Prima Secundae
168. Imitation, Humility and the Love of Wisdom; Mozart's Music; ST I-II Q.71 a.1: Is Vice Contrary to Virtue?
Class of 2014-04-24
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/11-prima-secundae/168-imitation-humility-and-the-love-of-wisdom-mozarts-music-st/

[0:00] Very soon as well. Something kind of struck me once that uh John the twenty third was very attached to the imitation of Christ, right? And I didn't know that. I didn't mean that, but I didn't know. it. And he called it the Golden Book. So he was learning from imitation of Christ, right? I remember in the life of Saint Thérèse de Lisieux right, she was very much attached to the.

[0:24] memory Yeah, yeah. Now he stands back, right? When Aristotle was in the book on the poetic art he's going to talk about the imitation called tragedy, and imitation called comedy, and imitation called the epic, and so on, right? So he stands back and he makes three, at least three, very famous statements about man and imitation. And you know what those three statements are? I'm going to guess one of them.

[0:56] Man is the most imitative of animals. Yeah, and man is the most imitative of all the animals, right? And the second statement he makes is that this delights him very much, right? He's delighted by imitation, right? That's why you all watch movies and fictions and novels and so on. And then, third, at first we learn by imitation. So you have to admire that great teacher, Aristotle, and Plato, right?

[1:27] Because Plato's dialogues are what imitations of people involved in philosophical conversation, and is kind of an introduction to philosophy, right? And they said that in the ancient world, there before you admitted to the Academy, you would read the dialogues outside the Academy under the direction of a student, right, or an in the Academy, and then after you kind of got all these questions, you want the answers for, and you've been thinking about these things, and now you're ready to come into the Academy.

[2:00] Aristotle himself wrote a number of dialogues, and only some of them lost, right? But he probably did write many of his Plato did because Plato did such a good job.

[2:13] I know when I first came to Assumption, they required four courses in philosophy of all students, huh? And they were arranged in a perfect order. The first course would be a logic course, and the second course would be a what natural philosophy course, the physics. Third course on the soul, right, the anima, and the fourth course was the ethics course, right? So you had a nice foundation there, and you could more advanced courses built upon that, right?

[2:42] But then when the Great Revolution happens and times and causes pressures, you know, and so on, and the requirements were cut down, right? Then people said, "We've got an introduction to philosophy course, right?" And because a guy might happen to take his first course, logic course, somebody else might take an ethics course, it's all chaos. And of course, kind of introduce them to philosophy, right? But what I made the introduction to philosophy course B was made in the dialogues of what The Theda, right?

[3:12] Because you can introduce into, you know, logic through the Meno and a little bit natural philosophy through the Phaedo and so on, and the Apology to ethics and so on, and so that's the way to go, right? So I was kind of struck by the fact that he was saying that more than once. We talked about John twenty third is love of the world, imitation of Christ, right?

[3:36] I said that's the way to begin, and if I didn't say it, please, since some probably doesn't even know about it. Sure. Yeah, but he called it the Golden Book, John twenty third. That was kind of striking, huh? Yeah, the Golden Book. That's that's interesting.

[3:55] Now think again about something more in the course here, the connection of what virtue, right? So there. And let me put it in the form of a question, right? Can you have the love of God without humility?

[4:19] I don't think you can. Okay. And something like this with the philosopher too, because the legend says that Pythagoras discovered wonderful things like the Pythagorean theorem, etc. And they wanted to call him what? Wise, right? And Pythagoras says, "Don't call me wise. God alone is wise." Well, but shall we call you that? Well, if you have to call me something, call me a lover of wisdom, right?

[4:53] So in the origin of the word philosopher, there's not only the meaning of the love of wisdom, which is in the etymology of the word philosopher. Sophia means wisdom, right? And philosophy means love, right? Sophia? But also humility, right? And that maybe you can't be a philosopher without what humility, right? Just like you can't be a what? Can't love God without what humility. There's a kind of connection between the two, right?

[5:25] Because wisdom, after all, is most of all God, right? So if you have a love of wisdom in the way you're loving God, but you can't have that love of wisdom without having the what humility. Then you know what's wrong with modern philosophy, right? There's no humility at all there. There's no love of wisdom in the way you're loving God, right? You know, it's, striking how Socrates is always what hesitant to say what?

