Prima Secundae
160. Does Hope or Faith Remain in Heaven? (Summa I-II q.67 a.4–5)
Class of 2014-03-06
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/160-does-hope-or-faith-remain-in-heaven-summa-i-ii-q-67-a-4-5/

[0:00] Let's say a little prayer now. Name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo Grazias. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, ordain and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, Pray for us. and help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit.

[0:33] Amen. Just finished reading the ninety-seventh chapter of the fourth book of Summa Contra Gentiles. That's the end of the book. That's the end of the book. That's it. So I feel like like Alexander, you know, No more worlds to conquer. What are we going

[0:51] to do? There you know where we started. Well, I know that, but we're going to take a little excursion there into the De Potentia you know, and you go into the Summa Theologiae and so on. To the fourth, one goes forward. Thus, it seems that hope remains after death in the state of glory, right? So we were joking about the fact that abandon all hope, you enter.

[1:24] You said we're heaven, as well as in hell. It doesn't remain up there, right? For hope, in a more noble way, perfects the human what, desire and power, than the moral virtues, and that's true, isn't it? But the moral virtues remain after this life, as is clear through Augustine in the fourteenth book of the Trinity. Therefore, much more hope, right? That's a beautiful what. Place there, dialectic, right?

[2:01] Huh? Because they're more noble than the moral virtues, who seem less apt to belong than moral virtues to survive in the state of perfection, right? Then hope. So if the ones are less apt to survive, survive, well, then they fortiori, the more noble ones going to survive, huh? Moreover,

[2:25] to hope is opposed what? Fear, right? Huh? But fear remains after this life, Fear of the Lord endures forever. and ever. Yeah. And in the blessed, there is what the filial fear, right? Which remains in saeculum, right? Of course, in the damned, there's the fear of punishments, huh? Therefore, hope, for like reason, is able to what remain, huh? They're like contraries, you know, same genus, right?

[3:07] Moreover, just as hope is of a future good, so also is desire. But in the blessed, there is a desire for a future good, both as regards the glory of the body, right, which the souls of the blessed desire, as Augustine says in the twelfth book upon Genesis to litteram. So there is still a desire for something there, right? If you had a television there.

[3:39] And even also as regards the glory of the soul, according to that of Ecclesiasticus, chapter twenty-four, who eat me will still what be hungry, and who drink me, right, will still be thirsty.

[3:55] And in one Peter one, verse twelve, in whom the angels desire to look upon, right. Therefore, it seems that there can be hope after this life in the blessed. What beautiful arguments those are! What a mind this guy had!

[4:20] Should we envy him, Joshua? What do you think? Is he so superior to us? We envy the excellence of his mind. What do you think? Is there such as a holy envy? A holy envy. Envy is

[4:37] really a horrible thing, right? But it starts over even good things, right? But against this is what the apostle says, Roman eight. What someone sees, what does he hope for, right? But the blessed see that which is the object of hope to it, God. Therefore, they do not what hope.

[5:09] Answer: It should be said that as has been said, that whose definition implies what Imperfection. an imperfection of the subject, right, that kind of imperfection, is not able to stand at the same time with the subject perfected by the opposite what perfection, huh? Okay, just the opposite of the imperfection in the subject.

[5:35] Just as it is clear that motion in its very what definition implies the imperfection of the subject, for it is the act of what exists in ability, in so far as it is of the sort, it's still what inability, right? It's not fully realized, right? So as Aristotle says in the ninth book of Wisdom, right? When you're walking home, you haven't walked home yet. When you understand what a triangle is, you have understood what a triangle is.

[6:05] So that's like a perfect act, right? But motion is, by its very definition, imperfect act. So it's said to be the act of the able, in so far as it is inability, right? It's not yet fully what realized, yeah. That's even beautiful, I know. Whence, when that potency is reduced to act, the motion what ceases, right? When the house is finally built, right? You become fully healthy, recovered from your whatever you had.

[6:37] Yeah. I think you're just playing, you know. Yeah, well, sometimes. For it is not yet what it is not still being whitened when it has had been made white.

