Prima Secundae
159. Summa I-II Q.67, Article 3: Does Faith Remain in Glory? Knowing, Guessing and the Beatific Vision
Class of 2014-02-27
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/159-summa-i-ii-q-67-article-3-does-faith-remain-in-glory-knowing/

[0:00] Theological virtues, right? Special concern here, the theologian. The third one goes forward. Thus, it seems that faith or belief remains after this life. For faith is more noble than science, but science remains after this life. Therefore, faith—that's persuasive, isn't it?

[0:36] Moreover, First Epistle of the Corinthians, chapter three. No one is able to lay down, right? Another foundation apart from that which has been laid down, which is Christ, what, Jesus, huh? That is the faith of what, Christ Jesus, huh? In fact, we call faith the what, the foundation, right? The substance, huh? But the foundation being taken away, there does not remain that which is what built upon it, right?

[1:17] Faith is defined there in in Hebrews as the substance, right? The foundation of what is hoped for, right? Conviction of what is not seen. Remove the foundation, and you know

[1:34] the building upon it is gone, right? Therefore, faith does not remain after this life. No other virtue will remain, right? Moreover, the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory differ according to perfect and what imperfect, huh?

[1:59] But imperfect knowledge is able to be together with perfect knowledge. Just as in the angel. At the same time, there can be evening knowledge with what morning knowledge, huh? Now, this is a distinction that Augustine used. That term for what the knowledge that the angel has is natural knowledge. He called evening knowledge, right? And then those angels that turn back to God and praise, right, received what morning knowledge, right?

[2:34] But they didn't lose their natural knowledge, right? When they acquired this supernatural knowledge, right? Okay. And some man is able to have together about the same conclusion. Now, science, which is something certain, through demonstrative syllogism. An opinion through a what dialectical syllogism, huh? So when Thomas is expounding the text of Aristotle, sometimes they say Aristotle is here giving a dialectical argument, right? Then here on he gives an argument that has necessity, right?

[3:12] And Aristotle, Thomas says that Aristotle's dialectic can be better because he knows the truth, right? He can find those arguments that are approaching it with probability. So that's imperfect knowledge, you might say, is probable knowledge, right? But it's something that can exist with the more perfect knowledge. And Thomas says all these objections, right? You know, against what he knows to be what true, right? Huh? But that's part of his excellence, right?

[3:43] Can do both, know both, right? Okay. And and Joshua can what say that it is so because Euclid said it is so, right? And he can go to the board. He can demonstrate the theorem on the board, right? Yeah. So he can give the probable argument, you know, probable opinion if Euclid says so, right? Now, and then he can give the demonstration, you know. So perfect and imperfect knowledge can exist together, right?

[4:13] Okay. Therefore, faith can be together after this life with the knowledge of glory, huh? Against this is what the apostle says in the second epistle to the Corinthians, chapter five. So long as we are in the body, we what wander, right? From the what Lord, right? Peregrinamur right? The name of that novel, Peregrine Pickle. It's a wander, right? Wandering around.

[5:00] Through faith we what walk and not through what species or fleeting sight. But those who are in glory do not wander from the Lord, but they are what.

[5:15] Yeah. Therefore, faith does not remain after this life in what glory, right? Huh? So he's saying, as long as we are in the body, we how do they translate there? Peregrinamur in your text, in English text, there if you want. While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord. Yeah. Okay.

[5:37] But by faith we walk, he says, right? And not through species, huh? So so long as we what by faith God in some ways absent from us, right? Okay. Well, next life, glory is not absence. Face to face, right? So faith is not going to remain.

[6:03] Now, let's see what Thomas says. I answer: It should be said that opposition is the per se and proper cause that one thing is excluded from another, right?

[6:24] In so far as in all opposites is included the opposition of affirmation and what negation, right? So we talked last night: Can odd number be even? Can odd number be even? Why not? Why is one excluded from the other? Why can't an odd number be even? It's like discrimination. And

[6:51] even number is a number that is divisible into equal parts, and the odd number is not divisible into equal parts, right? So how can an even number be an odd number, right? Can a prime number be a composite number? Can a prime number be a composite number? Well, prime number is a number that's measured only by what one and not any other number, right? Or a composite number is measured by some other number, right?

[7:26] Besides one, one is not strictly speaking a number, right? So the composite number is measured by some other number. A prime number is not. So can a prime number be a composite number? No, no. Can a

[7:43] acute angle be an obtuse angle? Now it's not so much in terms of what immediate contradiction, like in these first two cases I gave, right? You say an obtuse angle is an angle what? It defines an angle greater than a right angle. An acute angle is an angle less than a right angle, right? Okay.

[8:09] But you know, an angle that is greater than an obtuse angle cannot be what less than. But that's what an acute angle is, so it can't be. So there's affirmation negation there, right? Inside these, right? Okay. So Thomas starting off with a good solid foundation to build on there, right? Okay.

[8:36] And of course, affirmation negation. What's set up in the first statement, and something cannot both be and not be the same time, the same way, right? Or to quote Shakespeare, right, to be or not to be, that is the question, right? And they say, what's the question? Because you can't both be and not be, right? Okay.

