Prima Secundae
158. Summa I-II Q.67, Articles 1–2: Do the Moral and Intellectual Virtues Remain After This Life?
Class of 2014-02-27
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/158-summa-i-ii-q-67-articles-1-2-do-the-moral-and-intellectual/

[0:00] Son Holy Spirit Amen. Thank you God. Thank you guardian angels. Thank you Thomas Aquinas, God our enlightenment, guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds, pour the illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray for us. Help us to understand what you've written. Father Son Holy Spirit Amen. I guess we're up to question sixty-seven. Then Thomas says in the premium, "One not to consider about the duration, right, of virtues after this life, life,

[0:50] and about these six things are asked. First, whether the moral virtues remain after this life, and then secondly, whether the intellectual virtues remain, and the other four are about the what theological virtues, whether faith remains, huh, belief. Fourth, whether hope remains, and for some reason he has stuck in there, right, kind of afterthought, whether something of faith or something of what hope remains, huh, and then six, whether charity remains, huh.

[1:33] So to the first one goes forward. Thus, it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life, for men in the state of future glory will be like the angels. Which God says, Christ says that to the sadducees doesn't he? giving in marriage here, as is said in Matthew twenty-two, but it's ridiculous to lay down that there are moral virtues in the angels, as is said in the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics.

[2:09] Therefore, neither in men after this life will there be the moral virtues. Moreover, the moral virtues perfect man in this life, or excuse me, in the in the active life, excuse me, but the active life does not remain after this life, huh? When Christ says to what, Martha, you know, Mary has chosen the better part and shall not be taken away from her. This is going to continue the next life, the contemplative life, but the active life is going to be over, right?

[2:49] I'll tell that to St. Augustine. He says, "Well, then you got to get the active life in. " you don't have this life, right?

[3:06] where Gregory says in the sixth book of the morals that the works of the active life pass away with the body. No more filling out income tax form, right?

[3:21] Therefore, the get that into this life. Therefore, the moral virtues do not remain after what this life. Moreover, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, are virtues of the irrational parts of the soul, of the what concupiscible appetite and the irascible appetite, which even the dog and the cat have, right? The dog barking, that's irascible.

[3:57] You've been attacked by some vicious dog. Yeah. No, no, I'm very jealous. Okay. But the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, huh? When the body is corrupted, because they exist in the body, right? In that they are the acts of bodily organs, huh?

[4:29] What's the English word for organ? Tools. Tools, yeah. So Aristotle defines the soul as the first act of a natural body. Sometimes they translate that, you know, first act of a natural organic body, but it should be said, you know, first act of a natural body composed of tools, right? Equipped with tools.

[4:57] Therefore, it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life, right? Because they're in those powers that are in the body, the body is separate from you. But against this is what is said in the book of Wisdom, chapter one, verse fifteen, that justice is perpetual and what immortal. But notice justice is in the will, right? Which is in the reason, as Aristotle says, in the immaterial part of man.

[5:31] So maybe that could remain, right? In a way that fortitude and temperance would not remain, except in their root, you know, but not actually. Now, I answer. It should be said that as Augustine says in the fourteenth book of the Trinity, and who's he quoting? Augustine, tully right. that's Cicero, right? So here we have some nice profound things, in Cicero, that Tullius laid down that after this life, the four cardinal virtues are not able to what, be right, huh?

[6:15] But that in another life, huh, men will be blessed by the knowledge only of nature, right? In which there is nothing better or more lovable, as Augustine says there. By the nature which created what, all natures, right? Same time with God, I guess, huh?

[6:40] He, however, afterwards, I guess now who's Ipse? I think it's Augustine, all right. Determines that these four virtues in future life exist, but in another what, way, right? Now for the evidence of this, it should be known that in virtues of this sort, something is formal and something as what, material. Material in these virtues is a certain inclination of the desiring part to certain passions or operations in some what, way, right?

[7:25] But because this mode is determined by reason, then what is formal in all virtues is the order of what, reason, huh? The order which reason imposes upon these things. Thus, therefore, it should be said that moral virtues of this sort will not remain in the future life as regards that which is material in them, huh? For they will not have in the future life place the concupiscences and desires of food and venereal things, huh?

