, therefore, to which pertains what the knowledge of God, most of all in this what the status of this life is not able to what arrive perfectly, right? As it be is what his possession, right? He says there it's not a human possession, but a divine possession. And this is only of God, right? Okay, This is said in metaphysics. But nevertheless, that modica, that small small knowledge which is able to be had by wisdom, the wisdom about God, is preferred to all other what knowledge, huh?

[18:30] Okay. Of course, you know, Augustine says you're talking about even next life. There, you know, happy the man who knows God even if he knows nothing else, right? Miserable the man who knows all other things but doesn't know God. Happy also the man who knows God and other things, but not for knowing other things, but for knowing God alone, right? Huh? So you know how I use Romeo and Juliet to bring this out, right?

[18:59] huh? Eye is not seen, ear is not heard, nor is it into the heart of man. The things that God has prepared for those who love Him, right? So when you see God, you'll forget everything, even yourself.

[19:12] Just like Romeo forgets all about Rosalind when he sees Juliet, right? But if Romeo gets to see God, then he'll forget about even Juliet, right? Even about himself.

[19:27] You know, my friend Warren Murray used to talk about you know, talking about friendship, you know, and how you realize what perfect friendship is, right? And a lot of times the people you would like to be friends with, it's not possible because you are separated by distance, or they're in another age, you know, and so on. You'd love to, you know, to associate with Aristotle and Thomas and so on.

[19:50] You think, you know, you are going to spend your time in heaven to run around to to meet these guys that you were interested in historically. you know, I'd like to go find Shakespeare, you know, talk to him and find. Mozart, I hope they're there in heaven, and find Thomas and Albert and Augustine, so I love to talk to these guys, you know, but I think maybe if you take it up with God, you probably won't be running around much, you know.

[20:15] That's what somebody said once. When Christ comes on the last day on the clouds of heaven, we're not going to pull out the Summa and start reading about the Parousia. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[20:29] There must be some contact with the other saints, though, I mean. Yeah. Well, we're supposed to glorify God in everything. Yeah. Even in his works.

[20:46] What about the knowledge of beginnings here? To the fourth, it should be said that truth and the knowledge of indemonstrable beginnings depends on the definition of the what? Terms, right? Or if you know what is a whole and what is a part, at once it is known that every whole is greater than its what? Part.

[21:15] But to know the definition or the ratio of being and of non-being, and of whole and part, and of other things which follow upon being, from which, as from what, terms are put together the indemonstrable principles, pertains to what? Wisdom. Because ens commune being in common, is the, what, proper effect of the highest cause. God is the cause of being as being. And therefore, wisdom not only uses the indemonstrable beginnings of which there is understanding, concluding from them, as the other sciences do, but also what?

[21:57] Judging of them, right, and disputing against those who deny them, right? So Aristotle spends a good part, almost half of the fourth book there, right, defending the principle of what? Contradiction, right?

[22:13] I used to always quote Shakespeare, to be or not to be, that is the question. It's a question because you can't both be and not be. You could both be and not be, wouldn't be a question, right?

[22:27] But, you know, the meanings of the word whole and part are taken up in the Fifth Book of Wisdom, right? As well as the meanings of the word being, right? So the, the wise man, what? Judges these things, right, huh? So Aristotle speaks of wisdom as if it, it judges both the conclusions of the other sciences and it judges the beginnings, right, huh? It knows them in a sense better than natural understanding knows them.

[22:56] I used to give a simple example in class there. I'd say, uh, the whole is more than the part. Is that always so? And the students say, yeah. And I'd say, well, um, when I said that man is an animal, my mother didn't like that. I said, well, mother, he's not just an animal. He's an animal that has reason. Well, that's better, she said. So animal is only a part of what man is, right?

[23:26] So, okay, yeah. But animal includes, besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant, right? So sometimes the part includes more than the whole, right? Oh, oh, see? So students are now in doubt that the whole is, in fact, always more than the what? Part. Well, how do you solve this, right? See? Well, if you know the fifth book of wisdom, Aristotle would distinguish between the composed whole, which is put together from its parts, and the universal whole, which is said of its parts, right?

[24:00] And if you stick with the same meaning of whole and part, right? The whole is always, what, more than the part. The universal whole is said of more than the, what, subject part, right? And the composed whole is composed of more than one of the parts of which it is composed, you see? But I was mixing up the two, right, huh? When I say animal includes more than man, I'm taking animal now not as a composing part of the definition of man, where it's less than the whole definition of man, but as universal whole, which is said of man, dog, cat, horse, and so on, right?