[9:03] Well, Shirley was talking about there being poets seeing likenesses as opposed to distinctions. Yeah. And there's Whitman and "Song of Myself," "Leaves of Grass," whatever, where he goes, "I contradict myself." Well, very well, I contradict myself. There's a constant theme, at least that I've seen in the world back when I was out working, is that people think that it is possible for there to be a contradiction to exist within a certain thing.

[9:36] Yeah. And it seems sloppy thinking, but if you talk to them about it, they say, "Well, you know, there's this white male tradition of logic, which we have to sort of transcend. We have to grow beyond it." But I can never get any sort of solid argument why that was the case from them. But part of it's because I was thinking along that white male logic Probably, but it's that fuzzy thinking just is incredibly prevalent.

[10:04] Yeah, it is. Just in poetry. I told you my teacher Kasurik is at some conference, you know, and he got the guy, you know, into contradiction, right? And Kasurik says, "Now, what are you going to do about that?" And the guy says, "No, that's a contradiction I've learned to live with."

[10:33] There's found, however, in some things, an opposition according to what? Contrary forms, right? As in colors of what? White and what? Black, right? Huh? In some, however, according to perfect and imperfect,

[10:56] When in alterations more and more they are taken as what? As contraries, as when from the being less hot, something becomes more hot, right?

[11:12] And because perfect and imperfect are opposed, it is impossible that in the same what time together, according to the same thing, there be perfection and what? Imperfection, right? Huh?

[11:30] Now, it ought to be considered that imperfection is sometimes of the what? Very definition of the thing, right? Of the very notion of the thing, and pertains to its what? Species.

[11:50] Just as the what? Lack or defect of reason pertains to the notion of species of a horse or of a what? Cow, huh? And because one of the same remaining a number cannot be transferred from one species to another, hence it is that such an imperfection, being taken away, that it's taken away the very what? Species of thing, because now it would no longer be a cow or a horse if it were what?

[12:28] Rational, right? Just as he took away reason from man, the man didn't have reason; he would be no more than a what? Beast, right? Huh? Okay.

[12:46] Now, sometimes, however, an imperfection does not pertain to the notion of the species, but it happens to an individual according to something other, right? Just as to some man, sometimes it happens for there to be, a defect of reason, right?" Insofar as he's impeded in what it the use of reason on account of sleep, right, huh? Or on account of what being drunk, right, or something of this sort, right, huh?

[13:21] Or some kind of false imagination, right, huh? It is clear, however, that such an imperfection being removed, nevertheless, the substance of the thing what remains, right?

[13:38] So you're too tired, huh? Take yourself to sleep there. He's too tired to think of that, right? Can't think. Don't have reason anymore. No, it's a temporary thing.

[13:57] Now, what about this imperfection of knowledge that is of the notion of faith, huh? He says it's manifest, however, that the imperfection of knowledge, the imperfection of knowledge, is of the very notion of what faith, huh? For it is laid down in its definition: faith is the substance of what things hoped for, the conviction, right? Of things not seen, right? As is said in Hebrews 11, right?

[14:35] So when Thomas takes up faith in in detail in the Secunda Secundae, he's going to take up that definition there that Saint Paul has, and he does in other places when he takes up faith. Augustine says, "What is faith? To believe what one does not what see, right?

[15:02] Now that knowledge should be without appearance or or sight. This pertains to the what imperfection of knowledge, and thus the imperfection of knowledge is of the very what notion of faith, huh? Hence, it's manifest that faith cannot be right

[15:26] perfect knowledge and remain the same in what number, right? It's not the drunk man, right? It's of the very definition, the very nature of faith, right? Okay. Now sometimes we say to somebody, "No, do we know that or just guessing? No, I guess it's something different than belief, but can it be both? No, we can't know anything. Can I know something? And be sure that knowing in strict sense means you're sure, right?

[16:03] Can I know something and and just be guessing and be guessing it? I say I know there's four students here. This is one that's left. I know there are four students here, right? Can I be guessing that there are four?

[16:30] Because what is the distinction between knowing and guessing, right? Certainty and knowing. Yeah. And so the very definition of knowing in the strict sense that you're certain, right? And of a guess that you are what? Not certain, right? So can a guess be knowledge, right? Or can I guess when I when I know?

[16:59] So it's of the very nature, not only of guess but of belief that it be what. You know, perfectly see something, right? So when you come to see God as He is, as Saint John says in his epistle, right? Or as Saint Paul says, when you come to see God face to face, then are you believing that He is three and one?

[17:25] Are you believing anymore? You're knowing. You're knowing, yeah, yeah, yeah. That's what they call it, the beatific vision, right? Which is which is opposed to what faith is by definition, right? The conviction of what is not seen, right?

[17:48] You're convinced what you don't see by your mind is so, right? Well, a person who's who's drunk or asleep, right? He's impeded for the use of his reason, right? And he doesn't what lack reason like a dog does or a cat, right? Not to dwell. So you could include a lot of academics. What? You could include a lot of academics as far as being impeded in their reason, in that there are certain ways of thinking, deconstructionism and things like that, where you can't and related things where you can't really know it.