[8:04] nor would there be fears and boldnesses, audacities about the what, dangers of what, death, right? Nor will there be distributions and communications of things which come into use in the present life, huh?

[8:24] Which come for the use of the present life. But as regards that which is formal, there will remain in the blessed most perfectly after what, this life, huh? In so far as the reason of each one will be most what,

[8:46] rectified, right, huh? It's coming by the Marcus rectissima most rectified, but in this case, the reason of each person will be most rectified. About those things which what pertain to him according to that status, that state of life, and the desiring power will be altogether moved according to the order of reason in those things which pertain to that what state. That's prior to beatitude, right? That reason will be in complete control, which isn't in this life.

[9:30] You know from the daily newspaper, you would experience. whence augustine says that there will be prudence there without any danger of what error, right? You won't make a mistake as to what you should do or not do, right? Fortitude without the what being molested by evils that have to be tolerated, right? Temperance without the repugnance. Fighting against, you might say, of lusts, right? That of prudence, that no good will one what put before God or make equal to God, right?

[10:12] Of fortitude, that one will adhere most firmly to Him. Of temperance, that will not will not delight in any harmful defect, huh? But about justice, it is manifest which act you will have there, and that act will be to be what subject to God, right, huh?

[10:40] Because even in this life, it pertains to justice to be subject to what one superior, the abbot, right, the bishop, and so on. Now, in answer to the first objection, he says it should be said that the philosopher speaks there and the ethics there, huh, about these moral virtues as regards that which is material in them, right? In justice, as regards what exchanges and deposits and so on, about fortitude, as regards terrible right, dangers and so on, and temperance, as regards what depraved desires and so on.

[11:26] And likewise, it should be said in regard to the second that those things which are of the act of life pertain materially to what the virtues, of.

[11:42] Now, regard to the third objection, right, which is terms of the body. To third, it should be said that the state after this life is twofold, huh? One before the resurrection, when the souls are separated from their what bodies, right? I wonder if the first thing that greets you when you your soul separates from your body is your guardian angel, right? Why not? Yeah. Another is after resurrection, when the souls will again be united to their what bodies, right, huh?

[12:25] Now, in that state of resurrection, there will be the irrational powers again in the what organs of the body, right? Just as they now are in the organs of the body, right? Whence they will be able, in irascible, to be fortitude, or in the concupiscible, temperance, right? In so far as both what powers will be perfectly what disposed to obey reason, huh?

[13:00] But in the state before resurrection, the irrational parts will not be actually in the soul, right? But only the root will be in them, right? In the essence of the soul, as has been said in the what first part, huh?

[13:21] Whence neither will the virtues of this sort be in act. This is before the resurrection now, except in their root, which is in the reason and the will, right? Because they impose this order upon those two what irrational parts, huh?

[13:43] In which, meaning in reason and will, are the what the seed-like things, right? The seminalia of these what virtues. This has been said, huh? But he distinguishes like the objection make one think, right? From the book of wisdom, wasn't it? Where he said that justice, huh, is perpetual and immortal. There, from the first chapter of the book of wisdom, huh? But in the state before resurrection, excuse me, now, but justice, which is in the will, huh, will also what remain an act, right?

[14:23] When, specially, it is said about it, and it goes back to the said country there, that it is perpetual and immortal, right? Speaking of justice, both by reason of the subject, because the will is incorruptible, and also by reason of the likeness of the what act, huh?

[14:44] So he qualifies in a number of ways, right? The ways these wills are going to remain, right? In a formal way, and not an act in case of temperance and courage before the resurrection, right? But for justice, it will remain, right? An act. But after the resurrection, then you can have them again. So the the separated souls don't experience emotions. Then, I mean, they would experience the will, but not the sensitive emotions.

[15:15] Yeah, yeah. You wouldn't have. That's kind of strange. You wouldn't have hunger and thirst and sexual desire and anger, etc. Yeah, that's kind of a strange thing to be. in Yeah. I mean, you might, you might, you might, you know, sometimes you carry these names over for reason of certain what likeness of the acts of the will, right? You know, the the um. Um. If you take the the names of words like say love or desire, right, which first name may be the emotion, right?