[24:40] So you can see that the, you know, the man of natural understanding can't even defend that the whole is more than the part against the sophist Berquist, right? Unless he has the wise man Aristotle there to correct him, right? Shows you about that. Yeah, yeah. The same way with the word before, right? And Aristotle distinguishes the senses of the word before in the 12th chapter of the Categories, but also he does it in the 5th book, you know, a little different way.

[25:08] um, then you can see the truth of the axiom that nothing is before or after itself, right now. But if you mix up those different senses, something will end up being before itself, right? Because you have different senses of before, right? You can't- distinguish those, right? So you can kind of see how the wise man is- is wiser than the man of natural understanding, right? Even as regards the, what, indemonstrable beginnings, right?

[25:37] And he can defend them, right, and judge them better, right? Is nothing something? Our teacher Kasurik said, you know, philosophy is the only subject where you can get paid for talking about nothing, right? But nothing is a being of what? Reason, right? But the other guy couldn't separate those senses very much, huh?

[26:13] Pretty, pretty Russell, you know, he tried to show that, uh, even numbers are equal to all numbers, right? Because you can make it correspond to, you know, 1, 2, 2, 4, 3, 6, 4, 8. There's an even number for every number, right? So therefore the even number is equal to all numbers. Therefore the part is equal to the whole.

[26:42] How do you answer that, say? They kind of say, well, that's not difficult. I can just, you know, put 2, 2, 2, 2 after each one of them, right? Because you're multiplying these beings of reason, right? But you can see how people can get, you know, you know, denying something as fundamental as the whole is greater than the part if they don't have, what, some wisdom, right,

[27:10] Okay. Okay. How about logic, right, huh? Well, uh, logic is about the road of reason as reason, right, huh? But that presupposes the what? The natural road, right? So the wise man knows what? The natural road, which is the basis even of the road of what? Reason as reason, right? Natural road comes before what? The road of reason as reason. That's why he directs more, right? And the wise man actually distinguishes and shows the order of the three roads.

[28:02] So by doctoral thesis, when I worked on that, you know, I was what? Doing one of the things the wise man does, huh? Okay. But if there's no road beyond or before the road of the what? That the logician considers, then the logician would be what it seems.

[28:31] There's a road before that, which Aristotle talks about in the second book. Okay. So he's considering what is the best among the what, moral virtues and what is best among the virtues of reason now remains Among the theological virtues, right?

[28:58] Of course, obviously the sed contra is going to be from the apostle, right? To six, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that charity is not the greatest among the theological virtues. Now, how the heck are you going to? Well, since faith is in the understanding, hope and charity in the desiring power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity as intellectual virtues compared to moral virtues.

[29:41] Now, as Socrates says in the what Sophist, appropriately named dialogue, likeness is a most slippery thing. Most slippery thing, which means that you can what not grasp it when you think you have grasped it, right? Huh? Escapes you, right? Huh? Most slippery thing. It's really marvelous that Socrates should have said that. The text, Monty Dion pointed out to us, huh? Okay. And when Aristotle talks about the the tools of dialectic there in the book on places, the third tool is the ability to find a difference, right?

[30:32] When he gets to the fourth tool, he doesn't say and the ability to find a likeness. He says the ability to what consider a likeness, huh? Greek word is skepsis, right?

[30:48] And to consider likeness means the ability to consider in what way they really are alike. In some ways they are alike, in some ways they are not. And when you have a a proportion, right, a likeness of ratios, huh? There can be a what great difference, huh? The Lord is my rock, huh? Okay, there's some likeness there, right? But it's a very distant likeness, huh? You know, in what ways a rock may be like God?

[31:20] Because in many ways the rock is quite different from God, right? Huh? And so it's a tricky thing, huh? It's a slippery thing. It's especially uses, huh? It's a relative slippery there in the Greek text.

[31:37] Well, here he's saying, okay. Between human, yeah, the human, yeah. You're saying that faith is to hope and charity, that intellectual virtue is to the moral, right? And there's some likeness there, right? But is it such to justify this conclusion, right? Huh? We have to consider that likeness, huh? Likeness is a slippery thing. That's me, Plato, sometimes, and Socrates, here, they're really. And Thomas says, you know, the philosophy per quod.