[18:38] Yeah. And it seems like it's a real acid sort of corrosive thing as far as destroying the ability to know anything philosophically. You go back to that simple example I gave you about something as obvious as the whole is more than a part, right? And You know, I was trying to show my students, you know, the importance of of what Aristotle does in the fifth book of Wisdom, where he distinguishes the senses of these words, right?

[19:07] And but I would give the argument, you know, I've given this argument to in class several times, but just to give it again briefly, I say, my mother didn't like it when I said man is an animal. I said, well, mother, he's not just an animal; he's an animal that has reason. Well, that's better. My mother said. So,

[19:30] animal is only a part of what man is, right? Okay. Um. But yet, animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, and so on. So sometimes the part includes more than the whole. Yeah. Yeah. See, well, there you don't see how to what avoid the conclusion, right? See, you don't know. how to solve this sophistical argument, right? It's the most common type of fallacy. Aristotle says when it comes to mixing up the senses of a word, right?

[20:08] But if you can't untie that, then you, you what? Your mind is inclined to think that, well, then maybe the whole is not always greater than the part, right?

[20:19] But you don't really know that the whole is not. But you're you're you're confused because of this argument you can't untie. Now Socrates in the Meno, it's kind of beautiful what he does in the third part, there the Meno there. Socrates is being asked by Meno, you know, to, you know, can virtue be taught, right? And Socrates says, well, we don't even know what virtue is, so how can we answer that question, right?

[20:54] But Meno still wants to know, you know. My brother Mark used to say, you know, you know, what do you do with a guy like this, right? He's got to know this before he knows that, and he wants to to know this, right, without knowing that. But Socrates says, well, let's look and see what can be said for and against, right? And he gives probable argument that virtue can be taught, and probable argument that virtue cannot be taught, right?

[21:20] Well, they can't both be true, right? Okay. So then Socrates comes back and examines the arguments more closely, right? And he thinks he finds a difficulty, right? In the argument for saying that virtue can be taught, right? And the argument that virtue can be taught is basically that virtue is knowledge, and knowledge can be taught, therefore virtue can be taught. And the reason for saying that virtue is knowledge is that it's knowledge that directs us to the good, right?

[21:58] But the great men of Athens, right, directed Athens to what was good for Athens, right? And therefore virtue is what? These are the virtuous men. Virtue must be some kind of knowledge. And then Socrates says, well, is that true that you are directed towards the good by knowledge? Well, sometimes, right? But aren't you sometimes directed to the good by guess? Say. I have to give an example.

[22:26] You know, you're going down the the road there, and there's a fork in the road, and one fork leads to Boston, the other leads to Providence, and you want to get to Boston. But you don't which one is is the one, right? But you might guess that this is the one. And

[22:48] if you take that road and your guess was correct, you made the right guess, you'll get to Boston just as much as if you knew, right? So it ain't necessarily so that the man who directs us to the good knows, right? Okay. I take the example of the Inchon landing there, you know. Did MacArthur know that it would succeed? No, he had a plan, you know, to to draw off.

[23:14] He had to, you know. He didn't know, you know. Why? If I have a plan to draw off, you know, it's going to succeed, right?

[23:22] And MacArthur, you know, he's on the boat there, going there. He went over the the whole argument that he had, you know, kind of used bounces off one of his lesser officers there. You know, he says, "Yep, yep, yep." And they went ahead, right? Then he sat down, started reading the Bible, right? So he didn't he didn't know it was going to succeed, right? But he he made the right guess, you know.

[23:45] And you can see that, you know, these great generals, you know, they make the right guesses and so on, and they succeed, right? And sometimes, of course, they fail, right?

[23:57] MacArthur and and and what's his name Patton, I guess, were together in the first World War, and they were standing on some little mound, and the war was going on, and one of them said, "I think it's time to move on. Let's move on." And shortly after move on, the shells came right down there, right? So they escaped death, right? One or both of them by really what knowing it was time to move on.

[24:23] Yes. You know. Or when Nixon was down in South America, there, you know, they had those kind of riots there, down those things, and they were down one, I don't know, it was Venezuela, Caracas, all these places, and they were going down the high. They were like like dangerous to Iran, and and MacArthur and MacArthur Nixon said, you know, this is the wrong, you know, let's turn off this road, right?

[24:49] And they turned off the the road they were supposed to go on, right? And down the road there's a bomb, right? You know. Did he know there's a bomb there? No, but there's something, you know, just like the crowd or something, you know, something made him guess, you know. So Socrates says, right? So I guess, right? So Socrates then is introducing us to logic. or Plato is in the Meno, right?

[25:12] And this is part of logic to distinguish between knowing and what guessing, right? And so Socrates is is in solving, you know, this posing argument, this contradiction. He's coming to the distinction between knowing and guessing, right? And now Socrates says, and it's dramatic because Socrates rarely claims to know anything. If you know that you know, this he's famous for, you know, knowing what he didn't know, right?