[15:46] And then you carry them over to the acts of the will, you keep the formal aspect, right? But the body, the accompaniment of that is dropped, right? So it's like when you carry words over to God, you only keep the formal aspect and drop the material aspect. We keep the difference and drop the what? Yeah, the genus, right? Just taken from the matter or something which is more potential.

[16:16] This guy is Scientia, right? Well, Scientia really in us is. as you know from the study of Euclid. It's a demonstration, right? It's a syllogism making us know the cause, and that which it is a cause, it cannot be otherwise, right? Was there something like that in God? Does he syllogize? No, but as far as knowing the cause, the difference, right, and that which is a cause, it cannot be otherwise.

[16:40] He knows it more perfectly than we do, right? So he keeps the formal aspect for the difference, right, and drop the what? genius yeah. So you know, there's something material in my emotions, right? Hunger and thirst, huh? But insofar as there is a what? Desire for something good, right? So on, then there's a formal aspect to it, and you keep that formal aspect, right? You know, it's hard.

[17:15] You know, I know it's just being a teacher. You're trying to get students to see the difference between love, which is an emotion, and love, which is an act of the will. And for people in general, it's hard to really what. Separate those two, right? Hard to do this, isn't it? Especially older people, I would think. Yeah. Especially women. Yeah. Yeah. Women have a special

[17:41] hard time with it. And of course, you know, when they when they say, you know, that God has no emotions, that sounds terrible, you know. Feeling cold. Yeah, yeah, yeah. See, it's really there's some passage there in one of his books. there where he speaks of the love of the angels as being ferocious, right? So it's really it's really much more intense love than we have. Now we're kind of you know divided.

[18:07] A kingdom divided against itself cannot stand, right? So I mean, our our our will loves not as intense as the the act of the angels, right?

[18:24] But sometimes you know they'll they'll carry over even those words that name intense love. You know, eros, right, is sometimes carried over and applied even to to God, right, by Dionysius the Areopagite, right, because of the intensity of this, right. Well, St. Louis was trying to get people to see something about this, right? You know, but God's love obviously is much more intense. You know, infinitely more intense than our love is, right?

[18:54] And infinitely more intense than some emotion we have, you know. Interesting. Okay. Second article. To the second, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that intellectual virtues do not remain after this life,

[19:25] for the apostle says, Saint Paul is often referred to, right, as the apostle, right. For the apostle says in the first epistle to the Corinthians, chapter thirteen, that scientia destructa, right, science is destroyed, right.

[19:50] And the reason is because right, we know imperfectly, right. But just as the knowledge of science is ex parte, imperfect, that is imperfect. So also the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues remains as long as what this life remains. Therefore, all the intellectual virtues cease to be after what. This life. Yeah.

[20:28] Moreover, the philosopher says in the Predicamentis right, that's the Latin for the categories, right. Predicabilibus are the what genus, species, difference, property, accident, right, but the predicamenta are the ten categories, substance, quantity, quality, relation, so on. But the philosopher says there that science, since it is a habitus, is a quality that's difficultly what move or change, yeah. For it's not easily what lost, right, huh? Except from some great change or sickness, right.

[21:14] But no change of the human body is as great as what that to death, right, huh? Therefore, science and the other intellectual virtues will not remain after this life. Thomas has spent his whole life in acquiring all this knowledge, right? What's going to happen? My soul leaves my body, right, huh? He could do the frede's objections, right.

[21:42] What Socrates argues in in the. At the I was going to say at the Last Supper, in the. No, no, in the Phaedo, right, that the soul is going to be what perfected in knowledge, right, and in virtue when it leaves the body. This objection is saying no, no, it's going to be such a big change, huh?

[22:14] Shakespeare says, "Who knows but dreams may come when we have shuffled off this mortal coil." Okay. Moreover, the intellectual virtues perfect the understanding for acting well its own act, right? But the act intellect does not seem to be after this life, in as Aristotle says in the third book on the soul. The soul understands nothing without what the phantasm or the image, huh?

[22:49] But phantasms or images do not remain after this life because there is something in the body, since they are not except in bodily organs.