[6:56] But hope implies a certain motion towards that which is not had, right? As is clear from those things which have been said above about the passion of of hope,

[7:11] and therefore, when that is had which has been hoped for, to nay, to wit, the enjoyment of the divine, right? There can no longer be what hope. End of discussion. Yeah. Period. Unlike Obama's periods, right? When he goes

[7:36] up, he got in trouble. He's the word period, you know. You could keep your your your thing, your health plan, whatever it is. Period. Yeah, it's a moving target.

[7:52] Now, what is he saying though? To these wonderful objections, I love these objections. To the first, therefore, it should be said that hope is more noble than the moral virtues, as regards the object which is God. Okay.

[8:13] But the acts of the moral virtues are not repugnant to the perfection of what Beatitude, huh? Just as the acts of hope, except perhaps by reason of the matter, right? According to which they do not what remain. So I won't be struggling to eat a like a minimal amount of candy or something, right, Steak. Or not drink too much or something, right? I won't be eating at all, right?

[8:42] We'll be eating, but not. Yeah, there is a feast, but it's not food for the table. But moral virtue does not perfect the appetite only in that which is not yet had, right? But also about that which is had, what in the present, in the present, yeah.

[9:16] Now, I was taking an example there. You know, suppose I guess that there are three persons in God, right? Well, it's a very noble act, a very noble object that I had there, right? The Trinity, right? Huh? But considering me subject in my subject, right? There's imperfection there, right? If I'm guessing there are three persons in God, I don't strictly speaking know that there are three persons in God, right?

[9:47] So when I see God as He is face to face, right? Then I will know there's three persons in God, right? Of course, there has to be. Couldn't be otherwise. And then what? Could I still be guessing? No. But I bet even when I say God as He is face to face, I'll continue to know the Pythagorean theorem. Wouldn't you say so, Joshua? Even though it's a much lesser thing to know than the Trinity, right?

[10:16] So my guess—if I have a guess—if I'm not a believer, I guess that there are three persons in God, right? I have a more noble object than knowing the Pythagorean theorem, right? But the way in which me as a subject possesses that object is, by definition, imperfect, right? Even the great Socrates says there in the Meno, right? There's a difference between knowing and guessing. When I say this, I'm not guessing, which is unusual for Socrates to say that, right?

[10:49] He's famous always for saying, "I don't know, I don't know." He's always trying to avoid the terrible thing of thinking you know what you don't know, right? But here, he comes out and he, says, "Yeah." And even if someone says Socrates, "Oh, you don't, you don't know. You're just guessing." That person is making the same distinction, right? So the distinction is altogether what stable, certain, right? There is a distinction between knowing and guessing.

[11:19] You may not always know whether you're guessing or knowing, right? But there's still, even in that case, there's still a distinction, right, between knowing and guessing.

[11:30] Socrates is always warning you about thinking you know when you don't know, right? So you can think you know and you don't know, but

[11:39] that doesn't destroy the distinction between knowing and guessing. To the second, it should be said that fear is twofold: servile or slavish fear and filial fear, right? As will be said below, right? But briefly, what is the difference between servile fear and filial fear, right? Fear of punishment versus fear of offending. Yeah. In servile fear, I fear to what? Be punished by God, right? But filial fear, I fear to be separated from Him, right?

[12:28] Okay. So I treat Him very reverently, right? For servile, oh, he's telling us here. I'm just reading, you know, these testimonies to McCarthy there, and the latest thing that came, you know, from Thomas Aquinas there, and someone said, you know, that Thomas Aquinas taught them, you know, when you read Thomas, you got to read him sentence by sentence. I don't know if they make sense of a thing, right?

[13:05] So servile, slavish fear is the fear of punishment, which is not able to be in glory, right? So those who see God face to face, they can't fear that God will ever punish them now, right? There being no possibility remaining for punishment, they can't sin anymore.

[13:29] But filial fear has two acts, huh? This is very extremely interesting. To wit, to what reverence God, right? Huh? As regards this act, it what remains, huh? And to fear separation from Him, right? As regards this act, it does not what remain. So once you see God face to face, you don't what you know that this is going to last forever, right? And so you don't have any fear that you will be what ever separated from God.