[25:43] But he says, "I know there's a difference between knowing and guessing, right? Or knowledge and opinion. I know there's a difference, and he's not guessing when he says this, right? " I say, well. Why Socrates so sure? Well, because knowing is being sure, and guessing is not being sure, right? They can't be the same, right? And if someone says, "Well, Socrates, you don't really know that they're different; you're just guessing they're different," that person is making the distinction.

[26:09] Saying there's a difference between knowing and guessing, right? So the ball goes over. You have to admit that knowing and guessing are not the same thing, right? So you can say a guess is by what definition, right?

[26:24] Something what uncertain, right? Something imperfect, right? A guess can be a reasonable guess as opposed to an unreasonable guess, right? Or a, but it's it's still a guess, right? And the purpose of logic, as far as guessing is concerned, is to make reasonable guesses, right? A probable guess or a likely guess, right? In dialectic, it's a probable guess, and rhetoric it's a likely guess, right?

[26:57] So these are being here that belief is what by definition something what imperfect, right? It's not just you know temporarily, so like me when I'm drunk or I'm asleep or something, right? I'm angry or some crazy emotion, you know, I'm all heated up, you know, I don't see straight. But it's

[27:30] something in the very nature of what belief is, right? You don't see the thing, right? So when you come to see God as He is, which is the very words of Saint John, right? In the one chapter three verse two, right? The first epistle, I think it is.

[27:53] We know we shall be like him because we shall see Him as He is, right? Okay, We see him face to face, to use the expression of Saint Paul. Well, then faith is going to disappear, right? Okay.

[28:11] So if Aristotle has a demonstration, that this is so, or if my friend Euclid has a demonstration that the interior angles of a triangle are two right angles, right? Then he knows that this is so, right? He's not guessing, right? Even though he might not understand the problem of arguments that would lead you to that, right?

[28:39] I mean, if you if you read Euclid, you know you start to respect him and his mind, right? So you're going to be believing him even before you know his demonstration that he's he's he knows, right? But you know that that's the belief, right? But when you end up doing the demonstration, right? Then you're not believing them, right? But you're you knowing it. There's an interesting phenomenon too.

[29:09] It seems that traditionally you would believe people who were reliable witnesses and could say were reliable teachers. For example, the philosopher, the apostle. But these days, so many people

[29:24] actually they they are certain that certain people that they are following are correct, when they have a terrible track record of being wrong. You look at the philosophy and the lives of so many people like Lenin and Marx and Hitler and stuff like that, and Rousseau and and they're they're crazy in a lot of ways, and they're wrong about a lot of very basic important things, and yet so many people blindly follow them.

[29:52] And then they accuse people who believe in God of blind faith. It's a strange phenomenon. Today, where that traditional trusting in authority, a proven authority, now there's a lot of trust in people who are obviously not authorities. If you look into where they're reselling, essentially, they're educated. They call these get a little information about what's going on. You know, the weakly informed, as we say?

[30:42] So that a knowledge should be without something appearing or without vision. This pertains to the imperfection of knowledge, and thus the imperfection of knowledge is of the notion of faith or the definition of it. Whence is manifest that faith cannot be what

[31:05] cannot be perfect knowledge. Remain the same in what number? Right now, okay. You know, I mean, sometimes we speak improperly. You know, can a guess become knowledge? Right now, you

[31:21] know, when the murder has been committed and they're looking for the murderer, right? And what they do is they guess who it might be, right? The wife is murdered. They guess the husband. Always saying, you know, we we had in in Shrewsbury there years ago. You know the you know wife was murdered, right? Huh? Police are suspecting the poor husband, right? You know, he was quite innocent, you know, and they they find a years after they found the murderer, right?

[31:50] I guess he's the guy who had delivered at the house, right? And then he saw, you know, what the situation was, and the attractive young woman there by herself, you know. And then he came back later in the day, you know, and then they guess they get some DNA stuff at that time or something, you know, but they didn't know who the DNA was thing. But he went on to other crimes, you know, and they got DNA samples of him in California, I guess it was, and they have a bank where they could compare these, and they compared the his DNA there, California, with the DNA back here in Shrewsbury, Minnesota.

[32:27] I mean, Shrewsbury, Massachusetts, and they identified him as the guy who had killed this man's wife. You know, the poor husband had to leave the state here because he was suspecting him, you know, and so on. He, you know, he went out I think himself to California, but okay. So, but notice does a guess become knowledge? Is that way speaking not strictly speaking true?

[32:56] Yeah, yeah. Now, yeah. I mean, a guess. I mean, if they if they guess that that you did it, right, and then they get evidence that indicates kind of proves that you did it, right? Um, does a guess become knowledge? Can be knowledge, but it doesn't become. Yeah, but yeah, but really, a guess is now replaced by knowledge, right? It's not that a guess itself, because a guess by definition cannot be knowledge, right?