[23:01] Aristotle takes up the phantasm right after he's taken up the senses right. Okay, then he starts to distinguish the phantasms from thoughts, right? Therefore, the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. Won't be the same way, so they have understanding if there is, right? They won't be treating the images. if they don't have any, right?

[23:25] But against all this is that more firm is the knowledge of universals and necessary things than of particulars and what contingent things, huh? But in man there remain after this life the knowledge of contingent particular things, to wit, of those things which he did or underwent, right? According to that of what of Luke chapter sixteen, huh? Where he's talking against the rich man, right, huh? Remember that you received good things in this life, and Lazarus likewise had bad things, right, huh?

[24:05] You didn't take care of your neighbor, right? Okay. So it remains knowledge of singular contingent things, right? Much more will there remain in knowledge universal necessary things, huh? Which pertain to knowledge and scientia, reasoned-out knowledge, and to the other intellectual virtues, huh? So that means that the knowledge of particular contingent things is somehow stored in the intellect, intellectual memory. Oh, that's what the text seems to say from the gospel, right?

[24:41] So this is using a what dialectical place, right? If what is would seem less apt to remain does remain, then what is more so apt to remain will remain, right? But I'm I'm questioning about this less apt to remain because I'm having a hard time seeing how particular contingents can be in the intellectual memory. We take that as a probable statement because it's in Scripture, right? So he's not, yeah.

[25:08] You go. He's not. He's not showing how that's the case, you know. But. So then, Socrates' argument about the is the soul immortal, not huh? He's an argument from the more so, right? He he argues, you know, which is more godlike, huh? The body or the soul, right? And it's not too hard to show that the soul is more godlike, right, huh? And of course, for the Greeks, you know, they often refer to God as the immortals, so the gods as immortals, and he as immortals, right?

[25:40] So if the soul is more like God than the body, then the soul is more apt to be immortal than the body, right? Huh? But then Socrates says, but the body does survive death at least what the bones, right? And down in Egypt, you know, they even produce, they even save something, the skin, right, huh?

[26:03] My friend Robert Menory directed the little science museum there there in Saint Paul. there's a little kind of run by night thing but They had a mummy in there, right? You know, and so right next to this little science museum, right, you get Socrates' argument, right, here because the pieces of bones remain, right, huh? So if the the body of somebody, you know, remains after death, well then even more so will the what soul, right?

[26:30] Good good valid argument, huh? So this is in Phaedo. It's one of the places, huh? Now he's going back to something that was taken up earlier. And it should be said that this has been said in the prima pars. Some lay down that the understandable forms do not remain in the possible understanding, the undergoing understanding, except when it understands an act. Is what Avicenna said, right, huh?

[27:08] Every time you want to think, you got to turn yourself again to the agent intellect to have the forms come in, right? Nor is there some conservation of the forms when the actual consideration ceases, right? Except in the sensitive powers, which are acts of body organs, as in the imaginative power and the memorative power. And these sort of powers are corrupted, the body being corrupted. And therefore, according to this, reasoned-out knowledge or science in no way would be able to remain after this life, with the body being corrupted, nor any other intellectual virtue, right?

[27:49] But this opinion is against the position of Aristotle, who, in the third book about the soul, says that the understanding, the possible understanding, is an act when it becomes what each one of the singular things. Doesn't mean it's two singulars in the sense of individual, but. As one knowing, right? When since our word is importancy to consider an act, Aristotle distinguishes two acts, right? The first act when you receive the form, and then the second when you use that form to know something, right?

[28:22] And when you're not using it to know something, you still have that what form, right? Huh? And he's saying not only is it against the vision of Aristotle, but it's also against what reason, right? Huh? Because the understandable forms or understandable species are received in the possible understanding, what in an immobile way, according to the way of the what? Receiver. Receiver, right?

[28:56] Interesting. The Greek word for scientia there is what episteme, which comes from the Greek word for what coming to a halt or stop, right? Huh? You see it in the English word understanding too, right?

[29:12] Stand. huh So you receive something in an immobile way, huh and you understand. You have to calm down, calm down, and then you'll understand it. Stop all that motion, right?

[29:28] Whence the possible understanding is said to be the place of what forms, the place of the species, as it were, conserving the what understandable forms, right?