[5:53] Yeah. I know something, right? Huh? You know. And so it's always very interesting to comment when Socrates is sure about something, right? Why is he so sure about this, right? See, maybe he really is sure. You can see it when you go into him, huh? I think Augustine had that. Didn't he have a phrase in the City of God where he says the love of God, usque ad contemptum sui, builds the what city of God?

[6:22] The love of God going so far as to have to contempt of oneself, right? And then he went on that the love of self, usque ad contemptum Dei, right, is what builds the city of man, huh? I think you had your card there from what? Therese, right? That was in a somewhat poetic way, but she's saying the connection between humility, isn't she, right? And and charity, right?

[6:51] So you can't have that. But it's interesting, huh? Of course, I woke up this morning. I, you know, I think my guardian angel was helping me, you know, and what came into my mind?

[7:07] What is Mozart's music? representation. And I said, well, it's a what beautiful and interesting likeness, huh, of the emotions, right? Partaking more or less of reason

[7:34] in sounds, right? Then you can add harmony and rhythm and so on, right? Okay. I say more or less, huh? Because some emotions partake of reason more than others, right? And sometimes, you know, like in the B minor, you know, solo piano piece there, you know, it's kind of suffering, you know, depressed or something like that. But at the end, the tragedy turns, you know, at the end, you know, they're not going to stay in this this thing.

[8:10] We have a letter of Mozart, you know, writing to his what father, right, huh? About the representation of Osman's aria there in the production for the Seraglio, And Osman gets very angry and loses his his self control, you might say, right? And so Mozart says we've got to imitate this in music, right? But not in a way that becomes what displeasing. Displeasing to the ear. Yeah. Or, in other words, ceases to be what music, right?

[8:38] Okay. When Thomas talks about anger, he says that the angry man hears reason but imperfectly. So that's why I say more or less, right, huh? Because sometimes, you know, Mozart represents somewhat an emotion that is needs some correction, right? But does it the right way, huh? So that's what Mozart's music is, right? It's a likeness, huh? It's interesting. It's it's a what beautiful and interesting likeness of the emotions, partaking more or less of reason, right?

[9:20] So it's very interesting just to listen to music. Of course, the emotions can't be beautiful; they don't partake of reason. They're ugly, right? You know, Thomas says that the irascible partakes more reason than the concupiscible appetite.

[9:38] I was thinking about that. Is that because of the difficulty, or? Well, because it's this is for the sake of that. It draws the reason more, right? Concupiscible is something just pleasing to the senses. You go right towards it, right? See, but even the angry man is angry even with you because you did this. I'm going to punish you because of this, right? So he's kind of giving a reason for. this Right now, or you have a reason to fear something, or a reason to hope for something, right now.

[10:07] Okay. Then you see, you know, the pieces of Mozart's music where you see very much is by taking a reason, like the last symphonies, right? Well, the 36 and the 41st are both in the key of C major, and they both represent magnanimity, which is the virtue that does great things in all the virtues, huh? But magnanimity is basically concerned with what? The hope, huh? Let's move into great things, huh?

[10:36] And then you have the 40 symphonies and the 38 symphonies, which imitate what? Courage, which is also what, dealing with the irascible emotions, huh? So that's why I say more or less, because even if you're imitating, right? The irascible and the concupiscible, and both, you know, by taking a reason, the irascible even more so, right? You see that the height of Mozart reaches there They call the last symphony, the Jupiter symphony, right?

[11:02] The English critics, you know, so we're going to call this symphony. Well, it's the Jupiter symphony, right? Okay. Even greater things are greatness, you know. Question 71 here, and I don't think I can possibly get through the get beyond the first and second articles, right? It's absolutely absolutely amazing things he says in there, right?

[11:28] So let's look at the proemium again, huh? Consequently, we're not to consider about vices and sins, huh? There's the same knowledge of what? Opposites, right?

[11:42] So you have to talk only about the love of God, but the hate of God, right? And about this six things occur to be considered. First, about the vices and the sins in themselves. Secondly, about the what? Distinction of them. Third, about the comparison of them to each other, like which are worse. This is the beginning of question

[12:09] 71. The framing. Fourth, about the subject of sin. Fifth, about its cause, and sixth, about its what? Effect. Now, I'd say he's looking before and after wouldn't you say that?