[33:26] Okay. And belief by definition cannot be what seeing something as it is. And the only expression "seeing is believing" that's kind of very questionable way of speaking, right? Seeing is believing. Huh? Seeing you seeing you sitting there is believing that you are sitting. You know, if I am talking to you on the phone and you say you are sitting down, I might believe you. You know, but I don't really see that you are sitting down, do I?

[34:00] Unless you have one of these new phones. Even those things are something questionable. What they can do with them, but but seeing is cannot really be believing, right? Seeing is knowing. Yeah, yeah. And so, believing cannot be knowing, right? Nor can it become knowing, right? Although it can be replaced by it, right? Huh? And believing that he's sitting, you know, or walking the room, you know.

[34:35] If I, yeah, hey, you are on the phone. I am sitting down. I am not going to come. I turn around the corner and they said, "You are sitting." I am laying down. I don't want to come. You know. See what I mean? So sometimes we we speak that way, but it's kind of a loose way of speaking, right? Guessing becomes knowing, right?

[35:00] Seems like we say that more because of rhymes. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Or or you say my suspicion becomes certainty, right? Yeah. But suspicion doesn't become certain.

[35:14] Can Can suspicion grow into certitude, right? Huh? Or is it replaced by certitude, right? Now Thomas goes into n further discussion on it, But further one ought to consider whether it can be together with what perfect knowledge, right?

[35:47] He says, "For nothing prevents some imperfect knowledge being together with what some perfect knowledge." Now, what does this all mean? It should be considered that knowledge can be imperfect in three ways.

[36:05] In one way, on the side of the what? Object knowable, right? In another way, on the part of the middle, like the middle term, I suppose. In the third way, on the part of the what? Subject, huh? Now, on the part of the object knowable, perfect and imperfect knowledge differ. The what they call the morning knowledge and the evening knowledge in the angels, huh? I guess if you read the text very carefully, there in the what Genesis, right now, we say an evening and morning was the first day, right?

[36:47] So evening came before morning, right? Evening, Augustine in his commentary on the Genesis writes, says evening there indicates the natural knowledge of the angel, right? Huh?

[37:00] And then what morning, the beatific vision that the angel sees those who turn back to him, right? Huh? Okay. For morning knowledge is about things according to the being that they have in the word, right? In verbal, right? In God Himself.

[37:24] Evening knowledge is about those things according to the being they have in their own nature, which is imperfect with respect to the first what? Being, which is God. I am who I am.

[37:40] Now, on the part of the middle term, perfect and imperfect knowledge, which is about some conclusion, differ through what a demonstrative middle term. It shows it must be so, right? Huh? And a what probable middle term, right?

[38:03] On the side of the subject, they differ according to perfect and imperfect opinion, fides, and what? Science, huh? For it's of the very definition of opinion.

[38:19] And opinion knows is a form of what? Guess, right? Huh? When Thomas is talking about the intellectual virtues in the commentary on the sixth book of the Ethics, right? He says that opinion and suspicion are not intellectual virtues. See, because a virtue is what makes its haver good and its what activity good, right? Okay, well, opinion can be mistaken, right? Huh? And a fortiori, a suspicion can be right.

[38:51] So he says opinion and suspicion are both what? Conjectura, right? It's a Latin word for guess, right? Huh? Okay. For it's of the notion or the definition of opinion that it be taken one side of a contradiction, right? With fear of the what? Other opposite, right? Okay. So in the election, right? Huh? I think so and so is going to win, but I have some fear they might be what?

[39:24] Mistaken, right? And might be the guy, right? Huh? Okay. Hence, it does not have a firm what? Adherence, right? Huh? Okay. It's of the notion, though, of what? Science that it have a firm adhesion with intellectual vision, right? That you see what you see, right? Okay. Now you got to be careful about science in the modern world because science in the modern world often doesn't mean that, does it? It means something that is what.

[40:01] It's a guess that's been tested, but it might fail the next test, right? Okay. So Einstein says a scientific theory is a system of guesses, right? You know, use the word guess. You don't really know, right? And the reason for that is that the the confirmation of a scientific hypothesis is not a syllogism. You say if my hypothesis is correct, then this will be so. You find out this is so, does it follow that the hypothesis is so?

[40:34] You're arguing this form: if A is so, B is so. B is so. Does it follow that A is so? If Percus dropped dead, I say to my students, then he'll be absent from class, right? Percus is absent from class. Therefore, he dropped dead. I said that's wishful thinking, but it's not logical thinking. You see me. Now, if you say if A is so, then B is so, and B is so, right?

[41:12] And if A is so, also C will be so, but C is so. And if A is so, then D will be so, and D is so, and D and C and B are so. And now it becomes more probable, doesn't it? But still, by reason of the form of the argument, it doesn't follow necessarily. See. And as Einstein said about you know Newtonian physics, right? They had made so many predictions on the basis of Newtonian physics that became what?

[41:45] They were found to be true. That they concluded it must be what? It must be true, Newtonian physics, right? And you know, you know, for example, I guess as he studied the motions of the known planets, son. More carefully, they realized they didn't exactly obey the paths they should according to Newtonian physics. But they were so sure of Newtonian physics that they said there must be other planets that are influencing them.