[29:47] But the phantasms to which man understands by looking towards them, right, in this life, by applying to what them the intelligible forms, as it has been said in the first part, they are corrupted when the body is corrupted, right? So even if I know what a triangle is, I want to think of what a triangle is. I imagine a triangle, right, and I kind of apply my understanding what a triangle is to that particular triangle.

[30:18] So when you get old, and your imagination is starting to corrupt, right, a little difficulty, right? But if it's very when the images are gone entirely, right, then you don't understand that way. Whence, as regards the phantasms, the images, which are as it were material in the intellectual virtues, the intellectual virtues are destroyed according to that way of using them, right, by turning to the images when the body is destroyed, right?

[30:50] But as regards the intelligible forms themselves, which are in the possible understanding and not in the imagination, as far as they are themselves are concerned, the intellectual virtues remain. And basically, what that is, that scientia is, is an ordering of those understandable what forms.

[31:16] So will the separated soul be able to reason from one thing to another? Yeah, but it won't understand by turning to the images. But but it will be able to have this process by which it goes from one to another, from principles to conclusions. Yeah, I think so. Yeah. So you can do your geometry. The separated soul can kind of yeah do its geometry. I have more important things to think about.

[31:51] My teacher, Kasurik used to say, "you know, when you first meet your guardian angel, right, you're gonna, you know, you know, this is God, right? I mean, it's a magnificent creature, you know. I mean, I mean, you know, Then your guardian angel says, 'No, no, no, I'm not God. As you said, I'm way way down here, right? Got a long way to go. I'm not even the greatest of the angels, right?

[32:12] Let alone, God, right? huh? But he's going to be treating." Impress it right. That MJ comparison I make to Romeo and Juliet, right? I make that book too many steps, right? You see that your angel—that's really delightful to see, huh?

[32:33] I kind of think it's about to be the first person I'll miss, right? He just say goodbye. You are going down. Come on, come on, on give me, a dollar you know. I hope he says that. you know obviously The teacher, used to say, "you should make an act of will, you know, opening your mind up to your guardian angel, so he can, you know, have more influence there, directly, huh?"

[33:18] The one philosopher who was married to a woman who was very practical, she thought this all nonsense about angels. He can never convince her of anything. Let's start. Okay. So, know something

[33:45] little prayer that we say for the guardian angel there, right? You know, the part about the images you can forget about when you're getting separated, soul, right? To really help you to understand. When the intellectual virtues remain active

[34:05] in this life, as regards that which is formal in them, right, namely the understandable what forms, huh, that are received in the understanding in an unchanging way, but not as regards what is what material in them, right, which refers to the images that you turn to, right, huh?

[34:27] See, I would have thought that you needed those images in order to to reason, you know, to go. Yeah. You'll you'll more understand. Your your soul will understand itself through itself, right? See, in this life, the soul is known through its powers, right? And but the powers are known through their acts, and the acts are known through their objects. So it's a discourse starting with the objects, right?

[34:57] And then through that you come to know the acts and distinguish the acts, and then through that you come to know the powers, and then through that you come to know the soul, right? But when the soul is separated from the body, it will be actually understandable, right? And you understand the soul through itself in the way an angel understands himself. Do angels go from principle to conclusion?

[35:21] No, they don't do so, huh? So we'll be like that more, you know. Then I think we'll still understand reasoning, you know, but we'll be understanding in the way the angel kind of understands, huh? That's one. But if the angels don't have this process where they go from principle to conclusion, then why would they separate the soul? Yeah, it wouldn't be a normal way of knowing anymore, no.

[35:44] Okay, so it wouldn't be. Yeah. Yeah, but it might still know something about that, right? Just like Thomas says, you know, God understands syllogisms, right? He doesn't syllogize.

[36:01] And somebody said it was hard to imagine how the soul will be after separation from the body. And said, "But you can imagine it, right? It's not a body, right? " But it's very really hard for us to transcend the bodily, right? Aristotle in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, he takes a place, huh? He says he quotes a common opinion of the early Greeks that whatever it is must be somewhere.