[14:06] To be separated from God has the definition or the aspect of what something bad, right? But no, nothing bad will be feared there, right? Huh? According to that of Proverbs one thirty three, right? You will what rejoice in abundance, the fear of evil things being taken away. That's a beautiful text there, huh?

[14:42] But fear is opposed to hope by the opposition of what good and bad, huh? As has been said above. And therefore, the fear which remains in glory is not opposed to what hope, right? Okay. Funda later, Levalder talking about this fear that remains even in the division, right? And it's kind of like the last meaning of fear, right? Because you've almost lost the object of something what bad, right?

[15:19] Okay. There's still a reverence of God, you know, when you see His His infinite perfection, right? And you're just you know nothing in comparison to Him, right? It's kind of a reverence there, but reverence is kind of what um you know it's it's the least kind of fear in a sense, right? Huh?

[15:43] Yeah. Even our Lord had the fear of the Lord. Yeah. Yeah. In that sense, I think it says in Hebrews that when he prayed on the cross, he was heard for his reverence. Yeah. Yeah.

[16:05] My teacher, the secretary, the cons up there, gave me this talk at the seminary, you know, and some little problem with the microphone, and so he jumped out the audience, grabbed this thing, takes the little secret, and back again. That's a reference, you know.

[16:26] But in the damned, there is more able to be the fear of punishment than in the what blessed the hope of what glory, right? Why? Because in the damned there is a succession of what punishments. You go from the hot to the cold and back again, they say, and thus there remains there the ratio of the future, right? Which is the object of what fear, right? So you first define hope and fear there in regard to something in the future, right?

[16:57] Just like desire and aversion, right? Supposed love and hate, which can be in the presence of the object as well as the absence, and joy and pain, which is in the presence of their objects. But the glory of these things is without succession. Why? Because according to a certain partaking of eternity, and so we call it eternal life, right? Yeah Tota simul Yeah, Because it's the definition of eternity.

[17:25] Yeah. What's the definition of eternity? The one that we. use Tota simul et perfecta possessio Very good. And who gave that definition who gave that definition? Yeah, Thomas takes it over and bit by bit he prefers. Yeah, that's really magnificent, thing.

[17:48] I think Thomas had a great deal of respect for what. Boethius In which there is no before and after, but only the present. Okay. There's no before and after in God.

[18:11] You know, God is before us, right? But God the Father is not before the Son, and the Father and the Son are not before the Holy Spirit. And Thomas would take that up and he takes up the the Trinity, huh?

[18:29] But nevertheless, not even in the damned is there what properly fear, huh? Because just as has been said above, fear is never without some hope of what evasion, which altogether in the damned will not be, right?

[18:50] Whence neither what fear, right? Except. communiter loquendo right According as any expectation of a future evil is said to be fear, right? It's more like dread. Yeah. In some way, they know

[19:09] the next storm is coming. Yeah. Am I wrong to remember that? I thought that despair was the contrary of hope, not fear. Well, hope and fear are the what principal passions. Despair is kind of accidental in sense because its object is something good, right? And the good is more something you approach, right? So the despair arises because you don't think you can attain the good, right? But it's kind of secondary with regard to the good, huh?

[19:43] And fear is more the natural thing with regard to the what the bad, the boldness we go towards the evil, right? I was telling you, when I was trying to think out the definition of comedy, right? And I started off with the dialectical place, you know, that comedy is the contrary of tragedy. But we know from Aristotle's definition of tragedy, and what Shakespeare says in the prologue to *Romeo and Juliet*, that the emotions in what tragedy are fear and what pity, yeah, okay.

[20:21] Piteous overthrows, right? The fearful passage of their death-marked love, as Shakespeare says in *Romeo and Juliet* in the prologue, right? And then I said you got to take the opposites of those, right? So pity is a form of sadness, is maybe some kind of joy, right? In comedy, which is correct, it's just called mirth, mirth, merriment, and the opposite of what? Fear. Fear, which would be what?

[20:46] Hope? No, it'd be boldness, right? Boldness. See, okay. But then, as I studied it more, I saw no, that's not what it is, right? And I remember reading, you know, a guy who'd done a translation of I think it's Terence's comedies, right? Thomas quotes sometimes in *Ethical Matter*, and he said he kind of had heard, you know, faith, hope, and charity. You know, the greatest is charity, but in comedy, the greatest is hope, right?