[32:19] That word we saw before. We said the chief philosophers are Plato and Aristotle, right? And his teacher Albert the Great said, you know, to be a philosopher, you have to know both Plato and Aristotle, right? You know, we call Aristotle the philosopher, right? I mean, but the Plato, you know,

[32:38] you got no hint. This is a good example of that, right? Plato sees that good. You say that to find a likeness or to see the likeness is a slippery kind of thing. Is that something that would make poetry and art really dangerous? Yeah. It's just why the imagination, you know, is kind of the the source of what of error, right? Huh? Imagination is taken up with the likeness of things, as the poet says, right?

[33:09] You know, Shelley, you know, in his essay on poetry, right? Huh? You know, he talks about, you know, the poet is sees likenesses of things and so on, you know. But Aristotle points out in the book *On Sophistical Refutations*, likeness is the cause of error, right? And the most dangerous errors are ones where they most resemble the true. And

[33:34] so, you know, this this kind of name is equivocal by reason. In some ways, you got to be very careful that the name is equivocal by reason of a likeness of ratios.

[33:56] And this is the way the the word beginning is, right? The word end is, and the word before, right? The word end there in the things.

[34:20] To to grasp that kind of word is really difficult, right? Huh? Because you have to see in what way these things are alike, and what way they are what different, right? Huh? I think it's careful the careful carefulness of Aristotle, you know, the ability to find a difference. Doesn't seem the ability to find likeness. So the ability to consider likeness. I guess maybe the best way to translate the word skepsis there it's not skeptical, but it's what way they are like, huh?

[34:53] It's a good example of it. Moreover, what has itself from addition to another would seem to be what greater than it, right? But hope, as it seems, has itself from addition to charity, huh? For hope presupposes what love, huh? As Augustine says in the Enchiridion, huh?

[35:21] And he adds, it adds a certain motion of what extending to the thing what loved, huh? Therefore, hope is greater than charity. And then she has some friendship to God. You don't hope that he's going to. She hopes, especially someone who has charity, right? So it adds to it, right? It goes beyond.

[35:51] Moreover, the cause is more potent than the effect. Well, that's very careful because the fourth sense of before was what better, right? But then the cause before the effect was another sense, right? So you got to be careful, right?

[36:17] But faith and hope are causes of charity, as is said in Matthew one, the text we were talking about earlier, right? You know, spiritual meaning of Abraham begot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob, right? Faith begot hope, and hope begot love, huh? That's kind of talked about in the beginning of the the end of the Premium to Dei, Verbum Vatican two, huh?

[36:45] So it says you in Matthew one, giving the etymology there, Christ, I mean that etymology, the genealogy. I was disturbed by the likeness there between the genealogy and etymology. See how dangerous, slippery a thing it is, huh? The word I wanted slipped away from me, and yeah, it slipped away from me. I got the wrong word. Anyway, yeah, that's why I play the comparison to the guy the rich in the cave to get the bird for me.

[37:17] He grabs the wrong one, right? That's it's an error, right? It's a mis a mistake, a mistake. But against this is what the apostle says, huh? First Corinthians thirteen. Now there remains faith, hope, and charity. These three. No, the order he gives them in, right? Not the order of their excellences. Some other order, right? The order of what they're coming to be, right? The order of maybe a generation reason, knowing them, right?

[37:51] Because both Thomas and and and Augustine, when they take up. The Catechetical Instructions there, they take up faith, hope, and charity in that order, right? So you study the creed, and then the Our Father, and then the two commandments of love and the Ten Commandments, right? But in terms of the fourth sense of before, caritas is what. Right, right. The greater of these is charity. That's the fourth sense of before, right?

[38:19] But in the first sense, right, and maybe even the second sense, right, and in the third sense of before, the first sense of before is in time, right? So faith comes before. Second sense is what order of being, right? Well, faith can be without charity, but charity can't be without faith, right? And then it's perfect faith, of course, but so, and then maybe in the order of what reason, right?

[38:49] Instruct a person first in faith. It may be in the third sense of before And then hope, and then in charity. But in the fourth sense of better, charity comes before, and

[39:02] hope comes before faith. But you don't have that often taught, you know. I answer: It should be said. This has been said above. The magnitude or the greatness of virtue, according to its species, is considered from its object. Right. Since, however, the three theological virtues regard God as their proper object,

[39:32] one is not able to say, huh, one of them is greater than another, from this that it is about a greater object. That's an interesting thing he's pointing out, huh? The theological virtues all have God as their object, huh?

[39:51] But from this that one has itself nearer to the object than what? None. And it's in this way that charity is greater than the others. Huh? Doesn't have a greater object. Has the same object.