[42:15] And their mathematics was so accurate they could predict where those other planets were. Could have to be to cause that thing. And then they trained their telescopes and they found these other planets, right? Wow, you know, you know. And so Einstein said so many things, you know. If A is so, B is so, C is so, D is so, E is so, F is so, you know, and then they're all so, right?

[42:35] Then it had to be true, right? And so some physicists, he said, you know, came to the conclusion that the twin physics must be what? True. But Einstein showed that with a different hypotheses, he could predict the very same things that Newton had predicted. Plus some things that Newton couldn't predict. You know, and then. And she said, the scientists realize that you never really know, you know, that you just have what, more or less probability, right?

[43:10] So you got to be careful that the word science there today is used for something that is not what certain, you know, and why if you use the word science here for Euclid's elements, there he has something certain, right? And you have some certitude, you know, in the most general parts of natural philosophy, but as you get further on, you know, even Aristotle speaks as if he's not sure what he's saying now anymore, right?

[43:38] And so you got to be careful, right? He's using science in the strict sense, right? So it's of the ratio, right? It's of the notion of science that one has a firm adherence to one side of a contradiction, right? With a what understanding vision, right? Vision since understanding, for it has certitude going forth from the understanding of beginnings, right? But these are beginnings that are known, like the whole was more than the part, right?

[44:16] Those kinds of beginnings. Now faith, not to talk about supernatural faith, and not just to be believing some human being, in the middle way has itself, right? It exceeds opinion, right? In that it has a firm adherence, right? So one firmly adheres to their being To be persons in God, right? But it falls short from science in that it does not have the vision, right? Okay, because it's the substance of things hoped for and the conviction of what is not seen, right?

[44:52] That's in the very definition that we give in theology, and the Saint Paul gives there. Now it is manifest that perfect and imperfect cannot be together according to the same thing,

[45:06] but those things which differ according to perfect and imperfect according to something other can be together in the same what? What? Thus, perfect knowledge and imperfect on the side of the object in no way can be about the same object,

[45:28] but they can come together in the same what? Middle and in the same subject. Nothing prevents that a man together and once through one the same middle has a knowledge of two things of which one is what perfect and the other imperfect, just as about what health and sickness and good and what evil, right? Okay. So if I know what.

[46:03] Normal blood pressure is right. Then I can, at the same time, know what what high blood pressure is right. Although one is better than the other, right? Huh? And I can know them together, right? Huh? Or if I know what knowledge is, I can know what the same time with ignorance is.

[46:24] And so the the teacher who has the knowledge knows your ignorance better than you know it, right? Because you don't know what you're lacking, right? Huh? He knows what you're lacking. Okay. Okay.

[46:58] Likewise, it is impossible that perfect knowledge and imperfect on the side of the middle come together in one middle, right? Huh? But nothing prevents that one might in one object and in one subject. For a man, one man is able to know the same conclusion through a what probable middle term and a what demonstrative, right? So if you get Joshua up at the board there, right? Huh?

[47:27] On the blackboard, you're lucky, huh? He would demonstrate on the blackboard that the triangle has an interior angle is equal to three right angle or two right angles, right? Two right angles. Okay. But he could also, you know, say that it's

[47:48] probable because Euclid says so, right? And he has he's been used as a text for geometry since what 300 BC, right? They're about there. That's quite a.

[48:06] As Einstein said in the 20th century, right? If Euclid did not arouse your youthful enthusiasm, he says you were not born to be a scientist. So Euclid says

[48:22] this. That's probable, right? So Joshua knows both of those things, right? Can give you the demonstration, right? It proves that really is so, right? Can give you the probable argument that this great geometer, right, whom, even Einstein is studying, right? It's been studied for over 2, 000 years, right?

[48:47] Decidedly probable, right? Still the test of time. Yeah. And likewise, it is impossible that perfect knowledge and imperfect, on the part of the subject, are together the same subject,

[49:13] because faith has in its notion imperfection, which is on the side of the subject itself, that to wit, the one believing does not see that which he what believes. It's conviction of what is not seen, right? But beatitude has in its very notion perfection on the part of the subject, that the blessed man sees that by which he is made blessed. So they call it the beatific what vision, right?

[49:48] The vision that makes you blessed, right? But the man who believes doesn't see, right? Whence it is manifest that it is impossible that faith remain together with beatitude in the same what subject, right? I suppose you could argue something like that and say about a guess, right? Huh?

[50:17] When I see the reason why something must be so, right? And say I followed the demonstration there that Joshua has given us, then I'm no longer what guessing, right? Huh?

[50:41] Sometimes I think about something in geometry and I say, yeah, I, you know, I think that's so, you know. Then I try to find a reason to say that it is so, right? Huh? If I find a reason, I'm no longer what guessing, right? Huh?

[51:09] Okay. Now, to the first, it should be said, huh? The first objection was saying that faith is more noble than what science, right? And science remains and faiths, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that faith is more noble than science on the side of its what object, huh? Because its object is the first truth, huh? Now, the first truth is God Himself, right? God says, our Lord says, I am the road, I am the way, the truth, and the life, right?