[21:20] It kind of seemed that hope was what you get that movement from in the comedies of Terence, right? And then I got thinking more deeply about the emotions, and Thomas points out, right, that the principal passions are joy, sadness, and then hope and what fear, right? So tragedy and comedy, being the principal forms of fiction, right, they're going to deal with the what four principal passions, right?

[21:51] And since tragedy deals with fear and pity, a form of sadness, then comedy is going to deal with some form of joy, which is mirth, and then hope, right? Okay, you can see that, right? You study comedies, you know. So. I wonder that's what they were thinking of at the council when they had Gaudium et spes. Yeah, yeah. So they say they give the four of those, right?

[22:20] They find those. So Shakespeare enumerates the four together too, you know. Okay. To the third, it said it should be said. It's very interesting. Objection here. To the third, it should be said that as regards the glory of the soul. There cannot be in the blessed desire, according as it regards the future, right, for the reason already said, right.

[23:05] Now there is said to be what hunger and thirst, by reason of what the removal of. We call that? disgust or something. Yeah, or boredom. yeah. Okay. And for the same reason, there's said to be desire in the angels, right? Now it indicates you never get what tired of this, right? Okay. Now you don't eat food, of course. You know you eventually don't want anymore, right? huh?

[23:32] Yeah. yeah. Someone push another dish on you, you know, or another helping, you know, and and it's kind of embarrassing, you know, huh? You know, it's kind of disgusting after all, right? You know, but but you're tired of the food. That food after all, right? Let's not have this again, right? And and, uh, my cousin cousin Donald's in the Navy, you know, and of course, they order things, you know, and he says they're they're two weeks that they serve nothing but spam, right?

[24:03] People were just stuffing donuts and anything else in their mouth but that damn spam stuff. But so kind of metaphoric you say, you know, you're going to always be hungry for God, right? Now you say you'll never be what bored, right? Because you never comprehend God. That's part of the reason, right? Now, you know, but even God doesn't get what bored of himself, right? But the average person, will tell you, you know, what are we doing in heaven?

[24:33] We're just looking at God all the time. Oh, don't you know? Yeah, don't you get bored after a while? See something new, you know? It's like seeing the same movie over and over again, the same scene over and over again, you know.

[24:51] You don't realize that God is really infinite, right? You can't possibly become bored with God, huh? It's marvelous, huh? These are ways of speaking, right? You know.

[25:09] Yeah. That's what Shakespeare says in the Prince of Tyre, Pericles: Truth can never be confirmed enough. Though doubts did ever sleep. There would be no doubts in heaven. Yeah. Can't confirm it enough. Now, with respect to the glory of the body, huh? In the souls of the saints, there is able to be what desire, right? This is before their resurrection, right? Not, however, hope properly speaking, right?

[25:43] Now, why does he say this, huh? Nor according as hope is a theological virtue, for thus its object is not the body but God himself, right? Huh? Not some created good, right? Huh? Nor even according as hope is taken in general, because the object of hope is not just the good but the arduous good, right?

[26:13] That's why we say, you know, that it's necessary for the philosopher to have a kind of hope that he can find the what truth, right? Because truth is not only a good, but a what difficult good, right? Huh? So if he doesn't have that hope, if he despairs to find the truth, well, then it's horror for him, right? So he can teach philosophy at Harvard. Yeah.

[26:38] But we have, you know, the man is sure, you know, that God's going to give us the body at the end of the world, right? So that it's not arduous or difficult, right? Huh? A good of whose what inevitable cause we have is not compared to us in the ratio of something what difficult, right?

[27:04] Whence that is not properly said to be what? Someone who has gold. Yeah. To hope to have something that's immediately within his power that he buy it, right? And likewise, those who have the glory of the soul are not properly said to desire the glory of the body, which is going to be by redundancy, right? But only to what desire it, right? It's beautiful.