[40:11] For the others imply in their definition a certain distance from the object. For faith is about things not seen. It's the substance of things hoped for. The conviction of what is not seen, right? So there's some distance there, huh? And hope is about things not had, right? So you can see abandon all hope. You do it there. Yeah, you have it as well as hell for different reasons.

[40:41] I don't know about it that way. But the love of charity is about that which is already had, right? For the thing loved is in some way in the one what? Loving. Loving, huh?

[41:12] So you made a big impression upon her, or vice versa, right? So he or she has been impressed upon your what? Heart, right? In you, right? And also the one loving, through his affection, is drawn to union with the what? Loved, huh? So I was quoting that thing from Saint Thérèse of Lisieux right? And then

[41:41] Pius XI I guess, was the one who said she was the greatest saint of modern times, which is kind of a Bold statement, but I mean, but she said, you know, don't see what I can have in heaven they don't have now. Our union is already complete. That's kind of amazing to say, right? Huh? But in terms of charity, right, it's complete. An account of which it is said in the first epistle of Saint John, chapter four: Who remains in charity remains in God, and God in what?

[42:15] Him, huh? So I left my heart in San Francisco, right? If you love God, then you are in God, but then God is also what? In you.

[42:32] That's interesting, huh? So one doesn't have a greater object, because the object of all them is God, right? God in Himself, huh? But in faith and hope, a certain distance, right? So faith and hope disappear once you get to the vision, right? But charity is what perfected there, right? Because now it's C. but there is already a union there between you and God through what charity, right?

[43:07] So you are closer to the object, the supreme object. That's a nice distinction, Thomas sees there, right? You can't say one is better because it has a better object than the others, right?

[43:26] But because one is closer to that object than the other. See, J uh Sophia here at a distance, right? That's good to see her close up, you know. Okay, same object, already, you know.

[43:49] You're the one side of the distance there, right? You're in close up, you know. That's interesting. Probably it's showing that wisdom is better than the other sciences in terms of the object being better, right? Even though you were too close to it, some ways you didn't know the object too good, right? I'm closer to the square, you know, than to God in that sense, right? To understand better what the square is, right?

[44:20] To comprehend what the square is, really. Don't really comprehend God, right? Now, to the first, therefore it should be said. Now here we had likeness of what ratios, right? To the first, therefore it should be said that not in this way has faith and hope to charity. As what prudence to moral virtue, right? You're not seen, you know.

[44:56] And this on account of two things. First, because the theological virtues have an object which is above the human what soul, right? But prudence and the moral virtues are about those things which are below man.

[45:19] But in those things which are above man, more noble is love than what Knowledge. than knowledge, huh? Because knowledge is perfected according as the thing known are in the knower. That's why the Aristotle or Thomas rather speaks of the knowing powers as the vis apprehensiva, right? The grasping power, right? Huh? You grasp something; it's contained in your what hand. And so, when the mind grasps something, it is contained in the mind.

[45:58] Sometimes you see the first act of reason called simplex apprehension, right? But the English word is clear to us: on grasping, a simple apprehension. So knowledge is perfected according as things known are in the what nowhere, huh? But love, according as the one loving is drawn to the thing loved, I left my heart in San Francisco, right?

[46:30] But that which is above man is more noble in itself than as it is in man, because each thing is in another by way of that in which it is. Now the reverse is true about those things which are what below man, right? Huh?

[46:55] Okay. So the stone is more, the atom is more noble in our mind than it is in itself, right? More noble way. Yeah. Secondly, because prudence moderates the appetitive motions pertaining to the what moral virtues, right? Huh? How angry should I be with you, right? Because even Christ is in some scenes there in the Gospels is what angry there with the hard heartedness of the you know Pharisees and so on, right?

[47:45] But faith does not what moderate the appetitive motion tending towards God, which pertains to the what theological virtues. But it only shows the what object, Object, right? huh?

[48:05] But the appetitive motion to the object exceeds human knowledge, according to that of Ephesians chapter three, verse nineteen. The excelling science, the charity of Christ, right? Excelling what? Science knowledge. Yeah. It's probably knowledge in the Greek, you know, and the sense. Yeah.

[48:34] I suppose you're thinking that old thing where it says in Scripture, "A man doesn't know whether to be worthy of love or hate." You know, you don't really know your your movement, huh? But you love God, huh?

[48:50] Now to the second it should be. said, huh? This is the great distinction. The second should be said that hope presupposes the love of what? That which. Some. Someone. Hopes to obtain, right? Which is the love of what? Wanting. Yeah. Yeah. Which I think should be translated the love of wanting. Which by which love more one knows one's self, right? Who desires, who wants the good, than something else.