[12:25] Now, about the first six things are asked. First, whether vice is contrary to virtue. That's a nice fundamental way to begin, huh? And secondly, whether vice is what? Against nature. So

[12:46] third, whether which is worse, huh? Vice or the vicious act, huh? Four, whether a vicious act can be without, can be with, at the same time with virtue, right?

[13:10] Five: Whether in every sin there is some act, or just some sinful omission, which is. There is sin by contract. Yeah. And six about the definition of sin, which Augustine lays down in the twenty-second book against Faust. Who is Faust? Faustus. Yeah. And you know the time. I think Faust is the guy who, you know, Augustine was waiting to hear. You know, and Faust was talking very highly about great things.

[13:46] You know, and Augustine wasn't able to what to judge whether he was saying true or false things. And but then he found out he didn't know the what liberal arts, right? So how could he be up knowing all these most difficult things? You know, so there's a little bit of pride maybe in Faust, right?

[14:08] Thomas says that pride is a what cause of error in two ways. What are the two ways that pride is a cause of error?

[14:22] Which is opposed to philosophy obviously. right? Philosophy is the order of truth. Do. You attribute things to yourself. Well, if I'm proud, I think I'm better than I am, right? And therefore, I what attempt to judge things that are above the power at least now, or in this short thing, right?

[14:46] Someone asked me a question. I was talking out there in California, the exam, in the discussion period afterwards, kind of question, and I said, I think I won't shut my mouth on that matter. I said, I think I'll think about it.

[15:01] But the point is, if you think you're better than you are, right? Then you think you're capable of what more than you're capable of, right? And therefore, you try to judge something that is either above your powers to judge, or it's above your powers to judge now, right? There's the story there, of, Father Boulay. You know, he wanted to get a good teacher, and someone told him about this son, son Professor Danty who lives in Montreal.

[15:31] It's darn good, right? So he went down there, and every question he asked the guy, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, answer your question, not like that. So I'm not going to take this guy as a teacher. You

[15:44] have to be sure about Monsignor John, right? Monsignor John questioned, you know, hesitated, you know, and very careful, you know, I think this man is my teacher, right? But then the other way that pride is a cause of error is. That you refuse to put your mind under the greater minds, right? Okay.

[16:16] I remember when I was first studying Aristotle and Thomas, and someone says to me, "Wow, I'm going to do my own philosophy." Well, you're not going to get very far, right?

[16:28] How far would you get in geometry without Euclid? How long would it take you to discover, you know, a reason for the Pythagorean theorem? You know, Proposition forty-seven in Book One, on your own, right? Might not never get there, right? But I get to the first part. Yeah, this is supposed to be the easiest science, right? But about the more difficult ones. It's easy.

[17:00] What did you see last night? What Thomas in the ten categories? Three is enough. Yeah, but the only place I ever seen anybody explain the distinction of the ten, right? Maybe somebody else has, right? He's an Aristotelian, you know, explained it in the categories. I'm sure he knew it.

[17:25] Okay. I was reading my doctoral thesis. I always told that story. I go ask Diogenes, you know, who thought about the thing, and I was reading about Diogenes. Diogenes says, "Why do you even bother to ask me? You got Diogenes. " Hey, I said I don't want to hear what you say anyway. Okay, he says, "But that kind of humility, right? " You know, great Diogenes.

[17:59] Okay, six is about the definition of sin, which Augustine lays down, Conti Fausto. That sin is a something said, or done, or even what desired against the eternal law, right? That's enough for a definition, right?

[18:23] Let's look at the first one. To the first one goes forward. Thus, it seems that vice is not what contrary to virtue. For to one there is one contrary, as is proved in the tenth book of Wisdom, the Metaphysics. Now, what dialogue of Plato's that brought out that there's one opposite of what? One contrary to thing. Protagoras. Yeah, yeah. Because Protagus is asked by Socrates, are prudence and justice and fortitude and temperance so on, are these five names the same thing or are they names of different things, like ear and nose and eye and so on?

[19:16] And Protagus says, well, it's like ear and eye and nose and so on. Well, then Socrates starts to develop a argument that temperance is really the same thing as what? Wisdom, right? Okay. And of course, he induces by induction, right? Induces the statement that a thing is only one what? Contrary. Now, what's the contrary of wisdom? It's foolishness, huh? Folly, right, huh? And what's the contrary of temperance, huh?