[27:34] But as far as you know, desiring to see God, that's not really desiring in strict sense at all, right? It's kind of a way of saying that you're never what bored or you know, let's have something, let's have something else, you know? Change the channel Yeah, yeah, yeah. Do those clickers you know changing your channel because trying to avoid the advertisements or something or avoid the boredom of the thing huh But there won't be any evidence Yeah There'll be no deception Aristotle says there you know that in the Poetics you know that when the play is uh not so good people eat more right He sees Americans on their screen you know eating these big bowls of buttered popcorn you know And so I remember

[28:23] going to a movie theater one time they had a Shakespearean play you know on the thing on the screen you know and I had no inclination at all to buy any candy or popcorn you know but I see this person bring in a big bucket of popcorn and I thought it was something Yeah that's yeah This doesn't go popcorn is just going I remember that Greek teacher he'd be talking about you know you're sitting there with your girl there in the you know Greek theater you know chewing on your fig leaves you know So I guess they didn't have popcorn those days.

[29:14] Isn't that beautiful? I mean, what he says there in reply to that third objection, right? That's the way he's speaking. Now to the fifth. It's interesting that he he. He's already excluded what faith and hope, right, from glory. But now he says,

[29:36] almost an afterthought, to the fifth one proceeds thus It seems that something of hope, of faith, or hope remains in glory, right? Huh? Okay. Now, why is this?

[29:56] For removing that which is proper or particular, private, right, remains that which is common, right, as it is said in the book De Causis, right? Now, they thought the book De Causis was by what Aristotle, right? But it is not by Aristotle. It's by a, what? It's by a, it's by a Muslim, right? You know, but it's taken from Proclus, you know, one of the Greek commentators there, right?

[30:25] The other ones. And Thomas says a commentary on it. And it's a pretty good book. Once in a while, Thomas corrects a few little things, but pretty profound book. Okay, we still always say it's the last books of the wisdom, right?

[30:45] That rational removed, there remains living, and living removed, there remains what being, right? Huh? But in faith, there is something that has something common with the other two, to wit, knowledge itself, right? Huh? But something that is proper to it, right, or private to it, namely, what enigma, right? Huh?

[31:10] For faith is a dark knowledge or enigmatic, yeah. Therefore, we having removed the enigma of of of faith, there remains the knowledge of faith, right? Huh? Kind of an interesting objection,

[31:30] now. Moreover, faith is a certain spiritual light of the soul, right? Huh? According to that of Ephesians one, the eyes of your heart illuminated, right, enlightened in the knowledge of God, right. But this light is imperfect with respect to the light of glory. About which second light, huh? The light of glory is said in Psalm thirty-five, in your light we shall see light, huh? And Thomas sometimes applies that first from Psalm thirty-five, verse ten, to the aspect of the beatific vision that you see God through God, right?

[32:17] Huh? God is joined to our mind as the what form by which we see God, right? We can't see God through a created form, right? God Himself has to be joined to our mind as that by which we see. In order to be that which we see, as In lumine tuo videbimus lumen. But an imperfect light remains, coming upon it a perfect light, just as the candle is not extinguished, the clarity of the sun coming upon it.

[32:56] Right? Therefore, it seems that the light of faith remains with the light of glory. Right? Okay. Now, wouldn't the light to admit that our friend Euclid gave us, the Pythagorean theorem, wouldn't that remain? That greater light of the division, huh? Why not then the light of faith? Right?

[33:23] Huh? Moreover, the substance of a habit is not taken away through this that the matter is what subtracted. For a man can have the habit of liberality or retain that even when he what loses money. So I can't be generous with my money. I don't have any money, right? But I still have the virtue, right? Okay. But he can't have the act, right? Okay. This is a fortiori about magnificence, right?

[33:55] Where you dispense large sums, you know, and endow a chair at the university or something, or open a museum, huh? But the object of faith is the first truth, not seen. Therefore, there being removed through this that the first truth is seen, there can still remain the habit of what faith.

[34:23] But against this is that faith is a simple habit. Now, something simple is either the whole is taken away or the whole remains. Since faith does not wholly remain, but is what, yeah, it seems that is totally taken away, huh? Okay. So what's he going to do with this? Hence,

[34:55] it should be said that some say, right, huh, that hope is totally taken away, right, huh? But that faith is partly taken away as regards the enigma, right, huh? And partly remains, right, as regards the substance of the what knowledge, huh? Wouldn't I tell the teacher, right, the student has a confused knowledge of the subject, and you clarify things for him, right? The confusion disappears, but the knowledge remains, right?