[51:59] He's truth itself, right? And therefore, he's the first truth. So when Thomas takes up faith in the secund secunda, you know more in detail, faith, you'll see its object is the first truth, right? Prima Secundae. But science has a more perfect way of what knowing, right?

[52:24] Which is not repugnant to the perfection of beatitude, to its vision, right? Huh? Just as is repugnant to the what mode of what faith, huh? Okay. Now going back again, you know, the point that Aristotle makes, huh? In the proemium to the three books on the soul, Aristotle says that all knowledge is good, right? Huh? But then he gives two ways that one knowledge can be better than another, right?

[52:57] Although all knowledge is is good, that's we maintain, right? One knowledge can be better than another because it's about a better thing, right? Or because you know the thing better, right? Okay, you have more certitude, right? Okay. So it has these two criteria, right?

[53:20] Huh? But if one knowledge is about a better thing, and another knowledge is more certain but about a lesser thing, which knowledge is better? See? Well, we have a beautiful text of Aristotle there in the Parts of Animals, where he argues that an imperfect knowledge of a better thing is better than a perfect knowledge of a what? Yeah. So I can count the chairs in this room and you know count a couple times and so on and be very certain of the number, right?

[53:54] Huh? But big deal. I mean to know with certitude how many chairs in this room, who the hell cares? You know, unless you know put the whole congregation here or something. You know, then you you might have to know it, right? But other things which are much harder to know, right? I could know what would not know as well. I know the number of chairs in this room.

[54:16] So you could apply that to the distinction between belief and supernatural belief. Now, okay, not humanly, and and science that the science the way of knowing might be better, right? Huh? But the thing known is not as noble or greatest. Okay. So faith would still be simply better, right? Aristotle has a nice manuductio there in the Parts of Animals. You know, he says just as a glimpse of someone we love is worth more than the leisurely view.

[54:46] Somebody who cares? That's true, you love it. I had my little granddaughter, one of my little granddaughters, the last last week there. Those of you who are here, you know, a picture of Sophia, right? It means it means wisdom there. But what a smile on her face, you know, and and thinking of Thomas when he gives the excellence of wisdom there at the beginning, of Supercon Gentiles, you know, and the last thing he says, you know, you know, there's no boredom, no tedium, you know, The gaudium joy, you know.

[55:17] She had on her face all this joy, you know, with her book there, you know, and so on, and so it's better, right? Faith is better than scientia because you're knowing it for its truth, right? But you're not knowing it as well as as Joshua knows the the Pythagorean theorem, right? Huh? Right? Because he sees that it must be so, right? Huh? Well, in the case of believing, right?

[55:44] Okay. Now, faith is what the foundation, but it's the foundation as regards what it has of knowledge, right? But then when knowledge is perfected, is perfected like in the beatific vision, there will be a more what, perfect foundation, right?

[56:12] Of course, God's what, God's, God Himself will be the form of which you understand God. huh? Kind of an amazing thing, right? That's the way Thomas kind of explains those words in the Psalms there. In your light we shall see light, right? So God is both what we see in the beatific vision, right? And that by which, in the form by which we see Him, right?

[56:39] And you know you have to see God that way. You couldn't see God through a created form, right? It wouldn't be adequate to representing God as He is, right? And you know it's interesting. I was reading the part in the Summa contra Gentiles there, where Thomas is talking about the incarnation, right? And you know it's beautiful, beautiful the way he proceeds. He begins with all the heretics, right?

[57:05] And then he you know refutes them one by one, you know, through Scripture, through Scripture, right? So you know what the Church is is teaching, right? Okay. And then he has objections to the possibility of it, right, from reason, right? And then he goes through and answers all those objections, right? And finally says, okay, now we know what the Church teaches, and we know that it's not impossible for God to become man, right?

[57:29] But now is it suitable to become man, right? That's the third thing, right? huh? They have then about 24 arguments, you know, that's not suitable for God to become man. And then he answers all those and and gives the reasons why this is the best way, you know, for God to work. And but it's interesting. He gives you know in the chapter where he's showing it is suitable, the very first argument he gives is going back to the fact that what he's shown in the third book that the end and purpose of man is to see God as He is, right?

[58:04] And the only way you can see God as He is is if the form by which your reason is perfected to seeing God as He is is God Himself, right? That God is therefore joined to your mind as the form by which you see God as He is. And Thomas says, well, is it possible that God be joined to our mind, right, as the form by which we see, right?

[58:28] Well, when He became man, He joined what, man to His very what, person, right? Well, that gives us hope. The lesser thing, right? He can be joined to our own mind as the form by which we see, right? That's a lesser union with Him than there is in the incarnation itself, right? So if He could join, you know, Himself to man as He did, right, in the incarnation, well then a fortiori, right, He can join Himself to us as the form by which we will see Him as He is, right.

[59:04] That's the first reason he gives why it became. It's a very kind of marvelous. You see that, huh? But then you have a different foundation for your, you know, foundation would not be faith anymore, right? It would be the very substance of God itself, right? It'd be that. It'd be that convincing. It'll make you see Him as He is, huh?