[19:50] Well, everybody knows a drunk acts like a fool, right, huh? Okay. In Shakespeare, you know, he had the word fond, huh? You speak of a guy being fond of a girl. Right, huh? But the original meaning of "fond" is foolish. So, and it has uses in Shakespeare's, you know, plays. There has nothing to do with with that and a girl, right? Huh? It's in foolish. That's fond. It's stupid what you're saying, right?

[20:18] So, to say you're fond of a girl means you're acting what? Foolish about it, which that's quite true, huh? So, folly seems to be the opposite of temperance, right? Huh? Okay. The drunkard acts like a fool, right? Okay. So, if folly or foolishness is the opposite of temperance, as well as of what? Wisdom. Then wisdom and temperance must be the same thing. Well, that's not true, but there's a certain what?

[20:48] Connection between temperance and what? Wisdom. In fact, humility is put under what? Temperance. Temperance there in the Secunda, Secundae, right? Because it has the mode of temperance, huh? Restraining this desire for excellence, right? Huh?

[21:12] So he begins with that thing which Aristotle takes up formally in the tenth book of wisdom. But to virtue is contrary what? Sin and what? Yeah. Malice, right? Therefore, they can't be contrary to vice, right? Huh?

[21:32] Because vice seems also to be a what? Unsuitable disposition of members of the body or of anything whatsoever, right? So I used to say that a dull knife is a vicious knife, but not in a moral sense.

[21:55] Moreover, virtue names a certain perfection of what? Power. After some of the angels are named in Latin? Powers and some named virtues, huh? But vice names nothing pertaining to what? Power, right? Therefore, vice is not contrary to virtue.

[22:21] Moreover, Tullius, and that's another name for what? Cicero, right? Multivoca. Tullius says in the Tusculan Questions, huh? That virtue is a certain what? Yeah. Health of the soul, right? But to health is opposed sickness, disease, huh? More than vice, huh? Therefore, to virtue, vice is contrary. Okay.

[22:52] Now, sometimes you know we take these three main virtues of the body and we apply them a kind of analogy or likeness to the virtues of the soul, right? So you got what health, strength, and beauty, right? And how would you tie this up with the with justice, fortitude, and temperance? which would be what? Strength can always be fortitude. Yeah, Four is what's strong, right? Health and justice.

[23:27] Yeah. And beauty and temperance, I guess. Yeah. But against this is what the great Augustine says, huh? In his book on the perfection of justice, huh? He wrote an awful lot that Augustine didn't.

[23:53] I mean, that the most powerful book ever written, the Questiones Disputatae de Potentia, right? And Thomas, you know, of course, is dealing with the Trinity a lot in there, right? Huh? It's a beautiful thing, some Augustine. You can see how reverent and humble Augustine is when he talks about the what Trinity, right? Huh? And about the first six days and the Genesis, and so on. Vice is a quality according to which the soul is what?

[24:22] Bad. Yeah. But virtue is a quality which makes its haver what good, good, huh? So Aristotle defines it too, right? Makes its haver good and its activity good, right? Therefore, vice is contrary to what virtue, huh? This reminds me. Speaking of power, there was a bishop in Antigonish whose name was Power, Bishop Power, and he had his coat of arms that said Protestas That's the way to do it.

[25:02] Thomas Aquinas is going to make some not too difficult to see distinctions, right? So that virtue can be seen to be opposed to a number of things, but not in the same way, right? But most directly to vice. I answer. It should be said that about virtue we are able to consider two things. To wit, the essence, the nature of virtue, what it is, and that to which it is the virtue, right?

[25:33] That's yeah. In the nature or essence of virtue, something can be considered what directly and something what consequential, right? Now, directly, virtue implies a certain disposition of something in a way that is suitable, right? The one having it according to the what mode of its what nature, right? Now, this is a key word here, nature, huh? You see it, you know, repeated a number of times in this text, and then of course in the second article, right?

[26:17] And here is the first time where he mentions that. Having oneself suitable in a way that's in what agreement with one's what nature, right? Like Shakespeare in the Exhortation, right? What is a man? as his chief good and market of his time but to sleep and feed? A beast no more, right?