[36:38] If it isn't somewhere, it doesn't exist, right? Aristotle says, "Well, that's true, you know. Then place is really the first of all things, right? Because nothing else can be without having some place to be, right? " And but eventually Aristotle will argue that there exists something something that is not a what a body, right? But you can see that they've kind of identified what is with bodies, right?

[37:05] Because bodies got to be somewhere, right? Even Christ's body is somewhere, right? Because there's some problems in to think about the Eucharist and so on, which Thomas of course resolves in the Summa Contra Gentiles, Beautiful beautiful consideration there of the Eucharist there the Summa Contra Gentiles, Magnificent, magnificent. He's all he gives all the objections he has five, sets of objections, and then he, you know, chapter each one, and knock them off, but something easy.

[37:53] Didn't those Paul VI, I think got close to calling Thomas the you know the theologian of Eucharist, right? Huh? He understood it so well. So you've got

[38:14] the objection from from Saint Paul there, the apostle. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the word of the apostle should be understood as regards that which is material in science, and as regards the what way of understanding, right? Because neither do the what phantasms or images, phantasms, kind of the Greek word, Latinized, not translated, but the images or the phantasms remain. They don't remain when the body is destroyed.

[38:49] Nor would there be that use of science, that way of knowing, by conversion to the what phantasms or images. I tend to go to bed at night, and I get thinking about some philosophical thing, you know, and there's no distractions, and everything's quiet around, and your body's completely at rest, you know, and if you're not. Disposed to fall asleep, right? You know, then the images are kind of what clear and so on, huh?

[39:19] Remember, I come up the next morning. I told Mister. What I thought, you know. I said, "I was laying in bed last night and I thought of this." He was always amused. He thought that I would get to the bed, you know.

[39:37] You can see like, when a person's been drinking or something like that, the images are all kind of all moving around. You know, there's nothing at rest, right? You've got to have the images kind of at rest, right? So you can consider something in them. So that's why we pray for the angel to help us with their images. To second, it should be said that through sickness, the habit of science is corrupted, as regards that which is what material in it, that is, as regards the images, of some.

[40:13] But not as regards the what understandable forms which are in the possible understanding. An episteme or scientia is really a, what, an ordering of those understandable what forms.

[40:33] My teacher Mister. Used to joke about you know how do you recognize your friend there? You know, when he's another separate soul, right? Separate soul, right? Can't recognize him by his face, you know. And we said simply, you know, when they think, they always think, you know, in disorderly way, right? So he recognizes, yeah, you know, it's not stuff. That's our image. He always thought in a screwy way, you know.

[41:06] Some truth to that, right? Well, you're going to recognize Thomas right away, you know. First, it should be, then this distinction. Now, to the third, right? It should be said in regard to what Aristotle teaches us there. to the third, it should be said that the separated soul, after death, has a another way of understanding than through what conversion to the images, huh? As has been said in the first book, that belongs to that treatment of the soul there in the first part.

[41:47] And thus, scientia remains, but not according to what the same way of operating, right? You'd use those understandable forms, but not to know by applying them to images, right? Just as this has been said about the what, moral virtue, so. Yeah, I thought, again when you talk about Christ, right? Did Christ have this knowledge? You know, of treating the images and so on. See, if he had everything, you know, except sin, he's going to have that too, right?

[42:30] And that could develop throughout life, right? huh? It kind of one who's there, you know, the pagan there who has this belief, you know, and he's found such belief in

[42:44] yeah, yeah, And it's somebody tied up with these images, right? But in his other higher knowledge, he knew it all. This man already, right? Okay.

[43:11] Imagination has a lot to do with our making our mistakes. It's the cause of error. Imagination, your knowing, knowing things in their absence, right?

[43:27] You know yourself. You imagine something, and then you go there, and it's not the way you imagine it to be, right? C. S. Lewis says that in one of his little stories there, you know, where he's invited out by some uncle there in some part of England he's never been in, right? And he gets down there, and uh the countryside's not the way you imagine it to be at all.

[43:48] And his uncle says, "What way did you have to imagine it to be One way or another you'd never been here? " You know.

[43:58] My cousin Dallas, you know, he traveled and he's in the Navy, you know, around Europe and so on. And uh some days you're disappointed, you know, you get to some place, it's not the the romantic place you thought it would be, you know. It's rather humdrum, you know, So. what way do you have to mention it to be this way? you know.