[59:35] It's quite a thing. Oh yeah. That's the first of the arguments he gives, right? In the Summa Theologiae, when he takes that up, he gives ten arguments, right? But interesting to compare them. They're kind of substantially the same, but a little bit, you know, one not in the other, right? Sometimes the way it's said and so on. Magnificent. It's really kind of marvelous, you know, consideration of incarnation, right?

[1:00:05] You begin by, you know, what does the church say, you know? But but it begins with the heretics and misunderstandings of it, and he, you know, reading out scriptural texts, you know, he needs to do that. And you say, okay, this is what the church holds, but then reason comes in there and says, you know, is that possible, you know? All this reason says, you know, it can't be possible, and then Thomas answers all those, right?

[1:00:27] And it's, yeah, but is it suitable to become, you know, you know, give up the rule of the universe, come down here, you know? So and Thomas, beautiful, beautiful, he does, you know.

[1:00:43] You know, I'm prejudiced for the Summa Contra Gentiles. I tell you my little joke, you know. a girl, you know, you see there, you know, he asks me, "What's your favorite work of Saint Thomas?" And I say, "Of course, the Summa Contra Gentiles." And he says, "Why?" I says, "Well, you know, the edition I have is got bigger print than the than the Marietti, you know. It's kind of a small print, you know.

[1:01:05] The edition I have of the Summa Contra Gentiles, they put out, you know, directly from the Milan text, you know, and so on, and it's got bigger print, you know."

[1:01:15] So he doesn't know how much I mean that, you know. Even with your subconscious, es they say, you know, I was influenced by the fact that it's a nice, easy text to to read, you know, if you bring it in and compare it to very eddy text, you know. So it's it's bigger print, you know. Nice to read, impressive, huh? Another thing

[1:01:38] you can do is, you know, you can you can download these things from Navarre, you know. You know how to do that, don't you? Okay, I'll show you that. I have my own computer there, you know. So you know you can download a whole work of Thomas, right? And then you can, you know, on a computer you can make the printing smaller. So, if your eyesight starts to go or something, you know, you're getting old, you need bigger print, you know.

[1:02:05] And so, the nice, nice size print and comfortable reading, you know. Yeah. But before we had those those machines, you know, you had whatever the size was in the book you had, right? The Marietti's got kind of a fine print, you know. You got a bigger print there, right? Yeah. Well, this particular edition of the Summa Contra Gentiles has a bigger print, so I think that probably influenced me in some ways, you know.

[1:02:34] I think it was a call to the book and how you know I I saw it, right? You know, maybe to make a mistake, you know, saying you know how you know something is more important than what you know, right? You know, how you read it, you know, bigger small print, you know, than what you read.

[1:02:54] I like to think I'm really influenced by what I read. So the third says the solution is clear from those things which have been said,

[1:03:13] you know that's the distinction going back, right? So just as our friend Joshua can know, you know, the demonstration of the Pythagorean theorem, and then the authority of Pythagoras himself, right, and the authority of what of Euclid, right? That's pretty probable, right?

[1:03:48] If you take him as as a subject, can can he both be what believing, huh? Euclid and knowing that it is so? That's interesting. If you get a teacher like Euclid or a teacher like Aristotle or Thomas, you know, at first you believe them, right, and then as you read them more carefully, you know, then you come to know that it is so, right? And now it's no longer because you say that it is so that I say it is so or think it is so, but I see that it must be so, right?

[1:04:29] You really follow Euclid's argument? You say, oh, now I see that it must be so, right? And it's not because Euclid says so, but I see why it must be so, right? And then I now no longer believe now, but I I know. And so you see God as He is face to face, right? No longer believe that there are three persons in God. You see, well, of course there has to be.

[1:04:54] There has to be. You see why it must be so. You see, you'll see why it must be so, right? You know. Amen. Yeah. That'll be good stuff. Good stuff. It's one thing to go first, another thing to know your guardian angel. Yeah. To know God. You say you got an angel? Well, you've been on my life, you know. I've been near you.

[1:05:36] Sometimes I was a bit annoyed with you, but couldn't see what you thought of Lucretia. But you got chocolate or something else, or that's the big deal about those things.

[1:05:53] You know, you know, you know. You know, Thomas has a beautiful passage there, you know, in the beginning of the Summa there and the metaphors should be used in Scripture, right? And the objection says, you know, poetry is metaphors, right? But poetry is infima doctrina, the lowest teaching, right? So how can the highest teaching have this, right? And he says, well, they both use metaphors because they're dealing with something beyond reason, right?

[1:06:23] But in one case it's above reason and beyond in that way, In the other way it's below reason, right? So the angel has some difficulty understanding why we like wine or why we like chocolate or something. It's below him, right? I mean, it's a little there to like, you know. How can we like it so much, you know? Right?

[1:06:54] See, now this is what I enjoy, you know. I enjoy this vision of God, right? I mean, we've got a stop number. Is it time four ten? Is it?

[1:07:08] Just stop there. Okay. We'll find out about hope next time, right?