[26:44] I was reading the Oregon Trail there, you know, huh? An interesting book, you know, describing the Indians, right? Yeah, But their main interest in eating and what sleeping, you know. Well, that's not good enough for a man, right? He's a beast no more.

[27:05] And then he quotes the philosopher, huh? That's calling Aristotle by what? Antonomasia. Antonomasia, right? Which is a what favorite thing in the Bible, right? The word Bible is what by Antonomasia, right? What does Antonomasia mean?

[27:30] We take a word that signifies something common to many, and because one of these stands out, you call it the. You know, so he calls Aristotle the philosopher, and of course the Arabs had already called Aristotle the philosopher, right? Okay. Well, the word Bible means what? The book, yeah, bibliography, right? The same word there, right? But among all books, this book stands out because this is the word of God, right?

[28:00] So this book is called the book, right? Okay. Senator Dirksen nominated Senator Taft. Mr. Republican, right? Mr. American, my friend Bob Taft. But that's Antonio Massia. But that's Antonomasia, right? Doesn't it mean naming, naming again, or something like that, Antonomasia. Well, don't try to figure out too much the, the Greek words because they're, they could be, you know, I've got the word "onoma" in there, right? Yeah.

[28:35] But in place of right, huh? But it doesn't really give what's peculiar to Antonomasia from the etymology. But the word gospel in the same way. The word gospel means they say what? Good news. Yeah. Well, you know, you get good news besides the gospel, right? Huh? But this is good news before it's theory, right. Even stands out, so it's called the gospel, right? Christ is named by antonymous here.

[28:58] Christ means what? Anointed. The anointed, Yeah. but there's many people anointed, right? David was anointed, right? All kinds of people anointed. But among all those who are anointed, he is the anointed one, right?

[29:13] Aristotle, in the book that I mentioned earlier, he calls Homer what? The poet. In the Federalist Papers, you know, they quote Shakespeare, but they don't call him they say Shakespeare says that as the poet says, right? He's the poet for us, huh? Like Homer was the poet for the Greeks, huh? Notice what the philosopher says here in the seventh book of the Physics: that virtue is a disposition of the perfect, right, to what is best, right?

[29:45] That's a beautiful description of virtue. right? It's a disposition of the perfect to the best. And I suppose the best is talking about the operation, all right? He says, "I call that perfect which is disposed according to what nature, right? The same thing. "

[30:10] And Thomas said, "Here, it follows the same thing, right? " And then he says a third time, "Consequently, huh? It follows that virtue is a certain what goodness, huh? But not the only kind of goodness, right? For in this, the good of each thing consists that it have itself suitably according to the mode of its own what nature, right? But that to which virtue is ordered is a good act, as is clear from things said above or before.

[30:51] " So three times he used the word nature there. It's very striking. I'm going back to the poetics there. Got to be very careful when Aristotle uses the word imitation there, right? Because like happens with many words, this word has had a degradation due to our commercial customs. Yeah. So imitation, imitation is a what cheap copy of something that's been successful on the market, right? So the word imitation got kind of toned down and and it's what.

[31:27] Yeah, yeah, the word, yeah. So I usually call it, you know, a what a likeness, right, rather than imitation, right? When Aristotle talks about imitation, he has a nice distinction of three, right? He says you can represent men as they are, or you represent men as they are thought to be, or you represent men as they ought to be. So there's a real what variety there, right?

[31:55] Okay. Now why did I mention that, huh? In this context here. Well, we talked earlier about Plato's dialogues, right? Which are representation of men engaged in somewhat philosophical conversation, right? Huh? But in what this Greek society, right? Well, in the Greek society, homosexuality was what. Accepted. Yeah, accepted kind of, right? And so people say, well, you know, they're all homosexuals. It's not true about Plato, right? But he's representing men as they are in Greek society at that time, right?

[32:35] Huh? It's not saying he's representing men as they should be. Okay. Now how do we know that? Because Plato's one of his last works is the work called the Laws, right? Huh? And in there, there's a man called the Athenian Stranger, and he meets another man, and they go talking about what the laws should be, right? And the Athenian Stranger proposes a law. In the city against homosexuality, right?

[33:03] But the reason he gives is that it's contra naturam. It's against what nature, right? Okay. So Plato sees the same thing that Aristotle sees, right? Vices against nature.