[44:28] No, the uh Plato there says in the uh Darlo, appropriately called the sophist, right? now. Um he says that lightness is a most slippery thing, right?

[44:48] Slippery thing; it's hard to grasp exactly in what way two things are what alike, right? and somebody's, you know, doesn't understand the likeness between two things in the dialogue, right? And Socrates makes a very important point. Whereas, Gorgias, his book on sophistry, right, such a reputation, says that likeness is the cause of what deception, and you can be more precise and say, "Well, likeness, and you don't see the difference, right?

[45:16] " Okay. And then I notice Aristotle takes up the four tools of dialectic. Well, the third tool of dialectic is the tool of difference, right? And the fourth tool of dialectic is a tool of likeness,

[45:32] And Aristotle says that the fourth tool is the ability to find a difference, right? He says this is useful for syllogisms about the same and other, and for what definitions, right? Because difference is one, Then he takes up the tool of likeness, which he says is useful for induction, right? For, if then syllogisms, hypothetical syllogisms, and for what definitions, right? Okay, but he doesn't say that the fourth tool is the ability to find a likeness, right?

[46:14] But he says, I think the best way to translate it is the ability to consider a likeness, right? And the Greek word is skepsis which doesn't mean you know the ability to be skeptical about likeness be skeptical about likeness, right? Doesn't have that negative sense, but the idea that you consider exactly in what way they are what alike, right? And what way they are not alike, right?

[46:42] That's that's kind of part of it, right? And so you're deceived by likeness when you don't see the difference, right? I said years ago to Montaigne, and I said it seems to me that Aristotle gives the tool of difference before the tool of likeness, right? Because of that danger, right? That likeness can be not a you know source of knowledge, but a source of error or deception if you don't see the difference, right?

[47:08] Aristotle gives the tool of difference. Well, he didn't object in any sense. There's the joke about Montaigne. You know, his first reaction to any new idea was to reject it. You know, so he didn't object to this, but it seems to make some sense, right? So I kind of use those three passages, right? The one from Plato in the

[47:37] Sophist, right? And Aristotle saying it's his refutations that likeness is the cause of deception, then this thing about the tools, right? And okay, now what does the word imagination? What does the word image mean? imago versus the Latin word. What's the English word for that? Yeah.

[48:07] What's that? Let's say what image of what? I've seen. Seen already. We think it's an image of Father Patrick. All right, the one over there. Who's that? Who's that image of there? The one here on the right, not the one of our Lord, but the Saint

[48:29] Charbel, Saint Charbel Saint Bernard. That Charbel or Bernard? On the right, Saint Charbel. It's Charbel. Okay. So you know, we I'm thinking Latin, no, kind of you know, Latin, the right word, image, right, image of him. But we'd probably see it in English it's the likeness of him, right? Okay. When, Aristotle, you know, speaks of tragedy and these things as being an imitation of something, right? I think the word in English to use better is what a likeness of something, right?

[48:59] So the imagination is named from likeness, right? But without the without the difference, right? Yeah. And you know, Shelley has a famous thing. On what the poet is about, you know, and he sees the likeness of things, you know, and all reason sees is the difference of things. You know, you can see how it's kind of, you know, this is going to deceive somebody, right?

[49:31] You know, during the Second World War, there when we, communist Russia, was our what, our ally, right? They were putting movies out in Hollywood where they made Russia seem, you know, to be, you know, wonderful place to live, and people going to church and everything, you know. So, and people go away with this image, you know, what it's all about, right?

[49:54] And you know how politicians they worry primarily about their image, right? And we had very little to do with the, with the reality, right? You know, Uh

[50:08] you need to know what these people really are like. So, but the likeness, you know, sticks, right? So to not be dependent upon images, right, is going to lead to some purification of thought, right? Because imagination is the main cause of deception.

[50:35] Makes you think of that Beatles song, Imagine. Imagine how pernicious that sort of used. But politicians saying, you know, always saying, "I have a dream," right? You know. Yeah. Yeah.

[50:58] Okay, now he's going to the what?