[49:20] But charity implies the love of friendship. To which one arrives what? Through hope. Yeah. Now the love of friendship was the way they called the love. It's also called the love of what? Wishing well, right? Okay. So, you know, we ask, you know, what does it mean to love somebody, right? Huh? Well, to really love somebody is to wish good to them, right?

[49:53] So, if you're seeking your own enjoyment from their company, right? Are you really loving them? I used to say to students, you know, now you go to the mixer and you see a nice girl, right? And what kind of love do you have for her right away? Wanting. Yeah, yeah. This is the good you want for yourself. You want to enjoy this good, right? Huh? And you're not thinking of.

[50:22] I'm good for her. You know, any of you are are kind of proud. You know, you you're not after thinking I'm good for her. You know, therefore I should approach her. You know, it'd be good for her to know me. Know me, yeah. And bring her some great benefits. No. You had the love of wanting for her, right?

[50:43] And the one to whom you wish good is yourself, right? And she's the good you want for yourself. And so there's a great distance between that and then really what loving the woman, where you love her, wishing good what? For her, right? And I don't think people understand that distinction very well, right? But it's absolutely essential, right? Huh? And

[51:13] I remember one of my girl students, you know, saying. In the course, you know, you know, she learned the distinctions in the course, you know, and she got thinking about her parents, right? And why they stuck together how many years, you know, they've married all these years, but they really wished good to each other, right? And and that's what you have to have. It's kind of what you have to have for the marriage to what?

[51:34] Last. Survive. That's very kind of cultural in the hedonistic culture today. Yeah. To really think of the other to wish good for them. That's why, as Father Harden always points out, violations of the sixth commandment always involve violations of the fifth commandment, because unchaste people are selfish people, and so the kind of people who will kill anybody for their own advantage. So the two things always go together: unchastity and uncharity always go together.

[52:12] And this same age, where is the physical murder is well in the West anyway less common, except for abortion, of course. You have the other types of murder, you know, the destroying of people's reputations and job prospects and things like that for those who are ideological enemies in one's view. It's bizarre. But but other things too. Just like I think of when you first meet a good teacher, right?

[52:40] Huh? You know, what kind of love do you have for this good teacher? I want to know knowledge. Yeah, I mean, but but you think he's good for you because he's going to what? Especially. He's going to perfect your mind somewhat, right? Huh? You know, so you're really loving him. No, he's the good that you want for yourself, right? You want his teaching for yourself, right? Now you know you might eventually come to love him for his own sake, right?

[53:08] Huh? But you have to realize that's another kind of love, right? Huh? So I mean, the same sort of thing here with the girl, right? Where the first kind of love you have is the love of what? Of wanting.

[53:24] Now with wine, you know, it's forever the love of what? Only. Only. You don't ever wish the wine. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's kind of a backward way. Do you wish the wine to to keep well? You know, not not to. Because I want to enjoy it. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's the engine. There's always that one. Yeah. So. Remember the priest when he was marrying my my brother Richard and his wife, you know, and he liked marrying them, you know, because he knew they were going to stick together, right?

[53:58] But so many people he married, you know, just he had the sense, you know, that this is not going to last. You know, you have to marry them anyway. They're only getting married, but you know, but but but just has that sense of you know, a sadness there that you think that this is not going to last, you know. And of course, a lot of them don't last nowadays as Christian.

[54:20] Yeah. It's terrible. But I think you know, like like in business, you know, when you first somebody's useful to you, know, so so you have a love of wanting for this person, right? But but sometimes you know, businessman gets to know somebody and they become real friends, and they and apart from that, they wish good to that guy, right? To succeed too, you know. Apart from any help he gives them, you know.

[54:49] But you've got to realize that it's improvement, right? So, down to the last objection here. To theory, it, should be said that the cause perfecting is more potent than the effect, right? But not the cause disponent, huh? Okay. Thus, the heat of fire is what? More powerful than the soul. Than the soul to which it disposes what? Matter, right? Which is clearly what? False. Yeah. Thus, our faith generates hope, and hope charity, right?

[55:37] According to it, as one disposes for the what other, right? So they put dispositions sometimes under the genus of what, like material cause, right?

[55:51] Huh? So the matter has to be disposed in a certain way to receive the soul. Doesn't doesn't make the cause disposing the matter is better than the soul that it receives, huh? Okay. Now, I bet we got to

[56:12] stop, right? Yes. That you could hardly have a better stopping point, huh?