[35:31] Look at that! This guy's still thinking of this, right? Huh? It's kind of hard to get your hand around this, huh? and your mind around this.

[35:50] Okay. Which, if it be thus understood, that there remains not the same in number, right? But the same in genus, right? Then it is said most what truly, right? Because faith is a kind of knowledge, and what? To be division is a kind of knowledge, right? Huh? So they both have the same genus, right, of knowledge, huh?

[36:19] For faith with division of the fatherland, right? Belongs together in genus Together, huh? Isn't that beautiful, patria, huh? Patria and fatherland, huh? That's how we pray. We say, "Our Father, " right? And held by name, and then the kingdom come, where the kingdom is the ordered society of those who see God face to face, huh? So called the fatherland, huh? Patria. We're exiles now, right? Huh? Wandering in this valley of tears, huh?

[36:55] For faith comes together with division of the fatherland in genus, right? The genus here being knowledge, right? Huh? But hope does not come together with beatitude in genus, right? For hope is compared to the enjoyment of beatitude as motion to rest in the what? In the end, yeah. Motion is not in the same genus as rest, huh?

[37:30] If either one understands knowledge, the same knowledge in number, right, which is of faith, remains in the patria, right? This is altogether impossible, huh? Okay.

[37:47] For there does not remain the difference of some species, or for there is not the difference of some species being removed, right? There does not remain the substance of the genus the same in what? Number, right? Huh? For taking away the difference that constitutes whiteness, there does not remain the same substance of color number. Such that the same color in number is sometimes what white, and sometimes blackness, right?

[38:29] For the genus. Is not compared to the difference as matter to form, so that there remains what the same in number the substance genus, with the difference removed, as there remains the same in number the substance of the matter, the form removed. Huh? That's interesting because

[38:53] Plato there in the dialogue called the Sophist, right? Huh? He says that likeness is a most slippery thing, right? He uses superlative, right? Huh? It's not just slippery or very slippery, but most slippery, right? You got to watch out for slippery. For now, what does that mean? Huh? Well, the mind is the vis apprehensiva, right? The power that grasps things, right? Huh? And a slippery thing is something that is what? Hard to grasp, right?

[39:32] Where did they have that pole that you gotta try to climb up? That slippery pole, huh? The Navy there, was it? Some, some, you know? I can't remember what it was. What? An apple. Yeah, yeah. It was one of the ceremonial something you got to try to. Slippery pole. Yeah, yeah. Well, something that's slippery, you know, it's hard to grasp, right? So you got to be very careful with, right?

[39:57] And then I take what Aristotle says in the book *On Sophistical Refutation*, which is about fallacies, right? And then he speaks of likeness as being the cause of what? Deception, right? Okay. When I was a little boy, you know, I used to have these little ink bowls, you know, that you have at school, and there's actually a little hole in the desk there, and you fit your ink in there, you know.

[40:20] We try to put a girl's ring or something in there. We nasty little boys. I don't believe in that. No. Crazy. Put something in there, boys, because it has, you know, the ink down. Just. But sometimes these things would be spilled, right? And the house would happen, right? So they used to sell these little pieces of metal that looked like ink on top, you know. And you put on your mother's white tablecloth.

[40:48] You're like, oh! And she reaches up and she realizes that it's a joke, you know. It's a piece of tin, you know, huh? But why is it deceiving the woman, right? It's because of likeness, huh? Okay. As long as you have these artificial fruits, you know, they're made out of some kind of wax or something, you know, and they'll stick them in there with the other ones.

[41:13] My aunt Margaret used to take these artificial flowers and she put a little perfume on them. People call them people garland, but is that real or natural? Oh yeah, it's real.

[41:28] So it's likeness that is the cause of what? Deception. Deception. Yeah. And then I think I mentioned how in the tools of dialectic, right, huh? The third tool of dialectic is a tool of difference, and the fourth tool of dialectic is a tool of likeness, right? But the third tool is described as the ability to find a difference, right? But the fourth tool is not described as the ability to find a likeness, right?