[33:19] So it's very important that he emphasizes the word nature three times, right? And then he's going to talk about this particularly, you know, in the second article, which is whether vice is what against nature, right?

[33:38] So according to these three things, something is found to be opposed to virtue, right? Either what virtue is directly right opposed to it, or what is consequently pertaining to virtue, or that act which virtue is ordered, right?

[33:56] And there are three things opposed to it, of which one is sin, which is opposed to virtue on the side of that to which virtue is what ordered, right? Okay. For sin properly names a disordered act,

[34:17] just as the act of virtue is an act that is ordered, right? And as it ought to be, right? According that to the act of virtue, there follows that it be a certain what goodness, right? Then evil or malice is opposed to virtue, right? That's kind of a more general thing, right? But according to that which is directly of the definition of virtue, vice is opposed to what virtue, right?

[34:49] And for the vice of each thing would seem to be that it is not disposed according as is suitable to its nature. That's the fourth time he mentions the word nature, right? Okay.

[35:05] And then he quotes the great Augustine again, right? Once Augustine says in the third book on free will, free judgment, there that what what you see something that is what lacking to the perfection of nature, I call that vice. Okay. That's five times he mentions nature, nature in the grave, he quotes it by

[35:40] now. Now, if we go to the poet, right? And now, what is the most famous publication in the history of English literature? No, it's a folio, right? First folio was in 1623, something like that after Shakespeare died, right? Well, some of his plays that never appeared in print, you know, during his lifetime, right, were all put together, right? Thought he'd written, right? And the editors who were fellow actors with him in the company and so on, they said he was the most gentle imitator of nature.

[36:22] And it's in Hamlet that you see Shakespeare's view of what literature should be, huh? Or the plays should be, right? Huh? And as Kittridge says, um, in his edition of Hamlet, was always taken to be Shakespeare's own view of what. So what does he say? O'erstep not the modesty of nature, right? He says to the players, right, who have come to put on some plays, right, at the court, right.

[36:51] O'erstep not the modesty of nature, for things overdone is from the purpose of playing, whose end, both in the beginning and now, is to hold his work the mirror up to nature. And then he says to show virtue her own face and scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and picture. Now that is perfectly what ordered, right? He's saying you're going to hold the mirror up to nature first, right?

[37:20] Secondly, show virtue her own face. And rather than saying vice her own face, which would make it sound too philosophical and too pedantic, right? Huh? He says scorn, which is the what? Result of pride. Pride is what? Queen of the vices, right? So he says scorn, right? So it's virtue and vice, but said beautifully, huh? Okay, it's a figure of speech there, right? For vice, if I mean for pride and for vice, right?

[37:47] And then he says in the very age and body of the time his form and pressure. So nature is the measure of what is virtue and what is what vice, huh? Because virtue is in accordance with nature, being disposed in a way suitable to your nature as a man, right? And vice, your way, it's not suitable to your nature, being disposed. So nature is the measure of virtue and vice, huh?

[38:16] So once, so when the Athenian stranger rejects homosexuality, it's because it's against nature, right? That's the measure, huh? Okay. But then virtue and vice are the measure of the what? The age, huh? By the virtues or vices that predominate in that what age, right? The age is getting worse myself, of course. Now than it was in the 50s, I think, huh? You know. And the corruption is sinking in deeper.

[38:51] But it's perfectly ordered there, right? Huh? Okay. In a different way, you know. I mean, when Jefferson orders what life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, right? He orders them in what sense? There.

[39:11] Yeah, but the order of being, right? You have to have life before you can have liberty. You have to have liberty before you can pursue happiness. So he's got them well ordered, right? And so we say, you know, when you attack, you know, life, you know, really undermining everything, right? So, but Shakespeare has got this in the sense of what's the measure, right? It's perfectly what ordered, right?

[39:34] But Friar Laurence, what does he say? Stumbling on abuse. I know the passage, right? Yeah. For not so vile that on the earth doth live, but to the earth some special good doth give. Nor art so good, but strained from that fair use, revolts from true birth, which is original meaning of nature, right? Stumbling on abuse, right? You know. I listen to a Bobby, and I say, "He revolts from true birth stumbling on abuse."