[42:00] But the ability to consider a likeness, huh? And the Greek word is skepsis there You know, we get the word skeptic, huh? But you got to see exactly in what way things are alike, right? Because if you don't see their difference, you might what exaggerate the likeness and then be deceived, yeah. Okay. Well, there is a beautiful likeness, but the genus is to the difference. Like what?

[42:26] Matter is to what? Form, right? And when Aristotle or when Thomas orders the senses of being in, right? The first sense of being in is what? In place, right? Second one is part and whole. My teeth are in my mouth, right? And the third sense is what? Genus and the species, right?

[42:55] Because genus is a part of the definition of the species, right? And then the fourth sense is reversed: the species and the genus. But the species is in the genus, not in act, but in what? Ability, see? So quadrilateral is in the definition of square, right? But square is in quadrilateral, not as a private definition, but it's only in its ability, right? Because quadrilateral is able to be a square, but an oblong or a rhombus or a rhomboid or a trapezium, okay?

[43:32] And what do you think the fifth sense is? Form. Form and matter, right? Yeah, well that's like species and genus, see? Because the form is in the ability of matter first, right? And the species is what in the genus just in ability. For instance, tell you the difference. So there's a likeness there, huh? And Porphyry says that in the book on genus, species, difference, property, and accident, right?

[44:01] That the genus is the difference, like matter is to form, right? There is a likeness there, right? But is it so much as to justify what's being said here, right? If I have a piece of clay in the shape of what a sphere, and I mold it into a cube, right? You lost the shape, and you got a new shape in there, but it's the same clay in number, right?

[44:24] That you had before, right? Okay. But if I lose the the vice I have and acquire the opposite virtue, right? Does the genus of what my vice habit remain in my virtue? No, no, see? So in that way, the two are not alike, right? So see how sort of slippery thing, right? You know, because there is a real likeness in those two, and it justifies the order there of the senses of in, right?

[44:58] And it justifies, you know, when you talk about how when you carry a word over to God, right? Very often you drop the what genus and keep the what difference, because the genus is taken more from what is matter and material, and the difference is more like taken from act, right? Well, God is pure act, huh? So sometimes you can carry the difference over to something that's pure act, but you have to drop the genus, right?

[45:27] Because it's like matter, right? God is immaterial, and there's no passive ability in him, right? So we can see how hard it is to grasp the likeness of genus and difference in matter and form, because in some ways they are like, and one does illumine the other, and even the order, as I said, the senses of being in, follows upon that, right? Huh? And explains many things why, why, why, as Father Boulay would bang into our heads, you know, we drop so often the genus and keep the what difference, right?

[46:01] Huh? I mean, you know, it's a synonymous with God, right? Huh? Well, synonymous with us is really a demonstration. You know these demonstrations of Euclid, right? And what is a demonstration? Well, it's a syllogism making us know the cause and that which is the cause and cannot be otherwise? Well, is there syllogized, and that's how he knows? No. So he dropped the genus out of the definition, but then knowing the cause and that of which it is a cause and cannot be otherwise, he knows that much better than we do, right?

[46:34] So the difference, you know, can be carried over to God. Why not the genus? Well, the genus talks about some potentiality that is not appropriate to God, who's altogether pure act, right? Huh? So what a wise man Plato was, right? Or Socrates never said it. Socrates says it in the dialogue, right? Huh? And it's the most slippery thing. You know, calling that to everybody because they're always having problems with that.

[47:05] You know, always having problems with it. You know. No, so he says here. I don't know if you have the Latin there or not, but non idem comparatur genus et differentia secundum materiam et forma. He's not saying that absolutely, right? There's no way they're alike. There's a beautiful likeness there, right? Huh? Which is very useful, but not in this way, right? What we mean is that there remains the substance of the genus the same in number with the difference what removed.

[47:43] Just as there remains the same in number the substance of the matter when the form is removed, huh? It's a beautiful example what Plato was talking about. How Thomas, you know, is skepsis, right? That he considers in what way they're alike and he sees in what way they're alike, and sometimes he will reason from their likeness, right? That's how you explain the order there of the senses of in, right?

[48:07] Huh? And then here he sees that they're not like in this way though. You know? Say. Think we compare professors, right? And say, well, these guys are alike, right? But in some ways they're unlike, you know, huh? These guys compare iconic and dia, you know, and in some ways they're alike, but other ways, you know, they're not like in every way, right? Okay, I compare it to woman, right?

[48:38] We're like in some ways, but you know, for genus and differences are not parts of the species, huh? Okay, although in some cases he'll say they are, right? Huh? Otherwise, they would not be said of the species, huh? Okay. So strictly speaking, you can't say the letter C is the word cat, or the letter E is the word cat, right? You can't say that my arm is is a man, right?

[49:14] My foot is another man. My nose is another man, you know. But we all make up me, right? Okay. Anyone say the leg of the chair is a chair, right?

[49:26] But the genus is said of The what species and the difference, right? So you can say a square, that's a a quadrilateral, and you can say a equilateral, right? Okay.

[49:53] And just as the species signifies the whole, that is something composed from matter and form and material things, so the difference signifies the whole and likewise the genus. But the genus denominates the whole from what is as matter, right? Huh? Can answer the likeness comes in now, right? Difference from that which is as form, but the species from both. For just as in man the sensitive nature has itself in a material way to the understanding nature, but animal, however, said what has a sense nature, rational has an understanding nature, man that has both.

[50:39] And thus the same whole signified to these three, but not from the same thing in it. The one from matter, the one from form, and from both.

[50:55] Whence it is clear that since the difference is not, as it were, designated, of the genus with the difference removed, the substance of the genus is not able to remain the same. Just as it ought to remain the same animality, if a what there's another soul, a kind of soul constituting the animal. Once it's not able to be that the same in number knowledge which first was enigmatic, afterwards becomes what a clear version.

[51:30] And thus it's clear that nothing the same in number or species which is in faith remains in the fatherland, but only the same in what genus. Huh? But take my example, maybe a simpler one to see. There, when I lose a vice, right, and gain the opposite virtue, right, now do I keep the habit of the vice, but lose the badness of that habit? Doesn't make any sense, does it?

[51:57] I acquire a new habit, right now, doing through other kinds of acts that produce that habit, right? So I have a new habit as well as as well as what a virtue now, right? Okay, it's not this like the habit of the vice remains, right? It doesn't make any sense, does it?

[52:20] To the first objection, therefore, it should be said that you when you remove rational, there's not remain living the same in number, but the same in what genus, huh? Okay.

[52:35] To second should be said that the imperfection of the light of the candle is not opposed to the perfection of the light of the sun, right? Huh? Because they do not regard the same what subject. But the imperfection of faith and the imperfection of glory are opposed to each other, and they regard the same what subject. Whence they are not able to be what simile. Just as neither is the clarity of the air with the obscurity of it, huh?

[53:13] Can't have the day with with night at the same time, right? But notice again Thomas's ability there to see in what way these things are not like each other, right? Huh? It seems you know the light of faith and the light of glory and the light of the candle, the light of the sun. Yeah, the candle, you know, one's a greater light, one's a lesser light, and here the lesser light remains with the greater light, but here they don't, right?

[53:52] What about the man who remains a generous man but has no money left, right? Like Mozart without a piano. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I'll tell you, too. Magic flute, huh? Loses the magic flute. To third, it should be said that the one who who loses money does not lose the possibility of having money, right? Huh? And therefore, there suitably remains the habit of liberality. But in the state of glory, not only an act is taken away the object of faith, which is the what unseen, right?

[54:31] In the definition of faith, right? The substance of things hoped for, the conviction of what is not seen, right? But even the possibility of not seeing it, right? An account of the stability of beatitude. It's eternal, and therefore it be in vain that such a habit we remain. What a mind this guy had!

[54:59] Did you say so, Joshua? I wouldn't say so. You envy or you emulate the clarity of mind. You strive to be him. The other composers say, you know, was I forget was saying that if we cannot, you know, equal Mozart, John, at least we can try to, you know, imitate the clarity of the music.