[40:09] But you know, Planned Parenthood revolts from two births, stumbling on abuse. You know? But you see these great minds, like Shakespeare and Augustine here and Thomas and Aristotle. I mean, those four guys. You know, Shakespeare is wiser than any of the modern philosophers. No question about that.

[40:36] So, notice how he's ordered the objections, right? The first objection, you know, demanded that he distinguish the way different things could be opposed to virtue, right? And most directly, vice, and that's what he's discussing. To the first, it should be said that those three things are not contrary to virtue according to the same thing. But sin is contrary, according as virtue is what operative of something good, right?

[41:03] Malice, according as it is a certain what goodness, but properly vice is what according opposed to the quality of virtue. Okay. To the second, it should be said that virtue is not only implying the perfection of power, which is a principle of acting, but also implies a suitable what disposition to one of whom it is a virtue, and that because each thing acts according as it is an act, it is required therefore that something be in itself well disposed, and that it ought to be what operative of the good, and according to this, virtue or vice is what opposed to virtue.

[41:59] Aristotle takes up the category of what quality and logic there. He distinguishes four species, right? And the first one is disposition, right, or habit. The second one is what power, Natural power and lack of power. The third one is the sensible qualities, and the fourth one is what figure and shape, right? And Thomas says, "Why does he give first what disposition, right, or habit?" Well, he says, "What comes first to the thing is its nature, and by disposition or habit, you're either well or badly disposed to the contrary nature."

[42:38] So he puts that first. Aristotle, pretty subtle, right? But amazing, amazing. Okay. To the third, it should be said that Tully says in the fourth book of the Tusculan Questions that what sicknesses, right, are parts of viciousness, right.

[43:05] And in bodies morbum in Latin, names the what Corruption of the whole body right? It's like a fever or something of this sort. Aegrotationem a what sickness with weakness, huh? Vice when parts of the body are in conflict, right?

[43:29] And although in the body sometimes there is what morbus without aegrotatione, when someone is what inwardly badly disposed, nevertheless he is not what. He's not impeded. Yeah. From his customary operations, right? In the soul, however, as himself says, these two are not able to be what distinguished by thought. For it's necessary that whenever someone is inwardly badly disposed, he has a disordered what affection, because from this right,

[44:13] he is rendered what weak, weak for the operations he ought to exercise, huh? For each tree is known from its own what Fruit. fruit. I was thinking about that statement when I was saying the Hail Mary the other day. Holy Mary, Mother, Hail Mary, full of grace.

[44:32] Blessed, blessed is the fruit of thy womb Yeah, I said, well, you couldn't have a greater fruit than that, right? What's it say about the Blessed Virgin, right? On the journey home there, the program, you know, when they have, you know, it's always some of the Protestant ministers coming into the Catholic Church, you know, and that comes up a lot of times. You know, was the Blessed Virgin a impediment for you, you know, huh?

[44:54] And some of them, they get a little hesitant you know about that and so on. But if you take this thing, each tree is known from its fruit, right? Well, then say who is?

[45:04] This is the greatest fruit. But the vice of the of the soul, as Tully says there, is a habit, right, or affection of the soul, inconstant in his whole life, and what Dissenting from itself, right? What does Polonius say to his son there? This above all, to thine own self be true. it must follow the night, the day, thou canst not then be false to any man, right?

[45:34] You've got to be true to yourself, huh? Otherwise, you're really in conflict with yourself, huh? Whence vice is in more than aegrotatio or morbus. Just as virtue is had in itself more than health, for health is also laid down to a certain virtue, I suppose, of the body, though right? Okay And therefore, to virtue, more suitably is opposed vice than sickness. But you didn't speak of that, you know.

[46:08] I constantly see these crazy things being proposed every day in the newspaper, you know, or hearing about somebody proposing a crazy thing. And see, these people are really sick. you know. That's your first most known reaction, but don't think of it, this is this vice of course, obviously, but I mean, you know, I usually think of, you know, they're sick, they're crazy. these people. Yeah, the only word that comes to my mind is just insanity.

[46:41] Yeah, insane. I know. What was it? I heard a little item there in the National Review there where they were ended up, you know, describing these crazy things going on, and they quoted the Mad Hatter, right? He said, "If I was in charge, I'd make life nonsense." You know, he said. sometimes it didn't seem far from that. He says, "The guy, ready people, yes."